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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is the outcome of theory development research into an identified gap 
in knowledge about systemic risk of the global financial system. It takes a 
systems-theoretic approach, incorporating a simulation-constructivist orientation 
towards the meaning of theory and theory development, within a realist 
constructivism epistemology for knowledge generation about complex social 
phenomena. The specific purpose of which is to describe systemic risk of failure, 
and explain how it occurs in the global financial system, in order to diagnose and 
understand circumstances in which it arises, and offer insights into how that risk 
may be mitigated. 
An outline theory is developed, introducing a new operational definition of 
systemic risk of failure in which notions from evolutionary economics, finance 
and complexity science are combined with a general interpretation of entropy, to 
explain how catastrophic phenomena arise in that system. When a conceptual 
model incorporating the Icelandic financial system failure over the years 2003 – 
2008 is constructed from this theory, and the results of simulation experiments 
using a verified computational representation of the model are validated with 
empirical data from that event, and corroborated by theoretical triangulation, a 
null-hypothesis about the theory is refuted. Furthermore, results show that 
interplay between a lack of diversity in system participation strategies and shared 
exposure to potential losses may be a key operational mechanism of catastrophic 
tensions arising in the supply and demand of financial services.  These findings 
suggest new policy guidance for pre-emptive intervention calls for improved 
operational transparency from system participants, and prompt access to data 
about their operational behaviour, in order to prevent positive feedback inducing a 
failure of the system to operate within required parameters. 
The theory is then revised to reflect new insights exposed by simulation, and 
finally submitted as a new theory capable of unifying existing knowledge in this 
problem domain. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Motivation 
1.1.1 Background 
This is a time of turmoil for the global financial system, and for the academic 
discipline of economics. The emergence and persistence of global economic 
distress, which surprised almost all observers who claim expertise in such matters, 
is still without credible explanations. Indeed, challenges to prevailing economic 
notions that may offer useful insights continue to be blocked by the intellectual 
inertia and hubris protecting cherished dogmas. Certainly, promising contributions 
from other disciplines bring their own conceptual controversies, but they are too 
often dismissed without due consideration. Then unresolved philosophical 
conflicts deliver the final blow to surviving attempts at new insights that have 
overcome all other obstacles to multi-disciplinary thinking. 
Within that context of intellectual inertia, conceptual controversy and 
philosophical conflict, this research has set out to extend current economic 
thinking with insights from multiple academic disciplines in a thesis that has 
practical value in explaining and mitigating systemic risk of failure for the global 
financial system. Where inertia, controversy or conflict is encountered, it aligns 
itself with conversations in the literature that define the intellectual heritage being 
applied. The intention being to make a significant contribution to knowledge from 
a declared perspective through a credible piece of multi-disciplinary research 
which becomes the first step in on-going programme of research into the problem 
addressed, some of which may be conducted by other researchers in different 
academic disciplines. Even so, within the confines of a doctoral thesis, the number 
of unresolved issues to be navigated around will be greater than from similar 
research efforts in a single discipline. 
In anticipation of those issues, and in consideration of the many people who 
continue to suffer the harsh realities of current global economic distress, it is 
perhaps fitting to end this introductory sub-section with a summary of the 
challenges ahead quoted from an article titled “How Did Economists Get It So 
PhD - Cranfield University, January 2014. T.ILIN 
 
20 
Wrong?” by the 2008 Nobel Memorial Prize-winning economist Paul Krugman, 
in the New York Times (September 6th, 2009). 
“Few economists saw our current crisis coming, but this predictive failure 
was the least of the field’s problems. More important was the profession’s 
blindness to the very possibility of catastrophic failures in a market 
economy. … There was nothing in the prevailing models suggesting the 
possibility of the kind of collapse that happened last year. 
As I see it, the economics profession went astray because economists, as a 
group, mistook beauty, clad in impressive-looking mathematics, for truth. … 
as memories of the Depression faded, economists fell back in love with the 
old, idealized vision of an economy in which rational individuals interact in 
perfect markets, this time gussied up in fancy equations. 
Unfortunately, this romanticized and sanitized vision of the economy led 
most economists to ignore all the things that can go wrong. They turned a 
blind eye to the limitations of human rationality that often lead to bubbles 
and busts; to the problems of institutions that run amok; to the 
imperfections of markets – especially financial markets – that can cause the 
economy’s operating system to undergo sudden, unpredictable crashes; and 
to the dangers created when regulators don’t believe in regulation. 
It is much harder to say where the economics profession goes from here. 
But what’s almost certain is that economists will have to learn to live with 
messiness. That is, they will have to acknowledge the importance of 
irrational and often unpredictable behaviour, face up to the often 
idiosyncratic imperfections of markets, and accept that an elegant economic 
‘theory of everything’ is a long way off.” 
(Krugman, 2009) 
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1.1.2 Systemic Crises 
The inevitability of systemic crises in banking (Rochet, 2003), and by implication 
in the global financial system generally, suggests that long-term macroeconomic 
stability is unsustainable. Such crises seem to occur regularly, and they are usually 
attended by instability that can persist in the global economy over any time-frame, 
including extended periods between crises (Borio and Drehmann, 2009). 
However, the standard view of neoclassical economic theory, focused on dynamic 
equilibrium conditions of stability, struggles to explain what is happening in those 
circumstances. This thesis argues that an improved understanding of the 
fundamental nature of crises in the global financial system (Kindleberger and 
Aliber, 2005: 81-84; Allen and Gale, 2007: chapter 1), and their relationship to 
macroeconomic phenomena, can be gained by thinking about the system in crisis 
as having entered an operational state which is failing to maintain an adequate 
balance between the supply and demand of systemically important financial 
services (SIFS, such as short-term funding from money markets) among 
systemically important participants (SIPs, such as banks, intermediaries and their 
counterparties). From that perspective, as distress begins to propagate throughout 
the system, exogenous macroeconomic instability is observed to interact with 
endogenous operational instability, and vice versa, until a crisis is perceived when 
the system’s operational state crosses some threshold of escalating systemic 
failure and approaches collapse. 
Most debates about systemic crises in the literature ignore or blur this 
distinction between the global financial system and its economic environment. 
There is also a lack of consensus on definitions for key concepts, which makes 
research conversations difficult across that literature. Insights are offered about 
particular causes and effects of past crises for avoiding their recurrence, and 
models are proposed for financial contagion or the behavioural impacts of 
markets, participants and institutions, but the literature does not provide a general 
explanation about how these phenomena are interrelated. It is the view of this 
thesis that current knowledge about systemic crises could benefit from a unifying 
theory, capable of translating existing notions into a shared neutral context. A 
systems-theoretic explanation of operational distress and its propagation is argued 
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to offer this potential, by providing new insights for recognizing, avoiding and 
responding to the risk of potential failure of the global financial system, wherever 
it may emerge in the future. Therefore, a multidisciplinary theory is outlined here 
for a better understanding of systemic risk, based on an operational behaviour 
paradigm of systemic failure (see Figure 1). It focuses on plausible explanations 
for assertions A to F in that paradigm, and describes how they relate to familiar 
macroeconomic events. 
 
Figure 1: An operational behaviour paradigm of systemic failure 
1.1.3 Research Opportunity 
Since Krugman’s comments in 2009 (see 1.1.1), the current crisis disrupting the 
world economy has continued to intensify a general perception of contemporary 
economics being ineffectual at best. The end of neoclassical economics is being 
debated, and visions of a new era are gaining support for a paradigm shift based 
on notions of complexity. With so much emphasis on highly introspective themes 
in its mainstream literature, such as theories of economic growth, recognition is 
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dawning that scant attention has been given to useful ideas from other disciplines, 
such as theories on punctuated equilibrium (Bak and Sneppen, 1993) and non-
linear laws in nature (Prigogine, 1997) from physics, generalized notions of 
entropy from computer science (Shannon, 1948), critical transitions from the 
environmental sciences (Scheffer et al., 2009), and catastrophe theory from 
mathematical topology (Thom, 1975; Zeeman, 1976). Among the controversies of 
this debate, agent-based macro-economic modelling and simulation approaches 
that implement evolutionary economic principles are seen by some as strong 
contenders for providing better explanations for the intrinsically complex, 
dynamic social phenomena of the world’s evolving economy than traditional 
mathematical attempts.  
History suggests such crises occur regularly, and recent reports by regulatory 
institutions indicate that risks to global financial stability are generally continuing 
to increase in this current period while politicians turn a blind eye. Meanwhile, 
confusion around the meaning of risk in general, and systemic risk in particular, is 
becoming a serious barrier to progress in addressing those risks. The overall 
critical assessment of the literature reviewed in this thesis argues that, although 
some progress has recently been made in understanding certain aspects of 
systemic risk, the paradigms currently favoured in economics for explaining it are 
reaching their limits of usefulness. A consensus is growing around the view that a 
paradigm shift is indeed required, and contributions from other academic 
disciplines may be essential for introducing fresh ideas. Concepts from 
complexity science show the most promise, but they bring their own debates to 
any discussion. For example, tension between constructivism and formalism in 
that literature is shown to be of special relevance to this thesis. In particular, the 
applicability to economics of notions about criticality, catastrophe and entropy is 
explored, and a position is taken regarding the current debates each engender. 
Then, agent-based computational economics is applied as an experimental 
approach to demonstrating how these notions may offer solutions to the research 
problem of this thesis.  
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1.2 Purpose 
1.2.1 Finding a Better Explanation 
The need for a better explanation of systemic risk argued by this thesis is most 
evident in definitions currently used in the literature (see Figure 2). They reflect a 
low level of understanding and suitability for thinking about that risk, and are 
often too vague for practical uses such as risk mitigation, being narrowly focussed 
on specific causes and effects.  
 
Figure 2: Examples of current definitions for Systemic Risk. 
1.2.2 Introducing Clarity in Response Thinking 
It is further argued there is very little consideration in the literature about how 
systemic failure of the global financial system materialises operationally from 
systemic risk (i.e. rather than why it occurs); or indeed what that failure is deemed 
to be, how it relates to its risk, or how to recognize when it is occurring. Only 
when these things are understood can the emergence, nature and timing of 
systemic failure be predicted from a quantified systemic risk, to suggest 
appropriate mitigations. 
Current definitions can be classified as causal, consequential or combined.
Causal example:
. arises from moral hazard and individual firm leverage, which can cause a large 
shock to the financial system. (Dow, 2000).
... arises from a high inter-bank correlation of returns on assets, which through 
various means forms a multi-agent risk shifting phenomenon. (Acharya, 2009).
... arises from the propagation of economic distress between agents linked through 
financial transactions. (Rochet and Tirole, 1996).
Consequential example:
. results in multiple simultaneous defaults of systemically important financial 
institutions. (Huang, Zhou and Zhu, 2009).
Combined example:
. arises from a large shock event that triggers an apparent or actual loss of 
economic value, with the consequence of having significant adverse effects on the 
real economy. (Nicolo and Kwast, 2002).
Critical assessment:
They are too vague for practical applications, such as providing focus for systemic 
risk mitigation techniques that can be applied in a variety of circumstances.
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1.3 Research Overview 
1.3.1 Research Problem 
Although, to paraphrase Krugman (2009), a comprehensive economic “theory of 
financial crises” is certainly not attempted by this programme of research, it does 
aim to take a small step in that direction by finding an answer to the following 
question.  
Research Question  “How does instability of the global financial system 
become operationally catastrophic, and how could 
that outcome generally be avoided?” 
This question was constructed using keywords extracted from eight conjectures 
synthesised by the project 1 systematic review of literature from an identified gap 
in theory. The wording is deliberately open to multiple potential answers, to avoid 
confirmation bias. They can range from the type of research finding that declares 
“There are many ways instability can become operationally catastrophic in the 
global financial system, and they are so different and complex that unique 
explanations must be applied to each”;  to the other extreme where a more useful 
finding could declare “A new theory is presented for systemic risk of failure, 
about certain phenomena that emerge when instability of the global financial 
system becomes operationally catastrophic, and how that outcome could be 
avoided”.   
 
1.3.2 Gap in Knowledge 
1.3.2.1 The evidence 
The literature review and findings that demonstrate there is a gap in theory, from 
which the above research question was derived, are presented in Section 0 of this 
thesis. Direct references in that literature to this gap are discussed here.  
There is a consensus among academics that a general theoretical paradigm for 
systemic risk of the global financial system is still missing (Beinhocker, 2011; 
Colander et al., 2009; Bandt and Hartmann, 2000). Hoogduin’s (2010) stocktaking 
of issues and experiences related to financial instability also confirms the 
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regulatory view that it remains unresolved. A good example of the views being 
expressed is contributed by Beinhocker (2011), who argues that theoretical and 
ontological implications of the “evolution as computation literature” have not yet 
been adequately explored, presenting theory development opportunities in the 
domain of evolutionary economic systems. However, he finds there is no direct 
advice in the literature on how this should be done.  
From another perspective, Buchanan’s (2009) article in Nature discusses this 
generally perceived gap in knowledge about systemic risk in his review of 
academic thinking on preventing another financial crisis. He reports the opinion 
shared by many leading academics from different disciplines that the most recent 
global financial crisis has been a “massive failure of the dominant economic 
model”, and quotes them supporting “the need to purge economics and finance of 
ideology and failed assumptions”. Then he explains the widely acknowledged 
role of agent-based models (ABMs) in emerging multidisciplinary contributions, 
and summarizes a consensus among current researchers that the “regulatory 
system based on conventional economic theory has failed”, and that new 
multidisciplinary ideas are needed to make progress. Meanwhile, other 
contributions in the literature expand on the themes in Buchanan’s article, such as 
the critique by Farmer and Geanakoplos (2009) on the “virtues and vices of 
equilibrium”. In order to address this gap in knowledge, it is generally agreed that 
breakthroughs are needed in experimental and evolutionary economics, agent-
based modelling, and various alternative methods and multidisciplinary 
approaches to research in this field (Heckbert, 2009; Safarzynska and van den 
Bergh, 2010a; Hodgson, 2007; Windrum, Fagiolo and Moneta, 2007). 
1.3.2.2 An alternative view 
Allen and Gale (Allen and Gale, 2007: page 24) present the most persuasive 
argument against this proposed gap, summarised in their assertion “There is no 
one theory of crises that can explain all aspects of the phenomena of interest”. 
From their extensive reviews of the literature explaining different causes and 
effects of past sub-systemic crises (e.g. fiscal, banking and currency crises) it 
seems reasonable to accept that no single theory could encompass them all. 
Nevertheless, it is argued in this thesis that a unifying theory is indeed missing 
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and necessary for exposing fundamental principles in a single coherent model of 
systemic failure for the global financial system. Beyond any specific phenomena 
of interest this type of model may explicitly explain, such as how instability 
increases as the system approaches failure, it could also provide a general 
framework with the inherent capability of being used to integrate existing and new 
contributions from multiple disciplines to show how diverse crisis phenomena are 
interrelated. Therefore, it is not unreasonable to argue that a theory of this type, 
based on a neutral paradigm of systemic failure, could provide a single unifying 
thesis. Zeidan and Richardson (2010) describe the feasibility of this class of 
model as “an encompassing theory to tie all the different approaches together ... 
[within] a complexity-based standard model of finance”. 
1.3.2.3 This thesis 
Insights from the social science disciplines of evolutionary and behavioural 
economics, finance, and related contributions from the inter-science fields of 
complex systems and critical phenomena, provide this thesis with the foundations 
of a proposed unifying theory that can be used to describe systemic risk of failure, 
and explain how it occurs, in order to diagnose the overall operational state of the 
global financial system and understand how to improve its resilience. A new 
approach is taken, by combining an operational behaviour perspective on 
economics and finance with notions of criticality to explore systemic risk of 
failure (often abbreviated to ‘systemic risk’ in this thesis) as a focal research 
problem.  
Particular attention is given to operational states of the system close to failure. 
In that neighbourhood, strong patterns in operational behaviour are observed to 
emerge from normal complexities which lend themselves to theoretical analysis. 
Suggested applications for the theory include a pre-emptive macro-prudential 
approach to systemic risk of failure and its mitigation that can nurture stability 
even when circumstances are difficult.  
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1.3.3 Challenges 
1.3.3.1 Theory development 
There is a substantial body of literature on theory development in the social 
sciences, but disagreements persist about what constitutes a valid theoretical 
contribution (Dubin, 1978; Bacharach, 1989; Whetten, 1989; Sutton and Staw, 
1995; DiMaggio, 1995; Pawar, 2009). The nature and quality of theory offerings 
in multidisciplinary work is even more prone to dispute, due to differences of 
tradition in such matters as: the distinctions between theory construction and just 
theorising (Weick, 1995); different kinds of good theory (DiMaggio, 1995); 
strong or weak theories and the use of illustrative or definitive data (Sutton and 
Staw, 1995); and single or multiple paradigm adoption (Gioia and Pitre, 1990). In 
this thesis, insights from multiple informing disciplines are combined with new 
propositions to outline a single unifying theory. It synthesizes knowledge from 
that combined literature, with evolutionary economics in mind as the core 
discipline.  
Current theorising about systemic risk varies significantly in economics, from 
narrative-style descriptions evidenced by empirically-based quantification 
methods (Bartram, Brown and Hund, 2007), through a focus on framework or 
model development (Bhattacharyay, 2003; Huang, Zhou and Zhu, 2009; Ho and 
Saunders, 1980), to mostly conceptual and formally declared theory development 
(Acharya, 2009). All of these contributions are justifiably valued in the literature. 
Their differences simply illustrate the spectrum of detail, empirical assurance, 
formalism and confidence of the theorising presented in just a single discipline. 
This thesis seeks to fit into the more conceptual end of that spectrum, with an 
emphasis on demonstrating the principles of a new multidisciplinary theory of 
systemic risk, explaining phenomena that emerge in the overall operational 
behaviour of the global financial system modelled as a dynamical complex system 
responding to collective participation behaviour. It does not attempt to model 
some formal mathematical representation of a narrow aspect of the behaviour of 
individual financial or economic participants in that system, for example, as a 
stochastic Markov process (Safarzynska and van den Bergh, 2010a).  
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Even so, significant challenges to multidisciplinary theory development need to 
be addressed. Although calls for research in this problem area of systemic risk 
suggest there is an appetite for such contributions (Allen and Gale, 2007; 
Kambhu, Weidman and Neel, 2007: Introduction; Nelson and Winter, 1982), the 
academic scope of most published papers is still confined to economics literature. 
Why that should be is debatable, but theory development with references beyond 
the familiar ideas and research traditions of a single academic discipline is known 
to benefit from using a pragmatic philosophy of research as an essential tool for 
mediation between diverse viewpoints (Morgan, 2007; Creswell and Plano Clark, 
2007: 22-27). Therefore, until there is agreement among overlapping literatures on 
how to deal with conflicting demands, it would seem good research practice to 
apply pragmatism where necessary, while declaring key choices, trade-offs and 
intentions and explaining the rationale behind them. Where appropriate this thesis 
will do so, thereby enabling readers to make explicit distinctions between 
considerations of research preferences and the potential usefulness of insights 
being presented.  
1.3.3.2 Agent-based simulation 
Bankes (2002) summarizes the challenges and opportunities of agent-based 
simulation. Although this article was written over ten years ago, his comments 
still apply now. They can be characterized as ‘improving credibility’ in social 
science research when using this innovative tool. The key challenges he mentions 
of fundamental relevance to this thesis are all aspects of gaining acceptance for 
using the tool and the findings it generates (Figure 3).  
Computationally-based arguments are described as being capable of 
overcoming the restrictive and unrealistic assumptions made by more ‘accepted’ 
alternative formalisms based on mathematical analysis, such as linearity, 
homogeneity, normality and stationarity, but he observes there is a lack of clarity 
about the requirements for establishing credibility in those arguments. This thesis 
adopts his recommendation to apply the standards of rigour used by experimental 
science in forming conclusions, rather than the standards of deductive proof 
favoured by mathematics. However, issues around methodological controversies 
and the suitability of techniques for validating results and demonstrating 
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plausibility remain unresolved in the literature. Each of these will be explicitly 
addressed as discussed in the previous sub-section. 
 
 
Figure 3: Main Challenges 
 
Regarding the credibility of software tools available for computational modelling 
and simulation, there are notable differences in the capabilities and acceptance for 
research use among the tools readily available to the unsponsored doctoral 
researcher. Older tools are little more than sub-routine libraries hosted in the 
development interface of standard programming languages, with crude graphical 
interfaces and charting facilities for presenting simulation output. More recently 
developed tools usually have fully embedded features such as parameter-space 
exploration and built-in agent artefacts, with object-oriented programming 
features. However, every tool has major weaknesses and there is no established 
standard for tool selection to fit a research purpose. The choice made by this 
programme of research was NetLogo, because it is a single integrated tool that is 
stable and well-proven, with a successful history of use in many simple research 
simulations, and is known to be an easy tool in which to build, verify and simulate 
models. Its best feature is that it allows almost total focus on model development, 
with no need to modify the tool’s built-in functionality, and the code syntax is 
easily read and verified against textual model specifications by non-programmers. 
1. Improving credibility (Bankes, 2002).
• Computationally-based arguments.
• Rigour.
• Experimental science.
• Methodological controversy (simulation).
• Results validation
• Findings/interpretation plausibility.
2. Dealing with emergence (Bankes, 2002).
• Graphical representation.
• Formal definitions.
• Quantitative tests.
3. Shift to a new paradigm (Helbing, 2012).
• Improved simulation tools.
• Move beyond descriptive to explanatory models.
• Appropriate methodologies.
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Other useful features of NetLogo allowed this research programme to push the 
current envelope regarding computational economic models. For example, built-in 
3D rendering enabled the design of three different simulations embedded as 
separate surfaces within one 3D agent-space. Similarly, its built-in distinction 
between mobile ‘turtle’ agents and stationary ‘patch’ agents helped to simplify 
theory validation by triangulation between micro-level system participation 
among invisible turtles, meso-level financial effects shown in the simulation 
dashboard, and the movement of macro-level turtles over patches in a 3D 
representation where phenomena emerge for explanation by catastrophe theory. 
Finally, Bankes’ observations about an almost exclusive use of graphical 
demonstrations of emergence in current research, and the importance of 
advancing agent-based research beyond that limitation, resonates surprisingly well 
with the intentions of this thesis in defining systemic failure as an emergent 
phenomenon where systemic risk has breached certain regulatory thresholds at 
different levels. 
“Thus, emergence can be characterized by a measure of macroscopic 
behaviour achieving a threshold value in a simulation built from microscopic 
behaviour. The discipline of defining these macroscopic measures and using them 
to assess behaviour quantitatively across ensembles of alternative agent-based 
models can make rigorous what has often been polemical. And when this rigour 
becomes routine, the advertised revolution in social science will be well on its 
way to being achieved” (Bankes, 2002). 
1.3.3.3 Experimentation 
The computational model proposed by this thesis can be described as a detailed 
model (Helbing, 2012: sub-section 1.3.2) with many variables, parameters and 
initial conditions, incorporating three distinct sub-models, each with their own 
agent-sets.  It is nowhere near as complex as the types of large-scale simulations 
of weather patterns, asteroid impacts or bridge collapses run on supercomputers 
(Post and Votta, 2005), but it is designed for similar theory development (or 
prediction) purposes, and has the same challenges. These are quite distinct from 
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the purposes and challenges of simple models, and require radically different 
approaches to experimental design, verification, validation and theory testing.  
1.3.4 Approach 
With the above-mentioned challenges in mind, the pragmatic approach of this 
multidisciplinary thesis is summarised by the intention: to develop a new theory 
capable of unifying multi-disciplinary insights relevant to explaining systemic risk 
of failure of the global financial system; expressed informally and formally using 
declared theory development principles; by constructing a highly simplified 
computational representation of that system viewed from a national perspective; 
capable of describing how systemic failure occurs, defining the risk of that 
occurrence, and showing how it can be diagnosed and mitigated; validated by 
simulation of the Icelandic financial system collapse between the years 2003 to 
2008; and corroborated by theoretical triangulation with catastrophe theory. 
In that approach, realist constructivism is the research philosophy considered to 
offer the best potential for developing an improved understanding of intractable 
problems with nonlinear characteristics (Crnkovic, 2010) such as systemic failure. 
It has a capacity for achieving reconciliation between insights from different 
research traditions, by incorporating them as simple metaphorical references 
(Guba and Lincoln, 2005: chapter 8; Cornelissen, 2006; Weick, 1989) designed 
into a verified computational representation used for operationalising the 
proposed theory in simulation experiments. Hypothesised results from 
successfully tested simulations of this type can therefore be argued to have a 
propositional mode of pragmatic validity (Worren, Moore and Elliott, 2002), 
which requires explicit hypotheses that are testable, operational definitions of 
constructs, and descriptions with embedded rules for operationalising the theory. 
Agent-based computational modelling and simulation are the preferred 
constructivist methods for this purpose, with an ability to handle greater system 
complexity than their mathematical equivalents (Helbing, 2012), when applied 
within a suitable research methodology for theory development by simulation. 
 The approach also adapts suggestions from multi-paradigm perspectives on 
theory building in organisational studies concerning goals for guiding effort 
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(Gioia and Pitre, 1990). The goals chosen are: “to describe and explain in order 
to diagnose and understand”; reflecting the relative importance of clarification 
through novel theory over prediction or proof in this theory development research. 
Finally, pragmatism is introduced in this thesis by: the use of mixed methods, 
whereby constructivist modelling is augmented with quantitative financial 
analysis and qualitative evaluations of simulated phenomena. 
 
Figure 4: Research methodology - Davis, Eisenhardt and Bingham, 2007. 
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1.4 Claims 
An new theory is presented that extends and unifies current theory about systemic 
risk of failure, to explain how instability of the global financial system becomes 
operationally catastrophic, and how that outcome could be avoided. 
After a systematic review of literature, the eight conjectures of interest from 
project 1 are revised in the light of findings from a further exploratory search of 
literature, suggesting a theoretical model topology based on a cusp catastrophe-
type behavioural surface representing all potential operational states of the global 
financial system. Theory is developed from this model using concepts of 
complexity and principles from evolutionary economics, viewed from an 
operational behaviour perspective, comprised of 13 propositions grouped into 
explanations for: “recognising systemic failure”, the “operational state of 
participation”, and a “systemic risk of failure to operate”. Out of which 5 
hypotheses predict the implications of this theory for validation and testing. 
1.4.1 Key Innovations and insights 
The key claims of this theory are: 
i. It provides a clear, formal definition of systemic risk of failure and 
related terms, of practical value for economic discourse and policy 
making decisions, removing current ambiguities, inconsistencies and 
confusions. 
ii. It introduces entropy as a component in this probability-based definition, 
to incorporate a measure of uncertainty. 
iii. It transcends current explanations of systemic risk that are limited in 
applicability to specific crises or circumstances, by offering propositions 
and hypotheses explaining general phenomena observable in many 
financial crises, thereby contributing a general theory. 
iv. It introduces an operational behaviour perspective on the global 
financial system, which has the potential to overcome many of the 
philosophical difficulties of involving such notions as the ‘perception’ of 
probability and exposure inherent in current ideas of risk to that system. 
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v. It bases that operational behaviour perspective on a new interpretation of 
supply and demand interactions among systemically important 
participants over a functionally defined set of systemically important 
financial services. 
vi. It explores that operational behaviour perspective and discovers new 
applications of existing insights about criticality, disorder and 
catastrophe from complexity science. 
vii. It provides a rare demonstration of the dynamics of catastrophe theory in 
a non-trivial way, to explain how systemic failure materialises in the 
global financial system from systemic risk; moving understanding of 
that theory’s relevance beyond its mostly static, illustrative uses found in 
current literature explaining the causes and effects of systemic risk.  
viii. It pushes the envelope of current accepted practice in simulation-based 
theory testing by demonstrating a propositional form of pragmatic 
validity through the notion of theory triangulation for a single-case 
validation, single-run simulation of a detailed computational model. 
1.4.2 Contribution to Theory 
1.4.2.1 An new paradigm 
An operational behaviour paradigm of systemic failure is introduced for the global 
financial system, extending current theory about systemic risk of failure to explain 
how instability becomes operationally catastrophic, and how that outcome could 
be avoided (see Figure 1). It uses the notion of operational distress from 
proposition 12 to explain how execution-level supply and demand activities of 
collective participation behaviour emerge as operational behaviour at system 
level, potentially leading to systemic failure, encapsulated in the transformation: 
Distress:	Conditions 	↦ Current, , , ,                (26) 
(see full explanation in sub-section 4.9.5). 
1.4.2.2 A definition of systemic failure 
Explanation of that paradigm begins with a series of propositions leading to a 
definition of systemic failure in proposition 9, outlined as: 
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Ⅎ ≔	 , ,… ,  "#	$	%	∈	Ⅎ ,		' ∈ (,		) > 1,		, = ' + ) − 10,				19 
 (see full explanation in sub-section 4.9.2). 
1.4.2.3 A formal definition of entropy in systemic risk 
Then applying the concept of entropy to the uncertainty implicit in any 
determination of the probability of systemic failure over some useful future time- 
span, produces the new interpretation: 
Entropy5:6 	= − 7 58 log 58
6
8;
.																																			22 
(see full explanation in sub-section 4.9.4). 
1.4.2.4 A formal definition of systemic risk of failure 
Ultimately, this leads to the proposal of a probability metric for systemic risk of 
failure incorporating entropy as a measure of uncertainty, expressed as: 
RiskℲ6, , ∶=	A	56,	Entropy5:6B,																																	23 
(see full explanation in sub-section 4.9.4). Although this definition satisfies the 
thesis goal assertion of describing and explaining systemic risk of failure, 
calculating a precise probability with its uncertainty qualifier may still be beyond 
reach. However this thesis shows that a combined directional and velocity 
indicator of that risk may be feasible if it is based on simulated predictions. 
1.4.2.5 Relevance to the programme research problem 
The main contributions to theory summarised in the preceding sub-sections are 
operationalised in a way that can be traced back to the programme research 
problem by refuting a null hypothesis, and linking hypothesised predictions to a 
goal assertion derived from that problem (see sub-section 8.1).  
1.4.3 Contribution to Practice 
1.4.3.1 A practical definition of systemic risk of failure 
For practical purposes, the formal definition in expression 23 can be restated in 
less formal terminology as: “a measure of the overall probability at a current 
time of the system entering an operational state of systemic failure by a specified 
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time in the future; qualified by a measure of uncertainty determined by the 
system’s entropy for a series of probabilities about a succession of future 
operational states considered to be (e.g. by simulation) capable of that outcome 
by the specified time; in the absence of new mitigation efforts”.  
1.4.3.2 Recommended changes to practices 
Macroprudential tools incorporating the principles of this theory, or derivative 
models, could be used in monitoring distress as it propagates and simulating 
intervention effects to identify appropriate actions. These might include creating 
disincentives for growth in concentrations of participation involving certain SIFS; 
or using funds that would otherwise be employed in quantitative easing in 
addressing gaps in demand or supply; or influencing the interplay between 
diversity and exposure. Naturally, any such macroprudential initiatives must be 
aimed at system-wide effects globally, otherwise any sub-systemic response 
would likely be sub-optimal in its effects, potentially becoming a new source of 
systemic risk. 
1.4.4 Contribution to Policy 
Macroprudential oversight is therefore argued to require improved operational 
transparency from system participants, and prompt visibility of data about their 
operational behaviour, in order to prevent positive feedback inducing a failure of 
the system to operate within required parameters. This translates into changes and 
additions to policy, which in turn call for new regulatory practices. The policy and 
practice recommendations of this thesis are: 
i. Operational performance parameters should be identified, communicated, 
and required to be maintained by systemically important participants; and 
performance confirmation data should be provided by them; to enable 
constant prudential monitoring of the system’s operational behaviour; for 
continual updating and publication of operational behaviour assessments of 
the global financial system, and regional or national financial sub-systems; 
for the benefit of all system participants. 
ii. Then a policy of pre-emptive operational intervention should be assigned 
ownership among senior regulators, for ensuring positive feedback from 
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emergent operational behaviour is prevented from inducing a failure of the 
system to operate within the parameters established in policy ‘i’. 
1.5 Thesis Structure 
Sections in this thesis are organised according to a logical progression of research 
topics, which is not always the sequence in which research was conducted. This 
sub-section explains how they interrelate.  
A review of the extended core literature in section 2 of this thesis covers steps 
1, 2, and 3 of project 1 and step 5 of project 2 in the research methodology (see 
Figure 4). Discussions about step 4 and step 6 of project 2 are then split into two 
sections, by covering theory development issues in section 3 followed by a 
presentation of the constructed theory in section 4.  
Steps 7 to 13 of project 3 covering theory testing and validation are discussed 
in section 5, then section 6 summarises the findings from steps 14 and 15 of 
project 4 and refines the theory. Finally, after the general discussion from step 16 
is presented in section 7, overall conclusions (also from step 16) are considered in 
section 8 for their implications regarding the overall purpose of this research and 
its success in addressing the goal assertion. 
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During project 1 of the research methodology (see Figure 4), the systematic 
review of literature adapted a standard process prescribed by Cranfield University 
School of Management (see Figure 6), whereas the exploratory search of project 2 
simply involved running the systematic review search strings again at a later date 
to look for new contribution exemplars published after August 17th 2011, and then 
following references in the bibliographies of selected contributions that cited 
potentially relevant literature not scoped into the initial systematic review. New 
in-scope exemplars were not found, and so existing literature analysis remained 
valid. However, new out-of-scope contributions were found and directly 
combined with previously identified core contributions. They are reviewed 
together as an extended core literature in sub-sections 2.4 to 2.8 to explain how 
sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of this thesis were informed by existing knowledge. 
Qualitative methods used by this two-step approach combined both descriptive 
and interpretive thematic synthesis (Thomas and Harden, 2007; Barnett-Page and 
Thomas, 2009). They produced an assessment of the explanatory value of current 
primary research within scoped-in core literature for a pre-defined set of literature 
questions (see Figure 7) by using descriptive schemes of analysis, declared 
interpretations, and a weighted scoring method (see more detailed explanations in 
Appendices C and D), to synthesise a gap in knowledge interpreted from insights 
mapped to each question out of lines of thinking (see Appendix D.5). 
2.2 Systematic Review 
2.2.1 Process and Methodology 
The process followed by the systematic review of literature is described in 
Appendices C and D, and summarised in Figure 6 together with the review 
methodology applied. The purpose was to systematically search and review a 
potential gap in theory about catastrophic instability of the global financial 
system, and identify where there may be opportunities to improve understanding 
about how to mitigate its systemic risk of failure.  
The review began with output from the scoping study, which identified 5 
literature domains, 3 themes and 14 research conversations of significance to its 
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associated literature volumes. It summarizes how 4069 individual contributions of 
mostly academic literature were extracted from multiple sources on 16/17th 
August, 2011, and carefully filtered down to 194 selected contributions, out of 
which 62 were identified as core contributions and used to synthesize 8 
conjectures in response to the 4 literature review questions (see Figure 7). 
2.2.2 Literature Review Questions 
Questions for the literature review were devised from a literature hypothesis about 
a gap in theory suggested by 14 research conversations discovered during the 
scoping study. They were phrased in a way intended to establish the general level 
of understanding in academic literature about instability of the global financial 
system. If a gap in theory about systemic risk exists, it was expected to be 
apparent within broader findings about instability, thereby avoiding confirmation 
bias caused by making the questions too specific to that risk. 
Literature Hypothesis  
“There is a gap in knowledge and associated theory about how (not why) 
systemic risk of failure of the global financial system operationalises as 
systemic failure, and how that risk could be mitigated.” 
 
Figure 7: Systematic Literature Review Questions 
2.2.3 Scope of Literature 
A scope of literature for systematic review was determined from keywords used in 
both the literature hypothesis and the review questions, by selecting the entire 
literature domains of 4 academic disciplines normally associated with those 
keywords and one further domain comprised of domain-subsets from a 
combination of ‘other’ disciplines that share those keywords. Overlaps of those 
With reference to the Global Financial System .
Q1. What is the nature of catastrophic instability or total collapse of this system?
Q2. What is meant by the risk of such an occurrence?
Q3. How does that risk materialise?
Q4. What can be done to mitigate that risk?
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domains suggested three themes in this scope of literature: ‘systemic risk’, 
‘systems’ and ‘operational behaviour’. Then the focus of review attention became 
sub-sets a, b and c representing the most relevant literature from those themes, 
and their various unions and intersections identified in Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8: Literature Domains within Scope 
2.2.4 Search 
2.2.4.1 Strings 
Search strings were constructed for each literature theme, from sub-strings 
containing keywords relevant to the 4 review questions (see Table 1), with care 
being taken to minimize query overlap so there would be fewer duplicated 
contributions found when query results were combined. Aside from that 
limitation, the strings were deliberately designed to collect as many relevant 
unique contributions as practical. This was considered necessary for 
demonstrating a gap in theory, and the credibility of a new contribution, because 
the notion of a ‘theory’ has a wide range of meanings across the multiple domains 
of literature in scope (see discussion in 1.3.3.1), requiring a comprehensive 
evidence-base. 
Literature Domain 1:
Economics
Literature Domain 2:
Operations
Management
Literature Domain 3:
Complex
Systems
Literature Domain 4:
Risk
Management
Theme a:
Systemic
Risk
Theme c:
Operational
Behaviour
Theme b:
Systems 
(Global Financial)
Literature Domain 5:
Other contributions
e.g. Behavioural Science,
Critical Phenomena, Econophysics
Literature contribution flow
Domain boundary
Central Literature:
Operational 
Behaviour and 
Systemic Risk in the 
Global Financial 
System
(a∩b)\c (b∩c)\a
(a∩c)\b
(a∩b)∩c
Literature within scope
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Table 1: Derivation of search strings from review questions 
2.2.4.2 Results 
A summary of the number of contributions analysed during each task of the 
methodology is presented in Table 2, with sub-totals by category for statistics 
such as discards, approvals and significance (to the 14 research conversations).  
By the end of the search task T1, after a few additional contributions were 
added as shown, the overall number of collected contributions was 4076 (as 
distinct from the combined number of 4069 returned by the search strings). Out of 
this total, 1308 were dropped as duplicates and 47 as corrupted records, leaving 
2721 contributions that were actually reviewed. After task T4 this number was 
filtered down to 194 contributions selected for evaluation by conversation/ 
significance criteria. From that set of 194 selected contributions, task T5 extracted 
a core subset of 62 ‘exemplars’ of distinct lines of thinking (LoT) which were also 
mapped to one or more significance criteria, and were used for thematic analysis, 
conjecture synthesis and findings interpretation in tasks T6 and T7. This is only 
2% of the overall number of 4076 collected contributions. Although this is a small 
percentage, in total the 62 exemplars participated 306 times in 11 research 
conversations, which is an average of nearly 5 conversations each. 
Systematic Review Questions
(with reference to the global financial 
system)
Literature Domain Themes
a
Systemic Risk
b\a
Systems (Global Financial)
c\a
Operational Behaviour
Base string for each theme TITLE (systemic 
risk)
TITLE (bank OR banks OR 
banking OR financial)  
TITLE (operat* OR behav*) AND TITLE 
(bank OR banks OR banking OR regulat* 
OR firm*) 
AND AND
Q1 Nature:What is the nature of 
catastrophic instability or total 
collapse of this system? 
TITLE (cris* OR fail* OR 
crash* OR collaps* OR 
vulnerab* OR instability OR 
stability)
(breakdown OR mania* OR panic*) 
Q2 Meaning: What is meant by the 
risk of such an occurrence? 
AND (risk*) (OR threat* OR expos*) 
Q3 Materialization: How does that 
risk materialize?
(OR exuberan* OR greed* OR appetite* 
OR fear* OR hazard* OR collect* OR 
evol* OR bubble OR subprime OR sub-
prime OR suppl* OR demand*)
Q4 Mitigation: What can be done to 
mitigate that risk?
(OR mitiga* OR risk*) 
AND NOT (systemic risk) AND NOT (systemic risk)
Complete string for each theme TITLE (systemic 
risk) 
TITLE (bank OR banks OR 
banking OR financial) AND 
TITLE (cris* OR fail* OR 
crash* OR collaps* OR 
vulnerab* OR instability OR 
stability) AND (risk*) AND 
NOT (systemic risk)  
TITLE (operat* OR behav*) AND TITLE 
(bank OR banks OR banking OR regulat* 
OR firm*) AND (breakdown OR mania* 
OR panic* OR threat* OR expos* OR 
exuberan* OR greed* OR appetite* OR 
fear* OR hazard* OR collect* OR evol* 
OR bubble OR subprime OR sub-prime 
OR suppl* OR demand* OR mitiga* OR 
risk*) AND NOT (systemic risk) 
PhD 
 
- Cranfield University, January 2014
Table 2: Systematic Review of Literature, Summary Data.
. 
45 
T.ILIN
 
 
 
PhD - Cranfield University, January 2014. T.ILIN 
 
46 
2.2.5 Findings 
Sub-sections 2.3.1 to 2.3.15 in this review describe contributions to each of the 14 
research conversations found in the selected literature, followed by a critical 
assessment of their significance to this thesis in sub-section 2.3.16.  
2.3 Conversations 
2.3.1 Discussions: about theory development (S01) 
The contributions participating in this first conversation were recognized for their 
significant insights in explaining the meaning of the phrase ‘a gap in theory’ from 
the literature hypothesis of that study. The 4 lines of thinking identified within this 
conversation were: 
2.3.1.1 Nature of Theory (S01.1) 
This is known to be a source of contention among academic disciplines, and poses 
a serious challenge to the acceptance of potential new multi-disciplinary theory. 
There are 7 contributions within the selected literature that offer insights to this 
line of thinking. Among them is a definition of theory that is widely accepted in 
the social sciences, contributed by Wacker (1998) from the operations 
management literature. He proposes four criteria which a theory must satisfy, 
calling for: conceptual definitions, domain limitations, relationship-building and 
predictions. To be a ‘good’ theory he also suggests it must apply the virtues of 
uniqueness, parsimony, conservation, generalizability, fecundity, internal 
consistency, empirical riskiness, and abstraction. Therefore, regardless of the 
research methodology used, he argues that good theory-building research should 
define the variables, specify the domain, build internally consistent relationships, 
and make specific predictions. Similarly, Whetten (1989) addresses the absence of 
a broadly accepted framework of expectations and standards in the organizational 
sciences by translating the general works of Kaplan and Dubin into simple 
concepts for discussing the merits of conceptual writing in that discipline. After 
identifying the constituent elements of theory, he establishes standards for the 
theory-development process, and summarizes the expectations of reviewers in 
seven key factors to be considered when judging theoretical papers: “what’s 
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new?”; “so what?”; “why so?”; “well done?” (reflects seasoned thinking, 
completeness and thoroughness); “done well?” (well written); “why now?”; and 
“who cares?”.  
Then 2 contributions examine what theory is not, offering a counterpoint to the 
above-mentioned arguments for defining what it is. Sutton and Staw (1995) list 
five elements that are often confused with theory, and are used in lieu of it: 
references to theory, data, lists of variables or constructs, diagrams, and 
hypotheses. After describing how such elements arise in research manuscripts, 
they examine how journals contribute to this state of confusion. However, they 
agree that if a theory is particularly interesting, the standards that journals use 
should be relaxed somewhat when evaluating how well it is tested or grounded. 
For example, they suggest that major contributions can be made even when using 
data that is more illustrative than definitive. In the same paper, they do also make 
a positive assertion about theory, describing strong theory as understanding the 
detail systematic reasons ‘why’ phenomena occur. DiMaggio (1995) comments on 
Sutton and Staw by expanding on three views about what good theory should be: 
theory as covering laws, theory as enlightenment, and theory as narrative. He goes 
on to argue that many of the best theories are hybrids of these, and then elaborates 
on the “vexing choices” to be made: “clarity versus defamiliarization, focus 
versus multi-dimensionality, and comprehensiveness versus memorability”. 
The final 3 contributions look at research philosophy aspects of theory. In their 
review of the advice on methodologies and methods offered to early-career 
researchers, Mackenzie and Knipe (2006) argue that the use of mixed methods 
should be discussed more, particularly when addressing the perceived dichotomy 
between qualitative and quantitative research methodology. On the topic of 
theory, they make a distinction between theory and a theoretical framework of 
logically related assumptions, concepts and propositions. They explain the latter is 
sometimes referred to as a paradigm. Although, they agree that notion of a 
paradigm in research conflicts with other definitions, such as a particular 
combination of epistemology and ontology from an interpretive framework used 
to make claims of new knowledge. Their conclusion is that this inconsistent use of 
terminology can be confusing for researchers.  
PhD - Cranfield University, January 2014. T.ILIN 
 
48 
From the human resources literature, Worren, Moore and Elliott (2002) look at 
the contrasts between practice and theory, to ask how theories in management can 
be developed and used as cognitive tools by practitioners. To address the flaws of 
traditional criteria for scientific validity, they develop a framework and offer 
examples for a pragmatic form of validity encompassing the characteristics of 
useful knowledge according to three representational modes: propositional, 
narrative, or visual. Then they explore the implications for theory building and 
research in extending such evaluation criteria as explanatory power and 
falsifiability to incorporate this notion of pragmatic validity. 
Finally, Beinhocker (2011) argues that the theoretical and ontological 
implications of “evolution as computation literature” have not been adequately 
explored for evolutionary and institutional economics. He further argues that if the 
perspective they offer is not embraced, those fields of economics will continue to 
suffer a proliferation of ad hoc theories, ontological disputes, and a lack of rigour. 
2.3.1.2 Theory Development (S01.2) 
There are also 7 contributions within the selected literature of this line of thinking. 
The most influential work is Dubin (1978), who’s stated objective was to provide 
“a handbook of practical usefulness that may become a frequently consulted 
source … [of reference about building] viable models of the empirical world that 
can be comprehended by the human mind”. There is some overlap with the 
previous line of thinking (S01.1) in that contributions to theory development often 
begin with a definition of theory. In Chapter 1 Dubin quotes Karl Popper’s 
definition of the nature of theory, from ‘The Logic of Scientific Discovery’ 
(1959): “Theories are nets cast to catch what we call ‘the world’: to rationalize, 
to explain, and to master it. We endeavour to make the mesh ever finer and finer”. 
Dubin uses the terms theory, theoretical model, model, and system inter-
changeably, to stand for a closed system from which predictions about the nature 
of man’s world are generated that are open to some kind of empirical test. 
There are 2 other contributions in this line of thinking from the selected 
literature that directly address theory building. Gioia and Pitre (1990) argue for a 
multiparadigm approach to theory building using a metaparadigm perspective 
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intended for establishing correspondences between paradigms and theory 
construction efforts. A narrower approach is adopted by Pawar (2009), who 
focuses on hypothesis specification in organizational studies. In his section on the 
relevance of this book, Pawar confirms that a lack of clarity exists in the literature 
about what theory is, and there is general confusion about how to incorporate a 
‘proper’ theory into a paper. 
In their definition of mixed methodology research, Johnson, Onwuegbuzie and 
Turner (2007) argue that this type of research is one of three major research 
paradigms: quantitative research, qualitative research and mixed methods 
research. After reviewing the debates about singular and universal truths versus 
relative truths, they present definitions of this approach collected from leading 
researchers. Then they summarize the issues that arise in current work. 
Three contributions about simulation research complete this line of thinking, 
by describing how the research method of simulation (Dooley, 2002) can be used 
to build and test theories. Epstein (1984) examines the varying degrees of 
adequacy that can be achieved when building and testing theory by simulation, 
and argues that plausibility proofs should be the expected outcomes. Then Bankes 
(2002) summarizes the potential for building theory with agent-based modelling 
to demonstrate emergent phenomena in the areas of research where complexity 
science overlaps social science. 
2.3.1.3 Theory Testing (S01.3) 
In the line of thinking specifically about theory testing there are 3 contributions 
within the selected literature. A summary of the model construction and 
assessment of an artificial stock market is presented by LeBaron (2002). Then 
Lustick (2000) describes the challenges and opportunities of a constructivist 
approach to the study of collective identity using agent-based models. He shows 
how macro-patterns emerge from micro-interactions, and how they can be studied 
systematically. At the other end of the testing process, Windrum, Fagiolo and 
Moneta (2007) examine the methodological challenges of agent-based economics 
models, and discuss the prospects of three alternatives for their empirical 
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validation: indirect calibration, the Werker-Brenner approach, and the history-
friendly approach. 
2.3.1.4 Theory in Economics (S01.4) 
Hodgson (2002) introduces the 6 contributions to this line of thinking with a 
defence of biological analogies that apply Darwinism to socio-economic 
evolution, and argues that viable evolutionary economics must be Darwinian in 
some fundamental sense. Then he expands on these notions in Hodgson (2007) by 
explaining how evolutionary and institutional economics have become the new 
mainstream of thinking. He argues that one of the major priorities of these 
challenges to orthodox economics is the development of new theoretical 
alternatives to neoclassical equilibrium approaches, and emphasizes the 
importance of interdisciplinary dialogue in achieving that goal. Zafarzynska and 
van den Bergh (2010a) look at formal aspects of evolutionary-economic 
modelling in their broad classification of methods into: evolutionary game theory 
and selection dynamics, evolutionary computation and multi-agent models. They 
organize the components of such models into nine classifications: diversity, 
innovation, selection, bounded rationality, diffusion, path dependency and lock-in, 
coevolution, multi-level and group selection, and mechanisms of growth. Then, 
for the components of each classification, they clarify the choice range, formal 
expression, associated assumptions, and possible technique for formalization.  
Although Heckbert (2009) deals with the challenges of validating agent-based 
models, his contribution is placed with this line of thinking on theory in 
economics because he also addresses the problem of calibrating agent-based 
models with experimental techniques that use human participants. This generates 
economic theory by studying human behaviour, in order to identify rules and 
conditions for calibrating artificial agents before simulation begins. A similar 
aside is provided by Upper (2011), in his critical assessment of the economic 
theory implications of the modelling assumptions in simulations that attempt to 
estimate the danger of contagion in exposures arising from participating in the 
interbank loan market. Tesfatsion (2006) brings this line of thinking back to a 
constructivist approach to economic theory, by defining agent-based 
computational economics (ACE) as: “the computational study of economic 
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processes modelled as dynamic systems of interacting agents”. Her conclusion is 
that ACE models “could facilitate the development and experimental evaluation 
of integrated theories that build on theory and data from many different fields of 
social science”. 
2.3.2 Assessments: of a potential gap in theory (S02) 
This conversation had 16 contributions in the selected literature, all sharing a 
single line of thinking, namely: there is a potential gap in theory informing the 
research problem. The following 7 contributions are the most credible and recent 
examples from this conversation with references to that potential gap in theory. 
Buchanan (2009), in his review of current scientific opinion across multiple 
disciplines about what he calls the recent “financial meltdown”, reports the 
general consensus that there has been a massive failure of the dominant economic 
model. He finds there is a widely perceived need for some fresh thinking, not just 
more of the same type of theory. Agent-based techniques are discussed as 
probable ways that thinking can be developed, and Helbing is quoted as calling 
for the need to re-imagine the social and economic sciences on a larger scale, and 
to bring experts from different fields together to create new ideas by ‘colliding’ 
complementary knowledge much as new particles are created in particle colliders. 
In his own paper, Helbing (2010) expands on these views. After summarizing 
the properties of complex systems, and identifying factors related to the 
emergence of systemic risks in socio-economic systems, he lists the success 
stories of research in some application areas of complexity science. They include 
the Nobel prizes of Ilya Prigogine, Thomas Schelling, and Paul Krugmann. 
However, he argues that “crises still occur because the system dynamics are not 
well enough understood, leading to serious management mistakes”. In conclusion, 
he calls for more research in closing the gap between existing socio-economic 
problems and solutions, by building greater research capacities and establishing 
‘integrative systems design’ as a new study direction. 
Allen and Snyder (2009) agree that financial crisis literature still lacks a 
systemic understanding. In their section on new thinking, they describe 
complexity theory, complex adaptive systems and evolutionary economics as the 
PhD - Cranfield University, January 2014. T.ILIN 
 
52 
best approach towards understanding the current crisis, and recommend a 
departure from the neoclassical general equilibrium model and other explanations 
from mainstream economics. 
When Govtvan and Mansurov (2011) examined approaches to the estimation of 
systemic risk in the financial sphere, they also observed that there has been 
insufficient development of “many theoretical and practical matters” connected 
with the problem of systemic risk. 
Zeidan and Richardson (2010) analysed the financial crisis through the 
complexity theory lens, and concluded that the two main approaches to 
complexity in economics, econophysics and econobiology, only address specific 
aspects such as the network topologies of banking systems and the genetic 
algorithms used in predicting bank failures. They argue there is a need for an 
encompassing theory that can tie all the different approaches together in a 
complexity-based standard model of finance. 
In their stocktaking of issues and experiences relating to macroprudential 
instruments and frameworks, from a BIS paper by the Committee on the Global 
Financial System, (Hoogduin, 2010) calls for more research contributions to “big 
gaps in the nexus between the real economy, the financial system, and monetary 
policy”. It also welcomes latest research involving complex systems and related 
research analysing the financial system as a complex dynamic network of agents. 
Then, most recently, Beinhocker (2011) writes that “evolution as computation 
literature” introduces a new stream of interdisciplinary research that can make a 
powerful contribution to evolutionary theories of economics by explaining 
processes of order and complexity in the economy. 
2.3.3 Theories: about systemic risk (S03) 
Among the 85 contributions to this conversation in the selected literature, there 
are 10 lines of thinking: 
2.3.3.1 Candidate Theories (S03.1) 
However, only 8 contributions from this literature can claim some credibility as a 
candidate theory of systemic risk. Acharya (2009) stands out as an exemplary 
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contribution to theory in economics, but the others all have some inadequacies 
(see sub-section 2.3.16 for a comparative assessment).  
Acharya models systemic risk as the endogenously chosen correlation of 
returns on assets that give rise to a risk-shifting incentive for banks to undertake 
correlated investments. In doing so he focuses on specific financial aspects of 
these phenomena in the current systemic crisis, implicating recent innovations and 
practices, but cannot explain the observed phenomena of past crises or their 
potential future variations. For these reasons, although he has made a well-
structured contribution to theory, it does not constitute a general theory capable of 
addressing most potential crises.  Nevertheless, his model shows that prudential 
regulation should operate at a collective level, as a function of each bank’s joint 
risk with other banks together with its individual bank risk. 
2.3.3.2 Other insights (S03.2) 
There are other contributions from this literature that offer alternative forms of 
conceptualization for systemic crises. The following 7 lines of thinking address 
specific types: 
S03.21 Catastrophe. The notion of a catastrophe model is presented by Pruden, 
Paranque and Baets (2004) to illustrate how a catastrophe model from the 
behavioural sciences can be used to explain how a trader or investor may profit 
from behaviour observed in a stock market. In modelling that behaviour, they use 
a cusp-catastrophe type model as a positive scientific theory of ‘why’ it occurs, 
and technical market analysis provides a nominal theory of rules and principles 
about ‘how’ it occurs. Their model describes how the forces of greed and fear 
drive imbalances between buying power and selling pressure to explain behaviour 
such as irrational exuberance. Its main weakness is shared by all literature in this 
line of thinking, namely their use of catastrophe theory merely as an illustrative 
framework. Technical market analysis produces their main findings. 
Other models of this type use different behavioural parameters. For example, 
Ho and Saunders (1980) use the interplay between a bank’s net asset cash flows 
and its net deposit flows.  
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S03.22 Evaluation. All of the contributions to this line of thinking are 
incomplete or inadequate in some way. This is illustrated by Huang, Zhou and 
Zhu (2009), who provide a coherent framework for measuring the systemic risk of 
a group of major financial institutions, but the indicator of systemic risk they use 
is based on ex-ante measures of market perceptions, which are too subjective to 
offer any accuracy. 
S03.23 Propagation. Although contagion is often mentioned by contributions 
in the selected literature, there are only a few contributions that focus on 
modelling how this phenomenon propagates. Upper (2011) looks at simulation 
methods to demonstrate the danger of contagion in interbank markets, Gai and 
Kapadia (2010) examine how contagion occurs in financial networks, Martinez-
Jaramillo et al (2010) estimate the distribution of losses for the banking system 
within a network contagion model, and Uhlig (2010) models a systemic bank run.  
S03.24 Network. As with contagion, network effects are also mentioned often 
by contributions in the selected literature, such as Rochet and Tirole (1996), but 
true network models are rare. Elsinger, Lehar and Summer (2006) offer an 
exception that proves this rule. They carried out a systematic analysis of the 
impact of a set of macroeconomic risk factors on a group of banks, and built a 
network model of their mutual credit relations. This uncovered exposures to 
aggregate risk at system level, enabling them to make one of the first attempts to 
measure risk for the entire banking system, rather than at the level of individual 
institutions. 
S03.25 Criticality. Among the contributions that address models of criticality, 
the most interesting is Helbing’s (2010) review, which offers broad perspectives 
on this growing multi-disciplinary field. He refers to the potential of criticality 
notions in complexity science and related fields of knowledge, but falls short of 
explaining how such models can be developed, and does not attempt to offer new 
models to demonstrate that potential for this line of thinking. Criticality modelling 
is clearly in the early stages of establishing itself in the literature domains of 
systemic risk and financial stability, and it is struggling to find credible 
applications among this research. A few contributions were even screened out of 
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the selected literature because they failed the protocol’s quality criteria for some 
reason. However, the general consensus in that literature takes the view such 
notions have an unrealized potential which are likely to become a major strand of 
future research. 
Promising recent examples include Venkatasubramanian (2011), who considers 
the challenges and opportunities in managing the risk of potential fragility in 
complex engineered systems. He builds a view of common underlying patterns 
from incidents of failure across multiple industries, and calls for a more 
“prognostic approach” which can anticipate problems and replace the current 
react-and-fix methodology with one of managing systemic risk. For a more direct 
focus on the financial system, Zeidan and Richardson (2010) analyse the current 
financial crisis through the lens of complexity theory, to understand how to fill the 
gap in knowledge highlighted by the inability of current models to signal this 
crisis. They examine approaches from econophysics and econobiology, and 
consider the misleading nature of regulatory concepts about linear thinking and 
mild randomness (e.g. Gaussian distributions), arguing that regulators should not 
be asking questions about how stringently to regulate the system, but instead 
should be asking more fundamental questions about what is being regulated. 
S03.26 Operations. Although operational models are pervasive throughout the 
selected literature, they are rarely described or named as ‘operational’. Among the 
contributions that focus on operational models in this line of thinking, only 3 of 
them refer to ‘operations’ in some way, and just one of them makes a direct 
reference to an ‘operational framework.’ The latter contribution is from Gai, 
Jenkinson and Kapadia (2007), who look at the challenges of implementing a 
more rigorous and practical operational framework for improving the regulation 
of financial stability. They use models developed by the Bank of England to 
assess how the probability and potential impact of systemic crises has changed 
over the recent past, and find that although systemic crises are less likely in the 
future, they will potentially be more severe. 
S03.27 Behaviour. The dominance of behavioural finance in systemic risk and 
financial instability literature is reflected in more than 40 contributions of 
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behavioural models to this line of thinking. Perhaps the best-known representation 
of this literature is contributed by Shiller (2003), who describes behavioural 
finance as collaboration between finance and other social sciences such as 
psychology and sociology. Shiller explains how, since their dominance of 
academic thinking in the 1970s, the notions of efficient markets theory and 
rational expectations models have come to be recognized as being riddled with 
anomalies. After illustrating some of these, using his concept of irrational 
exuberance to describe the self-limiting behaviour of bubbles, he urges that future 
research should maintain a more eclectic approach, which is indeed what is found 
in this line of thinking. Dow (2000) provides a good example of that in his survey 
of systemic risk research and his discussion of moral hazard, initial shocks and 
distress propagation. 
2.3.3.3 Related Concepts (S03.3) 
This line of thinking gathers a collection of indirectly related concepts not present 
in other lines of thinking about systemic crisis models, frameworks and 
simulations. Goldstone and Janssen (2005) is a good example. They describe how 
agent-based models can explain collective behaviour computationally, providing a 
process-oriented alternative to descriptive mathematical models. However, it does 
not make the link between these models, the collective behaviour of participants 
in the financial system and systemic crises.  
2.3.3.4 Foundational Contributions (S03.4) 
Seminal or ground-breaking research is represented by this line of thinking, which 
created the foundations for thinking within several other conversations. They are 
collected here for reference. Examples include Zeeman’s (1976) article on 
Catastrophe Theory, Shiller’s (2000) article on Irrational Exuberance, and the 
article by Axelrod and Hamilton (1981) on The Evolution of Cooperation. 
2.3.4 Perspectives: on the system (S04) 
Among the contributions to this conversation in the selected literature, there are 8 
lines of thinking about the nature of the global financial system (GFS) and its 
various component sub-systems: 
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2.3.4.1 Banking System (S04.1) 
Among the contributions to this line of thinking, May and Arinaminpathy (2010) 
stands out as a contribution to literature that attempts to explain the interplay 
between the characteristics of individual banks and the overall dynamical 
behaviour of the GFS. For example, they explore simple mathematical caricatures 
for banking ecosystems, suitable for proposing a basic model of banking capable 
of providing a relatively simple metaphor that can offer interesting and potentially 
important insights. Uhlig’s (2010) model of a systemic bank run takes a similar 
perspective. Whereas, other contributions in this collection are more focused on 
individual bank perspectives within the context of the banking system, such as the 
role of bank provisioning behaviour and procyclicality (Bikker and Metzemakers, 
2005) and the failure mechanics of dealer banks (Duffie, 2010). 
A further 2 contributions to this line of thinking refer to the Shadow Banking 
System. In their exploration of the linkages between greed and governance in the 
GFS, Weitzner and Darroch (2009) describe how development of the Shadow 
Banking System and opaque products has been motivated by greed, in order to 
make governance of related activities difficult at institutional and market levels. 
Later, Van Doren (2011) supports the view of Gorton and Metrick (2010), who 
argue that the financial crisis of 2008 is best understood as a collapse of the 
shadow banking system, which occurred because the market did not understand 
the role of that system, or the true causes of the financial crisis. From these 
contributions it is clear that any model developed by the research following this 
systematic review will have to incorporate this shadow system, otherwise key 
influences on the overall GFS will be overlooked. 
2.3.4.2 Complex System (S04.2) 
This line of thinking differs from S03.25 in that it refers here to a general 
complexity perspective on the GFS, not different models of criticality for the 
GFS. There are 2 principal contributions. One of them (Zeidan and Richardson, 
2010) has already been discussed because it contributes to both lines of thinking. 
However, May, Levin and Sugihara (2008) specifically address the complexities 
of tipping points, thresholds, breakpoints and regime shifts of financial systems. 
They describe how changes in the overall state of a complex system can become 
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catastrophic, at which time it typically exhibits some form of hysteresis. Those 
changes are explained as being derived from how the system is organized, its 
internal feedback mechanisms, and certain latent linkages that are often 
unrecognized. Once set in motion they can become explosive, with the effect that 
recovery from catastrophe is usually much slower than the collapse, and in 
extreme situations may be irreversible. Their contribution is placed here because, 
as mentioned in S03.21, most references to catastrophe theory use it for 
illustration or context, with some other perspective actually generating research 
results. In this case it is an understanding of how complex systems deal with 
change that informs their findings. 
2.3.4.3 Economic System (S04.3) 
Among the many contributions to this line of thinking, Helbing (2010) has already 
been discussed in the context of a potential gap in theory and models of criticality, 
but he also raises interesting implications for the GFS when it is considered to be 
an economic system. From that perspective, complexity theory is shown to predict 
that experience-based or intuitive approaches to understanding how social and 
economic systems function often lead to the illusion of control, and a “dangerous 
logic of failure”, with occurrences of paradoxical system behaviours, unwanted 
side effects, and sudden regime shifts, in which the causes and effects will not be 
proportional to each other. Although, the theory is also said to suggest that it is 
possible to use the self-organizing, adaptive nature of such systems to achieve 
favourable economic outcomes. 
Stiglitz (1999) nicely summarizes the views of most other contributions to this 
collection, into 10 basic points and 3 methodological observations on reforming 
what he calls the global economic architecture. However, throughout the main 
text he refers to such things as interventions to stabilize capital flows, which 
generate high costs and limit benefits. All of which indicate that he is referring to 
a dynamic system not a static architecture.  
2.3.4.4 Financial System (S04.4) 
A more traditional financial system perspective on the GFS is taken by the large 
collection of contributions to this line of thinking. Gramlich and Oet (2011) offer 
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a recent example in their assessment of the structural fragility of the GFS. They 
explore the elements of that fragility, and suggest how to conceptualize and 
quantify related issues for developing early warning systems. A different 
approach is offered by Wagner (2008), who argues the counter-intuitive case for 
not providing regulatory relief to banks for diversification, by showing how their 
stability level reduces for various reasons if they do diversify, even though their 
risk-sharing is diminished.  
Loretan (1996) combines a financial system perspective with economic 
models, in a good example of cross-over literature, which also includes Minky’s 
(1993) economic views in his Financial Instability Hypothesis, and a more recent 
theoretical study on the estimation of systemic risk in the ‘financial sphere’ by 
Govtvan and Mansurov (2011). Indeed, cross-over thinking from other system 
perspectives often refers to this financial perspective in a similar way.  
2.3.4.5 Insurance System (S04.5) 
Among the insurance contributions in the selected literature, there are only a few 
that view the GFS as a system of insurance. Schich (2010) examines how certain 
financial instruments that provide an insurance function were at the core of recent 
difficulties, directly exposing many insurers to the epicentre of the financial crisis 
in a systematic way. Then he considers the adverse ways in which insurance 
companies have been affected by the current financial crisis through their 
investment portfolios, due to deteriorating market valuations. Concentrated 
insurance-related exposures to credit risks, market risks, and mortgage guarantees 
are revealed in many financial groups that are active in insurance markets, 
although the overall solvency of the insurance sector does not appear to be 
threatened, yet.  
On that same theme, O’Brien (2010) considers how to set a minimum solvency 
margin for the insurance sector, and assesses the implications of the global 
financial crisis for each method. In conclusion, he recommends a regulatory focus 
on stress tests which uses a more robust approach to calculating the probabilities 
of breaching that margin. 
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2.3.4.6 Market System (S04.6) 
The market system view of the GFS in this line of thinking is surprisingly under-
subscribed in the selected literature. In their examination of the associations 
between market crises, the financial system and the real economy, Scardovi, Gatti 
and Ventola (2010) argue there are five basic pillars currently supporting the 
global financial system. Three of them are market-related: market liquidity, 
funding structure and its mismatch, and asset quality in terms of the solvency of 
counterparties or the feasibility of debt recovery. Although they make no direct 
reference to a market system, their summary of events leading up to the current 
financial crisis, and their market-driven prognosis of the way forward relies 
heavily on a market paradigm of phenomena that occur in the financial system. 
Ball (2009) takes the view that Eugene Fama’s notion of ‘The Efficient Market 
Hypothesis’ has suffered from recent critiques of its many anomalies allegedly 
exposed during the current financial crisis, which he argues cannot be explained 
by a strict interpretation of that theory. However, he maintains that even if it is not 
a complete representation of how markets behave, the theory is durable despite its 
inevitable and painfully obvious limitations. His analysis of the systemic nature of 
bubbles, and the contributing role of market prices in valuations, confirm his 
interpretation of the GFS as a market system.  
Other contributions include simulations of market systems, used to represent 
the GFS. Iori, Jafarey and Padilla (2006) simulate systemic risk in the interbank 
market, while LeBaron (2002) describes the building of an artificial stock market, 
to illustrate how simulations can be built for financial markets in general. The key 
principle behind this type of simulation is that financial markets are modelled as 
market systems. 
2.3.4.7 Operational System (S04.7) 
Out of the entire selected literature, Shleifer and Vishny (2010) is probably the 
closest to an example of a theory of GFS operations. It is placed here among the 
contributions to an operational system perspective on the nature of the GFS 
because it takes an operational approach to theorising about financial 
intermediation. In particular, it points to the instability of highly leveraged banks 
that contribute to systemic risk by their profit maximizing operational behaviour.  
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Other contributions explore how competitive versus monopolistic banking 
systems operate (Boyd, De Nicola and Smith, 2004), fault-lines in the way the 
GFS operates (Pattanaik, 2008), and the benefits of a central counterparty in 
reducing the systemic risks resulting from transactions in OTC derivatives 
(Duffie, 2010). 
2.3.4.8 Regulatory System (S04.8) 
The most recent example among the contributions to a regulatory system line of 
thinking is Fisk (2011). He argues that the real failure of the current financial 
crisis should not be attributed to the regulators, but to their oversight system, the 
meta-regulation framework. This is equated in his article to the risk-regulatory 
sub-system of engineering systems. Then the evolution of financial crises is 
explained in terms of the stages of an engineering systems failure, and the 
functions of its risk-regulatory sub-system. Similarly, the article by Rochet (2009) 
proposes a new regulatory system for the ‘too big to fail’ (TBTF) problem, based 
on an industrial reorganization approach to systemic institutions, including 
interbank and money markets. In his other contribution to this line of thinking, 
Rochet (2010) develops these ideas into a call for the adoption of a ‘platform-
based’ approach to regulating systemic risk of the GFS. This is aimed at 
protecting ‘platforms’ (vital parts of financial infrastructure), not individual 
banks, with a new system of regulations. Sy (2009) takes the same view, but is 
more specifically focused on credit rating agencies and rated markets. 
Levine (2000) finds that both bank-based and market-based systems can 
operate effectively, but neither is better than the other. He concludes that in fact, 
the legal framework critically influences long-run growth, and so GFS focus 
should be on creating a sound legal environment. 
2.3.5 Definitions: of systemic risk, or similar terms (S05) 
Among the 17 contributions to this conversation in the selected literature, there 
are 4 lines of thinking: 
2.3.5.1 Causal (S05.1) 
The contributions to this line of thinking each offer a causal definition. For 
example, Acharya (2009) models systemic risk as the endogenously chosen 
PhD - Cranfield University, January 2014. T.ILIN 
 
62 
correlation of returns on assets held by banks. This is a positive causal definition, 
from a theory that uses an equilibrium characterization of systemic risk. 
According to that model, it arises due to four factors: (i) in extension, by a spill-
over effect after a bank failure, when depositors migrate to surviving banks; (ii) 
through network externalities such as the payments and settlements systems; (iii) 
through the failure of a few big banks; and (iv) through asymmetric information 
about the positions that different banks hold, as when the cost of a healthy bank’s 
capital rises after the failure of its peers. Rochet and Tirole (1996) offer a 
transactional alternative in their contribution on interbank lending. They define 
systemic risk as being caused by the propagation of an agent’s economic distress 
to other agents linked to that agent through financial transactions.  
Kane (2010) argues that official definitions of this type lead to an incomplete 
diagnosis of the roots of systemic risk, and misguided strategies of regulatory 
reform. Then he discusses a series of complementary ways of advancing towards 
the goal of a better definition, but does not actually formulate one! The other 
contributions in this line of thinking either: offer equally incoherent discussions 
about the causal trade-off between regulatory capital requirements and 
‘efficiency’ (Tsomocos, 2003); or focus on causal factors that are difficult to 
evaluate, such as moral hazard (Dow, 2000); or conclude that attempting to 
produce a ‘proper definition’ of causes may be a waste of time (Mundy, 2004). 
2.3.5.2 Consequential (S05.2) 
The single contribution in the selected literature to this line of thinking (Huang, 
Zhou and Zhu, 2009) uses the price of insurance against the consequences of 
financial distress as the measure of systemic risk. Towards that objective, they 
define systemic risk as “multiple simultaneous defaults of large financial 
institutions”. However, they do not show how that insurance may affect defaults. 
2.3.5.3 Combined (S05.3) 
In this line of thinking, Martinez-Jaramillo et al (2010) take an operational view. 
They refer to systemic risk as “the risk of the occurrence of an event that 
threatens the well functioning of the system of interest (financial, payments, 
banking, etc.), sometimes to the point of making its operation impossible”. 
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Schwarcz (2008) comes up with a much wider, more integrative legal 
interpretation in his testimony before the U.S. House of Representative 
Committee on Financial Services on October 2nd, 2007. He offers a working 
definition that holds systemic risk to be: “the risk that an economic shock such as 
a market or institutional failure triggers (through panic or otherwise) either the 
failure of a chain of markets or institutions, or a chain of significant losses to 
financial institutions, resulting in increases in the cost of capital or decreases in 
its availability, often evidenced by substantial financial-market price volatility”. 
This definition has so many embedded assumptions and is sufficiently vague that 
it has little practical value for either academic or regulatory purposes. 
An alternative, implicit definition of systemic risk in this line of thinking is 
contributed by Mishkin’s (1992) influential article from the financial instability 
literature. If systemic risk is understood to mean financial instability that creates 
the risk of a financial crisis outcome, then Mishkin defines that outcome as: “a 
disruption to financial markets in which adverse selection and moral hazard 
problems become much worse, so that financial markets are unable to efficiently 
channel funds to those who have the most productive investment opportunities”. 
As with the Schwarcz definition, this is sufficiently vague to be unusable. 
2.3.5.4 Similar terms and meanings (S05.4) 
Contributions to this line of thinking are mostly reviews of definitions in systemic 
risk literature, containing conclusions about the state of its terminology. Govtvan 
and Mansurov (2011) provide the most recent assessment of this literature among 
selected contributions, in which they find that “there is no unique, established 
definition of systemic risk”. They go on to attribute this situation to the 
insufficient development of many theoretical and practical matters connected to 
this problem. A common feature of contributions to this conversation is the failure 
to offer adequate explanations for the notion of ‘probability’ in their definitions of 
systemic risk, which is a major part of any risk definition. They focus on the 
causes and effects of systemic risk, but not how that risk refers to the likelihood of 
systemic failure. For example, is it a probability or a value-at-risk? If it is a 
probability, does it remain constant over some period of time, or does it relate 
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specifically to an assessment at a current point in time? Furthermore, how does it 
vary over time? These questions remain broadly unanswered. 
2.3.6 Forms: of distress in the system (S06) 
Among the 82 contributions to this conversation in the selected literature, there 
are 8 lines of thinking: 
2.3.6.1 Banking Distress (S06.1) 
All of the contributions to this line of thinking are from the financial crisis 
literature, and take a broad perspective on distress. The most recent is by Rotheli 
(2010), who attempts to describe the important determinants of the current crisis. 
He identifies the bounded rationality of banks, the credit cycle, monetary policy, 
rating agencies and bank regulations. When Rochet (2003) examined why there 
are so many banking crises, his main conclusions were: (i) although many 
banking crises have been initiated by financial deregulation and globalization, 
these crises were largely amplified by political interference; (ii) supervision 
systems face a fundamental commitment problem, analogous to the time 
consistency problem confronted by monetary policy; (iii) the key to successful 
reform is the independence and accountability of banking supervisors. Similar 
sentiments were expressed by Minsky (1977), who described in his theory of 
systemic fragility the fundamental nature of this type of observed phenomena as 
“incoherent behaviour” by key participants in the economy, generally 
characteristic of a financial crisis among fragile financial structures, whereby their 
reaction to disturbances amplifies rather than dampens the initial disturbance. 
Boyd, DeNicola and Smith (2004) look at variations in this condition of general 
distress between competitive versus monopolistic banking industries. 
2.3.6.2 Economic Distress (S06.2) 
This is a popular line of thinking, with a diverse range of interpretations. 
However, in his discussion of systemic risks in society and economics, Helbing 
(2010) shows that linear, experience-based, or intuitive approaches to economic 
systems often fail to explain the way they actually function, particularly when 
economic distress emerges during sudden regime shifts. This theme of shifts to a 
new regime is expanded on by Asensio and Lang (2010) in their proposal of a 
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Keynesian view of the current financial crisis. They discuss how Keynes’s theory 
emphasizes the way fundamental uncertainty inhibits self-regulating mechanisms, 
and how this is relevant to financial and economic meltdowns after which new 
regimes often introduce extended periods of degraded economic performance. 
Other examples in this line of thinking include the idea of responding to 
economic distress by rebalancing the global economy through policy changes 
(Freedman et al., 2010), boom and bust phases in the economy (Allen and Snyder, 
2009), and growth and stagnation mechanisms of economic distress (Foster and 
Magdoff, 2009). 
2.3.6.3 Financial Distress (S06.3) 
This is the single line of thinking with the most contributions of insights from the 
selected literature. The generally accepted understanding of how financial distress 
arises is summarised by Minsky (1993), who observes that “from time to time, 
capitalist economies exhibit inflations and debt deflations which seem to have the 
potential to spin out of control”. His ‘financial instability hypothesis’ holds that 
the effects of financial distress arising from business cycles are compounded out 
of (i) the internal dynamics of capitalist economies, and (ii) the system of 
interventions and regulations that are designed to keep the economy operating 
within reasonable bounds. Wolfson (2002) examines this theory from a global 
perspective, and concludes that Minsky’s debt-deflation process has so far (by 
2002) been averted, and he contends that a major revision of the optimistic 
expectations of a boom period has not occurred since the Great Depression due to 
the intervention of the Federal Reserve as lender of last resort. 
Benediktsdottir, Danielsson and Zoega (2011) draw similar lessons from the 
collapse of Iceland’s banking system in October 2008, and ultimately blame what 
they call the “small country syndrome” for problems of explosive growth and 
unsustainably high leverage in that sector, which they argue were exacerbated 
when the central bank found itself incapable of serving as the lender of last resort 
for a banking sector of that size. 
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2.3.6.4 Market Distress (S06.4) 
Among the many contributions to this line of thinking, two of them provide good 
examples of the view there is an interdependent relationship between bank 
competition, financial stability and the risk of bank failure (Berger, Klapper and 
Turk-Ariss, 2009; Martinez-Miera and Repullo, 2010). They respectively discuss 
the traditional ‘competition-fragility’ view, and its alternative ‘competition 
stability’ view, and both agree there are contradictory findings in the literature. 
But Martinez-Miera and Repullo make the strongest case that there is a U-shaped 
relationship between competition and the risk of bank failure.  
In his review of the Efficient Market Hypothesis, Ball (2009) concludes that 
market distress will always find ways to emerge, by examining the “inevitable 
and painfully obvious limitations” of this hypothesis. However, he still asserts 
that it has a durable relevance, and proceeds to dispel misreading of the theory 
and logical inconsistencies in academic commentary about its role in the current 
financial crisis. 
Other contributions consider such things as the non-rational behaviour 
responses of market agents (Loretan, 1996), and mechanisms of market distress 
contagion between the financial sector and the real economy (Scardovi, Gatti and 
Ventola, 2010). 
2.3.6.5 Monetary Distress (S06.5) 
In this line of thinking, Brunetti, Filippo and Harris (2011) provide the strongest 
explanation for how monetary distress arose out of monetary policies during the 
current financial crisis. The results they present suggest that when counterparty 
risk poses systemic risk for the interbank market, the central bank should not 
simply inject capital into the system but rather should focus on providing 
interbank loan guarantees or engage in direct asset purchases. This is different to 
the focus of Tsomocos (2003), who extends the GEI (General Equilibrium with 
Incomplete Markets) model with monetary and default notions, to explore 
monetary considerations as equilibrium phenomena. 
Davis (2005) takes an interest in monetary distress from a completely different 
perspective in his examination of the requirements of pension reform. He then 
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describes how monetary policy interacts with the demands of the population 
ageing process, as a future challenge to financial stability and potential new 
source of systemic risk. 
2.3.6.6 Operational Distress (S06.6) 
This line of thinking only has 8 contributions in the selected literature. As 
mentioned elsewhere in this section, many insights refer implicitly to operational 
matters. However, these contributions make explicit references to operational 
distress in the GFS, and many also contribute to other lines of thinking.  
Nicolo et al (2004) use data from more than 100 countries to document trends 
in bank consolidation, internationalization and conglomeration to explore the 
extent to which the individual and systemic risks of financial firms are affected. 
They find these trends may neither yield safer financial firms nor resilient banking 
systems, as conventional wisdom suggests. A different strand of this same line of 
thinking is followed by Shaffer (2007), who shows that the systemic costs of 
aggregate business failure in the banking industry are lower when the industry is 
fragmented than when it is concentrated in a few firms. This leads to concerns for 
regulators about proposed risk-related policies on aggregate concentrations in the 
industry. At the next level down in this line of thinking, Acharya et al (2009) 
conduct a comparative analysis between different periods in a longitudinal study 
of banking activity in the USA from 2002 to 2Q 2007, to explore the systemic 
implications of changes in the financial leverage practices and banking models 
adopted by financial services firms. They conclude that moral hazard problems, 
excess liquidity and the mis-pricing of risk do not fully explain the evidence, and 
suggest that distortions induced by regulation and government guarantees should 
also be considered. At this same level, Bikker and Metzemakers (2005) look at 
procyclicality created by unsound loan loss provisioning. They show this 
procyclicality exists, and it is linked to changes in GDP and credit portfolio risk. 
Then at individual firm level, Duffie (2010) looks at the mechanism by which 
dealer banks (i.e. banks that provide intermediate markets for securities and 
derivatives) can fail, and the policies available to address the systemic risk of their 
failures. They identify a form of bank run that differs markedly from conventional 
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commercial bank runs. Another strand of contagion is discussed by Love (2010) 
from the practitioner literature, and Krozner (2000), who examine central 
counterparties and clearinghouses, respectively. They both conclude these GFS 
participants are important to controlling systemic risk in periods of financial 
crisis. Furthermore, Love argues that revisions to the regulatory framework 
regarding perceived settlement risks in the markets for over-the-counter (OTC) 
derivatives, should call for these contracts to be cleared through a central 
counterparty. 
Finally, on the specific subject of operational distress arising from particular 
securitisation practices that are often cited as a cause of the current financial 
crisis, Shin (2009) attributes the reason why sophisticated financial intermediaries 
continued to make sub-prime loans, and why such intermediaries  acquired and 
held securities containing such loans on their own balance sheets rather than 
passing them on to other investors, could be explained by the operational 
imperative to use up slack in balance sheet capacity during a credit cycle upturn. 
2.3.6.7 Regulatory Distress (S06.7) 
The contributions to this line of thinking reach similar conclusions regarding the 
role of regulators in increasing distress during this current financial crisis.  
Calomiris (2010) provides the most comprehensive assessment of the issues 
behind systemic risk of failure arising from regulatory distress, and suggests 
regulatory improvements that can be made. He argues that the financial crisis is 
not so much a story of government “errors of omission”, but “errors of 
commission”. Although banks were allowed to avoid regulatory discipline due to 
the inadequate application and enforcement of existing regulations, he maintains 
that this was only one of four categories of government error that were 
instrumental in producing the crisis: lax interest rate policies; numerous 
government policies specifically promoting unwise risk taking by financial 
institutions, as in sub-prime lending; regulations limiting who can buy stock in 
banks that made effective corporate governance of large financial institutions 
virtually impossible; and ineffective prudential regulation of banks, including the 
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ill-considered reliance on credit rating agencies’ assessments of risk. Then he 
proposes 12 policy reforms. 
Other contributions include: the historic evidence presented by Kaufman and 
Scott (2003); exploration of the regulatory factors contributing to the problems of 
the credit transfer market (Espenilla Jr., 2009); and an assessment of the effects of 
bank capital regulation on the sub-prime mortgage crisis (Petersen et al., 2009). 
2.3.6.8 Sudden Shock (S06.8) 
Contributions to this line of thinking tend to refer to shocks to the system in a 
generic sense, and take a model-driven or simulation approach to explaining how 
systemic risk arises. Martinez-Jaramillo et al (2010) is representative of this 
thinking, by describing how a network can model the GFS as the ‘system of 
interest’, in which systemic risk has two main components: a random shock that 
weakens one or more financial institution, and a transmission mechanism which 
transmits and possibly exacerbates negative effects among the rest of the system. 
They show how this model enables the distribution of losses to be separated into 
the losses incurred by the initial shock, and the losses resulting from the contagion 
process. 
This view is shared by Dow (2000), who examines how the moral hazard and 
leverage of individual firms can create small shocks that are amplified by the 
GFS. An alternative, inter-temporal global model of the shock effects produced by 
‘sudden switching’ in expectations about risk premia is contributed by McKibbin 
and Stoeckel (2009). 
2.3.7 Mechanisms: of systemic failure (S07) 
Among the 50 contributions to this conversation in the selected literature, there 
are 3 lines of thinking: 
2.3.7.1 Contagion (S07.1) 
Among the contributions to this line of thinking in the selected literature, 3 strands 
of explanations can be found regarding ‘how’ distress propagates and ‘how’ 
failure materializes by contagious means. Views on propagation are represented in 
this literature by the work of Martinez-Jaramillo et al (2010) who separate 
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systemic and contagious elements of financial crises, and Uhlig’s (2010) model of 
a systemic bank run describing the fear aspects of uncertainty aversion in bank 
runs. Then the mechanisms of contagion are represented by Acharya and 
Yorulmazer (2008), in their explanation of the likelihood of information 
contagion inducing banks to herd with other banks in order to undertake 
correlated investments, thereby minimizing its impact on the expected cost of 
borrowing, and maximizing profits. Finally, the general effects of contagion are 
explored by Akhigbe and Madura (2001), who examine why those effects vary 
among bank failures. One of their conclusions is that the total risk shifted to 
surviving rival banks, following a bank failure announcement, is inversely related 
to their capital levels. 
2.3.7.2 Emergence (S07.2) 
Explicit descriptions of the systems concept of emergence are not provided in the 
selected literature. However, this line of thinking is represented by various 
implicit interpretations found in a few contributions. Govtvan and Mansurov 
(2011) describe it as a new ‘market tone’ produced by changes in the system that 
may be useful in the diagnosis of crisis potential, whereas Yang, Mu Yao (2009) 
provide a catastrophe model of emergence as an outbreak of brittleness at critical 
points in system behaviour. In their historical analysis, Jorda, Schularick and 
Taylor (2011) also make an implicit interpretation by showing that credit growth 
is the best predictor of emergent financial instability. 
2.3.7.3 Collapse (S07.3) 
This general term has special meaning in this line of thinking for some 
contributions to the selected literature. Benediktsdottir, Danielsson and Zoeg 
(2011) draw lessons from the collapse of Iceland’s banking system in October 
2008. They describe how distress was allowed to propagate by the banking 
industry’s political connections and through tacit support from the authorities, 
enabling senior bank managers and key stakeholders to benefit while shifting risk 
to domestic and foreign taxpayers and foreign creditors. Ho and Saunders (1980) 
take another approach when they describe the results of such events in their 
application of the theory of catastrophe to bank failure. They argue there is a 
crucial relationship between the power of regulatory intervention and depositor 
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confidence levels, which is both necessary and sufficient for collapse to occur. 
Panageas (2010), on the other hand, interprets it as a systemic collapse of 
financial institutions’ net worth, beyond the protection of bailouts. 
2.3.8 Recognition: of the potential for systemic failure (S08) 
Among the 34 contributions to this conversation in the selected literature, there 
are 5 lines of thinking: 
2.3.8.1 Early Warning Systems (S08.1) 
Among the various contributions to this line of thinking, three stand out as being 
particularly noteworthy. In his framework of macro-prudential leading indicators 
for monitoring the vulnerability of financial markets, Bhattacharyay (2003) 
provides a simple methodology for constructing benchmarks for early warning 
signals, and a set of composite indicators. Davis and Karim (2008) actually 
compare two early warning systems,’logit’ and ‘signal extraction’, and find that 
the former is the most appropriate approach for the GFS. A multidisciplinary 
approach is taken by Scheffer et al (2009), who review current knowledge about 
complex dynamical systems to establish what is known about predicting critical 
points (sometimes known as tipping points) ahead of sudden shifts to contrasting 
dynamical regimes. They find that work in different scientific fields is beginning 
to confirm that predicting the approach of a critical threshold may be feasible 
through generic early warning signals for a wide class of dynamical systems. 
2.3.8.2 Criteria (S08.2) 
The line of thinking that establishes clear criteria for recognizing systemic failure 
potential is not well supported in the selected literature. One of the first real 
attempts to contribute standard measures as criteria for quantifying systemic risk 
for the GFS came from Martinez-Jaramilo et al (2010). The criterion proposed by 
Huang, Zhou and Zhu (2009) is the price of insurance against financial distress to 
calculate a theoretical insurance premium that would be charged to protect against 
losses exceeding 15% of the total liabilities of the system.  
Govtvan and Mansurov (2011) contributed their alternative in a more watered-
down version of the Martinez-Jaramillo contribution in the form of acceptable 
macro-levels of risk. However, this line of thinking remains under-developed. 
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2.3.8.3 Stress Testing (S08.3) 
This line of thinking has few contributions in the selected literature, possibly due 
to stress-testing being driven by the regulatory practitioner literature. In the 
academic literature, Canedo and Jaramillo (2009) apply an integrated micro-
macro approach to stress testing a ‘system’ of financial institutions. They identify 
the fragility of the system through a probability distribution of losses for the 
system as a network of bilateral interbank exposures, which can be used for stress 
testing both individual bank default probabilities and interbank exposures. 
Other indirect references to stress testing can be found in recommendations for 
the use of ’ratings maps’ (Sy, 2009), and suggestions for central banks to release 
stress test results for individual banks instead of country or regional level 
summaries (Brunetti, Di Filippo and Harris, 2011). 
2.3.8.4 Measuring Implications (S08.4) 
There are several contributions to this line of thinking. Out of the four most 
representative two are from the practitioner literature and two are academic, 
although one of the academic papers is practitioner-oriented because it takes ‘a 
risk management approach.’ 
Borio and Drehmann (2009) make the most recent contribution in the 
published regulatory literature from the Bank for International Settlements. They 
confirm that policymakers are still a long way from developing a satisfactory 
operational framework for financial stability measurement. Then they highlight 
the key issues to be addressed when responding to that challenge, and suggest an 
outline of the most promising way forward. For example, on the measurement of 
system-wide risk they suggest a set of priorities, such as the need to include 
endogenous amplifying mechanisms. Similarly, Haldane, Hall and Pezzini (2007) 
write in the published regulatory literature from the Bank of England. They 
describe a ‘new approach’ in the form of a methodology for assessing risks to 
overall financial stability which includes: identifying vulnerabilities, selecting 
stress scenarios, measuring the impact of vulnerabilities, and assessing 
“aggregate financial system risk”. Lehar (2005) takes a more direct approach by 
defining systemic risk as the probability of systemic crisis. First, he computes the 
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probability that banks with total assets of more than a certain percentage of all 
banks’ assets will go bankrupt within a short period of time. He assumes a bank to 
be bankrupt if the market value of its assets falls below the face value of its debt 
within the next six months. Then surprisingly, when he computes the alternative 
probability that more than a certain fraction of all banks will go bankrupt at the 
same time there appears to be a remarkable correlation between these two 
numbers in his simulation data, considering they are not probabilities of the same 
phenomenon. After further simulation, his proposed measurement of systemic risk 
becomes an estimate of these joint dynamics for risk management. 
In the academic literature, perhaps the most prominent contribution comes 
from Rochet (2009), who reveals loopholes in the supervisory/regulatory 
framework, and proposes new measures of systemic risk exposure to address the 
problem. 
2.3.8.5 Concentrations (S08.5) 
In this line of thinking, there are a number of contributions discussing the 
behavioural effects of moral hazard (Wolf, 1999; Dow, 2000; Berger, Klapper and 
Turk-Ariss, 2009), and ‘too-big or too-connected to-fail’ (Rochet, 2009; Duffie, 
2010; Gramlich and Oet, 2011). 
Other contributions published around the same time but offering very different 
insights include Rochet (2010), who takes the view that the regulatory perspective 
on systemic risk should be changed drastically. He argues that, to a great extent, 
the contagion phenomena that took place in the interbank and money markets 
during the current financial crisis were the necessary outcomes of passive 
attitudes in banking supervision that allowed large banks to develop complex and 
opaque networks of bilateral obligations that made them ‘too-big-to-fail.’ Then he 
proposes the adoption of a platform-based regulatory perspective on systemic risk, 
in place of existing institutional-based regulation, with a system-wide shift to 
central counterparty clearing. However, Zhou (2010) challenges the general 
validity of the ‘too-big-to-fail’ argument. In his study of the relationship between 
the size and importance of financial institutions, Zhou found that size should not 
be considered a suitable proxy of systemic importance, and he provided an 
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estimation methodology for calculating that importance using a multivariate 
extreme value theory (EVT) framework. A third strand of this line of thinking is 
provided by Hashmall (2010), who challenges the narrow focus on banking in 
proposed changes to the financial services regulatory system, by arguing for even 
wider application of ‘too-big-to-fail’ regulations to include non-bank financial 
institutions. 
2.3.9 Responses: to the potential for systemic failure (S09) 
Among the 52 contributions to this conversation in the selected literature, there 
are 4 lines of thinking: 
2.3.9.1 Governance (S09.1) 
Two representative papers in this line of thinking summarize the governance 
issues highlighted by research into mitigating and regulating systemic risk. 
Among the seven principles in their new architecture for financial stability, 
Garicano and Lastra (2010) suggest in their principle 6 that “the macro supervisor 
must not limit its reliance on self-regulation”. Their argument is that managers 
who act in the interests of their own institution could still act in ways that are 
contrary to the interests of the financial system as a whole. So they conclude that 
better corporate governance is not the solution to problems generated in this way. 
Therefore, in their principle 7 they propose that ‘international supervision must 
move from a loose network to a hierarchical structure’ to address the 
interconnectedness of the global financial system.  
Illustrations of what happens when governance is not in place are provided by 
Sigurjonsson (2010), who looks at governance and risk management inadequacies 
demonstrated by the Icelandic banking system collapse in October 2008. He 
describes how this collapse was interwoven with corporate governance issues, and 
lists a number of reasons why corporate governance arrangements within 
Icelandic banks failed. They include a mismatch between incentive systems, lack 
of self-regulatory procedures and mechanisms, and ineffectual risk management 
that allowed the main boards of Icelandic banks to ignore evidence of risk 
escalation. 
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2.3.9.2 Intervention (S09.2) 
The contributions to this line of thinking can be represented by four distinct 
strands of research. Central bank intervention in the interbank market during the 
sub-prime crisis is explored by Brunetti et al (2011), who found that intervention 
consistently created greater uncertainty in the market, by failing to communicate 
findings.  They suggested that the central bank should release stress testing 
information about individual banks, provide interbank loan guarantees, and 
engage in direct asset purchases rather than simply testing and providing more 
capital.  
Xafa (2010) reviews the specific role of the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) during the recent global crisis, and finds that it has emerged as a powerful 
institutional force informing official action in various ways. Its key role is 
described as identifying contingent risks that threaten global economic and 
financial stability, and developing appropriate policy responses. The 
unprecedented interventions initiated by G20 leaders in November 2008, to 
prevent a disorderly failure of systemically important institutions, are an example 
of the IMF exercising its role. Whereas, Rao (2010) examines bailout 
interventions by regulators, outside stakeholders and debt-holders, and explains 
benefactor aspects of their necessity, size and efficient execution when applied to 
overcoming the liquidity problems and general insolvency of financial 
institutions. Conversely, beneficiary aspects of interventions are explored by 
Panageas (2010), such as the disincentives to manage risk or volatility properly 
when bankruptcy looms, because internal shareholders benefit from allowing 
increases in volatility up to some ‘pain’ threshold below which external 
stakeholders are motivated to provide a bailout. 
2.3.9.3 Regulation (S09.3) 
Among the contributions to this line of thinking, there are several perspectives on 
regulating systemic risk, but arguably only four distinct strands of research. 
Calomiris (2010) leads the contributions asking questions about the role of 
financial innovation, and its regulation and reform, when used to side-step 
restrictions that would otherwise have limited activities in which people wished to 
engage. He concludes there were many distortions in policies, regulations and 
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supervision that gave rise to the subprime turmoil, and suggests policy reforms to 
deal with them.  
On the general case of bank capital regulation, Petersen et al (2009) find that 
Basel regulations seem to have exacerbated the subprime mortgage crisis. 
Similarly, Karras (2009) finds that although credit risk derivatives provide 
effective insurance on the assets of banks, their lack of regulation can have a 
negative impact on the behaviour of banks, leading to aggressive credit expansion, 
credit risk concentrations, and disequilibrium elsewhere in financial markets. 
Gunnarsson (2011) describes how regulators responded to these and other 
challenges after the Icelandic banking crisis of 2008. He characterizes the 
situation they faced as a case in which the banks were not only ‘too-big-to-fail’, 
but ‘too-big-to-rescue’. Then he proceeds to describe regulatory actions that were 
taken, starting with the Emergency Act that provided supervisory authorities with 
emergency powers over banks in danger of becoming insolvent. 
2.3.9.4 Risk Management (S09.4) 
This line of thinking mostly provides mitigation insights from the selected 
literature. Although the nature of these contributions is diverse, the following 
three examples give an idea of the wide range of research interests they 
represented. Renn and Klinke (2004) propose a new way of thinking about risks 
from the biology literature. They call for a holistic and systemic concept of risk, 
which requires an expansion of the scope of risk assessment beyond its two 
classic components: extent of damage and probability of occurrence. They argue 
that it is no longer sufficient to simply look at the probability distribution of 
potential losses associated with a risk source, and suggest that a more stringent 
and logically well-structured decision-making process is required.  
Bikker and Metzemakers (2005) examine the potential for procyclicality 
created by unsound loan loss provisioning, to which they assert the Basel accord 
pays little attention. From observations gathered across 29 OECD countries, they 
confirm there is a direct negative relationship between GDP growth and 
provisioning, which they suggest implies that banks’ provisioning behaviour 
might be procyclical.  
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On the subject of securitisation as a risk management technique for enhancing 
financial stability, Shin (2009) examines the reasons why the technique has 
acquired a bad reputation for allowing bad loans to be passed on to unsuspecting 
investors. After considering the supply- and demand-side mechanisms for the 
growth of credit, he finds that the importance of securitisation is derived from the 
greater risk-taking capacity of the shadow banking system that led to an increase 
in the supply of credit. However, he shows that during an upturn in the credit 
cycle there is an imperative to find new assets to fill the balance sheets of 
financial intermediaries, and this induces a lowering of lending standards. When 
the ensuing credit bubble burst, those intermediaries ended up holding both their 
own bad loans and other firm’s securitized loans on their balance sheets. This 
suggests that securitization was not simply used to pass bad loans on to 
unsuspecting investors, but was rather used as both a risk management technique 
and an investment. Consequently, financial intermediaries ended up as victims of 
their own misuse of securitisation. 
Other more mainstream contributions come from Rotheli (2010), who 
addresses the bounded rationality of risk management, and Kane (2010), who 
calls for a redefinition of the incentives of risk managers. 
2.3.10 Effects: of systemic failure (S10) 
This conversation had several interesting contributions in the selected literature, 
all providing similar explanations for the effects of systemic failure or 
catastrophic instability. The following single contribution summarizes the most 
coherent and recent assessment. 
Asensio and Lang (2010) take a Keynesian perspective on the current financial 
crisis, and show that waiting for a quick return to some ‘natural order’ predicted 
by mainstream economists would be the worst thing to do. They discuss Keynes’s 
theory on how fundamental uncertainty inhibits self-regulating mechanisms, its 
relevance to economic meltdowns, and ways to get out of them. Then they argue 
that the memory of such collapses “durably curbs all risk-taking decisions”; that 
even the expected returns on productive investments should be downgraded; and 
that a regime shift may eventually take place characterized by relatively high 
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long-term interest rates, a low rate of productive capital employment, and 
significantly high unemployment rates. Unless, that is, the combined actions of 
authorities and economic institutions succeed in restoring a ‘state of confidence’. 
2.3.11 Recovery: from systemic failure (S11) 
This conversation had only 4 contributions in the selected literature. They were 
published over a three year period, and so probably reflect relevant circumstances 
and research conclusions from the early days of this current financial crisis in 
2008, right up to the mid-2011 extraction date of this review. A description of 
these contributions follows, in reverse chronological order of their publication. 
Acharya, Shin and Yorulmazer (2011) examine the relationship between crisis 
resolution and bank liquidity. They argue that choices in the levels of liquid asset 
holdings made by banks are counter-cyclical, being inefficiently low during 
economic booms but excessively high during times of crisis. They attribute this 
counter-cyclicality to the fire-sale pricing of assets following a large number of 
bank failures making it an attractive proposition to maintain high levels of 
liquidity in order to purchase assets at these prices, and vice versa when banks are 
not failing, assuming relative expertise in liquidity management is similar 
between banks. Then they present evidence consistent with these predictions, 
from which they infer that ex-post interventions to resolve banking crises may 
reduce incentives to hold liquid assets, and therefore should be conditional on 
appropriate levels of those assets. 
Asensio and Lang (2010) call for the combined actions of authorities and 
economic institutions to restore a ‘state of confidence’, by managing monetary 
and fiscal instruments to generate economic recovery led by a “significant fiscal 
policy supported by coordinated temporary deficits and truly accommodating and 
coordinated monetary policies”. Freedman et al (2010) follows this argument 
through with a description of the policy choices that would help support global 
demand on a more sustainable basis. They offer an analysis of both downside and 
upside scenarios to outline major risks and opportunities facing the world 
economy going forward from the current deep recession. In particular, they 
emphasize the importance of governments taking actions to return the financial 
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sectors of their economies to health, the importance of avoiding protectionist 
measures, and the need for increases in government infrastructure investment 
expenditures. Blankart and Fasten (2009) examine the theoretical basis for 
spending billions in fighting financial and economic crises, and propose a 
contractual model of next steps that involves an exchange of protection against 
systemic risks in return for significantly increased regulation of the banking 
sector. After which they evaluate the practicalities of enforcing this contractual 
framework internationally. 
2.3.12 Involvement: in the system (S12) 
Among the 54 contributions to this conversation in the selected literature, there 
are 5 lines of thinking: 
2.3.12.1 Collective (S12.1) 
The contributions to this line of thinking combine broad concepts from the 
sociology, psychology, information science and economics disciplines. They also 
have a natural chronological order of reasoning over a period of some 40 years. 
The following four contributions are representative of what this literature says. 
Granovetter (1978) introduced the notion of a threshold of collective 
behaviour, which is the number and/or proportion of others who must make a 
particular decision before a given actor does so. Although Granovetter interprets 
the implications of these thresholds in terms of cost/benefit equilibria, they have 
wider implications for the concept of ‘herding’. When Lux (1995) attempts to 
formalize herd behaviour, or mutual mimetic contagion in speculative markets, he 
concludes there is a basic cyclical mechanism around fundamental values of 
assets that take the form of ‘fierce self-amplifying reactions of speculators’ to 
small deviations from their equilibrium value. Although this provides an obvious 
explanation for excess volatility, it also applies to mean-reversion, when an 
endogenous breakdown of a bubble occurs and excess profits vanish.  
Shaffer (2007) then looks at the cost of systemic risk as an effect of collective 
behaviour, by examining aggregate concentrations that present themselves as 
aggregate business failure in the banking industry, to identify a theoretical basis 
for risk-related policy concerning such concentrations. Then Acharya and 
PhD - Cranfield University, January 2014. T.ILIN 
 
80 
Yorulmazer (2008) explain how the profit-maximizing effects of information 
contagion induce individual banks to herd with other banks. They show why 
banks herd and undertake correlated investments to minimize the impact of 
information contagion from news about similar activities by other banks, such as 
commonality in lending to certain industries, on the expected cost of borrowing. 
From that initial work, the most prominent contribution to this line of thinking 
was made by Acharya (2009) through his theory explaining aggregate risk-
shifting incentives at a collective level of operations. 
2.3.12.2 Deliberate - Strategic or Tactical (S12.2) 
Among the contributions to this line of thinking, there is one distinct strand of 
research with inconclusive findings, and a few miscellaneous insights. 
The strategic and tactical debates about the systemic effects of diversification, 
integration, consolidation and levels of competition are joined by five 
contributions. Strategic consolidation is examined by Nicolo and Kwast (2002) 
and Nicolo et al (2004). They argue that if firm inter-dependencies, as measured 
by correlations of stock returns, provide an indicator of systemic risk potential, 
then a sample of large and complex banking organizations that were involved in 
consolidation activity in the US over the period 1988-1999 suggests that 
consolidation has contributed to systemic risk potential. On a different level, 
Poirot (2001) explains how integration of the Russian financial system into the 
global financial system nearly led to the collapse of both in 1998, due to “a 
vicious circle of chaotic hysteresis and financial fragility” characterized by 
speculative financing.  
Wagner (Wagner, 2006) takes a different approach by looking at the tactical 
diversification of risks at financial institutions. He finds that there is an optimal 
degree to which such institutions can diversify, beyond which adverse effects 
begin to increase the likelihood of systemic crises. Martinez-Miera and Repullo 
(2010) find that, contrary to the accepted view that competition reduces the 
franchise values of banks and induces them to take more risks, opposite effects 
can be observed. However, they show there is actually a U-shaped relationship 
between competition and the risk of bank failure. 
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2.3.12.3 Dysfunctional (S12.3) 
The contributions to this line of thinking offer an important but disparate cross-
section of insights. 
Dysfunctional aspects of moral hazard are represented by Weitzner (2009), 
who explores the linkages between greed and governance failures in both 
financial institutions and financial markets. Acharya and Richardson (2009) 
provide the best explanation of two methods by which banks evaded regulatory 
capital requirements, and link them to the reason why the housing bubble had 
such an impact on the financial system when it burst. One method was the 
securitization of mortgages in off-balance-sheet entities, to avoid regulatory 
requirements to hold significant capital buffers against their potential default. The 
other was the relaxation of capital requirements for AAA-rated tranches of 
securitized mortgages that are retained on-balance-sheet. By repackaging 
mortgages into mortgage-backed securities in this way, both on and off their 
balance sheets, banks were able to reduce their regulatory capital obligations 
significantly. Acharya and Richardson conclude that this regulatory arbitrage 
effectively concentrated the risk of mortgage defaults in the banks, and rendered 
them insolvent when the housing bubble burst. Incentives to behave 
dysfunctionally are also described by Panageas (2010), who develops a model that 
explains the interplay between shareholders who deliberately allow volatility in a 
firm’s finances to increase, so they can avoid bankruptcy costs by exploiting the 
implicit protection of bailout options, and the response of external stakeholders. 
His model demonstrates the qualitative features of widely adopted risk 
management rules within stakeholder firms that can account for phenomena such 
as ‘flight to quality’ when the net worth of financial services firms fall below an 
endogenously determined threshold. 
2.3.12.4 Ignorant (S12.4) 
There are 3 contributions that stand out in this line of thinking, described in an 
increasing order of intensity for the ignorance phenomena identified, as follows: 
Holland (2010) presents the case for knowledge and learning failure in banks, 
in the context of this current financial crisis. He argues there is a lack of banking 
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knowledge and history among bank board directors, top management and 
regulators. The conclusion he draws suggests this fundamental knowledge gap 
and its causes, concerning banks’ understanding of their organizations, 
intermediation and risk management in an active market setting during a time of 
rapid change must be addressed in any lasting solution to the crisis. In Rotheli’s 
(2010) description of important determinants of the current financial crisis, the 
notion of ignorance is taken further by his use of the behavioural notion of 
bounded rationality to explain how over-optimism and over confidence led 
bankers to take on ever larger challenges in the pursuit of growth, no matter what 
risks were involved. Miller and Rosenfeld (2010) describe this ignorance more 
precisely as intellectual hazard, and define it as being pervasive, and existing 
whenever “production becomes segmented into complex organizational forms … 
that can pose a threat to the stability of the entire system of markets or 
institutions”. In particular, they describe how problems with intellectual hazard 
manifest themselves at the point where economic boom turns to bust, when actors 
who have never experienced such changes, or are unprepared, handle decisions 
poorly or panic. Then they proceed to review the three broad categories that can 
serve to organize different manifestations of intellectual hazard: complexity 
biases, incentive biases, and asymmetry biases. They conclude that this type of 
hazard impairs the acquisition, analysis, communication, and implementation of 
information within an organization, and the communication of such information 
between that organization and external parties. Finally, they suggest possible 
reforms to mitigate intellectual hazard in corporate governance, governmental 
supervision and oversight, stress testing, and changes in the education of the 
personnel in financial institutions. 
2.3.12.5 Procedural (S12.5) 
Out of the few contributions to this line of thinking, two distinct strands of 
research can be identified: 
Duffie (2010) is representative of contributions to operational aspects of this 
line of thinking.  He describes a new form of bank runs suffered by banks that 
intermediate markets for securities and derivatives, and the mechanics by which 
these dealer banks can fail. Then he suggests policies and procedures available to 
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mitigate the systemic risk of their failure. Alternatively, Rizzi (2008) explains 
behavioural biases that are reinforced by organizational procedures, such as 
misaligned compensation systems, and outlines a supplemental behavioural risk 
framework. 
2.3.13 Operations: of the system (S13) 
There are 31 contributions to this conversation in the selected literature, with 5 
lines of thinking: 
2.3.13.1 Cycles (S13.1) 
Two main strands of contribution to this line of thinking can be found in the 
selected literature. Procyclicality is represented by Bikker and Metzemakers 
(2005), Espenilla (2009) and Goodhart (2010). They explain that although 
financial intermediation is inherently cyclical, and the financial system tends to 
respond in a pro-cyclical way that increases systemic risk, a less procyclical 
financial system may be an achievable goal. However, they describe how this will 
need to overcome the proven inability of banks, policy makers and regulators to 
iron out such cycles, due to alternating periods of greed and fear. After some 
analysis of the causes and effects of pro-cyclicality, Goodhart concludes that the 
effect of this current crisis will be an increase in the spread between deposit and 
loan rates charged by the banks. As this cost of intermediation rises, he predicts 
that future financial intermediation will be diverted through new channels, 
possibly via securitization again. In that event, new risks will arise as the next 
financial crisis begins to unfold. 
The other strand within this line of thinking explores economic cycles of 
instability, or boom and bust, represented by Minsky (1977; 1993) and Jorda, 
Shularick and Taylor (2011). 
2.3.13.2 Innovation (S13.2) 
Although dubious motivations for creativity are often blamed as a cause for this 
current financial crisis in the selected literature, Espenilla (2009) still argues for 
allowing uninhibited banking innovation. Wallison (2008) agrees, and provides a 
thorough explanation of the most criticised of all innovations: credit default 
swaps. He argues that popular assessments are misinformed, and concludes that 
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excessive restrictions in the availability and use of credit default swaps would 
create considerably more risk than they would eliminate. 
2.3.13.3 Interconnectedness (S13.3) 
Many of the contributions to this line of thinking from the selected literature were 
published before the 2008 start of the current financial crisis, and the rate of 
contribution was losing its momentum. However, the crisis has recently revived 
interest. Kroszner (2000) may offer an explanation for this in the lessons he draws 
from previous crises, when he explores the potential of a wider role for 
clearinghouses in the future for mitigating systemic risk propagation, through 
providing coinsurance among the members of more markets. The nature of this 
systemic risk mitigation has perhaps been understood well enough by regulators 
that opportunities for further research were considered to be limited. 
Since 2008, new insights have been contributed about dynamic linkages 
between major US banks and macro-financial conditions (Huang, Zhou and Zhu, 
2009), and the network effects of interbank loan guarantees and counterparty risk 
(Brunetti, Di Filippo and Harris, 2011). 
2.3.13.4 Resilience (S13.4) 
Most of the contributions to this line of thinking are recent and distinct strands of 
research that refer to aspects of the global financial system’s fragility, resilience 
or both. The two contributions that are representative of this literature are: 
Schleifer and Vishny (2010), who propose a theory of financial intermediaries 
operating in markets influenced by investor sentiment, revise traditional theories 
of financial intermediation by extending their coverage of deposit taking and 
lending activities to include modern banking involvement in originating and 
distributing securities, trading, and lending or borrowing money in financial 
markets. Their theory predicts that profit-maximizing behaviour by banks across 
this full range of activities can make them unstable, creating a fragile financial 
system with increased systemic risk.  
Gai, Jenkinson and Kapadia (2007) take the alternative view that changes in 
the global financial system due to innovations and integration have served to 
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improve its resilience, making systemic crises in developed countries less likely 
than in the past, but potentially more severe. 
However, the most recent view is provided by Gramlich and Oet (2011), who 
look at the structure of the GFS to explore its vulnerabilities and concentrations. 
D.4.13.5 Visibility (S13.5) 
The contributions to this line of thinking illustrate an interesting phenomenon 
which may arguably require more research. ‘Visibility’ is intended to mean the 
extent to which the operational activities and methods of financial institutions are 
open to scrutiny, particularly for innovations that are not yet regulated. 
On the subject of retrospective visibility, Goodhart (2007) describes the 
difficulty of putting together a coherent story of ‘everything that has happened’ 
when writing about the background to the current financial crisis. He gives the 
example of the innovative new banking strategy titled ‘originate and distribute’, 
which was behind their aggressive move into securitization, well beyond 
traditional banking activities. Part of the problem of understanding what banks got 
up to is the opacity of their operations, often justified for reasons of commercial 
secrecy. 
That operational opacity is also shared by other financial institutions, such as 
credit rating agencies. In his discussion of the procyclical nature of rating 
agencies, Sy (2009) is critical of the way they help to fuel investments during 
‘good times’, and accelerate market losses in ‘bad times’. One suggestion he 
makes is to use ratings maps as a way for policy makers to identify the channels 
through which rating downgrades can lead to increases in systemic risk. However, 
more transparency and standardization would be needed from ratings agencies in 
their methods and criteria of rate assessments. 
Two alternative interpretations of visibility are provided by an analysis of the 
way ‘fair value accounting’ rules may have severely undermined the reported 
condition of financial institutions (Magnan, 2009), and information inadequacies 
of regulatory oversight (Fisk, 2011). 
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2.3.14 Reviews: of systemic crises and failures (S14) 
There are 20 contributions to this conversation in the selected literature, with 3 
lines of thinking: 
2.3.14.1 Current Crisis (S14.1) 
As would be expected, most reviews in this conversation focus on this line of 
thinking. They all refer to broadly the same time frame and events. The three most 
interesting and comprehensive reviews are considered to be: 
Foster and Magdoff (2009), who contribute the most comprehensive review of 
the current financial crisis, up to its publication in 2009. Their main argument is 
that both the financial explosion in recent decades and the financial implosion 
now taking place are to be explained in terms of “stagnation tendencies within the 
underlying economy”. Edey (2009) provides a brief chronology, looks at the 
underlying causes and economic impacts supported by key data and charts, then 
considers policy responses with a ‘look ahead’ into the future that sees signs of 
improved conditions. An alternative perspective is offered by Benediktsdottir, 
Danielsson and Zoega (2011), who focus entirely on the crisis as experienced by 
the Icelandic financial system. Their stated objective was to draw lessons from 
this episode for other countries. In conclusion, they argue that both the size of the 
financial sector in relationship to its central bank capabilities and its unsustainably 
rapid growth were a problem.  
2.3.14.2 Other Specific Crises (S14.2) 
There are only a few contributions to this line of thinking in the selected literature, 
among which the following two are most representative:  
Poirot (2001) reviews the Russian financial crisis of 1998, when the former 
Soviet Union embarked on a programme of reforms to create a market economy. 
He explains the poor economic performance of the Russian economy in the late 
1990s, and the financial crisis at the end of that period, in terms of chaotic 
hysteresis and financial fragility characterized by speculative financing, which 
was made even worse by the integration of Russia into global financial markets. 
He argues that consequently the level of systemic risk increased for both the 
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Russian financial system and global financial system, and led to the near collapse 
of both in the summer of 1998. 
Kong and Wang (2009) take a completely different approach by reviewing the 
16 early warning signals from their simulation of a potential crisis in the Chinese 
economy. By using factor analysis to study the sources of China’s financial risk, 
and a back-propagation neural network model of the Chinese financial system, 
they predicted the state of financial risk in 2008, after the commencement of the 
global financial crisis in 2007. 
2.3.14.3 General Crises (S14.3) 
The contributions to this line of thinking from the selected literature are quite 
varied in their objectives and conclusions. Four examples illustrate this point. 
Jorda, Schularick and Taylor (2011) study long-run data about the experiences 
of 14 developed countries over 140 years (1870 – 2008), and they identify five 
episodes of global financial instability in the past 140 years. When they examine 
the macroeconomic dynamics before each episode, they find that credit growth 
tends to be elevated and short-term interest rates tend to be depressed relative to 
the normal rates at other times. Their overall conclusion is that credit growth is 
the single best predictor of financial instability. 
In their history of financial crises, Kindleberger and Aliber (2005) review the 
circumstances of past crises, and present an economic model of a general financial 
crisis in the tradition of classical economists such as John Stuart Mill, Alfred 
Marshall, Knut Wicksell and Irving Fisher, based on instability in the supply of 
credit. Then they examine the variable nature of systemic shocks from one 
speculative boom to another, and explore how circumstances play themselves out 
in different scenarios. 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) review eight centuries of financial folly. They use 
data about financial crises that combines geographic breadth with historical depth 
to challenge the popular ‘this time is different’ syndrome, and describe the 
worldwide consequences of different types of crashes and catastrophic instability. 
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Franklin and Gale (2007) present their review of the history of financial crises, 
and an explanation of the modern theory of intermediation, with a detailed guide 
to current theoretical modelling approaches. Topics are addressed separately, as in 
“the business cycle of bank runs”, “types of equilibrium” and “incomplete 
contracts”, and they conclude that there is no single theory of financial crises. 
2.3.15 Summary of Conversations 
Out of task T4 in the systematic review methodology (Figure 6), 194 
contributions were selected for informing the review. Table 30 in Appendix D4 
provides a descriptive analysis of conversations found in this literature, further 
analysed by lines of thinking (LoT). A comparative analysis between approved 
and selected contributions to each conversation is summarised in Figure 9 below, 
followed by a critical assessment of core contributions. When considering data 
presented in the below chart, it should be remembered that any single contribution 
can participate in multiple conversations. 
 
 
Figure 9:  Conversations in the selected literature of 194 contributions 
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2.3.16 Critical Assessment of Core Literature 
2.3.16.1 Introduction 
The subset of contributions used here for assessment was defined by this review 
as the knowledge contained in a core literature of 62 contributions, extracted from 
the selected literature of 194 contributions in task T5 of the review methodology, 
that were identified as ‘exemplars’ of insights from distinct lines of thinking for 
answering the literature questions. These contributions represent the distilled 
essence of similar knowledge in the broader selected literature, and were used in 
thematic synthesis to manage the number of contributions to be processed. They 
are critically reviewed in this sub-section, alongside some references to the 
broader selected literature, to summarize the foundations in that literature for the 
synthesis results, and for the conclusions drawn in subsequent sections of this 
review. 
2.3.16.2 Theories of Systemic Risk 
There are few economic theories that directly address systemic risk. Govtvan and 
Mansurov (2011) describe systemic risk as being a concept that is “… most 
complicated and poorly studied”. They attribute this to, “… the insufficient 
development of many theoretical and practical matters connected with this 
problem”. However, they share a fundamental confusion with many other 
researchers in this field, illustrated by Miller and Rosenfeld (2010), who refer to 
“an important but previously unrecognized systemic risk … intellectual hazard” 
in their description of behavioural biases that interfere with accurate thought and 
analysis within complex organizations. Their statement confuses what is 
essentially a cause of systemic risk with systemic risk itself. There is no such 
thing as ‘a’ systemic risk, or the plural ‘systemic risks’. There can only be one 
risk of the entire system failing, systemic risk, which has multiple causes and 
effects, except when an overall breakdown of multiple different systems is being 
discussed as in Helbing (2010). 
Acharya (2009) is probably closest to a ‘good’ theory, as defined by DiMaggio 
(1995). The substance of this theory is logically coherent, methodologically 
sound, and well presented. Where it may be open to criticism is in its lack of 
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supporting data from theory testing and validation. As a conceptual paper, it 
stands purely on proofs for the mathematical expressions of its propositions, 
without demonstrating that those expressions do in fact describe reality. However, 
this is not in itself an insurmountable problem. Often contributions to this 
literature are presented as frameworks, models, or even just concepts. They 
generally fall into three categories, differentiated by their definition of systemic 
risk: casual, consequential, or both. Conjectures are developed to explain how 
causes or consequences arise, but the fundamental failure that may materialize 
remains unexplored. In an engineering example, this equates to attributing the 
structural failure of a bridge to bad traffic flow management, and ignoring 
evidence of a pre-failure crack in a support pillar that collapsed.  
Causal definitions are illustrated by Dow (2000). He suggests that systemic risk 
arises from moral hazard and individual firm leverage, which can cause a large 
shock to the financial system. While Acharya takes the view that it arises from a 
high inter-bank correlation of returns on assets, which through various means 
forms a multi-agent risk shifting phenomenon. Contagion is favoured by Rochet 
and Tirole (1996) who refer to the propagation of economic distress between 
agents linked through financial transactions. The approach taken by Huang, Zhou 
and Zhu (2009) uses a consequential definition, where systemic risk results in 
multiple simultaneous defaults of systemically important financial institutions. 
Whereas Martinez-Jaramillo, et al (2010) illustrate the combined view that 
systemic risk is caused by a random shock event that weakens financial 
institutions, with the consequence of having significant adverse effects on the real 
economy. A common feature of these examples, and most of the literature they 
represent, is the confinement of their scope of reference to the economics domain 
of literature, and their explanation of systemic risk in terms of specific past 
events. Therefore, a useful objective for this programme of research may be to 
contribute a multi-disciplinary outline of new theory, concerned with the 
fundamentals of operational behaviour approaching systemic failure that explains 
how insights from different literatures can be integrated to address systemic risk 
in any circumstances in which it may arise in the future. 
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2.3.16.3 Related Theories of Economics 
Indirect approaches to the risk of failure of financial systems can be found 
elsewhere in economics, as in the literatures of financial stability and financial 
crises. For example, the financial instability hypothesis (Minsky, 1993) argues the 
fragile nature of capitalist economies, and their tendency to fall into depression 
after debt-financed euphoria. Haldane, Hall and Pezzini (2007) take a different 
approach in their examination of how to predict the potential location and possible 
scale of ‘financial earthquakes’, by introducing notions of risk transmission 
mechanisms. The predictive approach is also taken by Bhattacharyay (2003), who 
proposes a leading indicators framework for monitoring financial vulnerability. 
However, as with theories of systemic risk, this review argues that many of these 
ideas can be translated to a more fundamental explanation based on a financial 
system’s operational behaviour. 
2.3.16.4 Critical Phenomena 
Helbing (2010) summarizes the sources and drivers of systemic risks in various 
socio-economic systems, and provides an example of financial market instability.  
He also describes relevant properties of complex systems in his review of the 
literature, including: self-organized or self-induced criticality; the limits of 
predictability, randomness, turbulence and chaos; and the logic of failure. A 
conclusion he draws from these ideas is that such systems cannot be easily 
controlled, according to research showing that counter-intuitive and unintended 
effects are to be expected from conventional attempts at controlling complex 
systems. He then relates the challenges of managing complexity to a variety of 
scientific techniques in the literatures of non-equilibrium statistical physics, non-
linear dynamics and chaos theory, catastrophe theory, and critical phenomena. 
Out of this wealth of multi-disciplinary insights, it is catastrophe theory (Thom, 
1975; Zeeman, 1976) that makes a widely adopted contribution to modelling the 
risk of failure of financial systems. The theory has been used previously in many 
contexts, including a model of bank failure (Ho and Saunders, 1980), a stock 
exchange model of irrational exuberance (Pruden, Paranque and Baets, 2004), and 
brittleness analysis of a loans sub-system (Yang, Mu and Yao, 2009). There are 
many other promising lines of research which are also relevant to the declared 
PhD - Cranfield University, January 2014. T.ILIN 
 
92 
focus of this thesis on operational states of the system close to failure, such as the 
use of dynamical systems theory from the critical phenomena literature to identify 
early warning signals of the ‘critical slowing down’ phenomenon in approaches to 
thresholds of critical transitions (Scheffer et al., 2009). However, these insights 
will remain fragmented until some means of unifying them is introduced. For 
example, when model systems have been used previously to combine notions in 
this way (May and Arinaminpathy, 2010; Beale et al., 2011), new explanations 
began to emerge about how herding behaviour generates risk concentrations in 
system operations. Perhaps if understanding about systemic risk of failure is 
moved from its current narrow types of focus, as in the popular balance-sheet 
perspective, to a system-wide operational perspective that unifies other notions 
with catastrophe theory, new explanations may become apparent. Then a plausible 
answer to the research question of this review may be some explanation of 
systemic risk of failure presented for the first time in terms of potential 
catastrophic changes in the system’s operational states that emerge from 
concentrations in operational behaviour. 
2.3.16.5 Regulatory Attention 
Speculation and theorising about the causes and consequences of financial crises 
started to intensify as the first decade of this millennium came to a close (May, 
Levin and Sugihara, 2008; Allen and Gale, 2007: chapter 1; Foster and Magdoff, 
2009). At the same time, belated regulatory attention began rationalizing why the 
recent so-called sub-prime crisis occurred, and furthermore why it appears to be 
continuing. While collective behaviour is blamed by regulators (Borio and 
Drehmann, 2009); there are calls from others for rethinking the role of regulation 
in the light of its contributions to this crisis (Slattery and Nellis, 2011). 
Meanwhile, regulatory literature has begun to lead the way in encouraging the 
development of practical new macroprudential methods and tools for dealing with 
systemic risk (Bullard, Neely and Wheelock, 2009). For example, the use of 
simulation techniques from agent-based computational economics (ACE) has 
been suggested to expose the many remaining inadequacies in how the financial 
system is regulated (Hoogduin, 2010). Consequently, receptiveness seems to be 
emerging among regulators for radical new instruments of systemic risk 
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mitigation, which could become the proposed contribution to practice of this 
programme of research. Although the question of which macroprudential 
authorities have the responsibility, or indeed the authority, for deciding and 
delivering that mitigation is still far from settled. 
2.3.16.6 Assessment 
It is the overall assessment of this review that, although good progress has 
recently been made in understanding certain aspects of systemic risk, the 
paradigms currently favoured in economics for explaining it are reaching their 
limits of usefulness. For example, the most explicit claim to be a theory of 
systemic risk (Acharya, 2009) is based on the dominant equilibrium paradigm of 
economics, and uses a balance-sheet perspective in its model. This is a well-
structured contribution of theory containing useful insights, but does not offer a 
general theory capable of addressing most potential crises. It focuses on specific 
financial aspects and risk-shifting phenomena of the current systemic crisis, 
implicating recent innovations and practices, but cannot explain other observed 
phenomena of past crises or their potential future variations. A more general 
treatment of the issues calls for relevant contributions from other academic 
disciplines to be explored. 
The core literature of this review contains many insights from a wide range of 
disciplines that were found to address narrow aspects of the research problem of 
this review. However important gaps were found, and a new unifying thesis is 
argued to be necessary for bringing those insights together within a new 
explanatory paradigm that transcends the limitations of current understanding. 
2.3.17 Thematic Synthesis 
2.3.17.1 Introduction 
Figure 36 in Appendix B describes the entire thematic synthesis process, and how 
fundamental artefacts of analysis are derived from core literature. Appendix D 
presents and discusses the detailed analysis generated by the systematic review 
from those artefacts, and sub-sections that follow here in the main thesis 
summarise the findings of that detailed analysis. 
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2.3.17.2 Analysis 
A thematic analysis of the core literature found in the scoped-in areas of Figure 8 
from sub-section 2.2.3 is presented in Table 3. It maps the significance of 20 
relevant lines of thinking (LoT) about answer themes identified for each of the 
literature review questions. Each cell contains the highest weighted score (from 
Appendix D.5) of explanatory value provided by insights among core literature 
contributions to a particular LoT about an answer theme for a specific question. 
Gaps in explanatory value are identified by only showing low scores of ≤ 3, and 
outlining clusters of low or missing scores as bordered regions of cells. Then 
assertions about those gaps are made using keywords and phrases from row and 
column labels by interpreting the mappings represented by combinations of cells 
within those bordered regions. 
Keywords and phrases in row and column titles that are emphasized in bold 
throughout Table 3, Table 4 and the detailed analysis in Appendix D.5 from 
which those tables are derived, originate from core literature metadata listed in 
Appendix D.6. In Table 3, two sets of gap assertions are interpreted from these 
emphasized texts as follows:  
• The text of assertion-rows ‘a’ to ‘e’ that are collectively labelled (i) in the 
right-most column is derived from individual row titles of LoT in the left-most 
cell of each row, and the answer-column titles of bordered regions that each 
row intersects - labelled (iii) in the bottom-left rows;  
• whereas the text of assertion-rows ‘f’ to ‘j’ labelled (ii) in the right-most 
column are derived from individual answer-column titles of bordered regions 
and the set of LoT titles of the rows that intersect those regions.  
• The focus of interpretation is bordered regions of cells with low scores. Within 
those regions, either a specific low score is shown for insights contributed by a 
LoT for an answer theme of a question, or a tick indicates the score is 
adequate, or a blank denotes a LoT is not relevant to the answer theme or 
question. 
For example, assertion ‘a’ refers to ‘catastrophe’ from the LOT row title of 
S03.21, and ‘nature’ from the answer-column title for Q1:A1.  
PhD 
 
 
- Cranfield University, January 2014.
Table 
 
95 
3: Thematic Analysis 
T.ILIN 
 
PhD - Cranfield University, January 2014. T.ILIN 
 
96 
2.3.17.3 Synthesis of Conjectures 
Once gap assertions were interpreted by thematic analysis in Table 3 (see right-
most column items ‘a’ to ‘j’), it became possible to build a set of conjectures 
representing a logical progression of reasoning about new ways to apply existing 
knowledge, derived by combining and re-stating assertions as conjectures using 
similar keywords and phrases (see Table 4). Although many alternative sets of 
conjectures can be built in this way, possibly resulting in quite contradictory 
progressions of reasoning, a compensating advantage of this type of synthesis is 
that it exposes the underlying qualitative assessments, interpreted implications, 
and rationale of assertions that form the basis of subsequent theorising. It 
therefore enables critical assessments about the value of any proposed new theory 
to be better informed, by placing them in the context of a coherent model of 
current understanding on which claims are based. Reading the columns of Table 4 
from left to right presents an audit trail of reasoning for conjectured answers that 
have not previously been articulated for each literature review question. Then 
organising the complete set of conjectures in their numbered sequence presents 
them as an initial theoretical argument for establishing a gap in theory (see Table 
5), answering the literature review questions (see Table 6), and constructing a 
research question for new theory development. 
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Table 4: Thematic Synthesis of Conjectures 
 
  
Literature Search Questions 
about the GFS 
 
Gaps / 
Questions / 
Answers / 
from LoT 
(see Table 3) 
Gap Assertions 
(see Table 3, (i) and (ii). Keywords 
and phrases are re-highlighted 
below for conjectures) 
 
Conjectures addressing this Gap 
(numbered as a logical progression of reasoning, derived 
by combining and re-stating gap assertions as new 
conjectures using similar keywords and phrases). 
Q1. What is the nature of 
catastrophic instability or 
total collapse of this 
system? 
I. Q1:A1 to A5 
from 
S03.1, S03.21 
a. Theoretical notions of 
catastrophe are not 
convincingly applied to 
explaining the nature of GFS 
instability. 
C1. If the essential nature of the GFS is represented as a 
complex system by a model describing the dynamics 
of all discrete potential operational states the GFS is 
able to assume, and that model is based on an 
operational behaviour paradigm, then it could be 
used for research into an operational perspective on 
the GFS and its systemic risk of failure. 
C5.  A succession of such shifts in actual operational 
states over a period of elapsed time could therefore 
be used in a theory to represent GFS operational 
behaviour, such as: catastrophic instability, or 
total collapse, when those shifts end in an actual 
operational state of systemic failure.  
VIII.Q1:A1 from  
S03.23 to S07.3 
f.  Instability of the GFS has not 
been explained in terms of the 
operational behaviour of a 
complex system. 
VIII.Q1:A2 from 
S03.23 to S07.3 
g. The state of crisis or total 
collapse the GFS can enter 
(i.e. its state of criticality) has 
not been explained as an 
operational state. 
VIII.Q1:A3 
from 
S03.23 to S07.3 
 
IV.Q3:A1 to A4 
from 
S04.70 to S04.80 
 
i.  The global transmission 
mechanism by which distress 
propagates and materializes 
throughout the GFS has not 
been explained as an 
operational process. 
C3. From which, distress in the GFS could be interpreted 
by the model as: an operational process whereby 
undesirable effects for system participants arise from 
participation behaviour in a part of the system; that 
become unsupportive of overall system operations; 
generating perceived disincentives or actual barriers 
to supportive participation in other parts of the system, 
or perceived incentives for unsupportive participation. 
X.Q1:A4 and A5 
from  
S04.30 to S04.80 
IV.Q3:A2 from 
S04.20 to S06.6 
j. There is no regulatory concept 
of how GFS operations 
interact financially or 
structurally with the economic 
environment. 
C8. The GFS could therefore be shown to interact with its 
economic environment by a two-way process of 
transformation between its endogenous operations 
and exogenous macro-economic circumstances. 
Q2. What is meant by the risk 
of such an occurrence? 
IX.Q2:A1 to A4 
from 
S05 
h.  There is no consensus about a 
comprehensive definition for 
systemic risk of failure of the 
GFS. 
C6. Which suggests that systemic risk of failure could 
be defined for the GFS as: the probability at a current 
time that a series of potential operational states of the 
GFS will manifest an operational behaviour capable of 
leading to the materialisation of that risk as an actual 
operational state of systemic failure; by a specified 
time in the future; in the absence of new efforts to 
mitigate that risk; through some process of distress 
generation and propagation; to emerge in the 
economic environment as a financial crisis. 
Q3. How does that risk 
materialise? 
 
III.Q3:A1 to A4  
from S03.26 
c.  It is not well understood how 
systemic risk materialises as 
a failure of GFS operations. 
C2.  In that model, systemic failure of the GFS could be 
understood to materialise as: an operational state 
that defines the system-wide consequence of 
aggregate distress among system operations 
exceeding distress tolerance and resilience criteria; 
producing a sustained inability of the entire system to 
operate as required. 
V. Q3:A1 to A4 
from S08.2 
 
VI. Q4:A1 to A4 
from  
S09.2, S09.3 
d. There is little basis for deciding 
the regulatory criteria for how 
systemic failure of the GFS 
will be determined to have 
materialised, for pre-emptive 
intervention or reactive 
mitigation purposes. 
VIII.Q1:A3 
from 
S03.23 to S07.3 
 
IV.Q3:A1 to A4 
from 
S04.70 to S04.80 
 
i. The global transmission 
mechanism by which distress 
propagates and materialises 
throughout the GFS has not 
been explained as an 
operational process.  
C4. This operational interpretation implies that distress 
propagates from where it arises to other parts of the 
GFS by: some collective behaviour transmission 
mechanism that spreads concentrations in 
unsupportive participation behaviour; increasing the 
intensity of collective focus on that behaviour; and 
generating further distress in more parts; to potentially 
emerge as a shift in the system’s actual operational 
state. 
Q4. What could be done to 
mitigate that risk? 
II. Q4:A1 to A4 
from S03.22 
b. Evaluation models for 
mitigation assessment are 
needed. 
C7. A model based on this definition could be used to 
select appropriate techniques for the assessment 
and mitigation of the effects of collective operational 
distress, in a pre-emptive or reactive response that 
diverts catastrophic operational behaviour before an 
actual operational state of systemic failure becomes 
unavoidable. 
 
V.Q4: A1 to A4 
from S08.2  
d. There is no basis for deciding 
the regulatory criteria for how 
systemic failure of the GFS 
will be determined to have 
materialised, for pre-emptive 
intervention or reactive 
mitigation purposes. 
VII. Q4:A1 to A4 
from S09.4 
e.  There is no basis for selecting 
appropriate techniques of 
systemic risk of failure 
mitigation for risk 
management. 
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2.3.17.4 Gaps in Explanatory Value 
Table 5 summarises associations between individual conjectures and the gap 
assertions from which they were derived, particular gaps they expose, and the 
literature search questions they address. Thematic analysis found 10 gaps (I to X 
in Table 3) in the core literature relevant to the 4 literature review questions (Q1 
to Q4), for which 8 conjectures (C1 to C8) were derived from gap assertions (‘a’ 
to ‘j’).  
It shows the 8 conjectures can address all literature review questions, and their 
derivation from gap assertions confirms an operational perspective is missing in 
current thinking among relevant insights from a broad range of academic 
disciplines. They constitute a simple theory, or basic theoretical model, which can 
be used as the starting point of new theory development, as prescribed in the 
methodology followed by this thesis (Davis, Eisenhardt and Bingham, 2007). 
Although detailed articulation of these conjectures is refined in subsequent 
theorising (see sub-section 4.3), their meaning and derivation is preserved by the 
numbers allocated to them, so that new theory proposals can be traced back to the 
gaps in explanatory value they are claimed to address. 
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Conjectures (from Table 4) Gap Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
C1.  If the essential nature of the GFS is represented as a 
complex system by a model describing the dynamics of all 
discrete potential operational states the GFS is able to 
assume, and that model is based on an operational 
behaviour paradigm, then it could be used for research into 
an operational perspective on the GFS and its systemic risk 
of failure.  From assertions a, f and g. 
I 
and 
VIII 
    
C2.  In that model, systemic failure of the GFS could be 
understood to materialise as: an operational state that 
defines the system-wide consequence of aggregate distress 
among system operations exceeding distress tolerance and 
resilience criteria; producing a sustained inability of the entire 
system to operate as required. From assertions c and d 
III 
and 
VI 
    
C3.  From which, distress in the GFS could be interpreted by the 
model as: an operational process whereby undesirable 
effects for system participants arise from participation 
behaviour in a part of the system; that become unsupportive 
of overall system operations; generating perceived 
disincentives or actual barriers to supportive participation in 
other parts of the system, or perceived incentives for 
unsupportive participation.  
 From assertion i 
VIII     
C4. This operational interpretation implies that distress 
propagates from where it arises to other parts of the GFS by: 
some collective behaviour transmission mechanism that 
spreads concentrations in unsupportive participation 
behaviour; increasing the intensity of collective focus on that 
behaviour; and generating further distress in more parts; to 
potentially emerge as a shift in the system’s actual 
operational state. From assertion i 
IV     
C5.  A succession of such shifts in actual operational states over a 
period of elapsed time could therefore be used in a theory to 
represent GFS operational behaviour, such as: catastrophic 
instability, or total collapse, when those shifts end in an actual 
operational state of systemic failure. From assertions a, f and g. 
I 
and 
VIII 
    
C6.  Which suggests that systemic risk of failure could be defined 
for the GFS as: the probability at a current time that a series 
of potential operational states of the GFS will manifest an 
operational behaviour capable of leading to the 
materialisation of that risk as an actual operational state of 
systemic failure; by a specified time in the future; in the 
absence of new efforts to mitigate that risk; through some 
process of distress generation and propagation; to emerge in 
the economic environment as a financial crisis. From assertion 
h. 
IX     
C7.  A model based on this definition could be used to select 
appropriate techniques for the assessment and mitigation of 
the effects of collective operational distress, in a pre-emptive 
or reactive response that diverts catastrophic operational 
behaviour before an actual operational state of systemic 
failure becomes unavoidable. From assertions b, d and e. 
II 
V 
and 
VII 
    
C8. The GFS could therefore be shown to interact with its 
economic environment by a two-way process of 
transformation between its endogenous operational 
behaviour and exogenous macro-economic circumstances. 
From assertion j. 
X     
Table 5: Addressing Gaps in Explanatory Value 
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2.3.17.5 Answering the Literature Review Questions 
In contrast to the critical assessment of core literature in sub-section 2.3.16, and 
the exposure of gaps in explanatory value for answering literature review 
questions in Table 3, this sub-section summarises what is currently known in that 
literature (see Table 6). A suitable overall research question is then proposed from 
these findings and the conjectures about a new operational explanation 
synthesised in Table 4, which together become the focus of theory development, 
testing and validation in the remainder of this thesis. 
 
Answer 
Themes 
Literature Questions  
(cells contain Answer Theme text for column, and applied LoT Counts 
Answer 
Totals  
(applied 
LoT 
count) 
Q1 
Nature 
Q2 
Meaning 
Q3 
Materialization 
Q4 
Mitigation 
A1 
Systemic 
  21 
Causes 
 2 
Behaviour 
 34 
Behaviour 
19 
76 
A2 
Critical 
  14 
Consequences 
 1 
Participation 
23 
Participation 
17 
55 
A3 
Global 
  12 
Combined 
 2 
Infrastructure 
 28 
Infrastructure 
22 
64 
A4 
Financial 
  19 
Similar terms 
 1 
Economic 
Environment 
18 
Economic 
Environment 
15 
53 
A5 
Structural 
  11 
- - - 
11 
Question  
Totals 
(applied 
LoT count) 
77 6 103 73  Grand 
Total 259 
Table 6: Answers to Questions from current Lines of Thinking 
The source of data summarised in Table 6 is the detailed thematic analysis of 
core selected literature in Appendix D.5. Its implications for each question are 
explained as follows.  
Q1. What is the nature of catastrophic instability or total collapse of this system? 
Interpretive analysis found five answer themes for this question in the core 
literature, which were used in the detail thematic analysis to identify 207 insights 
for this question from 35 contributions to the core literature of 77 applied lines of 
thinking (summarized in the Q1 row in Table 31, and the Q1 column in Table 6). 
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However, Table 30 suggests there is little consensus about the nature of the 
GFS itself, and that is reflected in how catastrophic instability or total collapse is 
perceived. Conversations S04 and S06 show that most contributions subscribe to 
the ‘Financial’ view that the GFS is a system in which the fundamental nature of 
its catastrophes are financial. Mishkin (1992) and Minsky (1993) are the earliest 
proponents of this point of view in the core literature. Mishkin describes crisis 
conditions as an inability of financial markets to channel funds efficiently, while 
Minsky refers to the GFS as a complex, sophisticated financial system spinning 
out of control through financial instability, exhibiting extremes in both inflations 
and debt-deflations. 
Jorda, Schularick and Taylor (2011), in their 140 years of lessons across 14 
developed countries, identify five episodes of global financial instability over that 
time. Their view is that credit growth is the single best predictor of financial 
instability, among other financial imbalances in macroeconomic dynamics. Foster 
and Magdoff (2009) take this view further in their analysis of the recent financial 
crisis, calling it a “great calamity of neoliberal capitalism”, taking the world from 
a financial explosion to a financial implosion. Whereas Mishkin and Frederic 
(1999) argue that financial instability arises from financial markets becoming 
unable to perform essential functions, due to adverse selection and moral hazard 
by system participants such as banks. Allen and Gale (2007) summarize these 
different viewpoints nicely in their compendium of lectures on financial crises.  
When the answer theme totals for this question in Table 6 are examined, the 
‘Systemic’ and ‘Critical’ themes also appear to be well supported by LoT in this 
core literature, although they are not as similar as might first be expected. The 
‘Systemic’ view of catastrophic instability, as represented by this literature, is not 
just based on theory about generic systems, but includes economic and financial 
notions. For example, in his theory of systemic fragility, Minsky (1977) refers to 
the susceptibility of economic disruption as a normal consequence of the fragile 
financial ‘structures’ economies tend to develop, creating what he calls the 
incoherent behaviour of financial crisis. While Acharya (2009) models instability 
arising from a system of correlated risks operating at a collective level among 
participants such as banks, and Martinez-Jaramillo et al (2010) favour an 
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operational system of commerce. The only contribution invoking systems theory 
is Helbing (2010), who refers to the self-organizing, adaptive nature of socio-
economic systems in terms of complex systems theory and methods.  
In contrast, the ‘Critical’ view of instability or total collapse uses notions from 
theories about complexity, catastrophe and evolutionary systems, such as the 
notions of Yang, Mu and Yao (2009) about how a financial system’s brittleness 
can trigger catastrophe. Zeidan and Richardson (2010) and Allen and Snyder 
(2009) also consider a range of such models in their reviews of the literatures 
from disciplines such as econophysics and evolutionary biology, using a 
complexity-theory lens. 
The ‘Global’ and ‘Structural’ answer themes in Table 6 also appear to have 
some support from the core literature LoTs. From his global perspective, Stiglitz 
(1999) calls for reforms to ‘economic architecture’ to deal with disastrous short-
term capital flows during crises; and the structural perspectives of Gramlich and 
Oet (2011) and Boyd, DeNicola and Smith (2004) suggest that structural fragility 
has a key role during crises, in both competitive and monopolistic systems. 
Q2. What is meant by the risk of such an occurrence? 
Interpretive analysis found four answer themes for this question in the core 
literature, which were used in the detail thematic analysis to identify 21 insights 
for this question from 16 contributions in the core literature of 6 applied lines of 
thinking (summarized in the Q2 row in Table 31, and the Q2 column in Table 6).  
Table 30 also suggests there is no consensus within conversation S05 on the 
meaning or definition of systemic risk, which seems to be confirmed by Table 6.  
Systemic risk, and associated terms, are usually defined or explained by 
contributions to this selected literature from some other research agenda, without 
much regard for rigour. For example, from the ‘Causes’ answer theme, Acharya 
(2009) defines it as a collective risk-shifting phenomenon in which one bank’s 
failure propagates as a contagion, causing the failure of many banks. In the 
‘Consequences’ answer theme, Huang, Zhou and Zhu (2009) define systemic risk 
as multiple simultaneous defaults of large financial institutions in their 
contribution of a way to measure that risk of a financial system. Similarly, from 
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the ‘Combined’ answer theme, Martinez-Jaramillo et al (2010) refer to a general 
acknowledgement that it is a “risk of the occurrence of an event that threatens the 
well functioning of the system of interest (financial, payments, banking, etc.) 
sometimes to the point of making its operation impossible”. 
In their review of systemic risk in the financial sphere, Govtvan and Mansurov 
(2011) confirm there is no established definition of systemic risk, and conclude it 
is “... the most complicated and poorly studied macro-level risk effect”. 
Q3. How does that risk materialize? 
Interpretive analysis found four answer themes for this question in the core 
literature, which were used in the detail thematic analysis to identify 544 insights 
for this question from 50 contributions in the core literature of 103 applied lines of 
thinking (summarized in the Q3 row in Table 31, and the Q3 column in Table 6). 
Among the contributions supporting the ‘Behaviour’ answer theme for this 
question, a wide range of behaviours is blamed for materializing systemic risk. 
They include panics (Uhlig, 2010), concentrations of collective actions (Acharya, 
2009), competition (Berger, Klapper and Turk-Ariss, 2009), bounded rationality 
(Rotheli, 2010), diversification (Wagner, 2006), moral hazard (Wolf, 1999), 
intellectual hazard (Miller and Rosenfeld, 2010), and operational policies and 
practices (Eisenbeis, Frame and Wall, 2007; Hart, 2009; Duffie, 2010). 
There is less support from contributions in this literature for the answer themes 
of ‘Economic Environment’, and ‘Financial Services’. Bikker and Metzemakers 
(2005) offer the best explanation of how provisioning behaviour and 
procyclicality interact with the economic environment, while Karras (2009) gives 
the best explanation of how financial services in the form of credit derivatives 
precipitated the sub-prime credit disaster leading to the current financial crisis. 
Finally, the answer theme of ‘Infrastructure’ found support from those who 
attribute the materialization of systemic risk to regulatory and central bank 
intervention (Brunetti, Di Filippo and Harris, 2011; Espenilla Jr., 2009; Kaufman 
and Scott, 2003). While accounting rules were offered as a mechanism of 
confusion by Magnan (2009). 
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Q4. What can be done to mitigate that risk? 
Interpretive analysis found four answer themes for this question in the core 
literature, which were used in the detail thematic analysis to identify 291 insights 
for this question from 43 contributions in the core literature of 73 applied lines of 
thinking (summarized in the Q4 row in Table 31, and the Q4 column in Table 6). 
The structure of answer themes for this answer matched their equivalent 
themes from the previous question. The difference was introduced by swapping 
the word ‘Through’ with ‘Modify’ in the full versions of these answer theme 
titles. For that reason, contributions about what could be done to mitigate systemic 
risk were seen to support a similar pattern of answers to the question of how that 
risk materializes. 
Modifying behaviour was supported by such contributions as Panageas (2010), 
who counselled caution in the way bailouts were provided, to ensure there were 
incentives to manage risk better in the future. Improved prudential regulation was 
argued to be the key by Acharya (2009). 
Early warning systems (Davis and Karim, 2008) and macro-prudential leading 
indicators (Bhattacharyay, 2003) were favoured by the ‘Modify Interactions’ 
literature. Although the rebalancing of policies (Freedman et al., 2010) and 
reforming of the global economic architecture (Stiglitz, 1999) gained equal 
support in this literature. 
Among the literature from the answer theme advocating modifications to 
systemically important services, credit-related services received all the attention. 
Karras (2009) argues that use of credit derivatives can have multiple effects on 
bank behaviour, and can lead to a reduction in their capital reserves. While better 
regulation of credit agencies holds the answer for Sy (2009). 
Finally, the answer theme suggesting modification of external interventions 
was favoured by Honohan (2008) and Blankart and Fasten (2009). They both 
advocate containment and resolution practices, but the former suggests that 
instability was the result of them being applied in a way he characterized as “too 
little too late”. 
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2.3.18 Conclusions 
2.3.18.1 Findings 
A gap in theory and knowledge about practice has been found in the evidence-
base of primary research that is presented and discussed in this systematic review, 
by the techniques of descriptive and interpretive analysis applied during thematic 
synthesis. It confirms that a unifying thesis capable of fully answering the 
literature review questions is indeed necessary and missing, and appears to be 
feasible if approached from a multi-disciplinary perspective. 
Eight conjectures were synthesised from ten thematic gaps in the explanations 
provided for literature review questions by relevant lines of thinking in the core 
literature (see Table 4). Each gap represents where there is unfulfilled potential 
for making contributions to answering four literature questions derived from this 
review’s initial research problem. When considered together with the analysis of 
answers found in the literature (see sub-section 2.3.17.5), they suggest that a 
plausible opportunity exists for developing a unifying thesis about systemic risk 
and its mitigation for the global financial system, based on notions of complexity 
and operational behaviour, which can also inform a contribution to regulatory 
practice. A theory of this type could explain specific phenomena that emerge 
when the system is close to operational catastrophe, and provide a neutral 
framework for interpreting how other contributions interrelate in this fragmented 
and disparate literature. 
2.3.18.2 Limitations 
The findings of this review are based on results from a qualitative method of 
synthesis, exposing it to challenges of lacking rigour. However, there is currently 
no quantitative synthesis method suitable for the project’s stated objective of 
identifying theory development opportunities from a disparate multidisciplinary 
literature (see synthesis aims in Appendix C.9, and the discussion about 
qualitative methods in sub-section 2.1). To some extent, that limitation has been 
addressed by ensuring transparency through providing an audit-trail of all 
literature collected, in the form of complete lists of categorized references in soft-
copy (see supporting evidence and materials in Appendix I). 
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Another way of improving that qualitative synthesis rigour could have been 
automation of interpretive analysis and synthesis rules, to ensure greater 
consistency in their application. This would also have enabled the synthesis 
process to be more replicable. However, to implement that improvement it would 
have been necessary to introduce another software application for rules 
automation into the systematic review tools environment. Nvivo9 does not have 
sufficient functionality to do this. The additional cost in terms of money and time 
required would have been prohibitive, so the ‘full audit trail’ solution was adopted 
as the quickest and simplest way to achieve adequate transparency and 
replicability. 
Finally, a smaller evidence-base could have been scoped by reducing the range 
of terms considered equivalent to ‘systemic risk’ and its related terms in 
economics and finance. However, it would have made any argument that a truly 
multi-disciplinary assessment of current understanding had been achieved by this 
review less credible. 
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2.4 Exploratory Search 
During project 2 in the research methodology (see Figure 4), before an outline of 
theory was developed in step 6, step 5 called for a more focused exploratory 
search of both in-scope and alternative literature to find more insights directly 
applicable to the research problem. Its findings are discussed here within the 
literature review section of this thesis, so that a combined review and assessment 
of the extended core literature can follow in sub-sections 2.5 to 2.8, even though 
the two reviews were not executed consecutively. 
First, a return to the literature sources of project 1 used the same search strings 
to look for new insights about the identified gap in theory published since the 
systematic review extraction date of 16/17th August 2011, and found no new 
‘exemplar’ contributions to add to the core literature. Then attention turned to 
what may be known in alternative literature sources about three new literature 
review questions (see Figure 10), derived from the gap assertions, aimed at 
finding insights that could test, validate and refine the outlined theory. 
 
Figure 10: Exploratory Literature Review Questions 
Finally, by following references in the bibliographies of the 194 selected 
contributions that cite potentially relevant literature not scoped into the initial 
systematic review, and continuing to follow the citation trails of applicable lines 
of thinking, 156 new exemplar contributions were revealed and added to the core 
literature (see underlined entries in the References section). This created a more 
diverse collection of relevant insights in an extended core literature. A picture 
began to emerge of latest research in a number of apparently unrelated academic 
fields, which suggested improvements to the systematic review conjectures for 
theory development, from which a research question is derived in sub-section 2.9. 
Q1.  What is known about disorder and related topics? 
Q2.  How may the operational behaviour of a complex system be 
modeled? 
Q3.  What are the implications of answers to Q1 and Q2 for making a 
contribution to theory and policy or practice? 
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2.5 Theory in Economics 
2.5.1 Map 
 
Figure 11: Literature Review Map, sub-section 2.5. 
2.5.2 Perceived value 
Willem H. Buiter, Chief Economist at Citigroup, expressed a popularly endorsed 
opinion of the economics practitioner community by writing in the Financial 
Times on the 6th March, 2009, about “The unfortunate uselessness of most ‘state 
of the art’ academic monetary economics”. He wrote: 
“Standard macroeconomic theory did not help to foresee the crisis, nor has 
it helped understand it or craft solutions. This column argues that both the 
New Classical and New Keynesian complete markets macroeconomic 
theories not only did not allow the key questions about insolvency and 
illiquidity to be answered. They did not allow such questions to be asked. A 
new paradigm is needed.”  
(Buiter, 2009) 
At first glance this appears to be an extreme statement by a senior practitioner 
who may be attempting to deflect attention away from poor decisions made by 
many in the banking industry. However, there is a surprising degree of support for 
this view growing in recent academic literature, although the aforementioned 
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schools of economic thought continue to be endorsed in academic courses on that 
discipline. 
When Buiter calls for a new paradigm, he is invoking the notion proposed by 
Thomas Kuhn (1962) to describe what happens when scientists within an 
academic discipline encounter anomalies they cannot explain by their current 
mode of thinking, assumptions and generally accepted understanding. According 
to Kuhn, when a sufficiently large body of new findings challenges that thinking 
in ways that cannot be disregarded as being due to errors of some kind in the 
research process, the discipline enters a state of crisis. A revolution follows in 
which intellectual conflict eventually leads to a new mode of thinking becoming 
dominant. He characterizes this process as a shift from one paradigm to another. 
Therefore, what Buiter is calling for is no less than an intellectual revolution in 
macroeconomics.  
A glance at the academic literature shows that the entire field of economics has 
indeed been going through the trauma of a paradigm shift for some time now. On 
the revolutionary side, Quiggin’s (2010) book titled ‘Zombie Economics’ offers a 
well-received exposition of “how dead ideas still walk among us” from a 
distinguished, award-winning academic. Counter-arguments are provided from 
the establishment by Williamson’s (2011) critique of Quiggin’s critique in his 
review essay ‘A Defence of Contemporary Economics’. Both are credible 
representations of the arguments offered by the growing literature from their side 
in this debate.  
Essentially, five ideas are being challenged and defended: 
i. The Great Moderation; 
ii. The Efficient Markets Hypothesis; 
iii. Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE); 
iv. Trickle-down Economics; 
v. Privatization. 
Although the debates around all of these ideas are fascinating, for the purposes 
of this thesis only idea iii above will be examined further. Given the advantage 
enjoyed by so-called contemporary economics as custodian of the incumbent 
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paradigm, and the potential offered by its critics for contributing to a new 
paradigm of economics, this thesis will focus on issues of alleged weaknesses that 
are relevant to the project 2 research problem. 
2.5.3 Alternatives 
The theme of a Kuhnian crisis in economics is summarised in a recent article 
(Holt, Rosser Jr and Colander, 2011) in which the authors argue that the 
neoclassical era in economics has already ended, and is being replaced by the 
‘complexity era’. However, they describe that process as not being revolutionary, 
but evolving out of a combination of neoclassical and other less orthodox work.   
2.5.3.1 New Opportunities 
In their assessment of the future of economics, the traditional role of models based 
on a priori assumptions will diminish, and empirically driven models and 
assumptions will eventually replace them. Answering grand questions will 
become less important than learning how to develop a better understanding of 
economic complexity that cannot be explained by models of the aggregate 
economy using analytically solvable equations. To do this, they suggest the 
economics profession has to “go into the trenches, and base our analysis on 
experimental and empirical data”, using behavioural approaches, and by adopting 
a complexity vision (see sub-section 2.7.2 for a further discussion on complexity). 
Their assessment is based on a rising tide of opinion, illustrated by an earlier 
paper which directly addresses the paradigm-shift question (Dore and Rosser Jr, 
2007). It concludes that neoclassical economics has already been transcended by a 
considerable body of empirical analysis and econometric work of an explicitly 
dynamic nature. Anomalies in that data are described as being inconsistent with 
the neoclassical model, finding chaotic dynamics and complexity to be rife in 
everyday reality, and indicating nonlinearities that could not be explained by 
traditional notions such as general equilibrium. 
Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) is an attempt by the 
neoclassical perspective to accommodate this dynamic behaviour of the economy 
as it changes over time. However, Gatti, Gaffeo and Gallegati (2010) argue there 
is a reductionist approach at the heart of mainstream DSGE models which 
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wrongly assumes all macroeconomic phenomena can be reduced to the collective 
effects of individual microeconomic behaviours, and so there is no 
macroeconomics worth preserving as an autonomous field. This approach is 
described as making an epistemological fallacy of composition, in which a 
property is assumed to be true for the whole when it is true for its constituent 
parts. Furthermore, they point out that in sciences such as statistical physics a 
hierarchical reductionist approach of that type is allowed if and only if the 
interaction between elementary units is linear. On the basis of that criterion, the 
practice of using DSGE to model dynamic economic behaviour that is non-linear 
must be discarded. Consequently, they suggest there is now a compelling need for 
a meaningful reconstruction of economic theory. They argue that macroeconomics 
needs a new scientific paradigm based on notions of complexity, with new tools 
and a new research agenda, to develop theories capable of explaining “how a 
cluster of interacting agents succeed in coordinating themselves without any 
central authority, and how they suddenly fail to do so from time to time”. One 
way of achieving that objective, they observe, is by the cross-fertilization of ideas 
when ‘contaminations’ with other scientific fields have “allowed the emergence 
of brand new questions never asked systematically before”. 
2.5.3.2 The Agent-Based Approach 
Leijonhufvud (2006) offers a good example of this vision in his discussion of 
macroeconomics and the potential of agent-based process analysis for explaining 
the self-regulating adaptive capabilities of a capitalist economy. He describes the 
first responsibility of a macroeconomist as working towards an understanding of 
major economic disasters, but confirms there has been a general failure to throw 
light on that subject. Although an economy is known to be an evolving, complex, 
adaptive dynamical system, he observes that the progress made in studying such 
systems over recent years in many other fields has not been matched by 
economics. He speculates this may be because the central concepts of complex 
systems theory that are generating excitement in other fields are old themes in 
economics; such as emergent order, and multiple-layered hierarchical structures of 
systems with embedded systems, comprised of simple interrelated components, 
sometimes interacting and operating on different timescales. The problem, he 
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suggests, is those old themes belong to an earlier form of neoclassicism, from 
before the 1950’s.  
The DSGE framework of modern macroeconomics has no place for most of 
these concepts, preferring alternative notions such as the representative agent 
model (see Kirman, 1992, for a discussion of this model), which uses a single 
highly-rational agent to displace the natural idea of multiple heterogeneous agents 
with bounded rationality interacting in ways that can be interpreted as creating 
such market forces as supply and demand. Leijonhufvud concludes that although 
the theories of Marshall and Keynes from that earlier form of neoclassicism were 
flawed, agent-based methods could tap into the older tradition in ways that are 
capable of advancing our understanding of the adaptive dynamics of actual 
economies and their systems. 
2.5.3.3 An Evolutionary Perspective 
Nelson and Winter (1982) conclude that the ideas of orthodox microeconomic 
theory from the 1950’s onwards, exemplified by neoclassical growth theory, were 
obscuring the essential features of the processes of economic change, and taking 
understanding “down a smooth road to a dead end”. They recognized the need 
for an evolutionary approach to growth theory, and developed a model in their 
seminal work on ‘An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change’ which combined 
their notion of selection equilibrium with existing ideas about evolutionary 
economics (see reviews in: Dosi and Nelson, 1994; and Hodgson, 1998), to 
explain how profitable expansion in firms is related to the decision rules they use 
when engaged in searching for how to evolve the way they do things in response 
to change. The authors chose to embody this evolutionary model of economic 
growth in a computer simulation, and ran a series of experiments which varied 
key parameter values to produce an account of economic growth in technical 
change that encompasses economic phenomena at both micro and macro levels 
derived from firm-level microeconomics. Their main intention was to develop a 
general evolutionary approach to theorising about economic change, not to 
construct and explore particular economic models or arguments through 
simulation. However, they observed that a combination of evolutionary theorising 
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and simulation permits greater complexity to be modelled, enabling a better 
understanding of intrinsically dynamic phenomena. 
Considerable research effort followed that early attempt to escape the 
limitations of neoclassical economics. A survey of the methods and building 
blocks of formal evolutionary economic modelling by Safarzynska and van den 
Bergh (2010a) provides three broad classifications of latest thinking in this area of 
research: game theory and selection dynamics, computation, and multi-agent 
models; with a comparison between their methods. In his article on evolutionary 
macroeconomics, Foster (2011) adds to that thinking by offering a new research 
agenda with an analytical framework for macroeconomics using a ‘micro-meso-
macro’ approach to economic evolution, focused on the stocks and flows of 
energy and knowledge in complex economic systems. This addresses the 
challenge of how a more balanced and coherent evolutionary macroeconomic 
approach to economic growth could be devised around discovered ‘meso-rules’ 
used by ‘meso-agents’ who represent diversity in microeconomic behaviour, built 
on the insights of Keynes and Schumpeter rather than neoclassical principles. 
Finally, Nelson’s (2012) recent interpretation of neoclassical price theory is a 
particular example of a new trend in evolutionary economics which considers the 
effects of shifts in demand or supply that may have special relevance to this 
programme of research.  
2.5.4 Issues for this thesis 
From the narrower perspective of this thesis, Boulding (1991) touches on the main 
deficiency of economic thinking summarised in sub-section 2.5.2. Evolution is not 
a continuous process as Darwin supposed, it is interrupted by catastrophes and 
other improbable events (Gould, 1982). With so much emphasis on theories of 
growth in mainstream economic literature, scant attention has been given to the 
implications of theories on punctuated equilibrium and criticality in evolution, as 
in self-organization into a critical steady state with intermittent coevolutionary 
avalanches (Bak and Sneppen, 1993; van den Bergh and Gowdy, 2000). Insights 
from evolutionary economics capable of explaining discontinuities using notions 
of that type from biology and physics could potentially be used to make 
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significant contributions to the systemic risk and financial crisis literature, by 
informing theory development from the conjectures of project 1. 
The other deficiency of this literature is more fundamental. The value of 
mathematical formalizations in many of its contributions is challenged by 
Velupillai (2005), who exposes “the unreasonable ineffectiveness of mathematics 
in economics”. He argues it is often “unreasonable, because the assumptions are 
economically unwarranted; [and] ineffective because the formalizations imply 
non-constructive and incomputable structures”. For example, the common 
practice of axiomatic encapsulation and compression of unrealistic fundamentals 
into precise mathematical theorems suggesting proof is shown to be misleading 
and irrelevant, because it cannot explain the proven mathematical intractability, 
insolvability and undecidability of solutions capable of experimentally 
demonstrating the true dynamical and complex nature of observed economic 
phenomena. His conclusion is that these undecidabilities and incomputabilities 
can be more reasonably explored with simpler Diophantine formalisms, allowing 
variables to take only integer values, in alternative mathematical structures 
underpinning freer experimental methodologies such as cellular automata.  
That insight offers useful criteria for selecting an appropriate overall research 
philosophy for theory development, and suitable methods for addressing the 
conjectures of project 1. 
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2.6 Financial Crises and Systemic Risk of Failure 
2.6.1 Map 
 
Figure 12: Literature Review Map, sub-section 2.6. 
2.6.2 A brief history of financial crises 
In their compilation of material from a series of lectures, Allen and Gale (2007) 
begin by describing financial crises as complex events. A brief analysis of crisis 
history is then provided in chapter 1, in which they examine the relationships 
between various historical events and the crisis phenomena that accompanied 
them, illustrated with references to findings from key contributions to the 
financial crisis literature. By considering a time period that ranges from the 
establishment of the first central bank in Sweden over 300 years ago in 1668, to 
the Argentine crisis of 2001-2002, Allen and Gale show how we arrived at the 
crisis situations of modern times. Among the many conclusions they draw, 
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perhaps the most relevant to this thesis is the observation that “crises are not 
everywhere and always bad”. Sometimes financial crises stimulate increases in 
effective contingencies, and generate improvements in the allocation of resources. 
But in general, increased financial fragility occurs because markets are 
incomplete, and it tends to have undesirable effects on economic welfare. It is 
therefore argued that an ability to identify the circumstances under which market 
failures can lead to such effects should be a priority for policy makers. Potential 
changes in the regulation of bank capital and liquidity are cited as practical ways 
of doing that. However, delivering more stability in overall economic welfare 
would require a better understanding of the complexities of financial crises, and 
the global financial system in general. 
Although there is a significant empirical literature on financial crises, Allen 
and Gale argue that theory is at a relatively early stage of development and much 
work remains to be done. They go on to summarize the state of financial crisis 
theory and develop an improved theoretical approach to analysing financial crises 
in subsequent chapters, after first providing an account of what has been found in 
the data so far.  
That account includes the empirical work of Bordo et al (2001), who analyse 
the macroeconomics of financial crises found in the data from a sample of 21 
countries over the years 1880 to 1997, and in further data from a larger sample of 
56 economies over the years 1973 to 1997. Four distinct periods were identified: 
i. Gold Standard Era, 1880-1913; 
ii. Interwar Years, 1919-1939; 
iii. Bretton Woods Period, 1945-1971; 
iv. Recent Period, 1973-1997. 
The results showed crisis frequency since 1973 has doubled that of the Bretton 
Woods and Gold Standard periods, and resembles the crisis-ridden Interwar 
Years, but crises have not become discernibly more severe in depth or duration. 
Unsurprisingly, recessions that occur with crises were found to be more severe 
than recessions at other times, lasting on average from 2 to 3 years and costing 5 
to 10 per cent of GDP. However, the various monetary and regulatory regimes in 
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effect over the four periods analysed seemed to suggest their differences of 
approach had little effect on preventing such crises, even when banking, currency 
and twin crises (banking and currency) were considered separately. A notable 
exception is the lack of banking crises during the Bretton Woods Period, which is 
often attributed to severe banking regulations and state controls introduced after 
the Great Depression. 
More recently, Kindleberger and Aliber (2011) provide an updated edition of 
their history of manias, panics and crashes, in which they analyse the stages of 
financial crises over a 400 year period from before ‘The Dutch Tulip Bulb 
Bubble’ bursting in 1636 to this current ‘Great Recession’. They describe how 
financial crises often follow bubbles in credit supply that stimulate economic 
booms until unsustainable bubbles in asset prices result in their collapse. Four 
recent waves of financial crises make the last forty years particularly unique, 
because the bubbles in those waves involved many countries simultaneously, and 
money flows associated with the implosion of bubbles in each wave probably 
contributed to the next wave. 
Other circumstances, such as banking and currency crises, are described in the 
context of financial crises and the links between them. A key feature of those 
links in the twentieth century, and financial crises generally according to 
Kindleberger and Aliber, is that central banks had to choose at those times 
between giving priority to maintaining the value of their currency or supporting 
their domestic economic stability. The crisis contagion effects in the 1930s 
triggered by fluctuations in those priorities after the Great Depression led central 
banks to conclude that the economic costs of business failures and unemployment 
from maintaining their currency exchange rate parity were too high, and certainly 
greater than the economic benefits. The key lessons learnt at that time, and 
revisited in the 1990s, are that: cross-border flows of money induced by central 
bank manipulation of currency rates often distort national competitiveness for a 
few years, with undesirable effects; and, free-floating currencies tend to 
‘overshoot’ or ‘undershoot’ their long run values, a behaviour which is 
exacerbated if central banks intermittently try to maintain exchange rate parity at 
times of crisis. 
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In terms of the number, scope and severity of country-level financial crises, the 
period since the 1980s is cited as the most ‘tumultuous’ in history (Kindleberger 
and Aliber, 2011: page 278). More national banking systems have collapsed in 
this period, and there have been more credit and asset-price bubbles, than in any 
other comparable period, with a resultant cost to taxpayers in some countries 
amounting to losses of 15 to 20 per cent of their GDP. One emerging pattern 
indicates that financial crises in this period follow two or three years after sudden 
reversals in the normal directions of cross-border money flows, when movements 
of money slow or dry up, causing the prices of key assets to fall and a 
depreciation of the affected currency. Another observation from this period 
indicates that the indebtedness usually comes to rest in a large group of system 
participants, such as home owners or large government institutions. It is usually 
not spread more widely throughout the financial system. 
A recent article documenting new research from a more world-wide 
perspective by Jorda, Schularick and Taylor (2011) found five episodes of global 
financial instability appearing as temporal and spatial patterns among country-
level financial crises, credit booms and external imbalances of 14 developed 
countries in a long-run data set covering 140 years (1870-2008). They also 
observed that the macroeconomic dynamics preceding global financial crises, 
when crises are ‘synchronized’ across many countries, tended to exhibit higher 
credit growth and more depressed short-term interest rates relative to isolated 
national crises; while the recessionary aftermath of global crises had deeper 
slumps and stronger turnarounds in general than recessions following other 
circumstances. However, external imbalances in long-run current and capital 
account data for economies involved did not seem to play a large role in creating 
financial instability over the period since World War II. They concede that the 
patterns identified were complex and not sufficiently clear to enable them to 
entirely reject the notion that “crises occur by and large randomly”. Although, 
they found the data concerning pre-crisis and post crisis macroeconomic dynamics 
clearly shows that excessive credit growth poses the key stability risk, and it 
suggests the rationale behind policy proposals on limiting financial fragility by 
restricting current account imbalances is not supported by empirical evidence. 
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2.6.3 Themes in history 
The common themes among this literature of relevance to this thesis can be 
organized into 5 observations about financial crises:  
i. They are complex phenomena.  
ii. They are not always bad for economic welfare.  
iii. They occur as concentrations in the behaviour of financial system 
participants and system responses.  
iv. They are usually induced by some initial stimulus;  
v. They escalate by some coordination process. 
2.6.4 Current global financial instability 
The IMF’s Global Financial Stability Report (Brockmeijer et al., 2012: October 
issue) is a biannual economic and financial survey of the world economy, 
published for the purpose of: 
[providing an informed assessment of] “… key risks facing the global 
financial system. In normal times, the report seeks to play a role in 
preventing crises by highlighting policies that may mitigate systemic risks, 
thereby contributing to global financial stability and the sustained growth of 
the IMF’s member countries”. 
It provides the latest official view of the state of global financial system at the 
time of writing this thesis, and makes observations which can inform a solution to 
the research problem.  
2.6.4.1 IMF Assessment 
The overall assessment is that risks to financial stability have increased since the 
April 2012 issue of this report, and confidence has become very fragile. The 
principal concern is the euro-area crisis, with possible currency redenomination 
fuelling retrenchments against exposures to the euro-periphery, resulting in capital 
flight and increasing market fragmentation. This sentiment in financial markets is 
generating contractions in projected credit supply which are expected to increase 
financial burdens on the corporate sector in the euro-area periphery, as funding 
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becomes even more difficult to obtain at a time when banks in the region are 
deleveraging and sovereign stress is generating a difficult economic climate. 
The report urges national policymakers to “build on improvements and avoid 
fresh setbacks”, by: reversing capital flight and reintegrating the euro zone 
through growth-friendly fiscal consolidations; reducing external imbalances 
through structural reforms; and resolving outstanding issues with the capital, 
structure and viability of their banks. 
At the euro zone level, the report calls for sufficient funding to be made 
available to banks through the European Central Bank’s (ECB’s) liquidity 
framework, and for ‘concrete progress’ towards establishing a banking union in 
the euro zone. A successful banking union is described as one with sufficient 
resources over the longer term to maintain a credible bank resolution authority 
and a joint deposit insurance fund. 
Meanwhile, flows of capital out of the euro zone to perceived safe-havens in 
other jurisdictions, notably the United States and Japan, are described as a flight 
towards unsustainable debt dynamics and growing local interdependencies 
between banks and sovereigns, where necessary steps towards fiscal adjustment 
are yet to be taken. The report hints at the flight of capital dangers of that lack of 
action, arising from the suspected role of external imbalances in creating financial 
instability indicated by long-run current and capital account data for economies 
(see historical discussion in sub-section 2.6.2), by highlighting: “The key lesson of 
the past few years is that imbalances need to be addressed well before markets 
start flagging credit concerns”.  
2.6.4.2 Recommendations 
On the topic of regulatory reforms, the report compares progress with a 
benchmark set of desirable features, categorized by: more transparency; less 
complexity; and less leverage. Analysis suggests that financial systems around the 
world are still overly complex, interconnected and concentrated, with many 
outstanding concerns such as ‘too-important-to-fail’ resolution issues. To some 
extent that is attributed to on-going crisis intervention measures delaying reforms. 
The areas still requiring attention are given as: a decision on the desirability or 
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otherwise of intervention by direct restrictions on certain business activities; 
consideration of how to deal with potential systemic risks of the nonbank system 
(i.e. shadow banking); and more progress in planning for how to recover from 
large institution failures, or their collapse resolution. 
Operational issues are hinted at in the report when it recommends by what it 
calls the desirable ‘structural features’ of a more stable financial system, citing 
notions such as “non-traditional bank intermediation”, and “cross-border 
connections … [acting ] as conduits to transmit destabilizing shocks”, or by 
statements such as “[banking] global interconnectivity needs to be managed”, 
that convey more than structural meaning. However, explicit recommendations 
about global financial system operations are not made, even though detailed 
worked examples are provided throughout the report to explain how operational 
effects occur (e.g. bank deleveraging simulations). This omission may be 
explained by the declared purpose of the report, which is to “[prevent] crises by 
highlighting policies”, as quoted at the beginning of this sub-section. But, when it 
makes assertions about a more stable financial system, policy suggestions 
regarding how they could be successfully operationalised would be helpful. As 
always, the devil is in the details. 
2.6.4.3 Systemic risk 
Finally, use of the term ‘systemic risk’ appears in different contexts, with implied 
meanings that are incompatible and potentially confusing. For example, many 
references are made to ‘systemic risks’, in the plural, whereas at other times a 
meaning of overall risk is implied by the use of a singular reference. Furthermore, 
in the singular, the systemic risk of a sub-systemic phenomenon is sometimes 
discussed, and in the plural, various causes and effects are referred to as systemic 
risks. Clarity is needed about the risk incurred and its causes, effects and 
subordinate risks. 
2.6.4.4 Relevant conclusions 
The main findings and recommendations of the report relevant to this thesis are: 
the global financial system continues to approach deeper levels of instability; and, 
complexity and concentrations in the financial system need to be addressed. Two 
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further observations arise from a critical assessment of its contents. The first 
concerns a missed opportunity to directly address the operational implications of 
findings, even for the purpose of making broad policy recommendations. For 
example, what policies should be applied when making decisions about reducing 
operational complexity, or when improving the operational visibility of 
systemically important nonbank institutions (i.e. shadow banking)? Secondly, 
systemic risk remains a confused notion that suffers from the lack of a precise 
definition and consequent inadequate analysis. 
2.6.5 The 2008 financial crisis 
To help explain how the global financial system got into the state described by the 
previous sub-section, this thesis turns to the final report of The National Crisis 
Inquiry Commission on the causes of the financial and economic crisis in the 
United States (Commission, 2011). Although Congress did not ask the 
Commission to offer policy recommendations, their report does provide a well-
researched analysis of how the greatest financial and economic upheaval since the 
Great Depression occurred. The Commission’s perspective was focused on the 
United States, but the report’s findings are generally relevant to the entire global 
financial system. Their declared mission was to ask and answer the central 
question:  
“How did it come to pass that in 2008 our nation was forced to choose 
between two stark and painful alternatives – either risk the total collapse of 
our financial system and economy or inject trillions of taxpayer dollars into 
the financial system and an array of companies, as millions of Americans 
still lost their jobs, their savings, and their homes?” 
2.6.5.1 Inquiry Assessment 
The major findings of that inquiry resulted in the following conclusions, offered 
in the hope that lessons may be learned to help avoid future catastrophe. 
i. This financial crisis was avoidable. 
ii. Widespread failures in the financial regulation and supervision proved 
devastating to the stability of the nation’s financial markets. 
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iii. Dramatic failures of corporate governance and risk management at many 
systemically important financial institutions were a key cause of this 
crisis. 
iv. A combination of excessive borrowing, risky investments, and lack of 
transparency put the financial system on a collision course with crisis. 
v. The government was ill prepared for the crisis, and its inconsistent 
response added to the uncertainty and panic in the financial markets. 
vi. There was a systemic breakdown in accountability and ethics. 
vii. Collapsing mortgage-lending standards and the mortgage securitization 
pipeline lit and spread the flame of contagion and crisis. 
viii. Over-the-counter derivatives contributed significantly to this crisis. 
ix. The failures of credit rating agencies were essential cogs in the wheel of 
financial destruction. 
Perhaps the most poignant comments are made at the end of the conclusions 
section of this report: 
“While we have not been charged with making policy recommendations, the 
very purpose of our report has been to take stock of what happened so we 
can plot a new course. In our inquiry, we found dramatic breakdowns of 
corporate governance, profound lapses in regulatory oversight, and near 
fatal flaws in our financial system. We also found a series of choices and 
actions led us toward a catastrophe for which we were ill prepared. These 
are serious matters that must be addressed and resolved to restore faith in 
our financial markets, to avoid the next crisis, and to rebuild a system of 
capital that provides the foundation for a new era of broadly shared 
prosperity. 
The greater tragedy would be to accept the refrain that no one could have 
seen this coming and thus nothing could have been done. If we accept this 
notion, it will happen again. 
This report should not be viewed as the end of the nation’s examination of 
this crisis. There is still much to learn, much to investigate, and much to fix. 
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This is our collective responsibility. It falls to us to make different choices if 
we want different results.” 
Apart from the valuable conclusions (i to ix) mentioned above, which serve as 
examples of the factors that can conspire to give rise to catastrophic failure of the 
global financial system, two other issues presented in the report have special 
relevance for this thesis. 
2.6.5.2 Recommendations 
The first is the issue of shadow banking discussed in chapter two of the report, 
also referred to as the ‘nonbank system’ in the Global Financial Stability Report 
reviewed in sub-section 2.6.4. This is closely related to the shadow market 
described by Weiner (2010), but takes a narrower view which defines it as the 
banking sub-system comprised of:  
“… financial institutions and activities that in some respects parallel 
banking activities but are subject to less regulation than commercial banks. 
Institutions include mutual funds, investment banks, and hedge funds”. 
Another definition is provided by the latest Global Shadow Banking 
Monitoring Report from the Financial Stability Board (FSB, 2012), which offers a 
functional interpretation in which there is: 
“… credit intermediation involving entities and activities outside the 
regular banking system”. 
The key point raised in chapter 2 is that shadow banking was, and continues to 
be, an essentially unregulated sub-system of the global financial system involved 
in activities that create concentrations of counterparty credit and operational risks 
in a very few firms. As of June 30th, 2008, the report cites examples of enormous 
OTC derivatives positions for JP Morgan of $94.5 trillion, $37.7 trillion for Bank 
of America, and $35.8 trillion for Citigroup. Through their interconnections with 
other financial institutions, these holding companies and investment banks clearly 
posed unacceptable levels of systemic risk to the entire global financial system. 
The aggregate size of the shadow banking system reached approximately half the 
size of total banking system assets in 2011, making it equivalent to 111% of the 
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aggregate GDP of all 26 jurisdictions monitored by the Global Shadow Banking 
Report (FSB, 2012). Consequently, by asset size, more than half of the banking 
system remains essentially unregulated but able to expose the entire system to 
concentrations in risk. 
There are others, however, who point out that the blame for current crisis 
circumstances should not be laid exclusively at bankers’ feet. While the banking 
industry has clearly played a central role in this economic catastrophe, some 
economists argue that the roots of fiscal problems went much deeper (Foster and 
Magdoff, 2009), mainly due to stagnation tendencies in the underlying economy 
giving rise to the phenomenon of capital seeking to ‘leverage’ speculative profits 
by expanding national debt. For example, over the period from 1959 to 2007 in 
the US, total debt (including non-financial business debt and government debt) as 
a percentage of GDP rose from 151 per cent to 373 per cent. 
2.6.5.3 Relevant conclusions 
This thesis examines how concentrations of various types give rise to systemic 
risk, and takes care to include relevant ‘nonbanking’ activities and institutions in 
its definition of the global financial system, to ensure that sufficient attention is 
given to contributing factors of systemic risk that do not currently appear on the 
regulatory radar. 
The other issue is more implicit and pervasive throughout the report; namely, 
it’s interpretation of the nature of systemic risk. As usual in both academic and 
practitioner literature, the meaning of this term is allowed to remain vague. Even 
though a token attempt is made to define it in the glossary section of this report, 
readers are left none the wiser. The glossary suggests: “Systemic Risk - In 
financial terms, [is] that which poses a threat to the financial system”. 
 In an otherwise excellent report, this is perhaps the single most glaring 
inadequacy. It is partly excusable because, as mentioned above, the Commission 
was not asked to make recommendations. However, even a non-technical 
explanation of what occurred still demands clarity about such a central notion. As 
Kane (2010) argues, official definitions of this type lead to an incomplete 
diagnosis of the roots of systemic risk, and misguided strategies of regulatory 
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reform. It is simply not a definition of a risk, in the sense given in the Oxford 
English Dictionary, as “a chance or possibility of danger, loss, injury, or other 
adverse consequences”, which is usually quantified by a probability. Instead, the 
report’s definition merely offers an allusion to some indeterminate cause of 
systemic risk. Unfortunately, neither the academic nor the practitioner literatures 
are free from dispute over the correct general definition of the term ‘risk’ (Holton, 
2004), or ‘systemic risk’ in particular. Sub-section 2.6.8 of this thesis reviews the 
current debate about both terms, and later sub-sections contribute a new 
operational perspective. 
2.6.6 Iceland’s financial system collapse 
Any attempt at a meaningful definition of the term ‘systemic risk’ in a new theory 
would be required to specify the phenomenon at risk of being manifested. This 
thesis explores the implications when ‘systemic failure’ is taken to be that 
phenomenon, from which the term ‘systemic risk’ is assumed to mean ‘systemic 
risk of failure’. Consequently, the term ‘failure’ also requires definition, as either 
a complete collapse or some lesser breach of performance criteria, along with 
some way of identifying when it has occurred. 
With definitions established for these terms, as proposed later in this thesis, a 
programme of research into the nature of systemic risk is well placed for its 
findings to be validated by real occurrences of global financial system failure. 
However, although it would be easy to identify, there has never been a 
manifestation of the ‘complete collapse’ interpretation of that failure in modern 
economic history, and therefore it would be impossible to empirically validate a 
theory directly for such cases. Even during The Great Depression the global 
financial system continued to limp along, and the only complete collapse of a sub-
global financial system at national level was that of Iceland in the fall of 2008 
(Nielsson and Torfason, 2012).  
At first glance, the alternative ‘breach of performance criteria’ interpretation of 
systemic failure seems to offer more potential for theory validation, because there 
have been at least five suitable examples of that type of failure in modern 
economic history (Jorda , Schularick and Taylor, 2011). However, a greater 
PhD - Cranfield University, January 2014. T.ILIN 
 
127 
exposure to the risk of confirmation bias arises in such cases, inherent in the 
choice of performance criteria for their identification. Besides, most historical 
accounts of either interpretation of systemic failure focus on the causes and effects 
of instability or collapse, not on the research interests of this thesis concerning 
how stability of the global financial system deteriorates and becomes 
operationally catastrophic. 
On closer examination, Iceland’s financial crisis is arguably the best option for 
assessing the plausibility of a systemic risk theory, by serving as a proxy for 
similar collapse events of the entire global financial system. In that option, 
speculations about causes and effects attributed to that crisis would be less 
relevant than the available raw data, which may be usable for proposition and 
hypothesis validation, followed by further inductive theorising. With that 
intention in mind, the protocol for project 3 will propose a review of empirical 
academic articles about the Icelandic financial system collapse, along with 
government reports and relevant financial databases, specifically to look for clues 
in the data about how it occurred or became operationalised.  
From those observations, a pattern of key contributing factors may begin to 
form that could help to either confirm or refute theoretical notions proposed in 
this thesis. Subsequent theory testing, validation and refinement would then build 
on any general findings to explore the implications for specific propositions and 
hypotheses. 
2.6.7 Theorising about financial crises 
Recent contributions to the financial crisis literature relevant to this thesis have 
appeared within two distinct strands of theorising. The first is about improvements 
in modelling financial crises, whereas the second addresses a greater 
understanding of the impact of shadow banking on financial stability. Examples 
from both of these strands of literature are discussed in this sub-section, to 
establish an appreciation of latest thinking about financial crises and the key 
issues involved in explaining them. 
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2.6.7.1 Models 
In their mathematical and critical-reflective analysis of the literature on financial 
and currency crisis models, Tularam and Subramanian (2013) find current 
approaches are not sufficiently “visionary or systematic”. While being highly 
adapted to specific past situations, these approaches are unable to explain what is 
generally happening at such times, or predict their occurrence. The authors 
categorize and review four generations of crisis models to assess what they 
describe as a “patchwork-like approach” to this area of research in the literature.  
Their results are summarised in a table of the main variables, important features 
and issues of each model generation, and its list of pioneer authors. Although a 
recent increase is identified in the range of contributions to nonlinear behavioural 
models in the fourth generation, real behaviour is not represented well and little 
new work is evident. Agent-based simulations are mentioned as being particularly 
well-suited to simulating the complex and nonlinear behaviour of the economy, 
but the overall assessment confirms the general view that this type of modelling is 
not sufficiently developed in economics (Farmer and Foley, 2009). In conclusion, 
the authors call for more research in this area incorporating new ways of thinking 
about these crises. 
2.6.7.2 Predictions 
Bezemer (2009) debunks the popular myth about the current global crisis that 
suggests “no one saw this coming” in his paper on understanding financial crises 
through accounting models. He does this by citing nine economists and three 
investment commentators, along with their accurate forecast quotes and dates, 
with some discussion of their rationale and models. Then he describes the crisis 
and its ensuing recession as a “natural experiment in the validity of economic 
models”, by reviewing the gross inadequacy of the general equilibrium models 
widely used in conventional analysis, to show by a systematic comparison of 
underlying assumptions and theoretical pedigrees how those who did see the crisis 
coming had used alternative flow-of-fund or ‘accounting’ models of the macro-
economy that are able to anticipate breakpoints in economic development. His 
conclusion echoes a quote he attributes to Keynes, which is actually paraphrased 
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from an original quote by Read (1838): “it is better to be roughly right than 
precisely wrong”. 
2.6.7.3 An alternative approach 
More recently, Bezemer (2011) expands on his theme of an accounting approach 
to economics, based on the ideas of Skaggs (2003) and others, by demonstrating 
how financial instability can be explicitly modelled as residing in the financial 
structure of the economy, not only in the behaviour of its agents. This is explained 
as an alternative and more realistic approach to the “methodological individualism 
with optimization” inherent in the exclusive focus on individual behaviour in the 
micro foundations of neoclassical economics. Then he shows how financial 
structure, based on a simplified balance-sheet interpretation that does not need to 
invoke the behavioural effects of micro foundations, can also be a source of the 
economy’s dynamical, complex-system behaviour, in a simulation of how 
leverage is key to understanding finance-induced instability. Having demonstrated 
in this way how traditional macroeconomics has failed to meaningfully include 
finance in its models, he suggests that a promising avenue of future research could 
be to combine micro foundational behaviour with a balance-sheet structure in 
developing a more comprehensive, financially credible agent-based simulation 
model for instability scenario analysis. The intentions of this thesis are broadly 
consistent with this suggestion, and will be explored further in later sections. 
A rare example of an agent-based simulation using a rigorous balance-sheet 
approach shows the emergence of endogenous business cycles from the interplay 
between real economic activity and it’s financing from various sources (Cincotti, 
Raberto and Teglio, 2010). Meanwhile, other agent-based research is now 
surfacing that takes a non-balance-sheet financial approach, such as the 
development of a consistent micro foundation for Minsky’s hypothesis (Chiarella 
and Di Guilmi, 2011) for exploring the mechanism of shock transmission from the 
financial sector to the real economy. 
2.6.7.4 Non-bank intermediation 
Regarding the second issue mentioned at the beginning of this sub-section, the 
relationship between shadow banking and financial stability is described in a 
PhD - Cranfield University, January 2014. T.ILIN 
 
130 
recent article by Bengtsson (2013) from the perspective of money market funds. 
Although, an earlier contribution from the US National Bureau of Economic 
Research (Gennaioli, Shleifer and Vishny, 2011) provides a more comprehensive 
model of how financial intermediaries originate and trade loans, assemble them 
into diversified portfolios, and attempt to finance the portfolios externally as 
riskless debt. From the perspective of this thesis, these contributions help to 
explain how concentrations of risks arise among non-bank intermediaries, 
generating financial fragility and fluctuations in liquidity system-wide over time. 
2.6.8 Theorising about systemic risk 
As mentioned earlier, understanding how the literature on ‘systemic risk’ has 
arrived at its current confused state requires an appreciation of the fundamental 
concept of ‘risk’ from which it should be derived. A brief review of relevant 
debates about both terms is provided in this sub-section to establish if they are 
related, with a summary of latest research, to set the scene for new contributions 
later in this thesis. 
2.6.8.1 Risk 
Haimes (2009) expresses the consensus view that “a universally agreed-upon 
succinct definition of risk has been difficult to develop … [because] it is 
multidimensional and nuanced”. He explains how over time, increasing fuzziness 
in proposed interpretations from different perspectives within the academic and 
practitioner literatures has led to general confusion. In their contribution of a 
quantitative definition of risk, Kaplan and Garrick (1981) refer to this issue as a 
need to “greatly diminish the confusion and controversy that often swirls around 
public decision making involving risk”. Holton (2004) agrees, finding there is a 
lot of discussion about risk in the literature but explicit definitions are rarely 
offered. In a common understanding of the term, risk is thought to entail both 
uncertainty and exposure regarding possible consequences, whereas formal 
interpretations are far less concise. Holton traces the latter back to the empiricism 
of Hume (1974), which is currently represented by the ‘probability’ and 
‘operationalism’ lines of thinking in the risk literature.  
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The key example Holton gives from the first line of thinking comes from the 
debate on subjective versus objective interpretations of probability. He cites a 
well-known contribution to the objectivist view that refers to risk as a real, 
measureable uncertainty relating to a probability intrinsic to some formally-
expressed logical proposition, whereas an unmeasureable uncertainty is simply an 
estimate (Knight, 1921). Another contribution from that debate cited by Holton 
also refers to this distinction between risk and uncertainty (Keynes, 1921), but 
holds that an objective probability is a relationship between two propositions, one 
of which is known to be true while the other can be rationally determined as 
evidence of the first by a statement of mathematical logic. Risk by these 
objectivist interpretations of probability may therefore be methodically evaluated 
through statistical analysis, or discovered by logic. Subjectivist interpretations, 
however, hold that probability is a characterization of uncertainty akin to a belief 
(de Finetti, 1974), and not intrinsic to nature. By that interpretation risk cannot 
therefore be rationally determined. Although this suggests an objectivist approach 
to defining risk may be the way to go, deep philosophical objections have been 
raised involving such inconsistencies as the relativity of risk (Kaplan and Garrick, 
1981). This is reminiscent of Einstein’s theory of the relativity of space and time 
(Einstein, 1905), in which time is argued to be relative to the perception of 
observers. Further consideration of criticisms and counter-criticisms leads Holton 
to conclude that, at best, probability quantifies ‘perceived’ uncertainty. Therefore, 
he tentatively defines risk as a condition of self-aware individuals who perceive 
“… exposure to a proposition of which one is uncertain”. An interesting 
implication of that narrow definition is that entities such as organizations, 
companies and governments are considered incapable of being at risk in a way 
that is independent of a self-aware perception of uncertainty about some 
proposition. They are simply conduits through which self-aware individuals can 
relate to risk. Holton’s definition is intended to clarify common usage, and raise 
new insights, but he acknowledges it is flawed because it depends on the notions 
of ‘exposure’ and ‘uncertainty’, which are also inherently vulnerable to 
philosophical inconsistencies. 
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However, the second line of thinking Holton identifies for understanding the 
term risk, based on the philosophy of operationalism (Bridgman, 1927), has the 
potential to overcome these inconsistencies. If knowledge of the world stems from 
our experiences, as relativity would imply, then a formal definition of a concept 
must refer to experiences. Operationalism proposes a way to achieve that by 
specifying: “the concept is synonymous with the corresponding set of operations 
[through which that concept is experienced]”. Holton gives an example, by 
reconsidering the traditional view of making a best estimate by taking a measure 
m of a quantity q that satisfies the equation: D = E + F, where e is the error in 
that measurement. According to operationalism, all that exists is the measurement 
m, defined by the operations through which it is obtained. The quantities q and e 
do not exist independently, because they are only perceived through m and its 
defining operations. 
The philosophical roots of operationalism can be traced back to the empiricism 
of David Hume by its similarities to logical positivism of the Vienna Circle 
(Hempel, 1965), one of the most influential philosophical movements of the 20th 
century. They wrote primarily for philosophers, whereas Bridgman wrote for 
scientists. When that philosophy is applied in finance, Holton finds the term risk 
is an exception to the general rule that most intuitively understood financial terms 
can be operationally defined if necessary. Operationalism maintains that 
operational definitions apply only to that which can be perceived. Therefore, 
Holton asserts there can be no true or absolute risk in finance, because a 
philosophically valid definition is likely to require the inclusion of more than what 
is perceived of risk by a self-aware entity. Instead, finance applies the common 
understanding of risk, entailing both uncertainty and exposure regarding possible 
consequences, for interpreting some aspect of perceived risk whereby subjective 
probabilities are used to operationally define perceived uncertainty, and where 
utility or state preferences are used to define perceived exposure. But aspects of 
perceived risk can take many forms. Holton observes finance addresses that issue 
by following Markowitz’s lead (Markowitz, 1952), in adopting one or more 
specific risk metrics, such as variance of return or maximum likely credit 
exposure, to represent a specific aspect of perceived risk. However, this approach 
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introduces another debate about whether adopted risk metrics are appropriate for a 
particular purpose, such as setting limits or performance-based compensation.  
In conclusion, Holton’s argument implies that it is meaningless to ask how 
absolute risk may be traditionally defined and measured, but it is useful to ask if a 
metric assigned to some operationally defined aspect of perceived risk captures 
that risk adequately for a purpose. That insight, and its application of the 
philosophy of operationalism, is explored further in a systemic risk context in 
later sections of this thesis. 
2.6.8.2 Derivative Concepts of Risk 
Given this lack of philosophical and practical consensus in the literature regarding 
the fundamental concept of risk, it is perhaps reasonable to expect that a similar 
situation exists in the complex systems and economics domains of literature, 
where logically derivative concepts are explored. However, evidence of attempts 
to derive new insights from that existing fundamental body of knowledge about 
risk is much stronger in the field of complex systems than in economics. This 
difference is attributed to the well-documented insular attitude of economics 
towards ideas ‘not invented here’ from other disciplines (Colander et al., 2009). 
Nonetheless a similar home-grown lack of consensus can be found in economics 
over derivative concepts such as systemic risk. 
2.6.8.3 Systemic Risk 
Project 1 reviewed example definitions of systemic risk and similar terms selected 
from the interpretations found in the literature, and categorized them as ‘causal’, 
‘consequential’ or ‘combined’. After further analysis, the assessment reached in 
sub-section 2.3.17.5 Q2 was in general agreement with Govtvan and Mansurov 
(2011), who confirm that there is no unique, established definition of systemic 
risk, and conclude it is “… the most poorly studied macro-level risk effect”. 
Since then, up to the time of writing this thesis, there has been further progress 
in the development of detailed analytical models of various systemic phenomena 
in the economy, but a consensus on the fundamental meaning of this macro-level 
risk remains out of reach. Preliminary findings from a recent survey of systemic 
risk analytics (Bisias et al., 2012) disseminated in a working paper published by 
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the Office of Financial Research (OFR) of the US Treasury, in collaboration with 
MIT Sloan School of Management and MIT Laboratory of Financial Engineering, 
confirm there is much that is still not understood. Although, the authors remain 
agnostic at this stage about what is ultimately knowable. Their stated intention is 
to encourage research and development in this area, and to provide the broadest 
possible audience with a sense of the boundaries of current knowledge, without 
introducing too many of their own preconceptions and opinions. The survey is 
currently only available as a working paper, but the authority and academic 
credibility of its sponsor and contributors is undeniable, and fully justifies its use 
as a key citation in this sub-section. 
The OFR was created by the Dodd Frank Act, the most comprehensive 
financial reform bill in the US since the 1930s, with three broad mandates: 
i. To identify risks to financial stability arising from events  or activities of 
large financial firms or elsewhere; 
ii. To promote market discipline by eliminating participants’ expectations 
of possible government bailouts; and 
iii. To respond to emerging threats to the stability of the financial system. 
Before any of these mandates can be addressed, however, the OFR 
acknowledges there is a need to identify an “accurate and timely measure of 
systemic risk”, which in turn demands a practical definition of what is to be 
measured. However, this working paper pithily observes that regulatory and 
research communities working on financial instability have a tendency of delving 
straight into the details of complex analytics without having established 
fundamental concepts, assuming it is sufficient to paraphrase Justice Potter 
Stewart’s definition of pornography: “systemic risk may be hard to define, but I 
know it when I see it”. 
Therefore, the survey’s stated intention is to become a perpetual working paper 
or living document that will evolve into a comprehensive library of systemic risk 
research, providing a categorized knowledgebase which can be used to expose 
such blind spots in current thinking, and stimulate innovative new ideas and 
approaches. Although the authors admit the survey does not attempt to be 
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exhaustive in breadth, as a typical academic survey might be, and its focus is the 
needs of regulators and policymakers not academic conjectures; from the 
perspective of this thesis, it provides a timely summary of the somewhat 
incomplete state of knowledge in practice. For that reason, it may also become the 
primary target for the contribution to practice of this overall programme of 
research, if an identified gap in knowledge about practice can be addressed. 
2.6.8.4 A Review of Latest Research 
Returning to the recent article by Govtvan and Mansurov (2011), in which they 
review approaches to the regulation and estimation of systemic risk in the 
financial sphere, the same mistake found throughout this literature of referring to 
‘systemic risks’ in the plural can be found repeated in their first paragraph. 
Although this is otherwise a timely review of a broad range of issues, it is 
extremely light on references to the literature, and the useful observations it 
makes are diminished by its lack of clarity about the nature of systemic risk.  
After confirming that knowledge of such risks and the ability to identify them 
is widely recognized as being crucial to financial stability in the private and public 
spheres, the authors attribute a continuing lack of consensus about them in the 
literature to “the insufficient development of many theoretical and practical 
matters connected with this problem”. Sadly, their working definition of systemic 
risk, on which subsequent comments are based, is then given as: “… a potential 
danger of the occurrence of situations in which the individual response of 
economic agents to risks leads to an increase in general insecurity rather than to 
their better division and diversification”. In terms of the project 1 categorization 
of such definitions mentioned earlier, this is a ‘combined’ causal and 
consequential definition based on the work of Aglietta (2001) and others more 
than ten years ago. It is also extremely vague, and serves little purpose either for 
practical reference or serious academic research. Various useful ideas are 
discussed, but they are often without reference to their original contributors, 
which is surprising considering the article is published through the Russian 
Academy of Sciences. However, it does present a credible summary of many 
issues pertinent to this thesis, and fairly represents the neutral and unprovocative 
flavour of recent reviews. 
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For more incisive discussions of latest academic research in the field of 
systemic risk it is necessary to look at that field by individual topics of focus. The 
remainder of this sub-section reviews examples from the topics that feature 
prominently among recent contributions. 
2.6.8.5 Measurement 
Systemic risk measurement is represented by an empirical methodology for that 
purpose from a working paper by Brownlees and Engle (2012) related to research 
out of Stern School of Business, New York University. It is based on a theoretical 
model for the measurement of systemic risk by Acharya et al (2010), which takes 
a different perspective to the theory of systemic risk from his PhD dissertation1 
(Acharya, 2009). The latter contribution was evaluated in the project 1 as: “… the 
most explicit claim to be a theory of systemic risk [in the literature] … based on 
the dominant equilibrium paradigm of economics … and uses a balance-sheet 
perspective in its model. This is a well-structured contribution of theory 
containing useful insights, but does not offer a general theory capable of 
addressing most potential crises. It focuses on specific financial aspects and risk-
shifting phenomena of the current systemic crisis, implicating recent innovations 
and practices, but cannot explain other observed phenomena of past crises or 
their potential future variations”. As a conceptual paper, it stands purely on 
proofs for the mathematical expressions of its propositions, without demonstrating 
that those expressions do in fact describe reality. In Acharya et al (2010) he 
explains his departure from this previous theory by saying: “It is of course 
difficult, if not impossible, to find a systemic risk measure that is at the same time 
practically relevant and completely justified by a general equilibrium model. In 
fact, the gap between theoretical models and the practical needs of regulators has 
been so wide that inappropriate measures … have persisted in assessing risks of 
the financial system as a whole”. His observation resonates with the misgivings 
expressed by others, quoted in sub-section 2.5.3 of this thesis. Nonetheless, 
Acharya’s research is deservedly highly rated, representing the most coherent 
theorising about systemic risk from that economics tradition to date. 
                                                 
1 Interestingly, when Acharya cites this paper he reverts to the original unabridged working 
paper published in 2001. 
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The methodology Brownlees and Engle propose, therefore, uses Acharya’s 
measure of systemic risk associated with his new model of the systemic expected 
shortfall (SES) of financial institutions, developed using less contentious 
statistical measures of risk. SES is defined in terms of undercapitalization and the 
exacerbating effects of leverage as an institution-level contribution to systemic 
risk through each institution’s expected loss in the tail of the system’s loss 
distribution (i.e., the institution-level marginal expected shortfall, MES), and 
shown to be particularly significant at times when the system as a whole is 
undercapitalized. By introducing the SRISK index, representing the expected 
capital shorfall of a firm conditional on a substantial market decline as a function 
of its degree of leverage, size, and MES, Brownlees and Engle are able to 
construct an aggregate SRISK of the whole financial system which can provide 
early warning signals of distress in the real economy. 
2.6.8.6 Indications 
Other recent contributions to indicators and early warning signals for systemic 
risk include a simple indicator using stock return correlations among financial 
institutions (Patro, Qi and Sun, 2012), and an analysis of the modelling 
implications for how to integrate structural fragility within a systemic risk 
framework to enable a more comprehensive and consistent assessment of its role 
as a cause of systemic distress (Gramlich and Oet, 2011). The former article is 
particularly interesting for its approach to disaggregating stock returns into 
systematic (i.e., market-driven) and idiosyncratic components. It finds that stock 
return correlations among banks are largely driven by their idiosyncratic risk 
correlations, which the authors associate with increasing systemic risk.  The latter 
article was included in project 1, but is revisited here for its review of 
concentration effects found among the elements of structural fragility, particularly 
relating to behavioural factors and the destabilizing effects of feedback loops on 
the system. 
2.6.8.7 Connectivity 
Meanwhile, connectivity remains a popular topic of research in the systemic risk 
field, illustrated by two recent articles. Battiston et al (2012) use the notion of 
‘financial acceleration’, about positive feedback of financial robustness on itself, 
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to explain the surprising effects of risk diversification in a financial network. The 
authors report on a very recent stream of work showing that full risk 
diversification is not an optimal approach for ensuring the resilience of financial 
networks. They introduce a dynamic model for the evolution of financial 
robustness, and show that a financial network is most resilient at an intermediate 
level of connectivity. This is contrary to the generally accepted view that greater 
diversification and integration equates to more resilience (Allen and Gale, 2001). 
In the other connectivity article, Haldane and May (2011) reach a similar 
conclusion when they explore the interplay between complexity and stability in 
financial network models that draw analogies from the dynamics of ecological 
food webs and the propagation patterns of infectious diseases. They find that in 
the pursuit of individual diversification in such things as balance sheet 
composition, funding sources and risk management systems, banks collectively 
reduce diversity in these areas as homogeneity breeds fragility across the system, 
increasing systemic risk. In other words, when banks individually attempted to do 
more things differently, they collectively ended up doing many things the same 
way, thereby increasing systemic risk. 
2.6.8.8 Other Insights 
The final two articles address the twin topics of legal and regulatory insights. A 
legal assessment of progress made in identifying and managing systemic risk is 
contributed by the first article (Schwarcz, 2011). Schwarcz was criticized in the 
Project 1 for his ‘combined’ definition of systemic risk in his testimony on 
October 2nd 2007, before the US House of Representatives Committee on 
Financial Services (Schwarcz, 2008). He offered a working definition that holds 
systemic risk to be: “the risk that an economic shock such as a market or 
institutional failure triggers (through panic or otherwise) either a failure of a 
chain of markets or institutions, or a chain of significant losses to financial 
institutions, resulting in increases in the cost of capital or decreases in its 
availability, often evidenced by substantial financial-market price volatility”.  
This was considered by project 2 to contain too many embedded assumptions, 
therefore having little practical value for either academic or regulatory purposes. 
However, it was a credible attempt at the time by a respected lawyer to inform 
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politicians about a concept for which the academic literature had completely 
failed to offer a better alternative. In his latest paper, Schwarcz takes a wider look 
at the on-going trend towards disintermediation. This enables firms in general to 
access new sources of funds without using banking services as intermediaries. He 
argues this trend is shifting the focus of systemic risk to financial markets. In his 
conclusions he then calls for regulations, such as the new Dodd-Frank Act, to 
move beyond politically targeted responses to: “situate financial regulation 
within an analytical framework that realistically explains how systemic risk is 
transmitted and why free-market factors do not limit that transmission”. His use 
of the word ‘how’ in that statement regarding systemic risk transmission echoes 
the research problem of this thesis. Although, it is maintained here that explaining 
how it is transmitted should be developed from a clear definition and an 
understanding of how it arises, not its causes and effects. 
In the final article of this sub-section, Arnold et al (2012) contribute another 
progress review. At a time of significant policy reform, they discuss various 
macroprudential and regulatory issues in a contribution that covers enough ground 
to fill four articles. Although they offer a well-informed overview of research in 
this area, many of the issues covered are not directly relevant to the research 
problem of this thesis. However, three issues stand out as being worthy of special 
note. The first is their confirmation that there is still “no universally accepted 
definition” of systemic risk, citing as an example a recent attempt by the President 
of the European Central Bank in Trichet (2010), who defines it as: “… financial 
instability so widespread that it impairs the functioning of a financial system to 
the point where economic growth and welfare suffer materially”. Secondly they 
point out the reasons why systemic risk measures that work well in the United 
States may not work so well elsewhere, as in Europe. Then, finally, they mention 
the normal exclusion of systemic risk associated with non-bank financial players 
in classic studies of financial crises, calling for future research in this area. 
2.6.9 Lessons learnt 
A number of important observations can be summarised from the literature on 
financial crises and systemic risk of failure reviewed in sub-section 2.6 as follows:   
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Financial crises: 
i. are complex phenomena; 
ii. are not always bad for economic welfare; 
iii. seem to entail concentrations in the behaviour of financial system 
participants, and responses by the system; 
iv. produce concentrations such as: unsustainable asset-price bubbles; 
currency exchange rate movements; the directions and destinations of 
money flows; focus on a reducing number of key financial institutions; 
similarity in operational practices in functional areas such as risk and 
treasury management; indebtedness coming to rest in particular groups 
of system participants, e.g. home owners, government institutions, etc.; 
v. are usually induced by some initial stimulus; 
vi. require some kind of synchronization; 
vii. are escalating in frequency, scope and severity; 
viii. have increasingly involved multiple countries on a global basis over the 
past forty years. 
The current crisis: 
ix. was predicted by credible economists and investors; 
x. could have been avoided; 
xi. is attributed to banking malpractices; 
xii. continues to be aggravated by nonbanking or shadow banking activities; 
xiii. was severely exacerbated by widespread failures in financial regulation 
and supervision. 
Current theory about financial crises: 
xiv. is at a relatively early stage of development and much work remains to 
be done; 
xv. is not sufficiently visionary or systematic. 
Systemic risk: 
xvi. calls for a new way of thinking about financial crises; 
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xvii. has only materialised as a complete failure once in modern economic 
history, on a non-global scale, as the collapse of Iceland’s financial 
system in the fall of 2008; 
xviii. remains a confused notion that suffers from the lack of a precise 
definition; 
xix. literature could apply some operationally defined aspect of systemic risk 
from the financial risk literature to gain useful insights that have not yet 
been explored; 
xx. literature could also use recent contributions to the accounting and 
behavioural economics literatures to develop a potential new theoretical 
explanation that is broadly operational. 
2.6.10 Issues for this thesis 
The phenomena of interest are complex in nature and global in scope, suggesting 
some role for the complexity sciences in potential solutions for the research 
problem. However, the relatively early stage of theory development in such a long 
established problem domain indicates that a more radical approach may be 
necessary to introduce a paradigmatic shift in current thinking. The philosophy of 
operationalism does not appear to have a central role to play in any such 
approach, but some operationally defined aspect of risk may prove more useful. 
With supporting contributions from notions of concentration in financial system 
participation, derivation of a more precise definition for systemic risk may be 
possible. However, any such solution for the research problem would need to 
account for all aspects of the financial system, including unregulated and 
otherwise hidden parts such as shadow banking, and it should be presented in a 
form that can make a contribution to regulatory and banking compliance practice.  
2.7 Disorder in Financial Systems 
References to systemic risk in economics usually have financial or economic loss 
in mind for what is ultimately being risked, with little concept of systemic failure 
other than some passing reference. For a more comprehensive understanding of 
disorder in financial systems, the return to literature included the literatures of 
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other disciplines, to find recent contributions and related landmark research 
offering useful insights about similar notions. This sub-section reviews the results 
of that search, and sets the scene for later discussions in this thesis by explaining 
the meaning intended when various non-economic terms are used, and establishes 
its alignment to relevant on-going debates. 
2.7.1 Map 
 
 
Figure 13: Literature Review Map, sub-section 2.7. 
2.7.2 Complexity 
2.7.2.1 Chaos and Economic Complexity 
Chaos has been described as a science of the global nature of systems, “a science 
of becoming rather than being … [eliminating] the Laplacian fantasy of 
deterministic probability” (Gleick, 1998). It observes that even the simplest of 
systems can present extraordinarily difficult problems of predictability through 
their irregular chaotic behaviour, while they also remain capable of spontaneously 
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giving rise to order. As part of the wider subject area known as dynamics, chaos is 
about system phenomena in which responses can be out of proportion to their 
stimuli; whereas, dynamics is more generally about ‘dynamical systems’ capable 
of changing their configuration over time. They are both further related to the 
much broader field of complexity, which involves interplay between chaos and 
non-chaos (Strogatz, 1994; Baranger, 2000), and the nature of change in all three 
is known to be mostly nonlinear (Prigogine, 1997). However, complexity does not 
require the occurrence of chaos even though nonlinearity tends to be irregularly 
chaotic, and chaos does not confirm the existence of complexity because very 
simple systems can behave chaotically. Any research involving these domains of 
knowledge must appreciate the subtle interplay between such concepts, and must 
be thoughtfully aligned with the academic debates in progress. 
2.7.2.2 Complex Systems 
This thesis takes an interest in both complexity and chaos through the type of 
dynamical systems known as complex systems, or more specifically their sub-set 
of complex adaptive systems, which are generally considered to be a plausible 
way of modelling a financial system. Apart from a general consensus on their 
dynamical nature, the precise definition of a complex system is still being 
debated. The following are some of their most typically accepted properties 
(Baranger, 2000): 
i. They contain many constituents interacting nonlinearly. 
ii. Their constituents are interdependent. 
iii. They have overall structures spanning several scales. 
iv. They are capable of emergent behaviour. 
v. Their complexity involves interplay between chaos and non-chaos. 
vi. They have constituents that mutually adapt to each other through their 
interactions (in the special case of complex adaptive systems). 
vii. The behaviour of their constituents involves interplay between 
cooperation and competition. 
Essentially, complex systems can be represented by nonlinear mathematical 
models consisting of a set of state variables to define things that can change over 
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time, and dynamical ‘equations of motion’ describing how that change occurs. 
What makes them distinct from other mathematical models of a similar type is the 
further requirement for their state variables to be chosen so that a complete set of 
data for those variables uniquely determines the overall state of the system in 
relationship with time; such that the system will always evolve identically after 
any time when the overall system state is defined by the same variable data. In 
other words, it will evolve deterministically in the absence of random or noisy 
input parameters, and any irregular behaviour will arise from the system’s 
nonlinearity driven by the state variables, not by any other forces (Strogatz, 1994: 
page 324).  
The set of all possible states of a complex system is known as the ‘phase 
space’, in which the present overall state is a point that moves over time according 
to the system’s equations of motion. A future trajectory of this state is calculated 
from the initial conditions of its state variables at some present point in the phase 
space, and can generally be solved as a nonlinear expression of the equations of 
motion. However, finding a solution is usually a non-trivial problem, due to the 
interplay between endogenously generated chaos and non-chaos in such systems. 
This is further exacerbated in social systems by the difficulties of developing 
deterministic models of systems defined by human behaviour. Although they 
exhibit many of the accepted properties of complex systems familiar to other 
disciplines, as in the physical sciences, social systems have an irreducible degree 
of randomness and other endogenous or exogenous factors affecting their 
behaviour (Helbing, 2012). Therefore, a more probabilistic interpretation is 
required for understanding the complex socio-economic systems of this thesis. An 
acknowledged alternative approach to modelling the nonlinearity of such systems 
by purely mathematical methods is to apply agent-based simulation techniques 
(Rosser Jr, 2010), which is the constructivist approach favoured by this thesis. 
2.7.2.3 The Structure of Complex Systems 
Baranger explains how perhaps the most striking difference between chaos and 
complexity is one of scales. As property iii implies, a complex system always has 
multiple scales, or layers of detail; such that chaos may reign in one layer, 
whereas the next layer may be self-organizing or non-chaotic. The most confusing 
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effect of chaotic complexity is probably something called “sensitivity to initial 
conditions”. This holds that, when a complex system’s nonlinear equations of 
motion are applied to determining how it will change, similar conditions in the 
state variables of two initially close overall system states will quickly produce 
divergent trajectories through phase space as the parameter of time is increased. 
Even though complex systems are deterministic, however accurately initial 
conditions are specified, irregular behaviour arising from the system’s 
nonlinearity, and its sensitivity to initial conditions, will make predictability of the 
system’s behaviour decay quickly over a very short period into the future. 
Strogatz describes this implication more generally as a characteristic of chaos, “in 
which a deterministic system exhibits aperiodic behaviour that depends sensitively 
on the initial conditions [of its state variables], thereby rendering long term 
prediction impossible”. Chaos is seen as destroying the reductionist dream in 
which phenomena in higher scales of complex systems can be explained by 
comprehensive knowledge about what happens in more detailed scales over useful 
timeframes.  That observation has special relevance for the ability to describe how 
and when certain macro-level phenomena arise in a financial system from 
knowledge of the interactions of its participants, in attempts to explain systemic 
risk of failure. 
2.7.2.4 Constructivism versus Formalism 
In a recent article, Rosser Jr (2010) adopts a hierarchical view of the different 
meanings of complexity found in the literature, with three categories: ‘small-tent’ 
complexity; ‘big tent’ complexity; and ‘meta’ complexity. This thesis uses the 
big-tent meaning, which encompasses cybernetics, catastrophe theory and chaos 
theory in what Rosser calls a dynamic definition of complexity. An earlier article 
he wrote on this subject (Rosser Jr, 2009) compares this dynamic definition with a 
more rigorous computational conceptualization based on notions involving the 
theories of probability, information and computability. He concludes that although 
adherents to the computational approach would not be impressed with the non-
axiomatic foundations of dynamic complexity, the latter line of thinking does 
provide insights suitable for constructivist research into the special problem of 
emergent phenomena in economics. However, when emergence is associated with 
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evolution (as in complex adaptive systems), Rosser (2008) argues it becomes 
desirable to attempt some reconciliation of these contradictory approaches to 
complexity. He calls this the struggle between constructivism and formalism. 
Rather than joining that struggle, this thesis intends to achieve a similar 
reconciliation effect by exploring the phenomenon of emergence by using the 
building blocks of evolutionary economics and its models (Safarzynska and van 
den Bergh, 2010a) in a constructivist context. 
2.7.2.5 Systemic Risk in Complex Socio-economic Systems 
If financial crises are complex phenomena that occur within a socio-economic 
system context, as the literature suggests, then it should also be possible to apply 
systems theory (Bertalanffy, 1950) to understanding how disorder may become 
catastrophic when they occur. In particular, new research in the fields of complex 
adaptive systems and chaotic systems contributed from other disciplines offers 
economics potential insights worth exploring. 
Established notions from these fields, such as the state of a system (e.g. 
stationary, steady and critical states), open or closed systems, equifinality, self-
organization, emergence, bifurcations and tipping points, are already being used 
to explain the complexity of financial system behaviour during times of crisis. 
When a more trans-disciplinary perspective is taken on that complexity (Rosser Jr, 
2009) further explanatory potential is revealed. This sub-section reviews two 
recent contributions to the literature on complexity and complex systems that are 
relevant to addressing the research problem of this thesis. 
Helbing (2010) reviews what is known in a wide scope of literature about 
complexity and the emergence of systemic risks that can be applied to socio-
economic systems, and concludes that large-scale disasters are generally induced 
by cascading effects arising from non-linear or network interactions, or both. He 
then describes how methods derived from an understanding of complex systems 
are able to mitigate systemic risks arising from these effects; whereas alternative 
linear, experience-based, or intuitive approaches create the illusion of control, and 
introduce a dangerous ‘logic of failure’ that tends to engender paradoxical system 
behaviours, unwanted side effects, and sudden regime shifts. 
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Among the explanations for systemic risk arising from complex systems 
behaviour cited by Helbing from the literature, there are a few notable 
observations relevant to a constructivist perspective. They are paraphrased in 
italics as follows (with relevance comments in regular font):  
i. “Complex systems are mostly characterised by non-linear interactions 
among their constituent elements or entities”. Therefore a realistic 
model of financial system behaviour must reflect these non-linear 
characteristics. 
ii. “Non-linear interactions typically occur among elements of a complex 
system that mutually adapt to, and have an impact on, each other and 
their environment”. This is consistent with how participants in a 
financial system behave, and suggests a realistic model should show 
how this mutual adaptation is operationalised, at least in some simple 
way. 
iii. “Non-linear causes and effects can be grossly disproportional to each 
other, and may be unresponsive to control attempts or show sudden 
regime shifts when a tipping point is crossed”. This needs to be 
considered when recommending a contribution to practice for risk 
mitigation, or an intervention policy for financial system regulation. 
iv. “When system elements tend to have strong interactions, this implies 
extreme events may occur with greater frequency, because the statistical 
distributions characterising their behaviour change from normal 
distributions to so-called heavy-tail distributions”. Power law 
relationships may apply. In general, when modelling participant 
behaviour, care needs to be taken over assumptions about the strength of 
interactions among participants as elements in a financial system; 
otherwise the frequency of extreme events will be unrealistic. 
v. “Network interactions are ubiquitous in socio-economic systems, and 
their non-linearity implies the occurrence of feedback loops, vicious 
circles and induced side effects, along with a tendency to cascade local 
failure events (as in chain reactions or domino effects)”. When 
modelling the special case of network interactions among financial 
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system participants, care needs to be taken to ensure that their 
elementary behaviour is not allowed to become spuriously amplified. 
vi. “Systemic failures are usually triggered by: passing over a critical point 
or tipping point (assuming a graphical representation of the system), 
beyond which system behaviour becomes catastrophic; or when a 
metastable system (that is robust to small perturbations) is overcome by 
a catastrophic perturbation that harms the system’s functionality; or 
when a metastable system is overcome by several interacting 
perturbations that trigger cascading failure events”. In a realistic model 
of participant behaviour, the potential for triggering financial system 
failure in these ways should be allowed to arise naturally. 
vii. “A critical state can be induced by exogenous or endogenous processes. 
The latter are called self-induced or self-organized criticality, such as 
bankruptcy cascades”. A model capable of showing how critical states 
arise in a financial system should allow them to be induced by its 
environment or from within. 
viii. “System phenomena such as turbulence and chaos, and a probabilistic 
or stochastic dynamic, can render a complex system unpredictable after 
a certain time period”. A model of such phenomena in a financial 
system should have a temporal dimension, and consider the effects of an 
extended passage of time. 
ix. “Complex systems can also exhibit self-fulfilling or self-destroying 
prophecy effects, as when stock speculation leads to herding behaviour 
and consequent bubbles, which later burst”. This can be modelled as 
normal participant behaviour in a financial system. 
x. “Critical transitions, or regime shifts, of a complex system can exhibit 
early warning signals such as: slow relaxation, where perturbations in 
the system take a long time to dampen out; and critical fluctuations or 
flickering, were regular perturbations in the system tend to be larger 
than usual”. This resonates with the research focus of project 1, which 
refers to ‘understanding the behaviour of the global financial system as 
it approaches a state of operational crisis’. Therefore, confirmation of 
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the plausibility of a model can be provided by observations of critical 
transitions exhibiting these phenomena. 
xi. “Complex systems tend to counteract external control attempts, which 
are obstructed by such effects as irreducible randomness which cannot 
be eliminated, or delays and anticipation in the behaviour of system 
elements. This is usually the reason why conventional attempts to 
control complex systems fail. When initial measures have little or no 
effect, due to the system’s push-back, increasingly intense measures are 
attempted, until the system undergoes a sudden regime shift. 
Oscillations of system state can ensue, and in extreme cases can develop 
into chaotic system dynamics. Such control attempts are described as 
applying the logic of failure”. Testing of a financial system model 
should include external control attempts, the results of which can inform 
mitigation recommendations. 
xii. “The correct approach to influencing the stability of a complex system is 
to nurture its self-organization and self-control mechanisms”. 
Explanations of how to achieve this nurturing would be a useful 
contribution to practice. 
xiii. “Among the 12 scientific techniques listed as credible ways to address 
the challenges of complex systems, agent-based modelling is described 
as maybe the most prominent”. Others techniques quoted as popular in 
financial crisis and systemic risk literature are ‘non-linear dynamics and 
chaos theory’, ‘systems theory and cybernetics’, ‘catastrophe theory’, 
and ‘the theory of critical phenomena’. 
At least some of these observations about complex systems and systemic risk 
in the literature noted by Helbing should be reflected in a proposed solution to the 
research problem of this thesis. 
In his contribution to the systems engineering literature, Haimes (2009) takes 
the view that risk, vulnerability and resilience of a system are best understood 
through a systems-based philosophy and methodology that recognizes the central 
role of system states. According to this view, risk to a system is: “inherently and 
fundamentally a function of the initiating event, the states of the system and of its 
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environment, and the time frame”. To define that function, he begins by 
deconstructing the standard risk management definition of risk, given as the 
probability and severity of adverse effects, using three assessment questions from 
the theory of scenario structuring (Kaplan and Garrick, 1981): ‘What can go 
wrong?’; ‘What is its likelihood?’; ‘What are the consequences?’ They lead him 
to conclude that a definition of risk that uses an abstract concept such as 
‘probability’ introduces conceptual and cognitive challenges (see sub-section 
2.6.8 in this thesis for a more comprehensive discussion). Therefore he bases his 
notion of ‘risk to a system’ on the objectivist mathematical definition of that term 
from Kolmogorov’s theory of probability (Kolmogorov, 1933), which Haimes 
describes as being the gold standard used in the field of systems engineering. He 
then explores the potential for mathematically modelling the complete risk 
function, and discusses the other concepts and state variables required for 
describing: the performance capabilities of a system; its vulnerability and 
resilience; and the consequences of the initiating event. 
Interestingly, Haimes does not refer to systemic risk at any point. He simply 
describes a systems engineering approach to defining ‘risk to a system’. He also 
makes little reference to complexity science in general, although some of the ideas 
he applies have their origins in that literature. Nonetheless, his view of the central 
role of system states resonates with the conclusions of this thesis. 
2.7.3 Uncertainty 
At first glance, the complexity of a financial system, with its inherent tendency 
towards irregular chaotic behaviour, would seem to imply there may be a 
connection between some general notion of disorder in the system and the overall 
risk of its failure. Entropy is a trans-disciplinary concept often interpreted as a 
measure of disorder, but it is also considered to be a measure of other things such 
as mixed-upness, disorganization, chaos, uncertainty, ignorance and missing 
information (Ben-Naim, 2008). The term is attributed to Rudolf Clausius, who 
coined it in 1865 to describe an idea of dissipative energy-use in thermodynamics 
based in part on the work of French mathematician Sadi Carnot and Lord Kelvin 
in 1824. It subsequently became a measure of disorder in the second law of 
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thermodynamics; which states that the entropy of an isolated system never 
decreases, because isolated systems spontaneously evolve towards thermo-
dynamic equilibrium, which is described as the state of maximum entropy. More 
general explanations of entropy refer to its increase as a consequence of a 
tendency for systems to move toward greater confusion over time. 
2.7.3.1 Origins of the term 
From the experimental research origins of entropy in the mid-19th century, when 
the sciences of physics and chemistry examined the relationship between ordered 
and disordered energy in the form of heat, the field of thermodynamics shifted its 
focus to a more theoretical point of view. The field of statistical dynamics 
emerged as an attempt to derive the laws of thermodynamics from existing laws 
of mechanics by statistical analysis. Boltzman’s statistical interpretation of 
entropy in his kinetic theory of gasses found it was proportional to the natural 
logarithm of the number of possible molecular conditions of a thermodynamic 
system which could give rise to an overall phenomenon. His expression (engraved 
on his tombstone in Vienna) for entropy S is: 
G = H. logI 
where k is known as Boltzmann’s constant (which is a physical constant relating 
the energy and temperature of an individual gas particle), and W is a variable 
representing the possible molecular conditions of position and momentum for a 
set of identical particles of a thermodynamic system corresponding to an 
observable overall phenomenon under consideration. The natural base e is used 
for the logarithm. Essentially, this expression is derived from statistical notions of 
probability, and uses k to characterize individual particle conditions in a unit of 
measure for a quantitative representation of an entire system’s degree of disorder. 
In this original form, entropy is defined in terms that are specific to physical 
and chemical systems involving heat transfer. However, it also suggests there may 
be a general relationship between the low-level conditions and overall phenomena 
of systems, and complex systems in particular, that may help to explain how the 
specific phenomenon of systemic failure arises, and its relationship to notions 
about the risk of that failure. 
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Boltzmann’s fundamental insight led to ground-breaking research in various 
fields of physics, such as quantum mechanics, and has been successfully applied 
to many other fields of knowledge, and refined in various ways. However, it has 
also attracted much controversy along the way, involving confusion about what 
entropy is actually measuring, and the subjective versus objective debate about the 
nature of probability on which the concept is founded (for further discussion see 
sub-section 2.6.8, and Ben-Naim, 2008). 
2.7.3.2 Relevance 
The next important development in the concept of entropy, for this thesis, came 
when Shannon (1948) proposed his theory of communication. This is also known 
as information theory, and uses entropy as a measure of information content. 
There is some debate about whether this meaning of entropy is consistent with 
Boltzmann’s concept, challenging its use of the ambiguous notion of information. 
Shannon’s theory simply refers to information as something that is 
communicated. However, he applies the mathematics of probability to provide an 
important measure of the flow of information from a source to a destination. In 
the process of doing so he defines entropy as a measure of uncertainty regarding 
what one could communicate, rather than what is communicated (Robinson, 
2008). This is expressed in terms of a discrete set of probabilities A5, …	5JB : 
K5 = KA5, …	5JB = 	−758	log	58
J
8;
 
which can be derived from the Boltzmann formulation. Interestingly, Shannon 
sidesteps some of the debates by making no claim that this particular expression is 
proof of his formalization of entropy as a measure of choice and uncertainty: 
“This theorem, and the assumptions required for its proof, are in no way 
necessary for the present theory. It is given chiefly to lend a certain 
plausibility to some of the later definitions. The real justification of these 
definitions, however, will reside in their implications” (Shannon, 1948: 
Theorem 2, page 11) 
If the contexts of information and communication in Shannon’s theory are set 
aside for a moment, his idea of special interest to this thesis is that entropy, or 
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disorder, can be expressed in terms of a set of probabilities representing the 
likelihood of different microstates of a system giving rise to a particular 
macrostate. When the systems context is also set aside, this idea becomes an even 
more general definition of entropy, expressed by Renyi (1961) as a 
characterization of Shannon’s measure of entropy for generalized probability 
distributions. Some combination of these latter two interpretations of entropy, the 
purely systems-based aspects of Shannon’s communication theory, and Renyi’s 
more general characterization, may be applicable to the research problem of this 
thesis. For example, it may offer a new perspective on systemic risk by providing 
a measure of uncertainty for potential macrostates of the global financial system.  
The literature on using notions of entropy for explaining or responding to 
systemic risk of a financial system is sparse, as shown by a direct search and by 
reference to the findings of two recent surveys of systemic risk analytics (Bisias et 
al., 2012; Billio et al., 2010). The surveys show that, so far, contributions are 
limited to inferring a probability distribution for one or more variables of interest, 
as in extracting default probabilities from the prices of equity options, or to 
establishing the degree of uncertainty when defining a banking system’s 
multivariate density function characterizing individual and joint asset-value 
movements. The direct search found a few more recent contributions, but they 
were derivations of research by Sheldon and Maurer (1998), who provide a well-
cited example of the principle of entropy maximization in their analysis of 
interbank lending in Switzerland’s banking network. The relationship between a 
clear definition of systemic risk of failure and a measure of systemic disorder has 
not been expressed for a financial system. 
2.7.4 Criticality 
This field of research is very trans-disciplinary, reflecting the pervasive and self-
organizing nature of critical phenomena (Bak, Tang and Wiesenfeld, 1987). There 
are three outstanding articles of direct relevance to this thesis among recent 
contributions to literature on the criticality of complex systems.  
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2.7.4.1 Approach indications 
Scheffer et al (2012) continue their previous work on early warning signals for 
critical transitions. They review the relevance to social sciences and medicine of 
research into generic indicators of system resilience in other fields, such as 
ecology and climate science. Examples discussed include how current work on 
ecological networks is revealing fundamental architectural features that may cause 
‘tipping points’ and thresholds to appear in financial markets, and other complex 
systems, leading to critical transitions in their system states. Elsewhere, research 
is uncovering generic empirical indicators of proximity to such phenomena. The 
authors argue that opportunities for new approaches to anticipating critical 
transitions (also described as sharp regime shifts to alternative states) are 
appearing at the crossroads of several emerging but hitherto disconnected lines of 
research.  
The relevant key findings identified by Scheffer et al are: 
i. The heterogeneity and connectivity of a complex system’s components 
are known determinants of its susceptibility to making critical transitions 
to alternative states. However, their effects are dependent on the nature 
of component interaction behaviour. Often, when that behaviour is 
conducive to stability or recovery from local damage, it is observed to 
have a counter-intuitive tendency to induce large-scale collapse. 
ii. Strong mutualistic interactions (e.g., pollination) among networks of 
complex system components are predicted to be robust to critical 
transitions if they occur in nested structures, in which specialists are 
preferentially linked to generalists acting in their mutual interests as 
hubs of connectivity. 
iii. Strong antagonistic interactions (e.g., competition) among networks of 
complex system components are predicted to be robust to critical 
transitions if they are compartmentalized into loosely connected 
modules. 
iv. The ‘critical slowing down’ phenomenon is observed in topological 
representations of complex systems as an increasing sluggishness in the 
recovery rate of the system from small, local perturbations. In such 
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systems which normally do not have volatile fluctuations in their states, 
this is considered to be a general indicator for the increasing likelihood 
of an impending critical transition to some alternative state requiring 
further confirmation by other means. 
v. Highly stochastic complex systems typically experience critical 
transitions far from local bifurcation points in such topologies, making 
measurement of slowing down based on local perturbations unlikely to 
be useful. However, as the current state of this type of system converges 
on an alternative basin of attraction, away from recent local critical 
phenomena, it can temporarily flip to an alternative state. This is 
described as ‘flickering’ behaviour, which is equivalent and converse to 
slowing down phenomena in less volatile systems, and is a known 
tendency of complex systems that exhibit rapid fluctuations. The 
different behaviour can be attributed to various causes, such as more 
chaotic nonlinearity, or greater sensitivity of the perturbation regime to 
small changes. It is, however, similar to slowing down in that it also 
suggests an increasing probability of a sudden critical transition.  
vi. Spatial patterns in topological representations of data about complex 
systems are increasingly being recognized as powerful ways to expose 
behavioural phenomena. For example, they can be used to infer how the 
resilience of alternative states depends on key drivers. But it is not 
entirely understood how these patterns should be interpreted in different 
circumstances. 
vii. The use of absolute values from individual indicators for particular 
levels of fragility is still beyond reach, but ranking situations according 
to scales of relative fragilities based on a complementary set of 
indicators is shown to be an effective way to detect increasing 
probabilities of critical transitions. 
2.7.4.2 Regulation priorities 
May and Arinaminpathy (2010) apply their perspectives from the fields of 
zoology and infectious diseases in exploring what they describe as simple 
mathematical caricatures for banking ecosystems, to understand the overall 
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dynamical behaviour and criticality of financial systems, and to discuss potential 
regulations for reducing systemic risk. Their motivation for this article comes 
from an observation that: “increasingly complex strategies for managing risk in 
individual banks have not been matched by corresponding attention to overall 
systemic risks”. 
A basic model of assets and liabilities in an interbank network is constructed, 
to show how liquidity shocks are initiated and propagated among banks in such 
networks through phases of systemic failure. It is described by the authors as a 
deliberate and extreme oversimplification, which is at best a mathematical 
metaphor based on earlier work that has produced useful insights. They use it for 
exploring the likelihood of well-intended regulatory measures having unintended 
adverse consequences, to gain a better understanding of the causes of current 
systemic failures. A series of numerical simulations generated by this model 
interpret bank failures as a function of their capital buffers and their mean number 
of inter-bank connections. By considering the results in a thought experiment 
based on the work of Beale et al (2011), the authors find evidence of what 
evolutionary biologists and ecologists respectively call the ‘Prisoner’s Dilemma’, 
or the ‘Tragedy of the Commons’. This is argued to show that when individual 
banks serve their own interests by conforming to system homogeneity, often 
facilitated by regulations, they create a destabilizing effect on the system as a 
whole which greatly increases systemic risk. The converse is also argued, 
whereby serving systemic interests puts individual banks at much greater risk. 
Therefore, May and Arinaminpathy conclude that potential regulations aimed at 
reducing systemic risk should first gain a clear understanding of the dynamical 
behaviour of the global banking network, and the impact of their decisions at both 
systemic and individual bank levels, and then decide their priorities. 
2.7.4.3 Concentrations, exposure and diversity 
Beale et al (2011) call this the regulator’s dilemma: “should regulations allow 
institutions to maximize their individual stability or should they safeguard 
stability of the system as a whole?” Their article shows, using model systems, that 
exposure and diversity are the two most important global parameters for 
explaining the expected systemic cost of multiple failures, suggesting that 
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regulatory intervention should promote more diversification among banks. An 
interesting feature of their model, of specific relevance to this thesis, is its highly 
stylized graphical representation of a world in which N banks invest in M assets 
that can inflict losses or gains proportional to the level of investment over time t. 
It uses a long-tailed distribution of asset price fluctuations with 1.5 degrees of 
freedom, and a probability of p that a bank will fail if all its investments are in a 
single asset class. The plausibility of this model is supported by its findings being 
remarkably robust to changes in the detail assumptions used. In particular, 
explanations of their findings are illustrated graphically with just two banks and 
one asset. 
This importance of concentrations in exposure and diversity is confirmed by 
another recent article (Haldane and May, 2011), and illustrated by work in which 
a simulation model of complex interbank lending behaviour and criticality shows 
how avalanche effects lead to more instability when heterogeneity in size and 
exposure to risk increases among banks (Iori and Jafarey, 2001; Iori, Jafarey and 
Padilla, 2006). 
The various characteristics of financial system criticality discussed in this sub-
section will be considered later in this thesis, for theory development and in 
specification of the project 3 protocol. 
2.7.5 Catastrophe 
When taken to its extremes, the notion of criticality becomes one of catastrophe. 
At that point research focus turns its attention to systemic failure, but the inherent 
nonlinearity of related problems such as systemic risk makes the traditional use of 
linear mathematical models increasingly impractical. 
2.7.5.1 Catastrophe Theory 
Helbing (2010) cites catastrophe theory (Thom, 1975; Zeeman, 1976) among the 
12 scientific techniques he lists as credible ways to address the challenges of 
systemic risk in complex economic systems. However, it has been criticised as an 
intellectual fad in many disciplines, and remains controversial in economics. In 
his criticism of the criticisms, Rosser Jr (2007) agrees with the conclusions of 
others that the baby was thrown out with the bathwater, and urges that catastrophe 
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theory should be openly and properly used again in economics. He points out that 
over this last decade, hardly any papers have appeared in leading journals in 
economics with a reference to catastrophe theory. It was ridiculed as an 
intellectual bubble in the mid-1990s alongside chaos theory, complexity theory 
and information theory, when they were all considered to be of little consequence 
(Horgan, 1995). Since then, the other theories have become recognized trans-
disciplinary fields of scientific research with fully established academic 
credentials, but catastrophe theory continues to be seen as mostly irrelevant. 
Rosser puts this down to the “sins of intellectual hype and exaggeration … [and] 
inappropriate applications of the theory”, and argues that “economists should re-
evaluate the former fad, and move it to a more proper valuation”. He has 
certainly followed his own advice, by contributing a general theory of economic 
discontinuities (Rosser Jr, 2000), which is the definitive textbook on such notions 
drawn from both catastrophe and chaos theories. 
In his later article (Rosser Jr, 2007), catastrophe theory is described by Rosser 
as an important aspect of bifurcation theory, within which it is the study of 
structurally stable singularities of dynamical systems. After describing how 
catastrophe theory came to be invented or discovered, and some of its essential 
features, Rosser lists a few reasonable applications in economics research that do 
not conform to critics’ claims of violated assumptions or misuse of the theory that 
undermined its credibility. Then he reviews the controversies and debates leading 
to the theory’s downfall, and offers an example of valid criticism, followed by a 
discussion of alternative approaches.  
The essential features of catastrophe theory mentioned by Rosser (2007; 2000) 
that are relevant to this thesis are: 
i. It is an important aspect of bifurcation theory. 
ii. It does not have a precise, generally agreed definition. 
iii. In mathematical terms it is a non-axiomatic theory. 
iv. It addresses structurally stable (generic) singularities of dynamical 
systems. 
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v. It is the most appropriate method to use for modelling sufficiently low 
dimensional systems with gradient dynamics derived from a potential 
function. 
vi. Singularities associated with elementary cusp catastrophe-types are of 
specific interest, having two control variables (the normal factor and the 
splitting factor) and one state variable. A pleat appears in the surface 
(manifold) of potential system states above a critical value for the 
splitting factor known as the cusp point (see example in Figure 18). 
vii. The control variables of dynamical systems that exhibit these 
singularities are characterized as moving slowly, while state variables 
are characterized as moving more rapidly. 
viii. There are four different behavioural patterns that a cusp catastrophe-type 
is recognized as being able to exhibit: bimodality, inaccessibility, 
sudden jumps and hysteresis. 
 
2.7.5.2 The Standard Form 
Standard (or ‘elementary’) catastrophe theory considers a dynamical system given 
by L functions on M	control variables N8, which determine its L state variables OP, 
such that 
OP = QPN, …	NR. 
Then, if S is a potential function on the set of control and state variables, where 
				S = STN8 , OPU 
such that for all OP 
VS VOP = 0⁄ , 
this set of points constitutes the equilibrium manifold Y. If it is further assumed 
that the potential function S provides the gradient dynamic and some convention 
whereby system state variables are placed in this manifold, then the catastrophe 
function Z[,Q is the projection of state variables in Y onto the control variable 
space. Singularities in this mapping (loosely defined as points where M is not 
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differentiable) are the focus of catastrophe theory, as in the attention paid to 
particular state variables associated with a bifurcation shadow area of the 
mapping. In the cusp catastrophe-type of interest to this thesis, Y is defined by 
two control variables N	and	N and one state variable O. When the state 
function Q of that cusp catastrophe-type is qualitatively stable under slight 
perturbations, any singularity of its catastrophe function will also be structurally 
stable under such perturbations. 
Variations of this standard catastrophe theory have been proposed by other 
researchers, in response to criticisms of Thom’s original conceptualization, but he 
maintains the view that it is intended for the “classification of analogous 
situations”, to be used in “understanding reality” (Thom, 1975: page 382). His 
counter-criticism is that its detractors are attempting to apply a neo-positive 
epistemology to a theory intended to show how qualitative changes could arise 
from quantitative changes. 
2.7.5.3 The Controversies 
Controversies surrounded catastrophe theory almost from its inception. Although, 
Rosser (2007) reports that the disdain in which it is currently held by some 
disciplines is widely considered to be overdone by mathematicians and 
researchers in certain fields of physics and engineering, because it has mathematic 
validity when used correctly in appropriate contexts. Objections raised by its 
critics in economics include: excessive reliance on qualitative methods; 
inappropriate use of quantitative techniques; and the limitations imposed by 
certain mathematical assumptions. However, the overall nature of these criticisms 
is generally attributable to the broader qualitative-quantitative divide in theoretical 
modelling among economists. For example, perhaps the most fundamental 
challenge of the theory comes from Sussmann and Zahler (1978), who argue from 
a more positivist epistemological perspective that Zeeman’s catastrophe model of 
stock market dynamics involves too many assumptions, and is essentially 
tautological because it fails to describe crashes in a nontrivial way, at best 
showing that crashes occur without explaining why. In recent models of 
heterogeneous agents in financial markets, the type of assumptions Zeeman makes 
regarding the behaviour of traders are now seen as central to determining the 
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dynamics of bubbles and crashes. Furthermore, such qualitative explanations have 
subsequently been supported by more detailed bifurcation analysis and broader 
overviews of this type of approach. 
2.7.5.4 Current Thinking 
New contributions must join these debates in the literature, to defend their chosen 
research approach, and be prepared to articulate the arguments in favour of a 
return to catastrophe theory. This thesis adopts a standard interpretation of the 
theory, generally aligned with Thom’s original intentions of providing more 
qualitative explanations (Thom, 1977). Therefore, Thom’s statements of rebuff 
and those of his supporters can be taken to apply here (see Rosser Jr, 2000; sub-
section 2.3.1.2).  
With regard to the separate debate about how to model temporal aspects of 
catastrophes when using this theory, Thom makes his views clear. Although 
gradient dynamics do not allow for time to be a variable of the potential function, 
he argues that an elementary catastrophe form may be embedded in a larger 
dynamical system which is time variant (Thom, 1983: pp. 107-108). This gives a 
series of structural characteristics  of a dynamical system modelled in a larger 
	 × , space, in which the larger system is transversal to the set of catastrophe 
structures in this enlarged space (Thom, 1975: pp. 38-40). In sub-sections 4.4 and  
4.5 of this thesis, a model with these properties is applied to explaining the 
structural characteristics of systemic risk in a financial system. 
A good example of how current applications of catastrophe theory in 
economics avoid this direct parameterization of time is provided by Ho and 
Saunders (1980). Their model of bank failures uses a differential equation of the 
form: 
_^ = Q^, [, `, 
to represent a financial system where ^ is some state variable, _^ is its derivative, 
and [, ` are parameters that affect the behaviour of ^. In that model, all potential 
states of ^ are mapped to locus points on a static three dimensional surface, which 
the article illustrates using a stylized sketch of a cusp catastrophe topology. Then 
discussions about how ^ changes refer to its potential movements around the 
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features of that supposed surface. The authors do not offer a mathematical 
expression for the actual topology of their model, and their considerations of 
change over time fail to account for the likely recursive effects in a dynamical 
system of changes in one time-period altering the behaviour surface topology in 
subsequent periods. Instead, the article simply makes broad, illustrative references 
to a cusp catastrophe-type, during a mostly conventional mathematical analysis of 
assumptions and conditions related to an overall probability of bank failures in 
their model, in a search for the conditions which are both necessary and sufficient 
to induce a catastrophic jump in that probability. They present implications 
derived from two versions of their model, one excluding regulators and the other 
including them, suggesting that a catastrophic jump in the probability of bank 
failure could occur, even if a continuous source of funding were available from a 
central bank acting as lender of last resort. Although contributions of this type 
offer useful qualitative insights that can inform central bank policy decisions, they 
do not demonstrate how catastrophe theory can be applied effectively. 
In a more recent article (Pruden, Paranque and Baets, 2004), the authors 
investigate the possibility of predicting when a price bubble in securities trading 
will burst, by observing the dissipative gradient that occurs in trading behaviour 
patterns within the cusp zone or threshold of a cusp catastrophe model of that 
behaviour. Although they verify and reinforce these observations with technical 
market analysis, it is the catastrophe theory application that is of interest to this 
thesis. They essentially take a similar approach to Ho and Saunders (1980) with 
respect to using a cusp catastrophe topology for illustrative purposes only, and the 
tricky question of how to deal with time. But at least they acknowledge that 
“implicit in the model is a fourth temporal dimension”. By this it is assumed they 
mean ‘there is an implicit fourth dimension, which is temporal’. An interesting 
feature of their research is its application of catastrophe theory to the Cal Tech 
experiment on irrational exuberance, using data collected by transcription from a 
video recording of the experiment. Their observations were an early insight on the 
focus of later work by Scheffer et al (2009) in applying the ‘critical slowing 
down’ phenomenon from dynamical systems theory to identifying early warning 
signals for critical transitions. 
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The latest directly relevant contribution identified by this thesis is a theoretical 
analysis of the causes of financial system brittleness based on catastrophe theory 
(Yang, Mu and Yao, 2009). While it does not use a standard graphical illustration 
of a catastrophe model, as noted in other contributions, this contribution does 
apply a theory of complex system brittleness to a very standard nonlinear equation 
often used to represent the generic form of a cusp catastrophe potential function: 
SO = Oa + [O + `O. 
The authors take this to represent a financial crisis caused by a loans sub-
system, which they explain by using a “catastrophe progression method” on three 
sub-systems b, c, d, having a relationship described as being ‘brittle’. The main 
problem with this use of the cusp catastrophe is that it takes a very generic 
mathematical expression, which is intended as a stylized example of the kind of 
expression that can describe a cusp, and combines this with broad assumptions 
such as “assuming subsystem b has been in a collapse state” without actually 
defining what a “collapse state” is. Fuzzy thinking of this type, covered in a 
smokescreen of mathematics, fails to remove this corner of economics literature 
from “the unreasonable ineffectiveness of mathematics in economics” (Velupillai, 
2005) discussed in sub-section 2.5.4 of this thesis. It simply helps to fuel the bad 
reputation catastrophe theory has gained in economics. 
2.7.6 Issues for this thesis 
When the research problem of this thesis is considered in the light of current 
limited knowledge regarding various aspects of disorder or failure in financial 
systems, then evident confusion regarding how best to achieve and maintain 
financial stability becomes understandable. 
As a complex, adaptive, dynamical system, the global financial system exhibits 
all the characteristics that are known to make the behaviour of such systems 
extremely difficult to explain, manage or predict. But recent contributions to other 
literatures offer economists some clues about the relationship between systemic 
risk and how instability of the global financial system becomes operationally 
catastrophic, which may suggest new explanations for that behaviour.  
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From the discussions in sub-section 2.7 on complexity and related topics, it 
seems that positivist research into emergent phenomena in behavioural economics 
may be reaching the limits of current formalisms. A constructivist approach to 
researching these phenomena, using the ‘big tent’ notion of complexity, 
encompassing a dynamic definition based on non-axiomatic foundations (Rosser 
Jr, 2010), is arguably the most promising alternative. It may not even be necessary 
to attempt reconciliation with a more positivist evolutionary perspective on 
emergent phenomena as Rosser suggests if some qualitative notion of the building 
blocks of evolutionary models (Safarzynska and van den Bergh, 2010a) can be 
incorporated in carefully specified simulation designs. Acceptance of such 
arguments does not concede to the view that emergent phenomena cannot be 
formalized in mathematical models; it simply adopts the most pragmatic way of 
identifying what is to be formalized, which is currently unclear. Then the 
relationship between systemic risk and the emergence of such phenomena leading 
to some tolerated limit of disorder or uncertainty may be explained by a suitable 
interpretation of entropy for financial systems. 
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2.8 Agent-Based Computational Economics 
Agent based modelling is mentioned in previous sub-sections as a viable 
constructivist approach to improving current understanding about systemic risk of 
failure for complex adaptive socio-economic systems such as financial systems. 
This sub-section reviews recent key contributions to the literature relevant to that 
topic, and sets the scene for project 3 proposals by explaining the meaning 
intended when various agent-based modelling terms are used, and establishes its 
alignment to on-going debates in this area of research. 
2.8.1 Map 
 
 
Figure 14: Literature Review Map, sub-section 2.8. 
2.8.2 Fundamentals 
The origins of agent-based modelling can be traced back to concepts developed by 
John von Neumann and Stanislaw Ulam at the end of the 1940s (Janssen, 2005). 
They were applied in models of cellular automata and subsequently evolved into a 
collection of modelling principles, to form the basis for multi-agent simulations in 
various scientific disciplines. In this thesis, it is the ACE interpretation of this 
modelling approach and its associated methodologies in economic research that is 
intended by references to agent-based terminology. 
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 Agent-based computational economics (ACE) is the computational study of 
economic processes modelled as dynamic systems of interacting autonomous 
agents such as individuals, social groupings, and institutions, represented by 
bundles of data and behavioural rules operating in computer-generated economic 
environments (Tesfatsion, 2006). It takes a bottom-up constructivist approach to 
economic theory development by simulating the phenomena that arise from 
participation in economic systems, enabling theories to be tested to see if they are 
sufficient for understanding the empirical evidence. Among the many reasons for 
building such models, perhaps the most important for this thesis is the ability of 
this type of computer simulation to deliver research insights beyond the current 
range of analytical tractability (Helbing, 2012). Essentially, every agent-based 
model has a corresponding and equivalent partial recursive function, as suggested 
by the Church-Turing Thesis (Epstein, 1999). However, the set of equations 
describing the dynamics of many interesting computational models is often 
beyond current mathematical formulation. 
Epstein (1999) describes this ability as a ‘generative’ approach to social 
science, with features distinguishing it from both ‘inductive’ and ‘deductive’ 
science. By this he means it offers powerful new forms of hybrid theoretical-
computational research of particular relevance to non-equilibrium systems, in 
which society is viewed as a distributed computational device that is able to 
interpret social dynamics as a type of computation, with interesting implications 
for the intractability and undecidability of some problems. 
A more accessible way of thinking about that ability is perhaps offered by 
Tesfatsion (2006), who describes ACE in terms of empirical observations on the 
structural conditions, institutional arrangements, and behavioural dispositions of a 
real world economic system translated directly into a computational model, cast at 
a less abstract level than equation-based economic models. It emphasizes a 
process of empirical understanding and creative conjecture rather than a collection 
of mathematical equilibrium solution techniques, and, most importantly for this 
thesis, ACE is better able to facilitate the development and experimental 
evaluation of integrated theories. 
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2.8.3 Changing imperatives 
Farmer and Foley (2009) describe how “leaders of the world are flying the 
economy by the seat of their pants”, because the two main economic models 
available to them, empirical models fitted to past statistical data and DSGE 
(Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium) models, each have fatal flaws that 
were clearly exposed by this current crisis. In the absence of something better, 
economic policy responses are being guided by common sense and anecdotal 
analogies to previous crises. However, as discussed in earlier sub-sections of this 
thesis, such attempts at controlling a complex system are likely to induce 
unexpected and possibly catastrophic systemic reactions.  
2.8.3.1 A Better Way 
The article suggests there is a better way: agent-based models. After a brief 
review of how the history of economics brought the world to its present ‘seat of 
the pants’ situation, it describes a few examples of successful agent-based models 
in economics and the challenges of making improvements. The authors conclude 
that when the enormity of the stakes involved is considered, this is an alternative 
approach worth trying. A discussion then follows, in which a holistic model is 
proposed for the entire economy. However, most agent-based models that have 
contributed useful insights are small, highly simplified and focused 
representations of the circumstances observed to be of empirical significance for a 
particular economic phenomenon, whereas attempts at a more holistic 
examination of emergent economic phenomena are rare. 
An earlier survey of the challenges to be met by agent-based modelling in 
social science quotes a similar conclusion among the three reasons it cites for the 
potential importance of the technique (Bankes, 2002): 
i. the inadequacy of alternative formalisms for modelling the problems of 
social science; 
ii. agents as a natural ontology; 
iii. a greater ability to discover and demonstrate emergence. 
Unrealistic assumptions imposed by alternatives to an ABM approach, 
including linearity, homogeneity, normality, and stationarity are now 
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acknowledged to be too restrictive, limiting their applicability to a narrow class of 
problems. They were introduced to make certain problems more tractable for 
mathematical analysis and proof, but simulation using ABM introduces greater 
flexibility in exploring the implications of imperfect rationality, the effects of 
learning and information availability, and the influence of social and institutional 
structures for a more comprehensive range of problems. 
2.8.3.2 Relevance 
The relevance of ABM as a social science ontology for expressing knowledge 
about the behaviour, motivations and relationships of social agents is shown best 
in contrast with the abstract approaches of mathematical derivation. This 
advantage is illustrated by ABM’s power to demonstrate emergent phenomena 
(Helbing, 2012: page 29), which are difficult to express and even more difficult to 
discover by using more traditional formalisms. 
2.8.4 Challenges for research 
Bankes (2002), however, points out a few issues that need to be addressed by 
future research involving ABMs. 
2.8.4.1 Improving Credibility 
A lack of clarity is identified by that article as being prevalent up to the time of its 
publication concerning the requirements for building credible arguments using 
computational models, which still seems to hold true.  It recommends that the 
standards of rigour applied to ABM simulations should be improved to remove 
perceived limitations in their usefulness as a scientific technique. However, rather 
than aspiring to the mathematical standards of deductive proof, which would 
compromise advantages of flexibility, it argues that agent-based modelling and 
simulation should apply standards of rigour appropriate for an experimental form 
of mathematics, casting them as techniques of an experimental science. Then their 
issues of credibility and methodology could be aligned with the views of Karl 
Popper (Popper, 1963; Popper, 1979) and the evolutionary epistemology, allowing 
the findings of ABM simulations to be admissible for informing public policy 
decisions. 
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2.8.4.2 Dealing with Emergence 
Simulation design, uncertainty analysis and methodology selection were other 
challenges noted by the article for future attention, along with establishing the 
best way to deal with emergent phenomena in simulations of complex systems. 
On the latter topic, the article observed that most demonstrations of emergence 
were confined to graphical examples, rarely supported by formal definitions and 
quantitative tests. Consequently, new disciplines were called for, to also make the 
analysis of emergent phenomena in ABM simulations more rigorous where it has 
previously been too polemical.   
2.8.4.3 A New Paradigm 
In his compilation and discussion of recently published papers on the latest 
approaches to agent-based modelling and simulation of socio-economic systems, 
Helbing (2012: page 61) describes many of these future requirements as demands 
for a paradigm shift. He shows that some of the issues raised in Bankes’ paper are 
now being addressed, although their resolution is often far from complete. But he 
accepts that a new paradigm has not yet appeared. 
Progress has been made, nonetheless. Data for parameter calibration and 
findings validation is now more readily available in the social sciences, and 
integration of that data in agent-based approaches to model simulation is 
significantly easier using improved simulation tools. There are also new 
opportunities to incorporate established analysis methods from disciplines such as 
statistical physics, and references to complex systems theory are generating a 
move in the literature beyond descriptive to explanatory models. However, future 
research in this area incorporating these advances needs to proceed carefully, by 
combining new and established capabilities, resources and methods with an 
appropriate methodology, to deliver what Bankes refers to as the “advertised 
revolution in social science” in a suitably rigorous approach to this new form of 
experimental research. 
2.8.5 Experimentation 
Unfortunately, recommendations about how to do experimentation are not well 
developed for agent-based simulation approaches (Allen and Snyder, 2009). 
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Although much has been written about: the nature and objectives of ACE 
(Tesfatsion, 2006; Helbing, 2012; Cristelli, Pietronero and Zaccaria, 2011); how 
to build ABMs and do simulation for ACE (Macal and North, 2010; Gilbert and 
Terna, 2000; Dinther, 2008; Dooley, 2002), how to develop theory with ACE 
(Davis, Eisenhardt and Bingham, 2007; Lustick, 2000); and how to test and 
validate ACE findings (Janssen and Ostrom, 2006; Windrum, Fagiolo and 
Moneta, 2007); there is very little practical advice or academic consensus on how 
to pull this all together in an approved experimentation approach within an ACE 
development and simulation methodology.  
 This situation contrasts with, and is distinct from, the plethora of agent-based 
systems development methodologies available for selection (Al-Hashel, 2010), 
which are not concerned with the purpose of experimentation for which those 
systems are intended. Most contributions of simulation results to the ACE 
literature have until quite recently tended to be generated by small, highly 
simplified ABMs involving few simulation runs. Their focus has often been the 
illustration of a particular economic phenomenon, in which the experimental 
aspect of their research context has been minor. Consequently, published results 
contain detailed descriptions of the agent-based model and how it was 
implemented by simulations, with little mention of the experimental approach 
taken in acquiring their results. An exception to this rule can be found in 
Damaceanu (2011). If, as Bankes (2002) suggests, in future research ABM 
modelling and simulation should be cast as the techniques of an experimental 
science to establish academic credibility, then attention must be given to 
developing a suitably rigorous approach to experimentation.  
2.8.6 Issues for this thesis 
There seems to be a compelling argument in favour of using ACE to model and 
demonstrate the validity of a solution proposal for the research problem of this 
thesis. However, a rigorous experimentation approach will need to be developed 
in the absence of any accepted standard. The implication for this programme of 
research is that experimental design in project 3 will be required to define both an 
overall approach and a specific series of experiments.  
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The ACE findings of the project will also require quantitative validation, to a 
standard of experimentation and rigour sufficient for informing public policy 
decisions. Preferably they should also pass the scrutiny of more demanding 
academic peer-review appraisals in top-ranking journals. 
2.9 Literature Review Conclusions 
2.9.1 Overall Assessment 
It is the overall assessment of the literature reviewed that, although good progress 
has recently been made in understanding certain aspects of systemic risk, the 
paradigms currently favoured in economics for explaining it are reaching their 
limits of usefulness.  
The main distinction between the literature review questions posed in this 
section and the questions being addressed in the extended core literature is one of 
understanding ‘how’ behavioural state transitions of the global financial system 
occur, not their causes or effects. That understanding begs the question: ‘what is 
the meaning of a behavioural state of the global financial system?’ A suitable 
answer would help to explain the basic principles of how a particular state occurs, 
and the risks associated with it, such as the risk of a transition from a state of 
relative stability to one of systemic failure. Then, the difficult challenge of 
avoiding multiple potential root causes and effects of systemic failure for that 
system becomes the simpler challenge of managing its current behavioural state, 
and potential transitions to future states, by influencing behavioural responses. 
A simple metaphor of this distinction is found in the ‘broken-down’ 
operational state of a motor vehicle. It may have many potential root causes and 
effects. However, rather than attempting to understand the complex permutations 
of their interactions, effort is usually applied to understanding the various 
potential manifestations of a broken-down state, how they occur, and what should 
be monitored to predict, and avoid or overcome them. Based on that 
understanding, initiatives are introduced to influence such things as design 
improvements for impact resilience, the use of redundant components (e.g. extra 
spare wheel), resources availability (e.g. carrying or acquiring extra fuel) and 
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safety checks (e.g. vehicle maintenance checks). None of these address potential 
root causes of a broken-down state, such as irrational driving behaviour, bad road 
surfaces, extreme weather, or the proximity of the nearest petrol station, but they 
do address how things could go wrong and what to do. Even in extreme cases, 
such as an impending crash, knowledge of a vehicle’s resilience to impact may be 
sufficient to avoid a write-off or a multi-vehicle pile-up by a well-executed 
manoeuvre. In financial systems, equivalent initiatives would be considered 
systemic risk mitigations, but the point made by this illustration is that they are 
more effective if applied directly to the potential state of breakdown, not to its 
perceived root causes or effects. It will therefore be argued in this thesis that 
macroprudential intervention should mitigate the risks of actual state transitions of 
the system’s behaviour, while regulations continue to address the potential root 
causes and effects of that behaviour. To some extent this is what is beginning to 
happen with initiatives such as quantitative easing, but the reason why they work 
is not understood by those who use them. Furthermore, insights into the systemic 
feedback implications of such initiatives may also be improved by this approach. 
2.9.2 Research Problem 
A plausible new theory was therefore proposed for development. It was intended 
to be capable of answering a question that encapsulates certain unresolved aspects 
of the literature hypothesis, issues identified in the extended core literature (see 
2.9.1), and the 8 conjectures synthesised by project 1. After consideration of 
keywords and phrases from each of these, the following question was formulated 
so that finding its answer could serve as the research problem of this thesis. 
Research Question “How does instability of the global financial system 
become operationally catastrophic, and how could 
that outcome generally be avoided?” 
The wording is deliberately open to multiple potential answers, to avoid 
confirmation bias implying that an explanation can only be found in the 8 risk-
based conjectures identified by this literature review. Useful findings are therefore 
possible, even if the propositions and hypotheses derived from those conjectures 
are shown to be implausible by theory testing and validation. 
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3 THEORY DEVELOPMENT 
3.1 Summary 
This section discusses considerations that arose in methodology steps 4 and 6 
during project 2 (see Figure 4), and explains how they were addressed when the 
outline of theory presented in section 4 was developed. As mentioned previously, 
findings from the exploratory search of alternative literature in step 5 are covered 
in the literature section. 
After reviewing how a focus of research was determined within the potential 
offered by the research question and its 8 conjectures from project 1 (see Table 5), 
and defending the criteria by which an appropriate research philosophy was 
selected, attention turns to the perspective taken by this thesis on theory 
development controversies. A discussion of the most pertinent debates then leads 
to a walk-through the approach applied, followed by declarations of alignment 
with multi-disciplinary theory informing the subject matter of this thesis. Finally, 
the potential is considered for a unifying theory of the type proposed to make a 
significant contribution to multi-disciplinary literature within focus, by enhancing 
macro-economic theory about crises, finance theory about financial services, and 
complexity science theory about system behaviours. 
3.2 Scope 
3.2.1 Research Focus 
Although the system of interest for this research is the global financial system, it 
is the macro-level phenomenon of systemic failure, and an understanding of the 
overall risk of its occurrence, that are of principal interest. Therefore, a focus on 
the neighbourhood of time close to when this phenomenon occurs, expressed as: 
Research Focus  “Explaining the behaviour of the global financial system 
when it approaches a state of operational crisis”, 
is considered broad enough to encompass that interest, but sufficiently limiting in 
its overall scope of attention to be manageable. This enables system behaviour to 
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be examined within a relatively short window of time, instead of throughout all 
time periods, and allows a narrow operational perspective to be taken on the way 
micro-level activities generate macro-level phenomena. At a micro-level, 
participation in the system is considered exclusively for its role in generating the 
potential for overall systemic failure, and for its mitigation, from which 
conjectures are developed into propositions and hypotheses in a theoretical model 
presented in section 4. 
3.2.2 Relevance 
Aspects of the gap in understanding represented by this research focus are already 
understood by some academic disciplines, as shown by the exploratory search of 
alternative literature reviewed in sub-sections 2.5 to 2.8. However, there is still no 
sign of relevant theory actually being developed within the boundaries of 
knowledge involved. So the time is arguably right for a multi-disciplinary 
contribution to unify related knowledge and extend it in a theory addressing the 
proposed focus.  
Current inadequacies may partly be due to a profound confusion concerning 
the meaning of risk in general, and systemic risk in particular, that appears to be 
distracting research attention away from such contributions. They may also be a 
consequence of references in some of the project 1 conjectures to an operational 
behaviour perspective, which is new to the combined literature reviewed and 
therefore unlikely to have already been considered. Whatever reasons may explain 
the existence of a gap, this thesis sets out to show that theory development 
opportunities relevant to the research problem offer the potential for a significant 
contribution to theory and practice, even within the proposed confines of the 
narrower research focus. 
3.3 Research Philosophy 
3.3.1 Rationale for requirements 
Calls in sub-section 1.3.2 for a paradigm shift in responding to the apparent 
intractable nature of systemic crises in the global financial system (Beinhocker, 
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2011; Colander et al., 2009; Bandt and Hartmann, 2000) suggest that a more 
multi-disciplinary approach will be necessary. But diverse traditions of the 
extended core literature demand a research philosophy compromise that is 
sufficiently pragmatic to bridge conflicts between those traditions when 
assimilating their potential insights from different epistemological perspectives.  
3.3.2 Selected research philosophy 
Further examination of alternative contributing literatures suggested that 
nonlinearity is a fundamental characteristic of this type of intractable problem (see 
discussions in sub-sections 2.7 and 2.8), and realist constructivism (Crnkovic, 
2010) is considered to offer the best potential for developing an improved 
understanding. It has a capacity for philosophical reconciliation between insights 
from different research traditions in the combined core literature by incorporating 
simple metaphorical references, as generally recommended (Guba and Lincoln, 
2005: chapter 8; Cornelissen, 2006; Weick, 1989), into the design of operational 
constructs. Successfully tested theoretical propositions derived from such 
constructs could therefore be argued to have pragmatic validity (Worren, Moore 
and Elliott, 2002).  
Selection of a constructivist epistemology for this research, within a realist 
ontology, in turn called for a suitable constructive research method for building 
practical, theoretical or combined artefacts to create knowledge about how a 
domain specific problem can be understood and explained in principle (Crnkovic, 
2010). Computational modelling and simulation methods were used, as 
recommended in other literature (Helbing, 2012; Farmer and Foley, 2009; 
Heckbert, 2009). However, even with those recommendations in place, 
philosophical controversies remained to be addressed. 
3.4 Perspectives on Theory Development 
3.4.1 Philosophy of risk 
From a realist constructivism perspective, this thesis accepts Holton’s (Holton, 
2004) argument that implies it is meaningless to ask how some absolute concept 
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of risk may be traditionally defined and measured, but it may be useful to ask if a 
metric assigned to some operationally defined aspect of perceived risk captures 
that risk adequately for a purpose (see discussion in sub-section 2.6.8.1).  
The aspect chosen was a state of operational failure, and its metric was a 
probability at a specific time of its potential for occurrence by some time in the 
future. 
3.4.2 Methodology,  methods and goals 
Axelrod (2007) describes simulation as a scientific methodology in which the 
principal value lies in prediction, proof and discovery. More specifically, the 
primary value of developing theory through simulation methods, according to 
Davis, Eisenhardt and Bingham (2007), is to be found in producing novel theory 
through creative experimentation. Helpfully, the latter article offers a roadmap for 
attaining that value, which this programme of research adapts and implements as 
its overall research methodology (see Figure 4). However, advice on setting goals 
for delivering value of relevance to a specific piece of simulation research is 
sparse (Heath, Hill and Ciarallo, 2009). The goals of this research adapt 
suggestions from multiparadigm perspectives on theory building in organizational 
studies (Gioia and Pitre, 1990), which are used to guide research efforts. They are: 
‘to describe and explain in order to diagnose and understand’. A key implication 
of this choice is that relevance in this specific piece of research is perceived to 
exist in clarification through novel theory, which aligns well with its declared 
focus (3.2.1). Axelrod’s notions of prediction and proof are not ignored, and 
significant progress in those directions is claimed, but they are not the principal 
intended contribution.  
3.4.3 The meaning of theory 
Weick (1995) observed that “most of what passes for theory in organizational 
studies consists of approximations”. Sutton and Staw (1995) are less forthright, 
but confirm that “there is little agreement about what constitutes strong versus 
weak theory in the social sciences, but there is more consensus [about what is] … 
not theory”. However, neither article offers a clear definition of what theory is. In 
his comments on the Sutton and Staw (1995) article, DiMaggio (1995) suggests 
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there are at least three views of what theory should be: theory as covering laws, 
theory as enlightenment, and theory as narrative. He then argues that many of the 
best theories are hybrids of some combination of these three views that find an 
appropriate balance between the vexing choices of: clarity versus 
defamiliarization, focus versus multidimensionality, and comprehensiveness 
versus memorability. Although DiMaggio’s observations are useful, there is a lack 
of further discussion about their practicalities. 
Perhaps the most thorough examination of the meaning of ‘theory’ in the social 
sciences is contributed by Abend (2008), who confirms that “it is quite unclear 
what sociologists mean by the words theory, theoretical, and theorize”. In a 
detailed semantic and lexicographical analysis of the different things sociologists 
may mean when they use the word theory, Abend arrives at seven implied 
interpretations quite early in the article. Sadly, none of the alternatives listed 
resonate with the implied meaning of calls for new theory within the scope of 
potential contributions in the literature reviewed in section 0. From that point on 
the article fails to contribute further insights of relevance to this thesis by 
descending into discussions of linguistic and philosophical issues without 
reaching any practical conclusions. 
Dubin (1978) is more helpful, but his definition is buried on page 216 in his 
discussion on the nature of research: 
“A theory is a model of some segment of the observable world. Such a 
model describes the face appearance of the phenomenon in such terms as 
structures, textures, forms and operations. In order that such a model is 
considered dynamic, it also describes how the phenomenon works, how it 
functions. All scientific models, then, are the imaginative recreation of some 
segment of the observable world by a theorist interested in comprehending 
the forms and functions of selected segments of the world around him.” 
This is still fairly vague. But, interestingly, in another part of that book he 
asserts that in his view the terms ‘theory’, ‘model’ and ‘system’ are identical for 
the purposes of theory building, and are used by him interchangeably. 
Considering the revised edition cited was published in the late 1970s, when 
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systems theory was still struggling for acceptance (Bertalanffy, 1950; Oren and 
Zeigler, 2012), Dubin’s views were extremely prescient of modern constructivist 
trends. His subsequent observations on developing theories of systems are of 
particular interest to this thesis, due to their relevance to the proposed new theory 
of systemic risk of failure for the global financial system. 
Dubin argues in chapter 12 that the development of scientific models, and by 
implication social science theories, can be couched in a systems format. A 
‘systems-theoretic approach’ to theory development is described as being capable 
of explaining macro-level behavioural phenomena characterized by changes in 
system states. Explanations are derived from propositions translated into 
interactions among the elements of that system according to their data and 
interaction rules. Furthermore, he describes how computer simulations of that 
system in operation are able to develop and demonstrate hypotheses as a way of 
building theory. In that sense the system specification is the theoretical model, and 
an explanation of the simulation results is the theory. Davis, Eisenhardt and 
Bingham (2007) describe simulation in this context as being placed in the ‘sweet 
spot’ between other more conventional theory-creating methods such as formal 
modelling and theory-testing methods, and they explain how it is ideally suited for 
building theories about complex dynamic nonlinear systems.  
It is that systems-theoretic approach to theory building, incorporating a 
simulation-constructivist orientation towards the meaning of theory, which is 
applied in the research methodology prescribed (see Figure 4). 
3.4.4 Methodological controversy 
Although simulation is now acknowledged to be an important methodology for 
theory building in the social sciences, as demonstrated by influential research into 
topics such as social behaviour (Helbing, 2012), its perceived value generally 
remains “clouded and even controversial” according to Davis, Eisenhardt and 
Bingham (2007). 
They identify the strength of simulation as being its ability to specify and 
extend theory in precise ways: 
PhD - Cranfield University, January 2014. T.ILIN 
 
179 
i. by providing a more coherent and transparent means of specifying 
theoretical assumptions and logic than through written theories alone, in 
satisfying the requirements of computational rigour and internal validity; 
ii. by enabling superior insights into complex theoretical relationships 
among constructs, especially when they are longitudinal, nonlinear, or 
limited in the availability of real data; 
iii. by offering a more effective way of understanding competing tensions, 
as in long versus short runs, or structure versus chaos; 
iv. by clearly revealing outcomes of complex interactions among multiple 
intertwined processes as they unfold over time, such as inertia, change, 
competition and legitimation; 
v. by contrasting theoretical arguments through a simplified model with 
tightened logical rigour and sharpened constructs;  
vi. by isolating the essential determinants of complex phenomena; 
vii. by creating a computational laboratory in which researchers can 
systematically experiment in various ways such as unpacking constructs, 
relaxing assumptions, varying construct values, and changing features. 
Whereas, objections to it are attributed to false perceptions of:  
viii. simulations simply being ‘toy models’ of actual phenomena, in which 
the obvious is represented while important realism is stripped away, 
thereby making them unable to yield valid theoretical insights; 
ix. simulation constructs being ‘measured’ by empirically distant means, as 
when ‘0’ and ‘1’ bit strings are used to represent complex states;  
x. simulation results being dynamically indeterminate and indecipherable. 
Controversy involving these false perceptions is argued by Davis, Eisenhardt 
and Bingham to be the consequence of a limited understanding within the broad 
research community about simulation as a theory building method, and how it fits 
within the overall range of methodological choices available for that purpose. It is 
further claimed to be exacerbated by inappropriate selections of simulation 
techniques, processes, and evaluation criteria leading to bad experiences. 
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3.4.5 Agent-based model simulation (ABMS) 
3.4.5.1 Simulation 
Simulation is defined as a method for using computer software to model the 
operation of ‘real-world’ processes, systems or events (Law and Kelton, 1991); in 
which simulations are virtual experiments (Carley, 2001), providing simplified 
pictures of the world that have a carefully selected subset of the characteristics of 
that world (Lave and March, 1975); to evaluate computational representations of 
theoretical expressions for propositions (Davis, Eisenhardt and Bingham, 2007).  
In a constructivist paradigm of theory development about systems, simulation 
models are computational representations of theoretical models that explain 
patterns in data about system behaviour, also known as schemes; in which system 
components operationalize theory by their interactions in each simulation run, and 
patterns materialize as emergent system behaviour.  
3.4.5.2 Agent-based approach 
Among various alternative approaches to simulation, ABMS appears to offer the 
best fit for the research problem of this thesis. In their comparison of alternative 
approaches, Davis, Eisenhardt and Bingham (2007) list the characteristics of each. 
ABMS is represented by ‘cellular automata’ in the Table 3 of their article, which 
is a particular form of that approach to simulation. The other approaches include 
system dynamics, NK fitness landscapes, genetic algorithms and stochastic 
processes. However, ABMS is the only one focused on the emergence of macro 
patterns from micro interactions in a population of agents representing system 
participants, which fits well with the research focus of this thesis (see sub-section 
3.2.1). For that reason it was selected as the simulation approach in this 
programme of research. 
3.4.5.3 Assumptions 
The key assumptions of this simulation approach are: 
i. it is based on a population of spatially arrayed, semi-intelligent, 
autonomous agents; 
ii. who use local and global rules for their interactions, some of which are 
based on spatial processes;  
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iii. in which there are neighbourhoods of agents where local rules apply;  
iv. with effects of interest emerging by some non-linear means from 
interactions among those agents; 
v. giving rise to phenomena at system-level over time; 
vi. which can be interpreted by some existing theory for hypothesis 
corroboration;  
vii. that can be embedded in the agent-space topology. 
3.4.5.4 Modelling 
Creating a computational representation of the theory built in this programme of 
research involved three important tasks, performed concurrently (Davis, 
Eisenhardt and Bingham, 2007). 
i. Operationalize theoretical constructs.  
This mostly involves clearly defining a conceptual model for evaluating 
the theory, and constructing a computational representation of that 
model in which the units of theory are identified and measurable in a 
way that can be linked to hypothesis predictions. It helps to ensure that 
construct validity can be claimed, by eliminating measurement errors 
associated with imprecise specifications. 
ii. Build algorithms that enact the theoretical logic.  
The logic implemented by software code in ABMS should be 
compatible with the goals and concerns of a constructivist paradigm of 
theory building (Davis, Eisenhardt and Bingham, 2007: Table 3), 
concerned with the generation of macro-level patterns from spatial 
processes that operate at micro-level (e.g. diffusion, competition, 
propagation, and segregation), often involving tensions between two 
opposing processes. Levels of algorithmic complexity in the code should 
find a balance between parsimony and accuracy in the representation of 
theoretical logic (Pfeffer, 1982).  
iii. Specify assumptions inherent in the theory, and reflected in simulation 
results. 
Internal validity is an important strength of theory development by 
simulation methods. It is achieved by a precisely specified 
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computational representation that accurately reflects a simplified 
theoretical model having known assumptions with expected implications 
for simulation results. Any deficiencies in that model, or its assumptions 
and expected implications, will have a negative effect on its perceived 
internal validity, and the credibility of the theory it is used to produce.  
The precision of computational representation requires assumptions to 
be made about such things as boundary conditions, the degree of 
complexity stripped out of the theoretical logic, and scope limitations. 
Therefore specifications of that representation must make those 
assumptions, their justifications, and their implications for simulation 
results explicit. 
These tasks were incorporated in the activities of computational model 
development in project 3 during theory testing and evaluation, as described in 
sub-section 5.4.  
3.4.6 Size and Complexity  Considerations 
Most academic articles that publish the simulation results of an agent-based model 
in the public domain use a small and highly simplified model to produce results 
validated by a single technique over multiple simulation runs (Heath, Hill and 
Ciarallo, 2009). Unsurprisingly, most advice about how to apply agent-based 
simulation methods is also focused on this type of contribution. However, large-
scale simulations of highly complex multi-disciplinary problems are becoming 
more common, and have reached a threshold at which improved or different 
techniques of verification and validation are demanded (Post and Votta, 2005). 
Figure 15 places the computational representation developed by this thesis 
among other examples, illustrating its relationship to this trend in the literature.  
The financial market simulation by Raberto et al (2001) is representative of small-
scale multiple run simulations prominent in the literature, whereas Tumer and 
Agogino (2007) illustrates an increasing use of complex large-scale simulations 
that are allowed to continue running for extended periods of time, or even in real-
time. The ‘frequency of simulation’ axis refers to results validation runs, not 
model calibration and verification runs, and the scale axis refers to the number 
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and variety of agents and data points being simulated. Dynamic complexity refers 
to the degree of non-linearity of interactions among autonomous agents and 
number of rules applied. 
 
Figure 15: Examples of simulation size and model complexity 
The simulation approach of this thesis is placed in the medium range on the 
scale axis, with a one run frequency, using a dynamically complex computational 
model relative to most contributions in the literature (represented by Raberto et al, 
2001), in line with the recent growing trend of larger scale simulations. 
A ‘one run’ validation frequency was selected due to the scarcity of empirical 
data, the purpose of simulation, and the consequent decision to use theoretical 
triangulation (Denzin, 1970) as a complementary approach to checking both the 
quantitative and qualitative validity of the computational representation and its 
empirical output (see explanation in sub-section 3.5.10).  
3.4.7 Experimentation 
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computational representation, and during experimentation when it is being tested, 
validated and refined. However, as discussed in sub-section 2.8.5, there is very 
little practical advice or academic consensus on approved experimentation 
approaches for agent-based simulation, particularly for more complex simulations 
(Post and Votta, 2005). Nonetheless, it has become a common practice to deploy 
multiple simulation runs during both steps in theory building (Davis, Eisenhardt 
and Bingham, 2007), in which initial values, parameters and assumptions are 
varied to establish robustness and sensitivity. 
A popular strategy combined with such practices calls for beginning with a 
relatively simple computational representation, and subsequently increasing 
realism to build confidence in the generalizability of its theory. Another strategy 
calls for building theory by a ‘disciplined imagination’ approach to simulation 
using an evolutionary process of speculative experimentation (Weick, 1989). Both 
strategies were used in project 3, but they were restricted to simulating for 
calibration and verification purposes. Only one simulation run was deployed for 
validating the computational representation in its final form (see Figure 15).  
The overall intention of this decision about how to deploy simulation 
experiments for theory development can be compared to the intentions addressed 
by final stages in design research, for example, when a model aircraft is stressed 
in a wind tunnel under the known conditions prior to a real air crash to establish 
how failure occurred. If the research purpose is to refute a null hypothesis that 
metal fatigue could not explain how that failure occurred, this is achieved by one 
simulated failure in which relevant measurements show that a critical component 
failed at a point of fatigue prior to the crash, and those measurements match the 
real crash findings. However, demonstrating the likelihood of that occurrence, and 
the range of necessary conditions, would require many more experiments. 
Different originating causes could be argued and simulated, such as exceeding 
operational tolerances, but if the fundamental nature of a failure is the primary 
interest then one experimental simulation may be sufficient to support a theory 
about similar cases. General applicability of that theory could then be the purpose 
of further research, based on an explanation developed out of the first simulation, 
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along with any insights about pre-emptive diagnosis of that failure and an 
improved understanding about its avoidance.  
In this thesis, systemic failure of the global financial system is equivalent to the 
air crash, known conditions prior to a real air crash are equivalent to archived data 
and academic analysis about the initial conditions of a real financial system 
failure, and the intention of establishing by simulation whether metal fatigue 
could not explain how that air crash occurred equate to the intention to 
demonstrate by simulation whether a proposed outline theory could not explain 
how a real financial system failure occurred. However, in both cases further 
evidence is required to support any arguments founded on assumptions that the 
simulation is a valid representation of reality, and refuting the null hypothesis can 
only indicate plausibility of the proposed theory. Further research is always 
necessary to establish general applicability. Nevertheless, a single-run approach to 
simulation for validating results is consistent with a ‘granular’ form of pragmatic 
validity (see subsection 3.5.10.1) and the goal assertion of this thesis (see sub-
section 3.5.1). 
3.4.8 Results assimilation 
Validation steps 11 and 12 in the methodology process (see Figure 4) are 
considered together for results assimilation in this thesis. Although some theorists 
argue that creating an interesting theory is a useful contribution to knowledge, 
without the necessity for immediate validation (Weick, 1989; Whetten, 1989), 
many still disagree. There is a substantial literature on testing simulation results 
and validating them with empirical data (Janssen and Ostrom, 2006; Windrum, 
Fagiolo and Moneta, 2007), but advice on how to interpret those results and place 
their meaning in the context of existing theory is scarce. The overall constructivist 
epistemology of this programme of research will, therefore, require careful 
justification for any argued assimilation of its result into current theory. 
3.4.9 Principles adopted 
Issues raised in preceding sub-sections 3.4.1 to 3.4.8 are addressed in a set of 
methodology principles declared as follows: 
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i. A systems-theoretic approach, incorporating a simulation-constructivist 
orientation towards the meaning of theory, is applied to theory building 
(Dubin, 1978; Crnkovic, 2010). 
ii. Theory is expressed using four key elements: constructs, propositions 
that link those constructs together, logical arguments that explain the 
underlying theoretical rationale for the propositions, and assumptions 
that define the scope or boundary conditions of the theory (Dubin, 1978; 
Davis, Eisenhardt and Bingham, 2007). 
iii. Among the potential starting points for theory building, a pre-existing 
simple theory is assumed (Davis, Eisenhardt and Bingham, 2007), 
represented in this research programme by the 8 conjectures synthesised 
from the boundaries in the literature gap exposed in project 1. 
iv. The process followed in this methodology is according to a roadmap for 
constructing theory using simulation methods (Davis, Eisenhardt and 
Bingham, 2007: Table 1). 
v. Theory building proceeds by that roadmap from the initial set of 
conjectures, through proposition construction, hypothesis development, 
computational representation, verification, experimentation (with theory 
refinement),  and empirical validation. 
vi. The simulation approach selected is ABMS (agent-based model 
simulation). 
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3.5 Approach 
3.5.1 Goals 
As discussed in sub-section 3.4.2, the goals selected for this research are: ‘to 
describe and explain in order to diagnose and understand’. When they are 
considered in the context of the research problem (2.9.2) and focus (3.2.1) of this 
thesis, they can be expanded into the following combined assertion:  
Goal Assertion  “To describe how instability of the global financial system 
becomes operationally catastrophic, and explain that 
operational behaviour, in order to diagnose when it 
approaches a state of operational crisis and understand 
how that outcome could generally be avoided”. 
This is henceforth used as a more precise expression of research intent for 
evaluating the theory development outcome of this thesis than seeking to answer 
the research question alone. 
3.5.2 Methodology implementation 
3.5.2.1 Project context 
A formal methodology was selected (see Figure 4) in response to a call in the 
literature for improvements in the rigour of computational approaches to research 
in the social sciences (Bankes, 2002). The term ‘rigour’ is interpreted here in its 
widest sense, to imply thoroughness in the pursuit of relevance. Appendix E 
describes the process followed. It required research effort to be applied in four 
phases of development (see Figure 16): exploration, explanation (outline), 
confirmation and explanation (completed). The following sub-sections describe 
the contribution each phase made towards a final outcome of new theory. 
3.5.2.2 Exploration 
The first phase of research identified an explanatory gap in knowledge from a 
comprehensive evidence-base of relevant literature. A qualitative process of 
thematic synthesis generated a set of conjectures about potential answers from an 
interpretive analysis of that gap, to pose a research question. 
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Figure 16: Phases of a Constructivist Theory Building Methodology 
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This was achieved by constructing and verifying an agent-based computational 
representation of the conceptual model for simulating the proposed theory. Then a 
preliminary series of simulation experiments demonstrated how phenomena 
related to theoretical propositions were able to emerge, making adjustments to the 
representation and re-verifying as necessary to eliminate error effects generated 
by coding defects rather than emergence. These were followed by experiments to 
evaluate the robustness and sensitivity of the representation to a limited range of 
initial values and conditions, to demonstrate it behaved consistently as a plausible 
financial system. Finally, the initial values, conditions and strategies of the 
representation were set according to data from the financial analysis in an 
experiment, for the purpose of replicating the macro-level financial effects of 
strategies observed in the real failure from simulated micro-level participant 
interactions, to a pre-determined degree of empirical approximation. At which 
point, phenomena emergent at overall system-level in the simulation interface 
were examined to qualitatively determine if they supported the null hypothesis 
about the outline theory. 
3.5.2.5 Explanation (completed) 
After failing to refute the outline theory’s hypotheses, it was fully expounded to 
integrate refinements suggested by experimentation and any new insights. A 
discussion about the overall implications of this final version of the theory, and 
the testing and validation results of its outline version, then concluded with a 
plausibility argument expressed as an outcome for the goal assertion. 
3.5.3 Methods 
The approach combined a quantitative method for providing a longitudinal 
financial analysis of the Icelandic financial system collapse, with a generative 
simulation method (Epstein, 1999) for replicating that collapse and observing 
emergent phenomena. This mixed methods approach placed an assessment of its 
combined results on the relevance side of the rigour-relevance debate, in which 
theoretical assertions cannot be proven but their plausibility can be argued (see 
‘evaluating mixed methods’, Creswell and Plano Clark, 2007: page 162). 
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3.5.4 Foundations 
Appendix F presents the theoretical foundations on which the theory is based, 
such as the boundaries, unit of theory, accepted principles, constraints, 
assumptions and practicalities (Dubin, 1978; Pawar, 2009). 
3.5.5 Results generation 
Testing and validation of the theory proposed by this thesis was conducted in 
project 3 using agent-based computational tools and techniques in a series of 
simulation experiments, validated using archival data mining techniques. Both 
qualitative and quantitative results were generated by this constructivist approach 
to demonstrating how systemic risk arises as bifurcations among the potential 
operational states of a financial system, interpreted by the patterns of dynamic 
discontinuities from bifurcation theory and its derivative catastrophe theory. The 
experiments simulated the interplay between diversity and exposure (Beale et al., 
2011; Haldane and May, 2011) in a highly simplified dynamical financial system 
of supply and demand tensions among system participants (SIPs) over financial 
services (SIFS).  
3.5.6 Experimentation Objectives 
Simulation experiments in project 3 were designed to provide an appraisal of the 
proposed outline of theory, focused on hypotheses 1, 2 and 5 of project 2, by 
empirical validation of simulation results against real systemic failure data from 
the Icelandic financial system collapse, and subsequent theoretical triangulation. 
This enabled project 4 to make refinements to the theory, and explain how 
observed emergent phenomena were determined by the conditions, variables and 
rules of the computational representation. 
Heath, Hill and Ciarallo (2009) describe these types of objectives as defining a 
‘mediator’ role for simulation, in which it is used to gain insight into the system of 
interest. Their survey of a sample of 279 articles found that 60.2% used 
simulation in that role. 
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3.5.7 Results interpretation 
3.5.7.1 Generative social science 
The systems-theoretic approach taken by this research is a form of ‘generative’ 
science of particular relevance to non-equilibrium systems. Epstein (1999) 
describes it as a third option, offering an alternative to both ‘inductive’ and 
‘deductive’ science (see sub-section 2.8.2). Social dynamics are viewed by this 
form of science as a type of computation in a distributed computational 
representation of society.  
Therefore, experimental results appear as different kinds of computational 
phenomena in an agent-space or simulation dashboard, requiring some degree of 
translation into real phenomena. Quantitative results manifest in the simulation 
dashboard as plotted lines, bar charts, or financial values in the ‘output’ window 
(see Appendix G.2.1), whereas qualitative results manifest as the behaviour of 
agents in the 3D-View. In both cases they vary by tick, in a standard progression 
of discrete time-periods. Then computational phenomena are observed as unusual 
formations in a succession of results over time, translated into their equivalent real 
phenomena by hypothesis specifications. 
3.5.7.2 Corroborating theory 
By shaping the agent-space as a manifold within a three-dimensional state-space 
of the type described by catastrophe theory, with the principal agent in that space 
defined as an operational state, and by using the discrete time periods of 
simulation experiments to represent a larger dynamical system that is time variant 
in which that state-space is embedded (see temporal discussion in 3.6.4), 
triangulation of empirically validated results with a corroborating theory became 
possible. This enabled observed phenomena attributed to the predictions of 
operational hypotheses from the outline theory developed in project 2 to be 
operationally validated as examples of standard system response behaviour 
corroborated by an existing (catastrophe) theory. 
3.5.8 Verification 
Verifying the computational representation against the theory before its use in 
simulation experiments ensured theoretical logic had been accurately embodied in 
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computational form (i.e. in software code; see in-line comments in the code listing 
provided in Appendix G3), and confirmed that logic was internally valid (see 
Table 8 in sub-section 5.5). Then artefacts nominated in criteria for validating 
hypotheses were tested to ensure necessary and sufficient conditions were 
satisfied, and empirical indicators could be properly observed. Finally, robustness 
checks were performed by changing the values of simulation parameters, 
constants and conditions to confirm consistent effects were being manifested. 
3.5.9 Sensitivity Analysis 
During those robustness checks, standard forms of sensitivity analysis examined 
such concerns as the sensitivity of simulation results to changing the values of 
micro/macro parameters; ergodicity; and across-run variability. However, instead 
of the usual emphasis on exploring a wide range of values, this analysis 
progressively narrowed down its focus on the values necessary to improve the 
approximation of simulated results to the financial effects identified in archival 
data about the real financial system collapse by financial analysis (see the 
rationale for this in the following sub-section). 
3.5.10 Validation  
3.5.10.1 Pragmatic validity 
On the relevance side of the rigour-relevance debate, it is important to establish 
how the validity being demonstrated is distinct from the well understood positivist 
meaning of that term. In this thesis, a propositional mode of pragmatic validity is 
applied (Worren, Moore and Elliott, 2002). Pragmatically valid theory according 
to that mode contains three major components: explicit hypotheses that are 
testable; operational definitions of constructs; and descriptions with embedded 
rules for how to operationalize the theory. With those components in place, if the 
theory is shown to be plausible in at least one case on the basis of empirical 
evidence, it is described by Davis, Eisenhardt and Bingham (2007) as exhibiting 
‘granular validity.’  The theory’s general applicability can then be demonstrated 
by further research. 
PhD - Cranfield University, January 2014. T.ILIN 
 
193 
3.5.10.2 Project context 
During project 3, after completing verification and sensitivity analysis in step 10 
of the methodology process, the main series of experiments began by loading 
empirical data from step 7, for the time when a real financial system failure was 
considered to have begun, as initial values and conditions in the simulation. 
Results generated by subsequent experiments were then statistically analysed in 
step 12 for external validity by using further empirical data from step 7 about real 
events leading up to that failure, over the period of time being simulated. When a 
quantitative comparison of effects observed in simulation results with that 
empirical evidence found a reasonable match, it was considered to indicate 
external granular validity of the simulation. Overall plausibility of the theory was 
then argued based on that claim, with corroboration by theoretical triangulation.  
3.5.10.3 Literature context 
In their survey of ABMS practices, Heath, Hill and Ciarallo (2009) found that 
95% of research was not validated by statistical techniques, relying instead on 
expert opinion and qualitative comparisons of behaviours. 
3.5.11 Falsification 
Although the ‘generative’ nature of the systems-theoretic approach taken by this 
research is distinct from more traditional inductive or deductive approaches (see 
sub-section 2.8.2), it shares the problem of induction whereby no amount of 
theory confirmation can establish the truth of its universal generalisation. Advice 
in theory development literature about simulation methods stops after validating a 
theory, with few recommendations for addressing this weakness in the overall 
plausibility of theory developed by such approaches. Popper (1963) describes it as 
a problem of demarcation between scientific methods and pseudoscience. His 
recommendation is for scientific theory to be required to make predictions that are 
potentially refutable by observation. However, not all theories can be practically 
refuted. That property of a theory is termed its falsifiability.  
In this thesis, all five hypotheses offer predictions with criteria for testing and 
external validation of the proposed theory, but only hypotheses 1, 2 and 5 are 
tested and validated by simulation because they directly address the goal 
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assertion. The other two hypotheses are left for future research to confirm. 
However, any validation achieved can only be claimed for the empirical results of 
the specific simulation experiment actually performed, not all experiments using 
the same computational representation with slightly different settings and values. 
This is due to the representation’s complex and stochastic nature. Furthermore, 
validation is subject to correctly translating observed simulation phenomena into 
real-world phenomena. 
Therefore, the general plausibility of a theory for real circumstances cannot 
simply be demonstrated by a few specific simulations, even if they are endorsed 
by other means, such as the corroboration of empirically validated simulation 
results by theoretical triangulation. However, if a theory’s falsification statement 
is refuted by at least one validated simulation, the theory can claim to describe 
those special circumstances, and explanations it offers may help to diagnose and 
understand similar circumstances, which is sufficient for satisfying the goal 
assertion of this research. For that reason a falsification statement is added in sub-
section 0 after the hypotheses, with a description of how the proposed theory can 
be refuted, satisfying Popper’s ‘scientific method’ condition. 
3.5.12 Assimilation 
Placing the proposed new theory in the context of existing theory then becomes a 
matter of descriptive alignment and logical argument (see sub-section 3.6 below, 
and sub-section 4.2). 
3.6 Multi-disciplinary Research Issues 
Two debates permeate the multi-disciplinary literature reviewed in section 0. 
They are the subjectivist versus objectivist debate, which is also common 
throughout many single-discipline literatures, and the constructivism versus 
formalism debate, which is particularly intense in the literatures of complexity. 
Alignments to the theories informing this thesis are explained in the following 
sub-sections from positions taken in general debates of this type, and from theory-
specific debates. 
PhD - Cranfield University, January 2014. T.ILIN 
 
195 
3.6.1 Economic theory 
The need for a paradigm shift is hotly debated between the proponents of 
contemporary economics of the neoclassical era and new economics of the 
complexity era, as discussed in sub-section 2.5. This thesis aligns with the latter. 
It takes the position that notions such as DSGE were shown to be unable to 
anticipate or explain the current financial crisis, and previous attempts at a theory 
of systemic risk based on DSGE have demonstrated it is inappropriate for 
addressing the research problem of project 2. This thesis does, however, accept 
that a combination of neoclassical and other less orthodox work is probably a 
better way forward than the total revision of economics proposed in revolutionary 
alternatives promoted by some academics. A shift to a new paradigm is needed, 
but sudden, traumatic change is probably unnecessary.   
3.6.2 Evolutionary theory 
An evolutionary perspective on the complex, intrinsically dynamic phenomena of 
economic reality is considered to offer a better alternative to the deficiencies of 
neoclassical thinking in the literature. This thesis agrees, and views systemic risk 
of failure through the lens of evolutionary economic theory. It applies the 
fundamental principles of that theory in a constructivist approach to new theory 
development through multi-agent computational modelling. That places 
contributions made by this thesis on the subjectivist side of the debate about the 
use of terms such as risk in evolutionary economic literature, and on the 
constructivism side of the debate with formalism.  
3.6.3 Complexity theory 
Within the broad field of complexity science, it is theory about complex adaptive 
systems that is of most interest to this thesis. In particular, notions of a ‘phase 
space’ of system states are used to translate an operational perspective on 
conjectures into the idea of a ‘state space’ of all potential operational states of the 
global financial system. Then, evolutionary economic theory provides insights 
about the adaptive nature of that system, and features such as ‘sensitivity to initial 
conditions’ and ‘emergence’ are used to define specific macro-level changes as 
that system’s operational behaviour. 
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More specifically, a ‘big tent’ meaning is adopted by this thesis in what Rosser 
(2009) calls a dynamic definition of complexity (see discussion in sub-section 
2.7.2). This places the contributions of this thesis on the constructivism side of the 
debate versus formalism, due to the non-axiomatic foundations of dynamic 
complexity, and aligns with the view that positivist research into emergent 
phenomena in behavioural economics is reaching the limits of current formalisms. 
3.6.4 Catastrophe theory 
Operational behaviour approaching a state of criticality is then explained through 
the lens of catastrophe theory, which is now recognized in the literature as an 
important aspect of bifurcation theory (Rosser Jr, 2007). It is used in this thesis to 
explain manifestations of nonlinearities representing systemic failure in the 
operational state space of the global financial system. Among the controversies 
surrounding catastrophe theory, this thesis adopts a standard interpretation aligned 
with Thom’s (1977) confirmed original intentions of providing more qualitative 
explanations of catastrophic phenomena. However, the thesis departs from 
existing uses of the theory by applying it to developing a new evolutionary theory 
of systemic risk that explains how bifurcations can change over time. This is also 
aligned with Thom’s (1983: pp. 38-40) original view regarding the separate 
debate about how to model temporal aspects of catastrophes when using this 
theory, in which he argues that an elementary catastrophe form may be embedded 
in a larger dynamical system which is time variant.  
3.6.5 Computational theory 
Evolutionary effects of emergence are demonstrated in project 3 by a non-
conventional approach to agent-based modelling of complex phenomena that 
transcends the usual stylized illustrations and generic mathematical analyses in 
current literature. This is further enhanced by efforts to improve the rigour of 
computational theory development, in which a research protocol is specified (see 
Appendix H) for agent-based simulation experiments to test, validate and verify 
the theory’s plausibility, using a well-defined methodology. This enables the 
experimental findings presented here to be replicated and developed further by 
other researchers. 
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3.7 Implications 
Section 3 describes how this programme of research approached making a 
contribution to a gap in explanatory value in the literature, from a systems-
theoretic approach to theory building, incorporating a simulation-constructivist 
orientation towards the meaning of theory, which is argued to have the potential to 
overcome the logical inconsistencies and intractabilities of more positivist 
approaches currently favoured in the literature. However, careful attention to 
experimental rigour will be necessary in project 4 to ensure that maximum 
validity is demonstrated for the theory proposed. When false perceptions about the 
approach taken are eliminated, remaining methodological controversies can be 
overcome by a set of principles that apply the best of current understanding about 
how to test and empirically validate new theory of this type.  
It is therefore argued that a plausible basis for this thesis to make a significant 
contribution to macro-economic theory of crises, finance theory of financial 
services, and complexity science theory of system behaviours is: a computational 
interpretation of the ‘big tent’ meaning of complexity; applied to explaining 
systemic risk of failure and its mitigation; from a new operational behaviour 
perspective on supply and demand in financial services; viewed through the lens 
of catastrophe theory.   
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4 THEORY 
4.1 Summary 
This section presents an outline of new theory developed in step 4 of the research 
methodology during project 2 (see Figure 4), using the approach described in sub-
section 3.5.  
4.2 Main Informing Concepts 
4.2.1 System dynamics and complexity 
The global financial system is modelled in this thesis as a type of system known 
as ‘dynamical’, from the applied mathematics of critical phenomena in complex 
systems (Strogatz, 1994: page 9; Rosser Jr, 2000; Chan Man Fong and De Kee, 
1999). Such systems have a state given by a vector that can be represented by a 
point in a geometric manifold or state space, in which there is a critical point 
where phase transitions can occur. As such it has a deterministic evolutionary rule 
that describes what future states follow from the current state. From statistical 
physics it is known that self-organized criticality (Bak, Tang and Wiesenfeld, 
1987) is a property of this type of system, whereby their macroscopic behaviour 
displays scale-invariance at the critical transition in the form of spontaneous 
complexity emerging from simple local interactions. Furthermore, the related 
notion of universality observes that this behaviour is robust to being modelled by 
widely differing sets of variable parameters without the need for sensitivity to 
operational details of the system. Which suggests it is possible to build a reliable 
model of the system to analyse simple local interactions around a critical 
phenomenon of interest using a few well-chosen features and parameters. In the 
model proposed, the state space is a three-dimensional surface of potential 
operational states, each state being comprised of a set of coordinates defining its 
operational effectiveness, together with a state categorization. This surface, and its 
boundary, represents the full range of potential operational behaviour of the global 
financial system, projected out of a two-dimensional control surface of 
operational focus. It takes the form of a cusp catastrophe-type model from 
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catastrophe theory (Thom, 1975; Zeeman, 1976), with a critical point located at 
the singularity of the cusp fold in the operational behaviour surface. Particular 
attention is given to macroscopic behaviour that emerges around this cusp fold, 
and the insights it can offer regarding how an operational state of systemic failure 
occurs, to explain the general nature of systemic risk and its mitigation. This 
macroscopic behaviour is conjectured to emerge as spontaneous complexity in the 
form of shifts in the overall operational effectiveness of supply satisfaction of 
demand, derived from simple individual interactions over SIFS that cumulatively 
comprise the collective operational behaviour of system participants. 
4.2.2 Evolutionary economics of supply and demand 
The evolutionary nature of this theory is explored using a multi-agent model of 
the global financial system as complex dynamical system, with inherent 
deterministic evolutionary rules, conceptualized in terms of the components of 
evolutionary-economic models (Safarzynska and van den Bergh, 2010a) as 
follows: 
G.1.2.1 Diversity  
This is related to behaviour in the proposed theory. Under certain circumstances 
normally diverse behaviour of SIPs, differing by rules of commercial intent, 
professional conditioning, response to peer or regulatory pressure, and risk 
appetite gives way to a narrower range of contagious, convergent or catastrophic 
behaviour that is reflected in the overall operational behaviour of the system. This 
potentially becomes systemic failure by way of a feedback loop to future 
participation behaviour. Insights such as emergent norm theory (Turner and 
Killian, 1987), and the notion of cognitive dissonance (Akerlof and Dickens, 
1982), help to explain how opportunities for individual SIPs to select from diverse 
behavioural options are diminished by emergent systemic behaviour inducing 
extreme concentrations and persistence in collective SIPs behaviour. 
G.1.2.2 Innovation  
Various forms of innovation are represented, such as opportunism in the search 
for unregulated commercial advantages, or evasiveness in behavioural rules for 
responding to regulatory pressure. Then practical models of motivation in 
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behaviour such as the resourceful, evaluative, maximizing model REMM (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1994) help to explain how those innovations gain popularity and 
create concentrations in financial services participation. 
G.1.2.3 Selection  
This occurs at the level of simple local interactions through the adaptive learning 
of SIPs, when learning routines and application rules (Dosi et al., 1999) are 
applied to selecting appropriate behavioural strategies. At overall system level it is 
also inherent in the deterministic evolutionary rules of state transitions in this type 
of dynamical system. 
G.1.2.4 Bounded rationality  
When individual SIPs imitate majority strategy (Shiller, 2000; Smelser, 1962; 
Lux, 1995), and when their intentional actions are supplanted by consequential 
actions (Cyert and March, 1992) among complex patterns of routinized behaviour 
(Nelson and Winter, 1982), they exhibit bounded rationality. 
G.1.2.5 Diffusion  
The mechanism of distress propagation through contagious behaviour among SIPs 
induces a form of diffusion, observed system-wide as emergent operational 
behaviour following similar principles to those described in threshold models of 
collective behaviour (Granovetter, 1978) and reciprocation theory (Axelrod and 
Hamilton, 1981). 
G.1.2.6 Path-dependence and lock-in  
This can take various forms, such as peer or stakeholder pressure to imitate, and 
regulatory feedback or intervention (Smelser, 1962; Mackay, 2004; Slattery and 
Nellis, 2011). 
G.1.2.7 Co-evolution  
The operational behaviour paradigm of the proposed theory, based on supply and 
demand activities, is co-evolutionary (Safarzynska and van den Bergh, 2010b). 
G.1.2.8 Multilevel evolution and group selection  
Differences between operational behaviour emergent at system level and distress 
arising at the level of collective operational behaviour among SIPS are an 
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example of this (Potts, 2000). Although Figure 18 only shows the topology of the 
former, the proposed outline theory encompasses both. 
G.1.2.9 Mechanisms of growth  
These are found in distress propagation (Mishkin, 1992); growth through variety 
by the introduction of new SIFS, variations in SIFS, and new SIPs entries; and 
growth by new participation opportunities in SIFS, sometimes leading to extreme 
growth effects by irrational exuberance (Shiller, 2000). 
4.2.3 An operational behaviour perspective 
At the core of this theory there is an operational behaviour paradigm based on the 
concept of an operational state of the global financial system, representing the 
overall operational effectiveness of supply satisfaction of demand in SIFS at a 
point in time. The full range in potential operational behaviour of that system then 
becomes a geometrical manifold or state-space of all potential operational states 
for a point in time, the topology of which can vary over time. It follows that an 
actual operational state of the system at a particular time can be plotted as 
coordinates in the current potential state-space, derived from execution-level 
participation data. The system’s actual operational behaviour is therefore the 
direction and distance of shifts between current operational states plotted in this 
changing potential state-space over a specified period in time. However, 
derivation of operational states from execution-level participation data is not a 
simple mathematical expression. It is the consequence of complex non-linear 
behaviour emergent at system-level from simple local interactions among SIPs in 
a dynamical system. As such, the operational states and behaviour of this system 
are best explained by a computational model using a simple set of entities, 
parameters and rules capable of describing their local interactions in a way that 
can isolate the key determinants of particular emergent complexities. With that 
model it becomes possible to ask questions about how a potential operational state 
such as systemic failure actually occurs, the overall risk of it occurring, and how 
that risk could be mitigated. The purpose of doing this is to understand how 
distress propagates as changing operational states in this system, and how it can 
be managed. A key assumption being that, whatever the causes or effects of 
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distress, understanding the way it propagates operationally through the system is 
crucially important for recognizing, avoiding and responding to potential systemic 
failures. 
4.3 Conjectures 
The following sub-sections integrate theorising introduced in project 2 with the 8 
conjectures synthesised by project 1 from an identified gap in explanatory value 
found in the literature (see Table 4 in sub-section 2.3.17). They present a set of 
revised conjectures that are more closely aligned with the intentions of this thesis 
and latest academic thinking. 
4.3.1 Conjecture 1: The nature of the global financial system 
Many alternative views exist regarding what is meant by this system, such as: the 
functional view (Merton and Bodie, 1995); the bank versus market view (Levine, 
2000); and the evolving view (Vedder, 2009). However, formally declared 
definitions are rare in the literature. Implied or informal descriptions usually 
involve an organized body of participants comprised of financial services 
institutions and their customers, intermediaries, governing bodies and regulators; 
together with their policies, financial resources, technology, sub-systems and 
infrastructures; that interact on international, regional, national or local levels.  
From a research point of view, this is far too broad in scope to get a useful 
grasp on particular features or behaviours of the system. Systemic risk literature 
usually gets around that problem by reducing scope down to a single market, 
industry or financial paradigm; or by modelling limited aspects of the system 
using linear mathematical expressions (Velupillai, 2005). But thorny issues such 
as the global financial system’s interconnectedness, and the unknown implications 
of extreme assumptions, remain a significant barrier to simplification.  
For a more practical interpretation of that system, this thesis turns to an 
operational behaviour paradigm (see figure 1), and focuses more on researching 
the fundamental principles of how the global financial system works as a system 
of supply and demand in financial services, and less on a detailed representation 
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of the system. It is argued that this approach captures the essential nature of the 
system, while emphasizing features relevant to understanding systemic risk. The 
corresponding synthesised conjecture from project 1 can be revised to reflect this 
supply and demand focus as follows: 
Conjecture 1 summary - The essential nature of the global financial system can 
be represented by: a dynamical, complex, adaptive systems model of all potential 
operational states that system is able to assume; based on an operational behaviour 
paradigm of participation in the supply and demand of financial services; for the 
purpose of investigating the risk of systemic failure (i.e. systemic risk). 
4.3.2 Conjecture 2: The nature of systemic failure 
However, any such investigation must first determine what is meant by a 
materialization of that risk, namely systemic failure. The operational behaviour 
paradigm used in conjecture 1 suggests that outcome manifests as a fundamental 
failure to continue operating as a global financial system, resulting from distress 
emerging somewhere in the system and spreading throughout when unchecked. 
 Two examples are:  
i. when irrational exuberance induces globally expanded supply in 
derivative instruments, that spreads the contamination of risk-exposures 
in residential real-estate transactions from one country to others, while 
drastically diminishing global participation in alternative assets having 
more diversified risk/reward profiles, until escalating risks make 
participation untenable; or,  
ii. when a concentration of demand for short-term funding in the banking 
industry creates a spike in funding requirements internationally, 
reducing funding availability for exceptional requirements such as 
sovereign debt refinancing, creating a bank-sovereign risk-feedback 
loop until the general availability of funding dries up.  
As the corresponding synthesised conjecture from project 1 already takes this 
view of the nature of systemic failure, it does not require substantial revision, and 
can be confirmed as follows: 
PhD - Cranfield University, January 2014. T.ILIN 
 
205 
Conjecture 2 summary - Systemic failure of the global financial system can be 
defined as an operational state which represents a sustained inability of the entire 
system to operate as required. 
4.3.3 Conjecture 3: How distress occurs 
When distress occurs, it seems to affect participants anywhere in the global 
financial system due to their interconnectedness. If the concept of a ‘part’ of the 
system is accepted to be sufficiently broad that it encompasses any physical, 
functional or organizational subdivision, then distress can be argued to arise as 
undesirable effects for participants in any part of the system from exogenous 
sources, or from endogenous participation behaviour that is unsupportive of 
overall system operations due to perceived incentives and disincentives. Actual 
barriers to supportive behaviour may also be introduced, such as misguided 
regulations or institutional policies. 
Understanding this behaviour and the operational nature of the distress it can 
generate is arguably more useful for dealing with systemic crises, and the 
avoidance or mitigation of systemic risk, than establishing root causes. Economic 
history suggests that different stimuli can cause the same behavioural response 
with similar effects, and this multiple causality may vary over time (Kindleberger 
and Aliber, 2005: chapter 2). Therefore, attributing causes to effects among 
complex system interactions exposes a theory to confirmation bias when many 
possibilities exist, and leads to retrospective theoretical justifications for distress 
in the system when a particular stimulus was deemed to be the root cause. So the 
value of causal theories in this field is arguably limited to occurrences of similar 
circumstances. Whereas, an explanation based on operational behaviour may be 
more relevant for a general theory applicable to all circumstances. 
The corresponding synthesised conjecture from project 1 requires substantial 
revision to reflect the above discussion, and to properly distinguish what distress 
is, and how it occurs, from a simple notion about how it propagates. A new 
version follows that combines these objectives while maintaining relevance to the 
identified gap in theory from which the original conjecture was synthesised: 
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Conjecture 3 summary – The occurrence of distress in the global financial 
system can be explained by describing it as an operational process whereby 
undesirable effects arise for system participants from exogenous sources, or from 
endogenous participation behaviour that is unsupportive of overall system 
operations by reinforcing perceived disincentives or actual barriers to supportive 
participation, or perceived incentives for unsupportive participation. 
4.3.4 Conjecture 4: How distress is propagated 
However, a general theory would also need to explain, for a wide range of supply 
and demand circumstances, how participation behaviour propagates distress 
throughout the system. If this is understood, and can be managed, then potential 
root causes become less relevant. A distinction should be made here between a 
local risk of a severe sub-system failure (such as a sovereign state’s potential 
default on its bonds), which may initially just involve relatively few participants, 
and the emergence of system-wide instability when distress is propagated through 
the collective operational behaviour of many participants (as in a situation of 
wide-scale simultaneous panic). In the former situation, the risk of systemic 
failure would not immediately escalate unless the potential for distress 
propagation already exists, as when there is no option to re-schedule payment of 
the sovereign state’s debts. In the latter situation, it would escalate rapidly in the 
absence of swift intervention from governing authorities.  
The corresponding synthesised conjecture from project 1 generally supports 
this view, but makes no mention of system-wide instability being a potential 
consequence of distress propagation. It can be revised to reflect this as follows: 
Conjecture 4 summary – The propagation of distress can be explained as some 
collective behaviour transmission mechanism that spreads concentrations in 
unsupportive participation behaviour from where they arise to other parts of the 
global financial system by: increasing the intensity of collective focus on that 
behaviour, and reducing diversity in participation, thereby generating further 
distress in more parts through operational interdependencies; to potentially 
emerge as a shift in the system’s overall operational state in the direction of 
greater system-wide instability. 
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4.3.5 Conjecture 5: When systemic failure occurs 
Some level of systemic risk will always exist, varying according to the system’s 
ability to absorb shocks and continue operating without disruptive failure (its 
failure tolerance), and its ability to recover quickly from shocks if they do occur 
(its failure resilience). Therefore effective management of systemic risk requires a 
critical threshold to be established among potential operational states of the 
system, based on tolerance and resilience assessments, where operational distress 
is deemed to have breached performance criteria as system operations become 
increasingly unstable. Then systemic failure is considered to occur when a current 
actual operational state has crossed that threshold by a succession of shifts 
between potential operational states. In a similar way, an outer boundary can be 
established where operational distress is deemed to become contagious. Then 
general guidelines on acknowledging the occurrence of systemic failure could be 
published in terms of such criteria, similar in principal to the criteria used by 
economists to confirm when an economy has moved into a state of recession. 
The corresponding synthesised conjecture from project 1 generally supports 
this view, but makes no mention of the criteria by which systemic failure is 
deemed to have occurred. It is revised to reflect this as follows: 
Conjecture 5 summary - If operational behaviour of the global financial system 
is represented by a succession of shifts in actual operational states over a period of 
elapsed time, then systemic failure can be thought to occur when contagious, 
convergent or catastrophic operational behaviour emerges and crosses into the 
region of those operational states defined as failing to satisfy aggregate distress 
tolerance and resilience criteria. 
4.3.6 Conjecture 6: The nature of systemic risk 
From conjectures 1 to 5 it then becomes possible to derive a definition of systemic 
risk based on an operational behaviour paradigm. If the nature of systemic failure 
is taken to be an emergent operational behaviour, a plausible definition of 
systemic risk could be based on the probability of distress spreading from local 
epicentres of adverse behaviour in participation, towards ultimate materialization 
as deemed failure in the system’s overall operations. Implying the root causes of 
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systemic failure are less relevant than ’how’ it occurs and ’when’ it is likely to 
happen, if no attempt is made at risk mitigation. 
The corresponding synthesised conjecture from project 1 generally supports 
this view, but simplifications are made in this revision to improve clarity and 
remove overlaps with other conjectures, as follows: 
Conjecture 6 summary - Systemic risk of failure can be defined as: the 
probability at a current time of the global financial system entering an operational 
state of systemic failure by a specified time in the future; in the absence of new 
efforts to mitigate that probability. 
4.3.7 Conjecture 7: Mitigation of systemic risk 
The implications of conjecture 4 are that increases in the diversity of participation 
combined with dispersal of participation focus, would counteract the risk of 
systemic failure. Interventions by regulatory authorities for the purpose of 
systemic risk mitigation could use these implications to influence the operational 
behaviour of the global financial system by selective intervention, such as: 
redirecting participation away from extreme concentrations of supply or demand 
by introducing short term incentives, alternatives or penalties; or, limiting extreme 
participation focus by reducing supply or demand side availability. 
The corresponding synthesised conjecture from project 1 generally supports 
this view, but simplifications are made in this revision to improve clarity and 
remove overlaps with other conjectures, as follows: 
Conjecture 7 summary - Mitigation of systemic risk of failure can be achieved 
by influencing operational behaviour, through increasing diversity in participation 
where there are extreme concentrations, and dispersing focus in participation 
where there is extreme intensity. 
4.3.8 Conjecture 8: How the system interacts with its environment 
Although conjectures 1 to 7 offer explanations for key aspects of crises in the 
global financial system, the interactions between emergent phenomena in that 
system and macroeconomic phenomena in its environment are not obvious. Some 
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translation is necessary, enabling economic decision makers to understand how 
complex circumstances arise, and the potential impacts of responses.  
The corresponding synthesised conjecture from project 1 generally supports 
this view, but it is revised to reflect the operational behaviour paradigm of Figure 
1 more closely, as follows: 
Conjecture 8 summary - Operational behaviour of the global financial system 
can be thought to interact with macroeconomic events in a two-way process that 
translates those events into: their effects operationalised in the system on the 
collective behaviour of participation (assertion A in Figure 1); and conversely, 
from the emergent operational behaviour of the system derived from that 
collective behaviour, into its effects manifested in macroeconomic events 
(assertion F in Figure 1). 
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4.4 Theoretical Model 
A cusp catastrophe-type model of the global financial system is now presented 
(see Figure 17, Figure 18 and Figure 19), based on catastrophe theory (Thom, 
1975; Zeeman, 1976) and 8 revised conjectures from an operational behaviour 
paradigm of systemic failure (see Figure 1), which were developed out of 
preliminary conjectures about systemic risk of failure and its mitigation 
synthesised in project 1. The model refers to a three-dimensional cusp surface  
comprised of the coordinates for all previous and predicted operational states of 
the system at time , (see Figure 18) in a three-dimensional state-space, 
representing its operational behaviour topology projected out of a two-
dimensional control surface e of overall operational focus (see Figure 17). Then 
the system’s actual operational state is defined by a specific point with 
coordinates O, f, ^ = 	` plotted on surface ` ∈  representing the system’s 
overall operational effectiveness for supply satisfaction of demand in SIFS at time 
,, together with a state-category attributed to the region in e in which those 
coordinates fall (e.g. the state category of ‘systemic failure’ attributed to a subset 
of states in the region egh8i). By projecting shifts in this placement of actual 
operational states over several periods of time from that three-dimensional surface 
 back onto the control surface e (independent of ,), operational behaviour of 
the system can be identified as the direction and distance of those shifts (see 
Figure 19). The effects of that behaviour are described by the topology of surface 
, as actual operational state shifts over boundaries and into regions that have 
consequences attributed to them. For example, the system is considered to have 
failed gradually when the projected placement in e of its actual operational state ` 
has shifted over a period of time into the systemic failure region egh8i, and it is 
considered to have failed immediately when ` has dropped vertically onto the 
control surface e at some coordinate O, f, 0), if in either case it remains there 
outside required operating parameters for longer than a time limit set by the 
financial system’s regulator.  
In this model, operational behaviour of the global financial system approaching 
region egh8i is conjectured to exhibit an increasing focus of participation in fewer 
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SIFS, while overall supply satisfaction of demand is also diminishing, until the 
system is deemed to have ceased to operate. By which time its operational state 
has entered that region of systemic failure by directional shifts in operational 
behaviour that are contagious, convergent or catastrophic. These system-level 
shifts are further conjectured to emerge due to the propagation of operational 
distress at lower levels of the system, among execution-level activities of 
individual participations. This is thought to occur by some participation behaviour 
transmission mechanism, suggested by such notions as herding (Lux, 1995; 
Acharya and Yorulmazer, 2008), generating changes in the collective operational 
behaviour of system participants. The operational nature of this mechanism is 
argued to be of crucial importance to understanding how distress becomes 
pervasive among execution-level activities system-wide. With that knowledge it 
becomes possible to explain how an operational state of systemic failure emerges 
using complex systems theory, and show how such operational behaviour of the 
global financial system generally interacts with familiar macroeconomic events.  
In sub-section 4.5, the key features of this model are illustrated by a theoretical 
topology which combines graphics and narrative in an informal academic style, to 
integrate theorising introduced in this sub-section with the revised conjectures of 
sub-section 4.3. This leads to a more formal outline of theory in sub-sections 4.6 
to 4.9, using predicate logic to express propositions of new theoretical insights 
about the nature of systemic risk and its mitigation. Then in sub-section 4.11, five 
hypotheses are developed with the criteria for testing and validating the proposed 
theory to be used in project 3. 
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4.5 Model Topology 
4.5.1 Control surface 
 
 
4.5.1.1 Focus of participation 
Figure 17 shows the two control parameters O and f of the control surface e in 
the cusp catastrophe-type model discussed in the previous sub-section. The 
percentage of SIFS that are the subject of intended demand concentrations is 
given by O, and the equivalent for supply is given by f, forming a surface in 
which each coordinate point O, f represents a focus Q of intended demand 
versus supply in SIFS at time ,. More specifically, O is the percentage of all SIFS 
which, when clustered according to suitably determined types of affinity in 
intended demand-related execution-level activities at time ,, belong to clusters 
where those activities are above an operationally significant demand/bid level. 
Conversely, f is the percentage of all SIFS which, when clustered according to 
the same types of affinity in intended supply-related execution-level activities at 
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time ,, belong to clusters where those activities are above an operationally 
significant supply/offer level.  
Therefore, each parameter pair O, f can be interpreted as an aggregate 
participation ratio for the percentage of all SIFS clustered together according to 
similarly high concentrations of intended supply versus demand focused on them 
at time ,, above a predetermined level of intensity. This shows the relative overall 
emphasis between intended supply and demand in the system, expressed as the 
proportions of all SIFS involved on either side of participation. Significant 
reductions in those proportions, or an imbalance between them, are then taken as 
key indicators that instability is increasing in the system. 
As clustering varies according to participation activities, this ratio does not 
simply reflect aggregate participation levels. For example, when high levels of 
intended supply participation are evenly dispersed among activity types for SIFS, 
while similar levels of intended demand participation place an emphasis on 
certain activity types for SIFS (e.g. extreme ‘Bid’ activity for ‘Short term funding’ 
SIFS), there is a resultant weakness in the supply side of focus relative to the 
demand side even though their levels of participation are comparable.  
In this e plane, no attempt is made to indicate the degree of actual supply 
satisfaction of demand, just their relative concentrations of intention or focus (Q). 
This is sufficient, for example, to identify thresholds of materialization for 
progressive contagion when there is an increasing overall supply or demand focus 
on a decreasing percentage of SIFS. It also enables the boundary of systemic 
failure to be identified. 
4.5.1.2 Rationale 
The rationale for selecting values for the parameter pair O, f derived from 
concentrations of intended demand and supply in SIFS is based on a combination 
of: recent research exploring inter-bank correlations in herding behaviour and 
risk-shifting phenomena involving particular asset types (Beale et al., 2011; May 
and Arinaminpathy, 2010; Acharya, 2009); and new approaches to complexity-
based modelling of financial systems (Zeidan and Richardson, 2010; Allen and 
Gale, 2007). Theorising in this thesis moves the former thinking away from a 
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balance-sheet perspective on a narrow scope of emergent behaviour to an 
operational model of system-level supply and demand in a wide range of SIFS. 
Then complexity notions are applied to model interactions between SIPs over 
those SIFS across the entire global financial system. The scope of potential 
complexity is managed by reducing it down to a focus on conjectures about what 
may be the fundamental features of this operational behaviour as it approaches 
instability, in a deliberately over-simplified model consistent with the usual 
approach to modelling applications of chaos theory. 
4.5.2 Behaviour surface 
When a third parameter ^, representing the percentage of all available SIFS that 
achieve an overall minimum level of actual supply satisfaction of demand is 
projected out of this control surface, the three dimensional surface  appears (see 
Figure 18). Where each point is a potential operational state of the system, and the 
entire surface  represents the system’s full range in potential operational 
behaviour at time ,. With surface  it becomes possible to visualise the contours 
of this operational behaviour topology, in which catastrophe theory suggests there 
will be a cusp fold representing catastrophic collapse in the system’s operational 
state, potentially leading to systemic failure. The standard nonlinear form of that 
type of cuspoid surface, called the potential function, is given by: 
S` = 	 ^a + O^ + f^																																																		  
where ` ∈  such that ` =	 O, f, ^) uses coefficients O and f to represent 
control parameters, and the variable ^ to determine the system’s behaviour.  
This standard form of cuspoid surface has one fold direction, and is often 
oriented around the singularity point O = f = ^ = 0, with two control variables 
(the normal factor and the splitting factor) and one state variable. Whereas in the 
proposed model, the fold is symmetrically aligned on the diagonal vector 
converging on the systemic failure set at the origin of surface e. Then as surface 
 varies with ,, it can fold either left-to-right (when viewed from the origin as 
shown in Figure 18) or right-to-left, as the roles of normal and splitting factor are 
swapped between the control variables O, f). 
PhD - Cranfield University, January 2014. T.ILIN 
 
215 
 
 
Temporal aspects of catastrophic failures are not part of standard catastrophe 
theory, and there are debates in the literature about how they should be treated. 
However, Thom makes his views clear. Although gradient dynamics do not allow 
for time to be a variable of the potential function, he argues that an elementary 
catastrophe form may be embedded in a larger dynamical system which is time 
variant (Thom, 1983: pp. 107-108). This gives a series of surface structures  for 
a dynamical system modelled in a larger 	 × , space, in which the larger system 
is transversal in time to the set of structures in that space (Thom, 1975: pp. 38-40).  
That approach is taken in the proposed theory, and fits well with the simulation 
intentions of this programme of research. It furthermore implies that the cusp fold 
may also vary dynamically over time as its singularity point moves, and the roles 
taken by the two axes of the control surface are no longer fixed but may swap. 
4.5.3 Behavioural shifts 
Projections of operational behaviour from shifts in the actual operational state 
coordinates ` over a progression of behaviour surfaces, , , , … , back 
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Figure 18: A cusp catastrophe-type model of systemic failure. 
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onto the control surface e (when independent of ,) can be described as shown in 
Figure 19, by extending notions from catastrophe theory. These descriptions of 
behaviour are useful for explaining how a system is responding to the stimuli of 
collective participation activity. When that response is a contagious, convergent or 
catastrophic shift of operational state in the direction of the systemic failure set, 
increasing distress will be observed in the system.  
However, the effects of this emergent behaviour at system level are not the 
same as distress propagation, which happens at lower levels of the system by 
some behaviour transmission mechanism among individual participations in 
execution-level activities of supply and demand for financial services. How this 
mechanism works is the subject of conjectures and propositions in the following 
sub-sections, and demonstrating its validity will be one of the objectives of the 
hypothesis testing phase of this research programme in project 3. 
 
Figure 19: Operational behaviour reflected in the control surface F. 
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4.6 Proposition Development 
With the global financial system defined in terms of the preceding theoretical 
model, topology and conjectures, it became possible to construct new propositions 
about systemic risk of failure based on well-established theoretical foundations, to 
inform an experimentation strategy for agent-based simulation of the programme 
research problem. 
Due to a lack of consensus in social sciences regarding distinctions between a 
conjecture and a proposition, and how theory development progresses from the 
former to the latter, this thesis takes a stance on what appears to be the most 
coherent approach (Pawar, 2009: page 56-57; Dubin, 1978: page 160). It applies 
Dubin’s definition of a proposition as: “a truth statement about (or logical 
consequence of) a theoretical model”, to make 12 propositions (+1 from theory 
revision) derived from the theory’s model topology, developed out of the set of 8 
improved conjectural statements from sub-section 4.3 informed by the literature 
review. In terms of the research methodology (see Figure 4) this happened in step 
6, and produced the formal propositions outlined in sub-sections 4.7, 4.8 and 4.9 
as a series of logical expressions, which became the foundations on which a 
computational model was developed for simulation experimentation. 
4.7 Recognizing Systemic Failure 
The operational behaviour paradigm of systemic failure is extended here by two 
propositions for recognizing when that failure occurs. They apply notions of 
participation, focus and contagion that were introduced in the theoretical model 
and topology of sub-sections 4.4 and 4.5, and integrated with the improved 
conjectures of sub-section 4.3, to contribute alternatives to standard explanations 
offered in the literature for the causes and effects of such events, typically centred 
on the financial issues of markets and industries (Acharya and Richardson, 2009; 
Huang, Zhou and Zhu, 2009; Bhattacharyay, 2003; Allen and Gale, 2007); or sub-
system failures (Ho and Saunders, 1980); and system characteristics such as 
brittleness (Yang, Mu and Yao, 2009). Whatever endogenous or exogenous root 
causes may be attributed to systemic failure, the view is taken in this thesis that it 
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is concentrations in what participants do or fail to do that precipitate and 
propagate distress, potentially culminating in a system-wide failure to operate. 
Otherwise, failure remains relatively localised, except in the extreme event of 
instant annihilation of the entire system. Theoretical discussion begins with the 
context in which systemic failure emerges.  
4.7.1 Proposition 1: The transition threshold of contagion 
If the current focus of participation in the global financial system is defined by a 
placement in the two-dimensional control surface of a cusp catastrophe-type 
model (see Figure 17), in which all potential such placements are plotted as a pair 
of control coordinates O, f, then the following region can be used to represent 
the percentage of SIFS that are the focus of concentrated demand intentions b 
(e.g. bids) relative to that of supply intentions c (e.g. offers) at time ,: 
e 	 ∶=	 AO, f ∈ ℝ|0 < O ≤ 100) ∧ 0 < f ≤ 100),	O ∈ b, f ∈ cB.								1) 
In that region, the threshold of transition from potential distress contagion into 
actual distress contagion, arising from an intensifying focus of participation, can 
be represented for regulatory purposes by a rational function such as: 
f = O ,					 ∈ ℝ,		 < 0.																																													2) 
This produces an equilateral hyperboloid describing where the transition is 
considered to occur. A fixed real number  is used for calibrating this threshold as 
a regulatory determinant of where actual system-level contagion is acknowledged 
to begin in e, with contagion occurring on the side of this threshold where: 
f < O	.																																																														3) 
4.7.2 Proposition 2: Systemic failure as participation unsustainability 
As the current focus of participation O, f converges on 0, 0 within that actual 
contagion side of the threshold of contagion in region e, due to escalating 
distress, it enters the control surface sub-region of participation unsustainability 
egh8i representing a failure of focus in e, which is outlined as the functional 
image set: 
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Failuree ∶= TO,	FailureOU ∈ egh8i %pq0 < O ≤ T√ + Us	⋀																					 
uT0 < Failure	O) ≤ √ + )U	⋀	qFailure	O) ≤ Osvw									4) 
where  ∈ ℝ and  > 0. 
The fixed real number  is used for calibrating the boundary of this region for 
regulatory tolerance of focus contagion2. If focus persists in this region for longer 
than a predetermined period of time, systemic failure must be acknowledged. This 
is similar in principle to the rules about successive periods of negative GDP used 
by economists to determine when an economy has moved into a state of recession. 
Clarity in recognizing when systemic failure is deemed to be occurring is a 
prerequisite for its mitigation. 
4.8 Operational States of Participation 
From propositions 1 and 2, an explanation was developed for how the global 
financial system’s operational state moves into egh8i. This begins by defining a 
set y of financial service activity-type executions in that system, generated by 
inter-agent participation and collected for a sufficient number of observations 
within discrete periods of time during simulation. They are the lowest granularity 
of data about system activity in this theoretical model, from which the system’s 
operational state changes emerge over time. Basic specifications of this data are 
given in expression (5), from which the expressions in following sub-sections are 
derived. Related definitions of sets are given as follows: let G be the set of all SIPs 
(participants) identified in the data; and similarly let z be the set of all products ; 
and let { be the set of all financial service activity-types (also referred to as SIFS); 
then let y be the set of relevant executions of { by G for z; let | be the pair of 
treatments “offer” and “bid”; and let ( be the set of all points in time for which 
this data is collected; with ' being the value of related open offers or bids. Then 
                                                 
2 Separate  values may be necessary for the demand and supply axes, as in } and  ~. 
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the members of each set are:  ∈ G, 5 ∈ z, [ ∈ {, F ∈ y,	E ∈ |, , ∈ (, with 
' ∈ ℝ, as referenced in: 
z ∶= A5, 5, … , 5B				where	Y ∈ ℤ.                             (5) 
y ∶= AF, F, … , FB			where	 ∈ ℤ. 
F ∶= A, 5, [, E, ,, ' ∈ yB. 
∴ FJ = J, 5J, [J, EJ, ,J, 'J				where	1 ≤ L ≤ TZ + ZU. 
yOffer ∶= yOffer ⊂ y		E = 'Offer'$. 
∴ FOffer = TOffer, 5Offer, [Offer, EOffer	,Offer, 'OfferU			where	1 ≤  ≤ Z. 
yBid ∶= yBid ⊂ y		E = 'Bid'$. 
∴ FBid = TBid, 5Bid, [Bid, EBid, ,Bid, 'BidU			where	1 ≤  ≤ Z . 
Where Z ∈ ℝ is the count of offer executions FOffer, and Z ∈ ℝ is the count of 
bid executions FBid. 
4.8.1 Proposition 3: Affinity in participation 
From this type of execution-level data it becomes possible to identify participation 
affinities over supply and demand intentions for SIFS. Various alternative 
methods can be applied, such as using a clustering function, or equivalent 
algorithms, with appropriate similarity coefficients  and partitioning levels , to 
cluster on relevant activity types and associated activity volumes and values for 
each SIFS. To simplify the translation of this proposition into a computational 
model, similarities in the adoption by SIPS of the same bid and offer strategies for 
their collective participation in SIFS at any point in time were used to identify bid 
and offer affinities. For each product, that becomes the two sided proposition: 
4.8.1.1 Bid affinities 
Affinities between all participants  ∈ G in their demand for a product 5 ∈ z can 
be expressed as the total open bids value  ∈ ℝ, at time , ∈ (, of bid activity-
type executions for 5 in the image set of a summation function for the sub-set 
yBid, such that:  
BidTyBid, 5, ,U ∶=  ∈ ℝ	 u =7 'Bid

; v , 	5Bid = 5, 	,Bid = ,w.			6 
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4.8.1.2 Offer affinities 
Whereas, affinities between all participants  ∈ G in their supply of a product 
5 ∈ z can be expressed as the total open offers value 	 ∈ ℝ,  at time , ∈ (, of 
offer activity-type executions for 5 in the image set of a summation function for 
the sub-set yOffer, such that: 
OfferTyOffer, 5, ,U ∶=  ∈ ℝ	 u =7 'Offer

; v , 	5Offer = 5, 	,Offer = ,w . 7 
4.8.2 Proposition 4: Intensity of participation 
These notions can be extended further, by calculating the intensity of participation 
focus on certain products, to understand imbalances created by extremes in 
collective behaviour.  
4.8.2.1 Intensity of Demand Focus 
For this theoretical model, demand focus is represented by the variable O, which is 
calculated as the percentage measuring the sum of open bid values 	 	¡ at time 
, ∈ ( for all products 5¢ ∈ z except the 5¢ with the maximum open bid value, in 
proportion to the sum including that value. As this variable decreases it suggests 
there is less diversity in demand intentions, and focus may be increasing on one 
product, unless open bid values are decreasing a similar amount for all products. 
O = uT∑ 
¤¢; U − max	 	¡$T∑ ¤¢; U v × 100,				where	O ∈ ℤ.									8 
4.8.2.2 Intensity of Supply Focus 
In a similar way, supply focus is represented by the variable f, 
f = uT∑ 	
¤¢; U − max		 	¡$T∑ 	¤¢; U v × 100,				where	f ∈ ℤ.									9 
4.8.3 Proposition 5: Focus (or diversity) of participation 
The tension between intended demand versus supply at time , then becomes the 
overall focus Q},~, defined by:  
Focus ∶= AO, f ∈ eB																																																					10 
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in which coordinates O and f define the axes of control surface e (see Figure 18). 
4.8.4 Proposition 6: Actual operational effectiveness 
For any point of focus the system exhibits, at specific O, f coordinates in e, 
there can be an actual satisfaction percentage σ	¤, at time ,, for every product 
5¢ ∈ z (not just those with current supply or demand intentions). That value is a 
proportion calculated as the maximum between filled offers and bids over the 
maximum between available offers and bids, where D ∈ ℤ such that: 
5¢ = Tª¢available, ­¢available, ª¢filled, ­¢filled, ,U				where	1 ≤ D ≤ Y,										(11) 
with ª¢available and ­¢available defined as available offers and bids respectively, and 
ª¢filled and ­¢filled defined as filled offers and bids respectively, such that: 
σ	¤ = u maxª¢
filled, ­¢filled$
maxª¢available, ­¢available$v × 100,				where	σ
	¤ ∈ ℤ.					(12) 
Then an overall satisfaction percentage ^ is given by: 
^ = uT∑ σ
	¤¢; U − maxσ		 	¡$T∑ σ	¤¢; U v × 100,				where	^ ∈ ℤ.									(13) 
This defines the third axis ^ of the cusp catastrophe-type model of systemic 
failure (see Figure 18), which relates a satisfaction parameter to each instance of 
focus Q(},~) to create an instance of actual operational effectiveness `(},~,®), 
among all potential ` on the surface  at time ,. 
4.8.5 Proposition 7: The global financial system’s operational state 
Then one of four regions in  can be assigned to each potential placement of 
actual operational effectiveness ` by the string constants ¯, … , ¯a, depending 
upon where in e its focus Q falls (see Figure 17), to describe it as: ¯ = 
performing (outside distress regions); ¯ =	contaminated (inside the progressive 
distress contagion region calibrated by the threshold  ∈ ℝ; ¯° =	collapsed 
(inside the catastrophic distress contagion region calibrated by the threshold 
 ∈ ℝ); or ¯a =	failed (inside the systemic failure region calibrated by the failure 
tolerance number  ∈ ℝ); expressed as: 
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Region`, , ,  = ¯,			where	¯ ∈ A¯, ¯, ¯°, ¯aB.																	(14) 
Therefore, in summary, a current operational state of the global financial 
system is more usefully represented in a cusp catastrophe-type surface 	by an 
instance of actual operational effectiveness `(},~,®) at the current time ,, for 
specific (O, f, ^) coordinates, determined by the relative supply and demand focus 
of participation intentions Q(},~) in active products, contrasted against actual 
supply satisfaction of demand ^ for all products at that time, and further qualified 
by its placement in a region ¯ of  according to calibrations of distress contagion 
( and ) and systemic failure tolerance (). This qualified definition becomes: 
Current( , , , ) ∶=	`(},~,®),	Region q`(},~,®), , , s0,																	(15) 
in which the complete set  of operational states representing previous and 
potential operational behaviour at time , can be expressed as the qualified set ℬ: 
Manifold( , , , ) ∶= T`,	Region(`, , , )U ∈ ℬ	` ∈ $.								(16) 
4.9 Systemic Risk of Failure to Operate 
It follows from propositions 1 to 7 that the potential of the current operational 
state of the global financial system at time , to move towards and cross over the 
threshold of distress contagion into the systemic failure zone within a certain 
period of time, based on the probable future direction of shifts in that state and the 
changing contours of , may have some relevance to the research problem.  
4.9.1 Proposition 8: Operational behaviour of the system 
The shifts broadly categorized as shown in Figure 19 and expression 15 can be 
modelled as the operational behaviour of the system, in the transformation: 
Behaviour:		Current , , ,  ↦ Current , , , 																		17 
where , ∈ (, ' ∈ ( and , < '. This behaviour is a phenomenon that emerges by 
nonlinear means from participation activities, interpreted at system level as 
movements in actual operational effectiveness ` over successive surfaces 
representing  between the data collection points in time , and ', from point ` in 
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surface  to point `  in surface  . Effectively, time , could be considered 
another dimension, giving a four-dimensional catastrophe-type model, but 
visualization of this proposition is kept relatively simple in Figure 18 and Figure 
19 by showing the behaviour surface  in three dimensions at a single point in 
time. Nonetheless, this thesis aligns with Thom’s view on temporal aspects of his 
theory by assuming an elementary catastrophe form is embedded in a larger 
dynamical system which is time variant (see temporal modelling comments in 
sub-section 3.6.4). It should simply be remembered, as suggested in sub-section 
4.5.2, that  and   are two different surfaces within a temporal progression of  
surfaces in which the topology and conjectured cusp fold of  may change (also 
see Hypothesis 3). The transformation of state topology over time in this way 
seems to be a principal driver of catastrophic operational behaviour. 
4.9.2 Proposition 9: A definition of systemic failure 
Then systemic failure at a time ,, denoted as Ⅎ, can be defined by regulations as a 
succession of failed operational states resulting from operational behaviour 
sustained over a period of time ) ∈ ℕ,		in which each failed current state 
 ∶= 	ACurrent , , ,  ∈ ℬ 	|Region` , , ,  = 	¯a,		' ∈ (	B,					18 
is a member of the succession of states Ⅎ such that: 
Ⅎ ∶= 	 , ,… ,  "#	$	%	∈	Ⅎ ,		, = ' + ) − 10,																19 
where  is the most recent of ) such states. 
4.9.3 Proposition 10: Probability of systemic failure 
As this particular operational behaviour emerges, probability can be used within a 
short time horizon as a metric at a current time , for a potential increase in 
operational distress among participation activities resulting in systemic failure by 
time ', denoted 5 , where ' ∈ (, , < '. However, irregular behaviour arising 
from the system’s nonlinearity, and its sensitivity to initial conditions, will make 
predictability of systemic failure decay quickly, suggesting that a simple 
probability is not a good candidate for a longer range metric of extreme distress 
potential, namely systemic risk of failure. 
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4.9.4 Proposition 11: A practical definition of systemic risk 
Nonetheless, the philosophical view implicit in this proposition holds it is more 
meaningful to assign a metric to some operationally defined aspect of risk than 
attempting a more direct and objective definition, for the reasons discussed in sub-
section 3.4.1. Therefore a practical definition of systemic risk of failure may be 
achieved by closely linking the short-term probability metric of systemic failure 
from proposition 10 to some longer range notion of disorder or uncertainty of the 
system within a proximity of interest, to account for its nonlinearity.  
By taking Shannon’s (1948) expression of entropy: 
K5 = KA5, … , 5JB = −758
J
8;
log 58 																													20 
representing a measure of uncertainty regarding what could be communicated (for 
discussion see sub-section 2.7.3.2), and replacing its set of information 
probabilities with a series of probabilities of systemic failure 5  for all intervening 
time periods ' between , and µ, denoted 5:6 , where , < ' ≤ µ, over the elapsed 
time ending in µ, to give: 
K5:6 = K q	5,		5, … ,		560s,																																		21 
a more general interpretation of entropy can be proposed along similar principles 
to Renyi (1961), in the form: 
Entropy5:6 	= − 7 58 log 58
6
8;
.																																			22 
This defines a metric for uncertainty regarding the probability of operational 
behaviour shifting the system into the systemic failure state by some time ', 
where , < ' ≤ µ. From which a new metric for systemic risk of failure can be 
outlined, by the expression: 
RiskℲ6, , ∶=	A	56,	Entropy5:6B,																																	23 
where Ⅎ6 denotes the systemic failure state at time µ, and , < µ. 
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It is therefore the conclusion of this thesis that a plausible metric of systemic 
risk of failure can be expressed informally by: “a measure of the overall 
probability at a current time of the system entering an operational state of 
systemic failure by a specified time in the future; qualified by a measure of 
uncertainty determined by the system’s entropy for a series of probabilities about 
the shortest succession of future operational states considered to be capable of 
that outcome by the specified time; in the absence of new mitigation efforts”. For 
practical purposes when philosophical concerns are set aside, the formal definition 
in expression 23  can be expressed in this less formal terminology as a definition 
of systemic risk of failure.  
4.9.5 Proposition 12: Emergence of operational behaviour 
If the operational behaviour of the system, from expression 17, is now restated in 
terms of participation z at execution-level y from which it arises, it becomes the 
transformation: 
Participation	y:	Conditionsz ↦ Conditionsz															24 
Then, assertion E from the operational behaviour paradigm (see Figure 1) can be 
expressed as the transformation: 
Emergence:	Conditionsz 	↦ Current, , ,                 (25) 
in which the conditions created by collective participation in execution-level 
activities from expression 24 are transformed into emergent operational behaviour 
of the system in expression 25 through some nonlinear relationship with actual 
operational states in succeeding time periods. Catastrophic instability is proposed 
as a special case of this transformation, whereby distress  conditions arising at 
time , + 1 somewhere are propagated by some operational mechanism at 
execution-level, to generate emergent operational behaviour by time , + 2 
reflecting that distress system-wide, as in the expression: 
Distress:	Conditions 	↦ Current, , , ,                (26) 
where   ⊂ z. A feedback loop may further exacerbate this distress, as in: 
Feedback: Current, , ,  	↦ Conditions°, where ° ⊂ z°.  (27) 
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This describes a propagation mechanism of distress transformations which 
occur spontaneously out of micro-level participation in SIFS supply and demand. 
4.10 Propositional Implications 
4.10.1 For Current Theory 
If propositions 1 to 12 are shown to be plausible, they provide current theory 
about financial system instability described in section 0 and sub-section 3.6.1 with 
a unifying theory capable of bridging related gaps and debates in multi-
disciplinary understanding. In particular, later sections of this thesis show that a 
computational representation of the systemic risk notion from proposition 11 
offers a very practical new interpretation suitable for guiding risk mitigation. 
Future research, focused on extending this theory to predict where and when 
systemic risk exposure is likely to materialize, may then offer additional 
significant insights for financial stability management in general. 
4.10.2 For Current Policy 
Emphasis placed by the goal assertion of this thesis (see sub-section 3.5.1) on 
understanding ‘how’ instability of the global financial system becomes 
operationally catastrophic, and ‘how’ it can be avoided, is reflected in the 
explanation offered by proposition 12. As the culmination of all 11 preceding 
propositions, it explains how operational behaviour emerges from execution-level 
participation by a propagation mechanism of distress transformation. Then risk 
mitigation techniques discussed in sub-section 7.2 can be based on policy 
guidance for intervention in these transformations. 
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4.11 Hypotheses 
The notion of hypothesis is taken from Dubin (1978: page 206), in which he 
states: “[It] may be defined as the predictions about values of units of theory in 
which empirical indicators are employed for the named units in each [of its] 
propositions”. On the relationship between hypotheses and propositions, he 
explains: “Every hypothesis is homologous with the proposition for which it 
stands. The homology is determined by the dimensionality of the theoretical 
definition of the units contained in the proposition. [Therefore] each empirical 
indicator has to meet the necessary and sufficient conditions of [its] theoretically 
defined unit”. 
The strategy adopted for hypothesis construction in this thesis involves a 
generative approach to theory building (see sub-section 2.8.2). As with inductive 
approaches, it begins with the ‘ad hoc’ hypotheses presented in the following sub-
sections, which are tested and empirically validated by agent-based simulation 
experiments in project 3 (see Figure 4). If they are not disproven, project 4 
generalizes and refines the original theoretical model into a completed theory. 
4.11.1 Hypothesis 1: Focus (or diversity) and satisfaction correlation 
4.11.1.1 Rationale 
If the cusp catastrophe-type surface presented in the theoretical model and 
topology of sub-sections 4.4 and 4.5, and outlined in propositions 1 and 2, is an 
accurate interpretation of operational behaviour in the global financial system; 
then as parameters O, f approach 0, 0 in surface e, the value of parameter ^ 
also diminishes until it moves catastrophically over the cusp threshold in surface 
, or continues to diminish contagiously or convergently towards the systemic 
failure sub-region projected out of egh8i onto surface .  
4.11.1.2 Prediction 
This predicts a correlation between an increasing intensity of operational focus on 
fewer SIFS and decreasing overall supply satisfaction of demand, as overall 
operational effectiveness approaches collapse. Conversely, it predicts an 
increasing diversity of operational focus on more SIFS has the opposite effect. 
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4.11.1.3 Criteria for testing and validation 
The relevant units of theory are: the coordinates O, f, ^ of surface . The 
necessary condition for plausibly measuring their predicted correlation requires 
that assigned values must not be directly dependent on each other, by calculation 
formula or equivalent algorithmic derivations. The sufficient condition for that 
measurement requires them to be able to move with enough freedom around the 
coordinate space of , to the extent they can potentially be observed to move 
without correlation, thereby refuting this hypothesis. 
4.11.1.4 Empirical indications 
An appropriate empirical indicator of correlation would be a clear down-sloping 
gradient in a chart plotting the values of demand focus O, supply focus f, and 
satisfaction ^, for a simulated financial system approaching systemic failure. That 
indicator could similarly be confirmed by observation of an operational state 
moving down a gradient in a behaviour surface manifold in a behaviour state-
space representing phenomena in that simulation explained by catastrophe theory. 
 
Figure 20: Hypothesis 1 – Focus and satisfaction correlation 
4.11.2 Hypothesis 2: Catastrophic tendencies at critical points 
4.11.2.1 Rationale 
The rationale from hypothesis 1 is extended by an additional assertion about 
systemic failure from proposition 9. 
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4.11.2.2 Prediction 
In combination, they predict that operational behaviour can exhibit catastrophic 
tendencies resulting in systemic collapse or failure at critical points on surface .   
4.11.2.3 Criteria for testing and validation 
The relevant units of theory are: the coordinates O, f, ^ of surface ; regulatory 
boundaries of systemic failure regions on surface ; and the time period ,. The 
necessary condition for plausibly measuring the predicted collapse or failure is 
that the O, f, ^ coordinates of the current operational state can move within 
regulatory boundaries of systemic failure regions on surface . The sufficient 
condition for that measurement is that enough time periods can be observed to 
create a reasonable opportunity for collapse or failure to occur. 
4.11.2.4 Empirical indication 
Then, an appropriate empirical indicator of collapse or failure would be when the 
level of overall satisfaction level ^ plotted on a chart plunges below a vertical 
boundary representing a regulatory determination of systemic failure. That 
indicator could similarly be confirmed by observation of an operational state 
dropping from a previously maintained level on a behaviour surface manifold in a 
behaviour state-space explained by catastrophe theory. 
 
Figure 21: Hypothesis 2 - Catastrophic tendencies 
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4.11.3 Hypothesis 3: Quantum behaviour analogy 
4.11.3.1 Rationale 
As a consequence of temporal considerations in proposition 8, the direction of the 
cusp fold, left-to-right or right-to-left, cannot be known until shortly before a 
catastrophic collapse or failure. At that time, as emergent operational behaviour 
slides towards the cusp, massive mitigation initiatives such as quantitative easing 
can ‘flip’ this direction of fold in successive surfaces of . These will have 
opposite gradients, offering temporary respite through intervention by reversing 
the decline of operational states. However, if a ‘see-saw’ effect is observed in 
emergent operational behaviour because it has insufficient momentum to escape 
the cusp, current mitigation strategies will ultimately fail unless further 
complementary mitigations take effect. This uncertainty in behaviour is analogous 
to recent experimental results from quantum physics concerning quantum 
behaviour on a macroscopic scale (Vedral, 2011). Thereafter, when mitigation 
effects begin to fail, closeness to the cusp and possibly its orientation may be 
predicted by such indicators as the slowing down effect known to occur when a 
critical threshold is approaching (Scheffer et al., 2009). 
4.11.3.2 Prediction 
This predicts that the cusp fold in the operational state surface will not appear 
until shortly before a catastrophic collapse or failure, and can disappear abruptly 
following intervention efforts. 
4.11.3.3 Criteria for testing and validation 
The relevant units of theory are: the coordinates O, f, ^ of surface ; and the 
time period ,. The necessary condition for measuring the predicted cusp fold 
appearance is that the coordinates are independent of time periods. The sufficient 
condition for that measurement is that enough time periods can be observed to 
create a reasonable opportunity for the cusp fold to appear. 
4.11.3.4 Empirical indication 
An appropriate empirical indicator of fold appearance would be a series of values 
for the coordinates O, f, ^ of `},~,® suggesting a significant change in the 
gradient of  ahead of `},~,® in the direction of operational behaviour. 
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Figure 22: Hypothesis 3 - Quantum behaviour analogy 
4.11.4 Hypothesis 4: Synchronicity effects 
4.11.4.1 Rationale 
When affinities in execution-level activities begin to cluster and focus as 
described in propositions 3, 4 and 5, future synchronicities are likely to develop if 
unchecked. They can take many forms, but all essentially create ripples in the 
future focus of collective participation behaviour on the same or related SIFS. An 
example of this occurs when many individual banks are refinanced 
simultaneously, as part of a massive systemic risk mitigation exercise by central 
bank authorities. If the periods of refinancing are not staggered, and subsequent 
alternative sources for on-going funding are not secured by a majority of those 
individual banks, then there is an increased risk of an intense concentration of 
focus on such SIFS emerging again as a new round of simultaneous funding 
requirements at the end of that common funding period. Even if systemic risk 
mitigation efforts are successful and take synchronicities into account, vigilance is 
still necessary for avoiding unintended secondary effects such as the creation of a 
bubble in a particular asset class. Synchronicities will have both positive and 
negative effects on emergent operational behaviour. Systemic risk mitigation 
techniques can be developed to use these effects for dispersing concentrations of 
focus well in advance with small interventions, so that feedback loops in emergent 
operational behaviour are avoided. 
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4.11.4.2 Prediction 
This predicts there is a tendency for an instance of focus intensity to recur if 
participation behaviour induces a synchronized response. 
4.11.4.3 Criteria for testing and validation 
The relevant units of theory are: the coordinates O, f, ^ of surface ; regulatory 
boundaries of systemic failure regions on surface ; and the time period ,. The 
necessary condition for measuring the predicted synchronicity effects is that the 
O, f, ^ coordinates of the current operational state are independent of time 
periods. The sufficient condition for that measurement is that enough time periods 
can be observed to create a reasonable opportunity for synchronicity effects to 
occur. 
4.11.4.4 Empirical indication 
An appropriate empirical indicator of synchronicity effects would be repetition in 
the movements of `},~,® between two non-consecutive periods , and '. 
4.11.5 Hypothesis 5: Bi-Polar (tight hysteresis) operational behaviour 
4.11.5.1 Rationale 
As a special case of the hysteresis loop of standard catastrophe theory, expression 
27 allows for the potential of tight loop-back behaviour around the singularity, 
which explains why a series of mitigation attempts close to the catastrophe cusp 
can cause emergent operational behaviour to cycle repeatedly through its slide 
towards and over the cusp. This is similar in effect to the bipolar condition in 
human psychology, with its reversals of optimism and despair at the edge of 
personal catastrophe. It will be more noticeable in the global financial system 
after initial brushes with catastrophe, when financial authorities are actively 
monitoring distress propagation and mitigating systemic risk accordingly. It is the 
principal reason why the risk of systemic failure tends to reverberate for some 
time. 
4.11.5.2 Prediction 
This predicts there will be a loop pattern in operational behaviour around a critical 
point induced by operational feedback close to the cusp. 
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4.11.5.3 Criteria for testing and validation 
The relevant units of theory are: the coordinates O, f, ^ of surface ; and the 
time period ,. The necessary condition for plausibly measuring the predicted bi-
polar operational behaviour is that the O, f, ^ coordinates of the current 
operational state are independent of time periods. The sufficient condition for that 
measurement is that enough time periods can be observed to create a reasonable 
opportunity for bipolar effects to repeat a sufficient number of times for loop-back 
in operational behaviour to be observed. 
4.11.5.4 Empirical indication 
An appropriate empirical indicator of bi-polar behaviour would be a series of 
repeated values for the coordinates O, f, ^ representing circular motion in the 
movements of the current operational state over consecutive time periods. Those 
indicators could similarly be confirmed by observation of an operational state 
moving in circles on a behaviour surface manifold in a behaviour state-space 
representing phenomena in that simulation explained by catastrophe theory. 
 
Figure 23: Hypothesis 5 - Bi-polar operational behaviour 
  
0%
Repeating
PhD - Cranfield University, January 2014. T.ILIN 
 
235 
4.11.6 Falsification statement 
Hypotheses 1, 2 and 5 are specifically relevant to the circumstances of the only 
recent case of a real financial system collapse that occurred in Iceland over the 
years 2003 to 2008. Therefore, in a generative science context, this theory can be 
falsified by demonstrating a null-hypothesis that states: 
Null-Hypothesis  “A plausible (verified and empirically validated) 
simulation of a real financial system collapse, 
corroborated by theoretical triangulation with 
catastrophe theory, will not confirm the predictions of 
hypotheses 1, 2 and 5.” 
Rejecting this null-hypothesis would neither prove nor demonstrate the general 
plausibility of the theory in all real world cases (Popper, 1959), but it could 
support an assertion about a non-empty class of computational models capable of 
simulating reality according to its propositions. That would satisfy the goal 
assertion of this thesis (see sub-section 3.5.1), for the single real world case of 
Iceland, while providing significant insights about the notion of systemic risk of 
failure for future research into its general applicability. 
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5 THEORY TESTING AND VALIDATION 
5.1 Summary 
This section reviews testing and validation of the proposed outline of theory, 
using the approach described in sub-section 3.5. 
It begins by presenting the financial analysis of step 7 based on data collected 
from archived annual reports of firms directly involved in the Icelandic financial 
system collapse between the years 2003 and 2008, along with a brief review of 
associated academic commentary. Then the conceptual model of that system from 
step 8 based on the financial analysis, and its agent-based computational 
representation from step 9 incorporating the proposed outline of theory, are used 
to establish how verification of real world abstraction has been achieved in step 
10. After which key aspects of simulation experiments and their results from step 
11 are reported for potential replication, and validated findings are presented with 
an overall outcome summary.  
Finally, a critical assessment of project 3 findings is expressed in terms of the 
original goal assertion.  
5.2 Financial Analysis 
5.2.1 Objectives 
Step 7 of the theory development methodology (see Figure 4) requires collection 
of empirical data for financial analysis, to identify simulation datapoints and 
translate them into a conceptual model design and results validation criteria.  
5.2.2 Data Collection 
The primary source of empirical data was Bankscope, a comprehensive global 
database of bank financial statements, ratings and other intelligence offered by 
Bureau Van Dijk (see http://www.bvdinfo.com/en-gb/products/company-
information/international/bankscope). It was collected by downloading an excel 
workbook file containing extracts from the reported accounts of all 51 financial 
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institutions active in Iceland over the years 2000 to 2009. That file, with 
additional tabs containing extract tables and charts presented in this thesis, is 
among the supporting materials supplied on CD with this thesis (see Appendix I). 
 
 
Chart 1: Icelandic financial system data, for the years 2000 to 2009. 
A summary of the financial analysis is provided in Chart 1. It shows total 
actual values for a set of financial reporting variables, with interpretive comments 
pointing to features observed by this thesis. In later sub-sections Chart 1 will be 
compared with simulation results for the period of particular interest from the end 
of 2003 to the end of 2008.  
5.2.3 Interpretation 
5.2.3.1 Thesis observations 
Over the ten years from 2000 to 2009 analysed by Chart 1, six features were 
identified as representative of participant sentiment corresponding to anecdotal 
evidence and academic commentary. They occurred during the years 2003 to 
2009, and are characterized by this thesis respectively as: relief, euphoria, 
frustration, euphoria, fear and relief. Completed liberalization and privatisation of 
the Icelandic financial sector marked the beginning of this period at the end of 
Source:  Extracted from the reported accounts of all 51 financial institutions in the Iceland database of Bankscope.
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
tot_profit_act 1,656,700 4,312,100 8,403,100 2,276,100 6,020,600 3,549,845,139 239,599,662 206,412,248 -1,953,841,290 -607,881,900
tot_assets_act 451,393,500 924,935,100 981,676,800 565,522,000 2,939,201,500 15,999,713,336 7,811,197,543 10,435,219,325 4,996,139,748 3,887,703,500
tot_liabilities_act 468,318,500 939,790,100 995,786,700 570,690,500 3,044,863,900 16,654,898,860 8,383,680,300 11,465,867,885 5,574,049,530 4,318,728,400
tot_liquid_act 231,931,800 330,242,100 363,716,300 103,713,500 691,861,200 1,525,669,113 2,581,366,364 4,860,068,189 2,374,534,591 1,734,561,200
tot_securities_act 53,084,900 74,062,800 67,007,000 17,630,800 407,113,000 12,681,175,749 1,712,223,256 2,715,050,572 1,093,228,923 774,386,700
tot_debt_act 202,975,600 557,257,400 572,129,000 437,710,500 1,951,623,900 7,215,230,684 4,429,202,641 4,835,106,317 3,480,337,873 3,811,485,100
tot_loans_act 0 0 0 0 250,700,200 354,177,740 934,168,278 999,915,622 332,978,327 323,283,500
tot_deposits_act 92,725,900 138,312,400 136,906,900 5,807,700 136,177,400 342,577,782 511,286,489 1,081,272,784 688,948,932 362,818,900
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2003, and central bank intervention to head off total losses marked the end in 
2008. In between, a dash for asset growth is evidenced by prolific new issuance of 
debt securities on foreign markets that was grossly disproportionate to more 
traditional banking activities, ending in a fall in counterparty confidence, followed 
by a change in tactics, with a subsequent collapse.  
A light regulatory regime in place at the time allowed domestic institutions to 
engage in this type of ‘hybrid’ banking activities. The chart suggests that when 
bad reports by rating agencies limited access to international securities markets, 
Icelandic banks sought new cash flows and asset growth by making foreign 
acquisitions. Interestingly, when it became clear to the central authorities that a 
total failure of the system was imminent, it froze assets and allowed local banks to 
default on their obligations. For this thesis, it confirmed that systemic failure does 
not simply occur when the last participant turns out the lights on their way out of 
business, rather it is when the system is deemed to have failed and gets shut down. 
In Iceland’s case that left 13 financial institutions surviving under the protection 
of central authorities in the year after shut-down. 
5.2.3.2 Academic commentary 
An overall prognosis is contributed by Nielsson and Torfason (2012), who 
describe Iceland’s economic collapse as being “… primarily home-brewed, and a 
consequence of an unbound, risk-seeking banking sector and ineffective (or non-
existent) actions of the Icelandic authorities”. 
Relief after de-regulation of the domestic banking sector is attributed by them 
to a dramatic ascent of the country’s banking system after a “managed 
privatisation among friends”, excluding foreign buyers, in which sales were 
conducted in a way that ensured the ‘right’ price. 
The euphoria that followed, according to Benediktsdottir, Danielsson and 
Zoega (2011), was due to a business model combining investment and 
commercial banking financed initially by borrowing extensively in European 
bond markets. As a consequence, the total assets of the banking sector rose from 
174% of GDP at the end of 2003 to 744% of GDP at the end of 2007. 
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Frustration set in as domestic banks’ access to the European securities market 
became severely restricted when ratings agencies published negative reports at the 
beginning of 2006, after which retail deposit accounts became the main source of 
funding (Benediktsdottir, Danielsson and Zoega, 2011). 
But euphoria came back when domestic banks discovered the asset growth and 
cash-flow potentials created by large acquisitions of foreign banks in Norway, 
Denmark and Britain (Nielsson and Torfason, 2012). 
Then fear set in as shrinking liquidity began to set in globally, and a parallel 
currency crisis in the Krona became severe at the same time that panic surrounded 
the fall of Bear Stearns in March 2008 and the fall of Lehman Brothers in the 
autumn of that year (Nielsson and Torfason, 2012). 
Finally, central authority intervention created relief after Iceland’s financial 
system failed over a two week period in October 2008 and its stock market was 
almost completely wiped out, the foreign currency markets closed down and the 
external payments system froze (Benediktsdottir, Danielsson and Zoega, 2011). 
5.2.4 Relevance to Hypotheses 
Hypotheses 3 and 4 are not exhibited in this financial analysis. Hypothesis 3 
requires data from multiple cases of systemic failure, to determine that operational 
behaviour is consistent with its quantum analogy, whereas hypothesis 4 requires a 
longer time period over which synchronicities due to mitigation efforts can 
emerge. 
Nonetheless, hypotheses 1 and 2 should be exhibited in every systemic failure, 
and hypothesis 5 is highly probable in the Icelandic failure at the major reversal of 
sentiment in 2005. 
5.2.5 Simulation Datapoints 
The six sets of variable values in the table of actual data in Chart 1 for each year 
from 2003 to 2008 comprised the simulation datapoints for empirical results 
validation, of which there were 48 in total (8 variables by six years). Appendix G4 
shows the equivalent values from the final simulation experiment.  
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5.3 Conceptual Model of the System 
5.3.1 Introduction 
This model instructs an apparatus of experimentation (see Figure 28 and 
Appendix G) to address the research goals by specifying a set of operations 
corresponding to the theory’s propositions about systemic risk of failure, to 
explain how that risk occurs in a financial system, diagnose circumstances in 
which it materializes, and offer insights into how it may be mitigated. 
It conforms to the normal practice of expressing relevant characteristics of a 
complex system through an extremely simplified conceptual interpretation, in 
which the essential features of interest can be specified. 
5.3.2 Principles 
Although the proposed theory addresses systemic risk of failure of the global 
financial system, there has never been a total failure of that system. Even the 
Great Depression of 1929 did not result in a complete failure (Kindleberger and 
Aliber, 2011). Consequently, there is no real world data for empirically validating 
a simulation of that scale of failure, even if it were considered a reasonable thing 
to attempt in a doctoral thesis. However, there have been many failures of national 
financial systems. After careful consideration when designing this conceptual 
model and its agent-based representation, a four-level structure was proposed 
based on a micro-level in which all individual participation occurs. The other 
levels reflect activity in that micro-level at different stages of aggregation. There 
is a meso-level showing collective participation, a macro-level showing 
operational state interplay in a behaviour manifold from catastrophe theory, and a 
phenomenal level showing operational behaviour as the interplay between 
operational focus and satisfaction. The remainder of this sub-section describes a 
national-centric conceptual design chosen for the micro-level, embedded in the 
global financial system by simple interactions with ‘foreign’ participants and a 
single international market. Other levels will be described in later sub-sections. 
Figure 24 is an overview diagram of that design showing the key participants 
along with products and activity-types. It is a model of interactions between 
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systemically important participants (SIPs), involving financial service products, 
traded as executions of systemically important financial service activity-types 
(SIFS). The most important simplification of the model is a bid/offer market 
design for all interactions between participants. This removes the need to model 
direct interactions between participants. Bids/offers are placed in the market 
according to selected strategies, in a configurable number of trading cycles each 
tick, and randomly matched as fills according to various trading rules. As market 
sentiment changes, rules about changing rules are applied, while trading reactions 
are driven by the evolving circumstances of participants. 
Proximity among participants is determined by similarities in their current 
strategy and trading tactics. They do not have a physical location, but assets and 
liabilities flow between them through market exchanges, and participants can 
individually fail. However, there is no provision for new startups. 
 A few features of the original model are suppressed by parameter choice to 
reflect known circumstances of the Icelandic collapse, and corresponding code 
has been removed from the computational representation to reduce its complexity 
to a more readable version only containing code that is actually run by 
simulations. Examples of such removals are the implementation of a fine policy, 
and regulatory budget collection. These were removed due to a ‘lack of 
authoritative response’ (Nielsson and Torfason, 2012) from regulatory authorities 
and the central bank in Iceland over the period in time simulated, jointly modelled 
as the central authority. The parameters involved are ‘strategies and policies’, 
which were set to ‘MIN-REGULATION’, ‘NO-FINES’ and ‘DO-NOTHING’. 
 The key design principles applied in the conceptual model design are: 
simplification of reality to expose essential features of interest, using a 
participation mechanism that allows catastrophe theory principles to be embedded 
in the computational representation to interpret results for corroborating 
hypotheses. 
5.3.3 Agents and Interactions 
Six generic systemically important financial service products are traded in this 
model as executions of systemically important financial service activity-types 
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(SIFS) for those products. Finance and economics literature provided little help in 
identifying what those high level generically representative products should be. 
Furthermore, there is little evidence for explicit definitions of a ‘financial service’. 
Whenever that term is mentioned, it is usually linked to accounting notions from 
annual reports, such as ‘loans’, ‘deposits’, or ‘credit derivatives’. There is no 
distinction drawn between products, services related to those products, and 
execution of those services. For example, academic references to financial 
services in the balance sheets of annual reports by banks show aggregate values 
for executions of products in an accounting period, not financial services totals. 
In order to model the interaction between supply and demand in financial 
services, it was necessary to make a distinction between a product, such as a 
‘loan’, and its related financial service activity-types (SIFS) ‘lending’ and 
‘borrowing’, and execution of those activity-types in an actual provision of a 
financial service. This is a standard approach applied in systems development of 
banking computer applications, but it is often confused in academic literature. 
With that distinction modelled, the generic selection of products became: loan, 
deposit, debt, settlement, security, and fund. Their respective SIFS became: 
lending/borrowing, taking/placing, issuing/holding, retiring/discharging, 
tendering/acquiring, and providing/receiving. Then separate rules were developed 
for each SIFS, qualified by market sentiment and the individual circumstances of 
participants. This particular combination of generic notions about supply and 
demand in financial services has no exact precedent in either academic or 
practitioner literature, but was considered to be the most accurate simplification of 
reality after a series of 862 simulation experiments to refine the model’s efficacy. 
Agent-sets were created in the computational representation for these 
conceptual model components, along with the range of participant types shown in 
Figure 24, and the operational process and rules by which their members interact 
defined in Figure 25, and Table 7 respectively. They can all be found in the 
computational representation code extract listed in Appendix G.3, and the full 
code listing provided on the companion CD mentioned in Appendix I.  
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computational representation. It has 23 separate steps, with 10 dedicated to 
simulation run setup and the other 13 performing tick-related actions. Procedure 
names given in this flowchart exactly match names used in the computational 
representation, and the number and textual description of each step can be found 
as a comment line before the code block for that step’s logic. Finally, the 
organization of code broadly follows the flowchart sequence. 
This close coupling of the conceptual model with its representation is intended 
to make verification easier, by enabling navigation to specific code of interest in a 
moderately complex design. Further extensive in-line commentary explains the 
logic and purpose of the code it surrounds, enabling it to be read by reviewers 
who are not familiar with the NetLogo programming language. 
5.3.5 Rules 
Conceptual model rules are documented in the verification table (see Table 8), 
and repeated as in-line commentary of the computational representation using 
matching rule numbers, for the same reason as discussed in the previous section. 
Depending on the process step in which they are found, rules will either 
implement setup logic, tick loop logic, or error/diagnostics logic. For example, 
setup rules include logic for randomly assigning initial values for variables across 
all simulation participants using national maximum, upper and lower year-end 
reporting totals from the previous year. They appear among relevant agent-set 
initialization code.  
Other un-numbered logic exists, such as process flow logic, ‘rules about rules’ 
reasoning and simulation interface logic, but these are not documented in the 
conceptual model. They are usually performed in the computational representation 
across multiple code-blocks that are not easily cross-referenced, and best 
understood by reading general in-line commentary. Simulation interface logic 
refers to agent-specific code for visualization agent-sets used to present results in 
the meso-, macro-, and phenomenal levels of the simulation interface, such as the 
agents comprising the behaviour-state manifold from catastrophe theory. These 
agents and their agent-sets are not part of the conceptual model, because they do 
not exist in the micro-level. They are explained in sub-section 5.4. 
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Figure 25: Operational Flowchart 
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5.3.6 Simplifications and Assumptions 
The six generic systemically important financial service products introduced in 
sub-section 5.3.3 are shown in the left-most column of Table 7 next to their 
activity-types (SIFS) and associated financial effects. They are all highly 
simplified, and not intended to represent any particular accounting standard. 
Nonetheless, calibration runs of this computational representation and final 
simulation experiments demonstrated they generate a reasonable approximation of 
the real effects of financial services provided between systemically important 
participants. 
 
 
Table 7: Financial effects of simplified product activities 
Product 
Activity-types 
(SIFS) 
s- supply/offer 
d- demand/bid 
Asset Effect 
} = share liquid-asset flow 
Liability Effect 
} = share liquid-asset flow 
Liquid-Asset 
Flow Effect 
i = incoming 
o = outgoing 
Loan 
Lending 
(s) 
loans-to-SIPs (+ o) 
liquid-assets (− o) 
 
o (deal) 
loans-to-SIPs (− i) 
liquid-assets (+ i) 
 
i (repayment) 
Borrowing 
(d) 
liquid-assets (+ i) borrowings-from-SIPs(+ i) i (deal) 
liquid-assets (− o) borrowings-from-SIPs(− o) o (repayment) 
Deposit 
Taking 
(s) 
liquid-assets (+ i) deposits-from-SIPs (+ i) i (deal) 
liquid-assets (− o) deposits-from-SIPs (− o) o (withdrawal) 
Placing 
(d) 
liquid-assets (− o) 
deposits-with-SIPs (+ o) 
 o (deal) 
liquid-assets (+ i) 
deposits-with-SIPs (− i) 
 i (withdrawal) 
Debt 
(origination) 
Issuing 
(s) 
trading (+ i) 
liquid-assets (+ i) debt-issued (+ i) i (deal) 
Holding 
(d)* 
debt-held (+ o) 
liquid-assets (− o) 
 
o (deal) 
(Debt) 
Settlement 
Retiring 
(s) 
trading (− o) 
liquid-assets (− o)  debt-issued (− o)  o (deal) 
Discharging 
(d)* 
debt-held (− i) 
liquid-assets (+ i) 
 
i (deal) 
Security 
Tendering 
(s) 
securities (− i) 
trading (+ cash) 
 
on-margin (− credit)  i (deal) 
Acquiring 
(d) 
securities (+ o) 
trading (− cash)  
 
on-margin (+ credit)  o (deal) 
Fund 
Providing 
(s)** 
liquid-assets (− o)  o (deal) 
Receiving 
(d) 
liquid-assets (+ i) funds-received (+ i) i (deal) 
liquid-assets (− o) funds-received (− o) o - refund 
* Activity exclusively performed by the Foreign Participant counterparty. 
** Activity exclusively performed by the Central Authority counterparty (refunds not shown).  
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A ‘loan’ is assumed to be repaid periodically, and never repaid at once in full, 
whereas ‘debt’ is always settled at once in full (by the ‘settlement’ product). Other 
variations of loan-type products in the real world, such as repos, are then 
approximated by these three generic products. A ‘deposit’ is similarly 
straightforward, representing any interest-bearing placement of assets by one 
participant with another, other than central bank funding (see ‘fund’ product 
comments). On the investment side, the ‘security’ product represents all types of 
traded assets, such as stocks, bonds and derivatives, whereas the ‘fund’ product is 
a hybrid between loan products and investments such as bailout finance, offered 
by the central authority to individual participants. 
By their nature, these simple generic products have no direct equivalent among 
the plethora of complex real world financial service products, but they are 
designed to collectively simulate the overall financial effects of such products. 
The following example of how to read Table 7 applies to the row containing an 
‘issuing’ activity-type of the ‘debt (origination)’ product. In the right-most cell of 
that row, ‘i(deal)’ indicates that incoming liquid-assets flow from a debt issuance 
deal, which is shown in cells to the left to be recorded as a ‘debt-issued’ liability 
effect, and shared as an asset effect in some proportion (decided by allocation 
rules for liquid-assets flow) between trading and liquid-assets. All other rows in 
this table follow a similar logic as relevant to their activity-types. 
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5.4 Computational Representation 
5.4.1 Construction 
This model conforms to the normal practice of expressing relevant characteristics 
of a complex system through the construction of an extremely simplified 
computational representation, in which the essential features of interest can be 
explored. Within that approach, it extends previous notions about representing 
such systems by physically incorporating catastrophe theory into the model 
topology to provide a recognized basis for interpreting emergent phenomena in 
experimental observations, and corroborating the theory by theoretical 
triangulation. The intention being to represent a plausible conceptual model for 
simulating essential features of the global financial system, from a national sub-
system perspective, capable of describing how catastrophic failure of the Icelandic 
financial system occurred between the years 2003 to 2008. The representation is 
comprised of a particular set of configuration parameters and rules of system 
participation, together with a 3-dimensional agent-based simulation interface and 
a separate run-time dashboard. It is designed to simulate a reasonable 
approximation to the financial effects of that failure based on official accounts of 
events over that time, and archived annual reports data (see sub-section 5.2), to 
show how their hypothesized consequences as emergent phenomena can be 
interpreted through the lens of catastrophe theory and corroborated. 
Appendix G describes more aspects of this representation, while sub-sections 
5.4.1 to 5.4.4 explain its purpose.  
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presentation; and the separate 3D window for corroborating results as phenomena 
interpreted by catastrophe theory. 
The meso-level chart has two modes, controlled by a ‘meso analysis’ drop-
down selector. It is normally in the ‘TOTALS’ selection, which produces a chart 
that can be visually compared with the output chart from financial analysis (see 
sub-section 5.2). The other setting of ‘AVERAGES’ produces a chart that plots 
totals from the previous tick averaged by the number of participants remaining 
after failures have been dropped. 
The output text box has two settings, controlled by a ‘write-all-transactions’ 
toggle switch in the interface, which is normally in the ‘off’ position. In addition 
to setup and end-run diagnostics, this default setting loads summary information 
into the text box after each tick ends, whereas the ‘on’ position also dumps all 
micro-level execution information into that box as it happens. 
Hypotheses are tested by examining patterns in the four chart boxes in 
conjunction with phenomena observed in the 3D window, using catastrophe 
theory to independently interpret those phenomena for credible corroboration of 
the null-hypothesis (see sub-section 0). 
5.4.2.2 Reading the 3D Window 
Phenomena are presented in this window on three surfaces: the control plane, 
behaviour surface, and  phenomenal plane (see Figure 27). 
The control plane performs two functions:  
i. Its bottom-surface is coloured green, and presents a dynamic summary of 
micro-level participation executions in the form of supply or demand 
arrows for each of the 12 activity-types, organized on the diagonal 
emerging from the origin coordinates (0, 0) in descending sequence of their 
changing values for open bids or offers. 
ii. Its top-surface is coloured black, and forms the state-space floor on which 
the behaviour surface comes to rest as states approach the origin 
coordinates (0, 0, 0). This is the way the representation interprets the 
standard meaning of a control surface in catastrophe theory. 
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movements in the current operational state in the form of a growing connected 
trail of changes in the position of its (x, y) coordinates. 
5.4.3 Run-Time Features 
In the final validated version of this computational representation, operational 
strategies used for simulation are limited by parameter to ‘GROW-ASSETS’, 
which is acknowledged in the literature to have been the shared objective of most 
participants in Iceland during the period of interest (Nielsson and Torfason, 2012). 
This setting is operationalised by participation rules that emphasize tactics for 
assets acquisition. 
During run-time, the consequence of following that strategy can be observed in 
the micro-level bar-chart as reductions in participant ratings by a rating agency 
according to its rules, and subsequent failures. Meanwhile operational state 
interplay between exposure and diversity can be observed in the macro-level bar-
chart. Neither of these charts is directly referred to when comparing simulation 
results with the output of financial analysis for corroboration assessment, but they 
do provide additional insights for risk mitigation. 
5.4.4 Capabilities and Limitations 
Simulation experiments for calibrating the computational representation were able 
to reasonably approximate the financial effects of the Icelandic failure over the 
years 2003 to 2008, based on official accounts of events over that time, and 
archived annual reports data, to show how their hypothesized consequences as 
emergent phenomena could be interpreted through the lens of catastrophe theory. 
However, originally constructed capabilities were subsequently limited to the 
requirements of the Icelandic failure, reducing potentials for: strategies in effect 
(only asset growth), regulatory intervention (or lack of it), creation of new 
participants (no new participants created after initial setup, but failures allowed), 
and central bank bailout injection (none occurred). Although the criticality surface 
(coloured blue), added as a new feature during interface design that is not shown 
in the figures of section 4, introduced a better capability of simulating bifurcations 
involving immediate catastrophic failures, rather than just progressive ones. 
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5.5 Verification 
5.5.1 Objectives 
Verification is considered by Davis, Eisenhardt and Bingham (2007) to be roughly 
analogous to manipulation checks in laboratory experiments. They describe its 
purpose as ensuring that the computational representation accurately embodies the 
theoretical logic. Sargent (1996) and Kleijnen (1995) go further, by using various 
object-oriented techniques and related approaches in the structural design of 
simulation code to facilitate additional verification. However, the NetLogo 
simulation tool lacks object-oriented or structural features, and so is limited in its 
verification capabilities (NetLogo has simulation objects called ‘turtles’, but it is 
not an object-oriented language with features such as inheritance, encapsulation 
and polymorphism). When other considerations are also taken into account, such 
as the relative complexity of the simulation being verified, and its unusual 
approach to theoretical triangulation, less conventional techniques seem 
appropriate. The general approach taken by this thesis to verification is specified 
in sub-section 3.5.8; whereas this sub-section examines the contents of Table 8 
and Table 9, created for verification purposes in project 3 to establish if real world 
abstraction has been successfully achieved in step 10 of the methodology.  
5.5.2 Operational  
Table 8 maps data entry fields in the computational representation to their sources 
of initial values in the spreadsheet downloaded from Bankscope; and further maps 
both to their equivalent code variable (given the same name as its conceptual 
model equivalent); which is in turn linked to rules for value disbursement and use 
among other variables, and their impacts; and associated with one or more steps in 
the operational flowchart to facilitate their discovery in the code. This describes 
where initial values are sourced, where they are allocated, and the rules by which 
those allocations are setup and subsequently used at run-time, their value impacts, 
and where that impact occurs in code. In that way a mapping is provided between 
source data, the computational representation interface, internal variables and 
rules in simulation code, artefacts in the conceptual model with the same names, 
and steps in the operational flowchart. 
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Table 8: Iceland - initial conditions, values and rules verification. 
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).
 
1
. 
lo
a
ns
-t
o
-S
IP
s,
2
. 
b
o
rr
o
w
in
g
s
-f
ro
m
-S
IP
s
R
0
2
 -
 S
e
tu
p
 d
is
tr
ib
u
te
s 
ra
n
d
o
m
**
 v
a
lu
e
s 
d
e
ri
ve
d
 fr
o
m
 th
e
  d
a
ta
 v
a
lu
e
s
 in
 (
c
) 
to
 a
ll 
S
IP
s
 
th
ro
u
g
h
 t
he
ir
 S
IP
 a
g
e
n
t-
fi
e
ld
 n
a
m
e
d
 i
n 
(e
).
R
0
2
 i
n
 s
te
p
 1
 
(i
n 
'b
ui
ld
-m
ic
ro
-l
e
ve
l' 
ca
lle
d
 
p
ro
c
e
d
u
re
).
 
A
lr
e
a
d
y 
in
 A
 
a
nd
 L
A
 (
-)
, L
 (
+
)
A
 (
+
),
 L
 (
-)
(+
/-
)
(+
/-
)
R
0
9
  
in
 s
te
p
 1
 
(i
n 
'b
ui
ld
-m
ic
ro
-l
e
ve
l' 
ca
lle
d
 
p
ro
c
e
d
u
re
).
 
R
1
0
 i
n
 s
te
p
 1
2
.
R
1
1
 i
n
 s
te
p
 1
2
.
s
e
c
ur
iti
e
s
R
0
9
 -
 S
e
tu
p
 d
is
tr
ib
u
te
s 
ra
n
d
o
m
**
 v
a
lu
e
s 
d
e
ri
ve
d
 fr
o
m
 th
e
 d
a
ta
 v
a
lu
e
s 
in
 (
c
) 
a
m
o
n
g
 a
ll 
S
IP
s
 t
hr
o
u
g
h
 th
e
ir
 S
IP
 a
g
e
nt
-f
ie
ld
 n
a
m
e
d
 i
n 
(e
).
 
R
1
0
 -
 T
he
n
 r
u
n-
ti
m
e
 f
ill
s
 o
f s
e
c
u
ri
ti
e
s
 
T
E
N
D
E
R
IN
G
 a
c
tiv
it
ie
s
 a
d
ju
s
t 
a
s
se
t 
le
ve
ls
.
R
1
1
 -
 O
r 
ru
n-
ti
m
e
 f
ill
s
 o
f s
e
c
u
ri
ti
e
s
 
A
C
Q
U
IR
IN
G
 a
ct
iv
iti
e
s
 a
d
ju
s
t 
a
s
se
t l
e
ve
ls
.
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Table 8 (cont): Iceland - initial conditions, values and rules verification. 
(c
) 
D
a
ta
 v
a
lu
e
(d
)
D
a
ta
 S
o
u
rc
e
 R
e
fe
re
n
c
e
in
iti
a
l-
liq
u
id
-a
s
s
e
ts
-m
a
x
2
3
,1
4
6
,9
0
0
 'S
o
ur
c
e
 D
a
ta
'!
A
F
1
8
6
in
iti
a
l-
liq
u
id
-a
s
s
e
ts
-u
p
p
e
r
1
7
,6
0
0
,7
0
0
 'S
o
ur
c
e
 D
a
ta
'!
A
F
1
8
9
in
iti
a
l-
liq
u
id
-a
s
s
e
ts
-l
o
w
e
r
1
7
4
,5
0
0
 'S
o
ur
c
e
 D
a
ta
'!
A
F
1
8
7
in
iti
a
l-
d
e
p
o
si
ts
-m
a
x
3
,5
2
0
,0
0
0
 'S
o
ur
c
e
 D
a
ta
'!
B
W
1
8
9
in
iti
a
l-
d
e
p
o
si
ts
-u
p
p
e
r
5
4
2
,5
0
0
 'S
o
ur
c
e
 D
a
ta
'!
B
W
1
8
8
in
iti
a
l-
d
e
p
o
si
ts
-lo
w
e
r
4
0
0
 'S
o
ur
c
e
 D
a
ta
'!
B
W
2
0
0
in
iti
a
l-
d
e
b
t-
m
a
x
4
2
4
,9
7
8
,7
0
0
 'S
o
ur
c
e
 D
a
ta
'!
C
U
1
8
6
in
iti
a
l-
d
e
b
t-
up
p
e
r
7
,1
6
4
,0
0
0
 'S
o
ur
c
e
 D
a
ta
'!
C
U
1
8
9
in
iti
a
l-
d
e
b
t-
lo
w
e
r
1
6
,5
0
0
 'S
o
ur
c
e
 D
a
ta
'!
C
U
2
0
1
(a
) 
S
im
u
la
ti
o
n
: 
in
it
ia
l 
v
a
lu
e
 f
ie
ld
s
e
e
 s
im
u
la
ti
o
n
 c
o
n
s
o
le
(m
a
x
 v
a
lu
e
s
 a
re
 f
ro
m
 a
n
y
 
e
x
tr
e
m
e
 o
u
tl
ie
r 
S
IP
s
, 
o
th
e
r 
th
a
n
 
th
e
 b
u
il
t-
in
 a
g
e
n
ts
. 
U
p
p
e
r 
a
n
d
 
lo
w
e
r 
v
a
lu
e
s
 r
e
p
re
s
e
n
t 
th
e
 n
o
rm
a
l 
ra
n
g
e
 o
f 
m
o
s
t 
S
IP
s
)
(b
) 
S
IF
S
-
re
la
te
d
 (
e
)
S
IP
 a
g
e
n
t-
fi
e
ld
N
o
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
(f
)
R
u
le
 f
o
r 
v
a
lu
e
 a
ll
o
c
a
ti
o
n
 
to
 i
n
d
iv
id
u
a
l 
S
IP
s
(i
)
E
x
p
la
n
a
to
ry
 n
o
te
(i
d
e
n
ti
fy
in
g
 t
h
e
 s
te
p
s
 i
n
 t
h
e
 
o
p
e
ra
ti
o
n
a
l 
fl
o
w
c
h
a
rt
 w
h
e
re
 
ru
le
s
 a
re
 i
m
p
le
m
e
n
te
d
, 
a
n
d
 
w
h
e
re
 e
x
p
la
n
a
to
ry
 c
o
m
m
e
n
ts
 
c
a
n
 b
e
 f
o
u
n
d
 i
n
 t
h
e
 
s
im
u
la
ti
o
n
 c
o
d
e
)
S
o
u
rc
e
: 
S
im
u
la
ti
o
n
 A
n
a
ly
s
is
 S
p
re
a
d
s
h
e
e
t
(C
o
n
ta
in
in
g
 a
n
 e
x
tr
a
c
t 
o
f 
fi
n
a
n
c
ia
l 
re
p
o
rt
in
g
 
d
a
ta
 f
ro
m
 B
a
n
k
s
c
o
p
e
 a
b
o
u
t 
th
e
 I
c
e
la
n
d
 
fi
n
a
n
c
ia
l 
s
y
s
te
m
 f
a
il
u
re
. 
R
e
fe
rs
 t
o
 t
h
e
 2
0
0
3
 
d
a
ta
 i
n
 T
a
b
le
 1
 o
f 
th
e
 'S
o
u
rc
e
 D
a
ta
' t
a
b
).
(g
)
Im
p
a
c
t 
o
n
 
a
s
s
e
ts
 '
A
',
 
li
a
b
il
it
ie
s
 '
L
',
  
li
q
u
id
-a
s
s
e
ts
 
'L
A
' 
.
(h
)
G
e
n
e
ra
te
s
 
in
c
o
m
e
 (
+
) 
o
r 
e
x
p
e
n
s
e
 (
-)
1
. d
e
b
t-
is
s
u
e
d
2
. d
e
b
t-
h
e
ld
R
1
9
 -
 S
e
tu
p
 d
is
tr
ib
u
te
s
 r
a
nd
o
m
**
 v
a
lu
e
s
 
d
e
ri
ve
d
 fr
o
m
 th
e
 d
a
ta
 v
a
lu
e
s
 in
 (
c)
 a
m
o
ng
 
a
m
o
n
g
 h
a
lf 
o
f 
th
e
 S
IP
s 
th
ro
u
g
h 
th
e
ir
 S
IP
 
a
g
e
nt
-f
ie
ld
 1
 n
a
m
e
d
 i
n
 (
e
).
 
R
2
0
 -
 T
he
n 
ru
n-
ti
m
e
 f
ill
s
 o
f 
d
e
b
t 
IS
S
U
IN
G
 
a
ct
iv
it
ie
s
 a
d
ju
st
 li
a
b
ili
ty
 a
n
d
 li
q
ui
d
-a
s
se
t 
le
ve
ls
, 
R
2
1
 -
 w
it
h
 r
a
nd
o
m
**
 p
e
ri
o
d
ic
 r
e
ti
ri
n
g
 o
f 
d
e
b
t 
is
s
u
e
d
 h
a
vi
n
g
 a
 r
e
ve
rs
e
* 
e
ffe
c
t.
R
2
2
 -
 S
e
tu
p
 d
is
tr
ib
u
te
s
 r
a
nd
o
m
**
 v
a
lu
e
s
 
d
e
ri
ve
d
 fr
o
m
 th
e
  d
a
ta
 v
a
lu
e
s
 i
n 
(c
) 
a
m
o
ng
 t
he
 
o
th
e
r 
h
a
lf 
o
f S
IP
s
 th
ro
ug
h
 th
e
ir
 S
IP
 a
g
e
n
t-
fi
e
ld
 
2
 n
a
m
e
d
 i
n 
(e
).
 
R
2
3
 -
 T
he
n 
ru
n-
ti
m
e
 f
ill
s
 o
f 
d
e
b
t 
H
O
L
D
IN
G
 
a
ct
iv
it
ie
s
 a
d
ju
st
 a
s
s
e
t 
a
n
d
 s
e
c
ur
iti
e
s
 le
ve
ls
, 
R
2
4
 -
 w
it
h
 r
a
nd
o
m
**
 p
e
ri
o
d
ic
 d
is
ch
a
rg
e
 o
f 
d
e
b
t h
e
ld
 h
a
vi
n
g
 a
 r
e
ve
rs
e
* 
e
ffe
c
t.
A
lr
e
a
d
y 
in
 L
A
 (
+
),
 L
 (
+
)
A
 (
-)
, 
L
 (
-)
A
lr
e
a
d
y 
in
 A
A
 (
+
),
 L
A
 (
-)
A
 (
-)
, L
A
 (
+
)
(-
)
(-
)
(+
)
(+
)
liq
u
id
-a
ss
e
ts
R
1
2
 -
 S
e
tu
p
 d
is
tr
ib
u
te
s
 r
a
nd
o
m
**
 v
a
lu
e
s
 
d
e
ri
ve
d
 fr
o
m
 th
e
 d
a
ta
 v
a
lu
e
s
 in
 (
c)
 t
o
 a
ll 
S
IP
s
 
th
ro
u
g
h
 th
e
ir
 S
IP
 a
g
e
n
t-
fi
e
ld
 n
a
m
e
d
 in
 (
e
).
A
lre
a
d
y 
in
 A
,
In
it
ia
l L
A
(+
)
R
1
2
  
in
 s
te
p
 1
 
(i
n
 'b
u
ild
-m
ic
ro
-le
ve
l' 
ca
lle
d
 
p
ro
c
e
d
ur
e
).
  
 
R
1
9
 i
n 
st
e
p
 1
 
(i
n
 'b
u
ild
-m
ic
ro
-le
ve
l' 
ca
lle
d
 
p
ro
c
e
d
ur
e
).
 
R
2
0
 i
n 
st
e
p
 1
2
.
R
2
1
 i
n 
st
e
p
 1
2
.
R
2
2
 i
n 
st
e
p
 1
 
(i
n
 'b
u
ild
-m
ic
ro
-le
ve
l' 
ca
lle
d
 
p
ro
c
e
d
ur
e
).
 
R
2
3
 i
n 
st
e
p
 1
2
.
R
2
4
 i
n 
st
e
p
 1
2
.
1
. d
e
p
o
s
it
s-
fr
o
m
-S
IP
s
2
. d
e
p
o
s
it
s-
w
ith
-S
IP
s
R
1
3
 -
 S
e
tu
p
 d
is
tr
ib
u
te
s
 r
a
nd
o
m
**
 v
a
lu
e
s
 
d
e
ri
ve
d
 fr
o
m
 th
e
 d
a
ta
 v
a
lu
e
s
 in
 (
c)
 a
m
o
ng
 h
a
lf 
o
f t
he
 S
IP
s
 t
hr
o
ug
h
 th
e
ir
 S
IP
 a
g
e
n
t-
fi
e
ld
 1
 
n
a
m
e
d
 i
n
 (
e
).
 
R
1
4
 -
 T
he
n 
ru
n-
ti
m
e
 f
ill
s
 o
f 
d
e
p
o
si
t T
A
K
IN
G
 
a
ct
iv
it
ie
s
 a
d
ju
st
 li
a
b
ili
ti
e
s
 a
nd
 li
q
u
id
-a
ss
e
ts
, 
R
1
5
 -
 w
it
h
 r
a
nd
o
m
**
 p
e
ri
o
d
ic
 w
it
h
d
ra
w
a
ls
 
h
a
vi
ng
 a
 r
e
ve
rs
e
* 
e
ff
e
c
t.
R
1
6
 -
 S
e
tu
p
 d
is
tr
ib
u
te
s
 r
a
nd
o
m
**
 v
a
lu
e
s
 
d
e
ri
ve
d
 fr
o
m
 th
e
  d
a
ta
 v
a
lu
e
s
 i
n 
(c
) 
a
m
o
ng
 t
he
 
o
th
e
r 
h
a
lf 
o
f S
IP
s
 th
ro
ug
h
 th
e
ir
 S
IP
 a
g
e
n
t-
fi
e
ld
 
2
 n
a
m
e
d
 i
n 
(e
).
 
R
1
7
 -
 T
he
n 
ru
n-
ti
m
e
 f
ill
s
 o
f 
d
e
p
o
si
t P
L
A
C
IN
G
 
a
ct
iv
it
ie
s
 a
d
ju
st
 a
s
s
e
t 
le
ve
ls
, 
R
1
9
 -
 w
it
h
 r
a
nd
o
m
**
 p
e
ri
o
d
ic
 w
it
h
d
ra
w
a
ls
 
h
a
vi
ng
 a
 r
e
ve
rs
e
* 
e
ff
e
c
t.
A
lr
e
a
d
y 
in
 L
L
 (
+
),
 L
A
 (
+
)
L
 (
-)
, 
L
A
 (
-)
A
lr
e
a
d
y 
in
 A
A
 (
+
),
 L
A
 (
-)
A
 (
-)
, L
A
 (
+
)
(-
)
(+
)
R
1
3
 i
n 
st
e
p
 1
 
(i
n
 'b
u
ild
-m
ic
ro
-le
ve
l' 
ca
lle
d
 
p
ro
c
e
d
ur
e
).
 
R
1
4
 i
n 
st
e
p
 1
2
.
R
1
5
 i
n 
st
e
p
 2
0
.
R
1
6
 i
n 
st
e
p
 1
 
(i
n
 'b
u
ild
-m
ic
ro
-le
ve
l' 
ca
lle
d
 
p
ro
c
e
d
ur
e
).
R
1
7
 i
n 
st
e
p
 1
2
.
R
1
8
 i
n 
st
e
p
 2
0
.
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Table 8 (cont): Iceland - initial conditions, values and rules verification. 
(c
) 
D
a
ta
 v
a
lu
e
(d
)
D
a
ta
 S
o
u
rc
e
 R
e
fe
re
n
c
e
in
iti
a
l-
p
ro
fit
s-
m
a
x
1
,6
7
8
,2
0
0
 'S
o
u
rc
e
 D
a
ta
'!
G
1
8
6
in
iti
a
l-
p
ro
fit
s-
up
p
e
r
2
3
3
,9
0
0
 'S
o
u
rc
e
 D
a
ta
'!
G
1
8
7
in
iti
a
l-
p
ro
fit
s-
lo
w
e
r
-3
4
0
,4
0
0
 'S
o
u
rc
e
 D
a
ta
'!
G
2
0
7
in
iti
a
l-
ca
-lo
a
n
s
Y
e
s
2
4
,0
3
8
,2
0
0
'S
o
ur
ce
 D
a
ta
'!
B
O
2
0
5
lo
a
n
s
-t
o
-S
IP
s
R
2
7
 -
 S
e
tu
p
 d
ir
e
c
tly
 lo
a
d
s
 t
he
 fu
ll 
d
a
ta
 v
a
lu
e
 
fr
o
m
 (
c)
 to
 th
e
 C
e
n
tr
a
l-A
ut
h
o
ri
ty
's
 S
IP
 a
g
e
n
t-
fie
ld
 1
 n
a
m
e
d
 in
 (
e
).
 
A
lr
e
a
d
y 
in
 A
S
e
e
 r
ul
e
s
 i
m
p
le
m
e
n
ta
tio
n 
in
 
th
e
 lo
a
n
s
 s
e
c
tio
n 
a
b
o
ve
 f
o
r 
ru
n-
ti
m
e
 r
ul
e
s
 a
nd
 im
p
a
c
ts
.
T
he
se
 lo
a
ns
 a
llo
w
 t
h
e
 C
e
nt
ra
l-
A
u
th
o
ri
ty
 t
o
 a
c
t a
s 
c
o
u
n
te
rp
a
rt
y 
o
f l
a
s
t r
e
s
o
rt
, 
w
h
e
n 
n
e
ce
ss
a
ry
.
in
iti
a
l-
ca
-d
e
p
o
si
ts
-f
ro
m
-S
IP
s
Y
e
s
2
6
,3
3
3
 'S
o
u
rc
e
 D
a
ta
'!
C
E
1
8
2
d
e
p
o
s
its
-f
ro
m
-S
IP
s
R
2
8
 -
 S
e
tu
p
 d
ir
e
c
tly
 lo
a
d
s
 t
he
 fu
ll 
d
a
ta
 v
a
lu
e
 
fr
o
m
 (
c)
 to
 th
e
 C
e
n
tr
a
l-A
ut
h
o
ri
ty
's
 S
IP
 a
g
e
n
t-
fie
ld
 1
 n
a
m
e
d
 in
 (
e
).
 
A
lr
e
a
d
y 
in
 L
S
e
e
 r
ul
e
s
 i
m
p
le
m
e
n
ta
tio
n 
in
 
th
e
 d
e
p
o
s
its
 s
e
c
tio
n
 a
b
o
ve
 fo
r 
ru
n
-t
im
e
 r
u
le
s 
a
n
d
 i
m
p
a
ct
s.
T
he
se
 d
e
p
o
s
its
 a
llo
w
 t
h
e
 
C
e
nt
ra
l-
A
u
th
o
ri
ty
 to
 a
ct
 a
s
 
c
o
u
n
te
rp
a
rt
y 
o
f l
a
s
t r
e
s
o
rt
, 
w
h
e
n 
n
e
ce
ss
a
ry
.
in
iti
a
l-
ca
-li
q
u
id
-a
s
s
e
ts
Y
e
s
3
5
,9
0
9
,1
0
0
 'S
o
u
rc
e
 D
a
ta
'!
A
F
2
0
5
1
. 
liq
u
id
-a
s
s
e
ts
2
. 
liq
u
id
-a
s
s
e
ts
R
2
9
 -
 S
e
tu
p
 d
ir
e
c
tly
 lo
a
d
s
 t
he
 fu
ll 
d
a
ta
 v
a
lu
e
 
fr
o
m
 (
c)
 to
 th
e
 C
e
n
tr
a
l-A
ut
h
o
ri
ty
's
 S
IP
 a
g
e
n
t-
fie
ld
 1
 n
a
m
e
d
 in
 (
e
).
 
R
3
0
 -
 T
he
n
 r
u
n-
ti
m
e
 f
ill
s
 o
f f
un
d
s
 P
R
O
V
ID
IN
G
 
a
c
tiv
it
ie
s 
a
lte
r 
a
s
s
e
t 
le
ve
ls
.
R
3
1
 -
 T
he
n
 r
u
n-
ti
m
e
 f
ill
s
 o
f f
un
d
s
 R
E
C
E
IV
IN
G
 
a
c
tiv
it
ie
s 
b
y 
th
e
 o
th
e
r 
S
IP
s
 a
d
ju
s
t l
ia
b
ili
ty
 a
n
d
 
liq
u
id
-a
s
se
t l
e
ve
ls
.
A
lr
e
a
d
y 
in
 A
A
 (
+
),
 L
A
 (
-)
L
 (
+
),
 L
A
 (
+
)
O
ff
e
re
d
 t
o
 S
IP
s 
w
he
n 
liq
u
id
it
y 
a
va
ila
b
ili
ty
 i
s 
lo
w
, a
nd
 th
e
 
C
e
nt
ra
l-
A
u
th
o
ri
ty
 s
tr
a
te
g
y 
is
 
n
o
t 
'D
O
-N
O
T
H
IN
G
'.
T
he
 Ic
e
la
nd
ic
 s
im
ul
a
ti
o
n
 
a
ss
u
m
p
ti
o
n
 is
 t
ha
t n
o
n
e
 o
f 
th
e
 
fu
n
d
s
 p
ro
vi
d
e
d
 a
re
 r
e
p
a
id
.
* 
  
 
**
B
a
s
e
d
 o
n
 a
 r
a
n
d
o
m
-n
o
rm
a
l d
is
tr
ib
u
tio
n
.
(a
) 
S
im
u
la
ti
o
n
: 
in
it
ia
l 
v
a
lu
e
 f
ie
ld
s
e
e
 s
im
u
la
ti
o
n
 c
o
n
s
o
le
(m
a
x
 v
a
lu
e
s
 a
re
 f
ro
m
 a
n
y
 
e
x
tr
e
m
e
 o
u
tl
ie
r 
S
IP
s
, 
o
th
e
r 
th
a
n
 
th
e
 b
u
il
t-
in
 a
g
e
n
ts
. 
U
p
p
e
r 
a
n
d
 
lo
w
e
r 
v
a
lu
e
s
 r
e
p
re
s
e
n
t 
th
e
 n
o
rm
a
l 
ra
n
g
e
 o
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5.5.3 Theoretical  
Table 9, on the other hand, presents a mapping from propositions in the 
theoretical model to internal variables and code procedures. Interestingly, the 
main purpose of this thesis expressed simply as proposition P11 appears to be 
unverifiable. However, it should be remembered that this is the aim of validation 
(see sub-section 5.7). 
 
Proposition (P) Verified by = 
P1:   
The transition threshold of contagion 
Code implementing the catastrophic-threshold 
interface parameter. 
P2:   
Systemic failure as participation 
unsustainability 
Code implementing the sustained-failure-ticks 
interface parameter. 
P3:  
Affinity in participation 
Code calculating the global variables  
g-matching-list-bids and g-matching-list-offers. 
P4:  
Intensity of participation 
Code calculating the variables 
overall-demand-focus and overall-supply-focus. 
P5:  
Focus (or diversity) of participation 
Code calculating the global variable 
g-overall-demand-focus. 
P6:  
Actual operational effectiveness 
Code calculating the global variable 
g-overall-available-satisfied. 
P7:   
The global financial system’s 
operational state 
Code calculating the global variable 
g-current-state. 
P8:   
Operational behaviour of the system 
Code implementing the draw-behaviour-surface 
procedure. 
P9:   
A definition of systemic failure 
Code implementing the failure-tolerance interface 
parameter. 
P10:  
Probability of systemic failure 
Not simulated (systemic failure is simulated, but 
not the calculation of its probability). 
P11:  
A practical definition of systemic risk 
Not simulated (see P10). 
P12:  
Emergence of operational behaviour 
Code implementing the propagate-effects 
procedure. 
Table 9: Proposition Verification 
When considered in combination with commentary in the NetLogo code, these 
two tables facilitate more thorough verification than could be achieved by such 
techniques as the application of structured methods, given the limitations of 
NetLogo. 
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Although individual acts of participation at the micro-level are invisible, the 
bottom  surface of the control plane (see the 3D View in Figure 27) presents a 
summary of intended supply and demand activity (i.e. bids and offers) for each 
financial service activity type (SIFS). On a tick-by-tick basis, this shows how 
participation focus volumes shift among SIFS, giving a breakdown by SIFS for 
the overall operational focus of the current state in the 3D View’s behaviour 
space. This is useful for identifying risk mitigation opportunities when examined 
for each tick in combination with the micro- and macro-level bar charts in the 
simulation interface. However, deviations of simulated financial results from 
actual values at this level of participation granularity offer a better understanding 
of simulation accuracy. Chart 2 presents this information, derived from datapoint 
summaries in Appendix G4. These results are subsequently used for calculating 
statistical correlations during validation.  
5.6.3.2 Meso-level 
The meso-level results presented in Chart 3 are a composite of three separate line-
charts, depicting closely related data used for both qualitative and quantitative 
validity assessment. The top chart shows actual totals for financial reporting 
variables over the years 2000 to 2009. It is the same as Chart 1 presented in sub-
section 5.2.2, reproduced here for easy comparison with the other two charts. 
Simulated values equivalent to those totals are presented in the middle chart, for 
the period of interest to this thesis over the years 2003 to 2008. These values were 
extracted from simulation output at the datapoints given in Appendix G4, and 
entered into the MS Excel file containing the top chart for comparison using the 
same charting tool. The two charts appear to match quite well, but the degree of 
correlation will be determined statistically during validation. Finally, the bottom 
chart presents the same simulated values as the middle chart, but rendered by the 
NetLogo charting object in the simulation interface. Changes in sentiment 
reflected in these charts by the directions and gradients of line-plots were induced 
by simulation interface parameters, such as ‘sentiment-change-on-tick’ and 
‘foreign-acquisitions-on-tick’. References to them were restricted to the rules of 
individual participation in the micro-level, to ensure that non-linear relationships 
between the micro- and phenomenal-level would not be compromised. 
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Operational behaviour at the phenomenal-level is represented in Chart 4 by 
plotting focus tensions between supply and demand, versus overall satisfaction. 
When these values are combined in the behaviour space coordinates O, f, ^ they 
represent operational effectiveness. The simulation results show converging and 
diverging plots that are nominated as empirical indicators for hypotheses when 
examined together with phenomena observed in the 3D View (see Figure 32 and 
Figure 33). They are used for qualitative validation of hypothesised phenomena in 
sub-section 5.7. 
5.6.4 Replication 
The final verified and validated simulation experiment can be replicated simply 
by installing the correct NetLogo version and running the source-code file in 
NetLogo readable format (.nlogo3d). Installation files and source code are 
provided on the CD supplied with this thesis (see Appendix I). See sub-section 
5.4.2 for further instructions. 
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5.7 Validation 
5.7.1 Objectives  
The general approach taken by this thesis to validation is specified in sub-section 
3.5.10; whereas this sub-section examines effects that were visible in the interface 
during simulation, and the results summarised in Table 10.  
 
Figure 29: Empirical validation datapoints 
5.7.2 Quantitative  
Simulation results are linked by the 6 datapoints identified in Figure 29 to actual 
values. They mark year-end reporting for 8 financial variables, and serve as the 
beginnings and ends of yearly changes in participation sentiment identified by 
financial analysis during step 7 of the research methodology (see Figure 4). 
Validation uses these datapoints for reconciling actual and simulated data, by 
comparing continuously changing simulation values with actual data reported for 
discrete points in time (i.e. at year end), where 57 ticks are equivalent to one year.  
A statistical analysis of experimentation results is presented in Table 10 for 
quantitative validation. It analyses overall maximum deviations and individual 
correlations between actual and simulated values for 8 financial variables over six 
Source:  Extracted from the reported accounts of all 51 financial institutions in the Iceland database of Bankscope.
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datapoints. Both total and average values are given, to show the effects of 
differences between numbers of actual and simulated participants. 
 
 
Table 10: Summary of validation data for the final simulation 
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Table 10 (cont): Summary of validation data for the final simulation 
In summary, quantitative validation of the final simulation results in Table 10 
confirms that simulated values for each of the 8 financial variables at year-end 
boundaries over the period from 2003 to 2008, when compared as a time-series of 
data points with their equivalent actual values from the financial analysis of 
annual reports, all have a Pearson Correlation Coefficient of 1.00 and an overall 
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satisfaction collapsed suddenly and bounced along the bottom of the chart for a 
while. The first behaviour was unexpected, and suggested an extension to 
proposition 9; whereas the second validated hypothesis 2 with an example of an 
‘immediate’ catastrophic collapse from which the system recovered, until central 
authority intervention. See theory revision in section 6 for further discussion. 
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5.7.5 A New Conjecture 
As phenomena observed in Figure 32 and Figure 33 unfolded, the interplay 
mentioned in sub-section 5.6.3.3 between a lack of diversity in system 
participation strategies and shared exposure to potential losses as the system 
approaches a state of systemic failure in the macro-level dynamic bar chart 
confirmed this may be a key operational mechanism of catastrophic tensions 
arising in the supply and demand of financial services. Theory revision in section 
6 refers to these observations, and adds a new conjecture to the proposed theory, 
for validation in future research. 
5.7.6 Outcome 
After a series of 862 simulation experiments to refine the model’s efficacy and 
improve its results correlation to actual data for the period of interest, attention 
turned to confirming the null hypothesis that the theory’s predictions would not be 
present. A diagnosis of circumstances in which failure arises in a final simulation 
experiment that uses this refined computational representation, verified with the 
proposed theory, then refuted the null hypothesis by showing that a particular set 
of initial conditions, parameters and rules of participation is capable of generating 
financial results and emergent phenomena that are highly correlated with actual 
data, and corroborated by theoretical triangulation with catastrophe theory. It is 
therefore argued in this thesis that: if alternative sets of parameters and rules, 
verified with the proposed theory, are shown in future research to also be capable 
of simulating an approximation of the observed financial effects from the same 
initial conditions; generating similar emergent operational phenomena 
corroborated by theoretical triangulation in the same way; they would comprise a 
solution set of sets that suggests the proposed theory’s hypotheses about real 
financial systems may be valid in more general circumstances. Furthermore, by 
altering certain configuration parameters of future simulations it should also be 
possible to generate hypothesised phenomena from the same rules of participation 
without failure arising, offering further insights for systemic risk mitigation in 
such systems.  
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5.8 Critical Assessment 
Due to the apparent intractable nature of the research question addressed by this 
thesis, the scarcity of data for empirical validation, and nonlinear aspects of 
satisfying its goal assertion, theory testing and validation required an innovative 
approach. The approach selected was based on realist constructivism combined 
with agent-based model simulation for the reasons explained; and wherever 
practical, the expectations of that approach were satisfied according to advice 
found in the literature. Furthermore, although the goal assertion carefully 
positioned potential contributions of this thesis on the relevance side of the 
rigour/relevance debate, this approach nonetheless attempted to maintain rigour in 
its widest sense, implying thoroughness in the pursuit of relevance. Therefore, the 
outcome of research is argued by this thesis to have satisfied its goal of making a 
significant contribution to theory, supported by findings validated according to 
latest understanding about how to address such research challenges. However, 
only the first step on a long journey can be claimed to have been made. Much 
research remains to be done before the proposed theory is shown to be generally 
applicable, although the outcome presented here is argued to offer a significant 
contribution to the foundations of that work.  
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6 THEORY REVISION 
6.1 Simulation Experiment Findings 
6.1.1 Improvements 
Observations made during project 3 of the methodology (see Figure 4) suggested 
certain amendments and additions to the proposed theory, which are addressed 
here in the revision section of this thesis together with potential risk mitigation 
opportunities. They do not materially affect outcomes reported in the previous 
section, but offer improvements which can be explored in future research. 
Revising the proposed theory in this way expounds an outline of new theory into a 
completed theory satisfying the goal assertion of this thesis. 
6.1.2 Observations 
The following three observations were made over a complete series of 862 
simulation experiments. They are not presented in any particular order, but are 
listed here for reference in following sub-sections. 
6.1.2.1 Systemic failure occurrence 
Entering a region in the behaviour manifold centred on its origin-coordinates 
which signifies systemic failure is not the only way to induce that operational 
state. Figure 32 observes there can be both gradual and immediate shifts into that 
state. A horizontal criticality plane was therefore added to the 3D View (i.e. the 
blue plane not originally shown in Figure 18 of the theoretical model), introducing 
a vertical boundary for satisfaction values, below which the danger of failure is 
recognized to have become severe. Therefore, in addition to a partial collapse 
followed by a bounce and gradual decline towards the origin of the behaviour 
space, systemic failure can also occur vertically through operational states with 
zero or near zero values of satisfaction. 
6.1.2.2 Predicting a change in sentiment 
A large fall in satisfaction values observed in Figure 30 preceding a change of 
sentiment in Figure 29 suggests there may be a predictive relationship between the 
two phenomena of relevance to risk mitigation efforts. 
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6.1.2.3 Exposure and Diversity 
The interplay between levels of exposure and diversity in collective participation 
observed in the dashboard’s macro-level bar chart, and the dominance of each at 
particular times under different conditions and sentiments, may offer new risk 
mitigation potential that can be tested in future research. 
6.1.2.4 Implications 
Observation 6.1.2.1 indicates experimental support for a proposition extension, 
while 6.1.2.2 and 6.1.2.3 suggest a new conjecture for further research.  
6.2 Extended Proposition 
6.2.1 Proposition 13: A definition of systemic failure (extended) 
If the satisfaction coordinate ^ of operational effectiveness drops immediately to a 
value of 0, or comes down to that value more slowly and eventually lands on the 
control surface outside the region e gh8i at a time ', the operational state with 
those coordinates O, f, 0 is also considered to be a failed current state such that: 
 ∶=	Current , , ,  ∈ ℬ 	%Region q` },~,º, , , s = 	¯a,		' ∈ (	0.			29 
In other words, the entire control surface is an extension of the region egh8i for 
coordinates with ^ = 0. Furthermore, a horizontal plane at some value ^ > 0 can 
serve as a criticality threshold », to define satisfaction as being critically low. 
6.3 New conjecture 
6.3.1 Conjecture 9: Predicting change in systemic risk of failure 
Even though proposition 11 outlines a practical definition of systemic risk of 
failure based on expression 23, quantifying its element of uncertainty remains a 
challenge for predictive calculations. However, the simulation experiment 
findings presented in sub-section 6.1 suggest that an operational perspective on 
how systemic risk occurs may be useful for indicating whether it is likely to 
increase or decrease, and by how much. A precise probability with its uncertainty 
qualifier may still be beyond reach, but a combined directional and velocity 
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indicator may be feasible. For example, observations 6.1.2.2 and 6.1.2.3 showed 
that after a prolonged period of intense participation in a subset of products, 
during which overall satisfaction values remained low, interplay between overall 
diversity and exposure intensified before a major reversal in sentiment. Further 
research may find this particular operational behaviour holds true in general as a 
mechanism of distress propagation, for which another conjecture is offered: 
Conjecture 9 summary – An improved understanding of how participation 
intensities interact with overall focus diversity, exposure and sentiment can 
indicate the direction and velocity of change in systemic risk of failure for 
practical risk mitigation purposes over short and medium range time periods. 
6.4 Further research 
Conjecture 9 opens up the potential for quantifying systemic risk in some way 
suitable for policy guidance. This could be achieved by extending the 
computational representation developed in this thesis to simulate new properties 
of the trajectory of operational behaviour. Then experimentation could show how 
proposed techniques for predicting this trajectory at the phenomenal level (having 
a nonlinear relationship to micro-level participation) perform when initial 
conditions, values and parameters of Iceland’s systemic failure are varied to 
generate different outcomes. If these techniques perform well, then a simulation 
tool that calculates the direction and velocity of change in systemic risk of failure 
for the global financial system could be used in risk mitigation until mathematical 
techniques mature sufficiently to predict its probability more accurately. 
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7 DISCUSSION 
7.1 The Theory in Current Events 
Since submission in 2011 of the original paper on which this thesis is based, and 
its subsequent presentation at the Global Finance Conference in May 2012, the 
systemic crisis of 2008 has moved through several phases of emergent operational 
behaviour involving varying degrees of systemic risk of failure. In what the IMF 
(2011) refers to as the bank-sovereign feedback loop, the balance between 
instabilities swung towards increasing risk of multiple sovereign defaults in 
2011/12. This was distress propagation on a grand scale, impacting all types of 
financial institutions and systemically exposed counterparties. Bipolar operational 
behaviour intensified throughout the global financial system as temporary fixes 
proved increasingly ineffectual until some massive mitigation initiative, such as 
another global round of quantitative easing, or the financial bailout of a Eurozone 
member, once again flipped the catastrophe fold to buy a little time.  
In more recent phases there have been many repeating cycles of this bipolar 
operational behaviour of the global financial system, emerging from a currency 
crisis centred on the Euro, and a succession of failures among countries including 
Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece and Cyprus, arguably arising as operational 
tensions. For example, the Cyprus government allowed its financial system to 
become so big that figures show banking assets reached 800% of GDP in 2011, 
which is very reminiscent of Iceland at the end of 2007 . Eurozone politicians who 
did not understand what they were doing pressurized Cypriot politicians, who 
knew even less, to respond hastily. They, in turn, leant on Cypriot bankers to 
inflict losses on deposits, thereby breaking depository guarantees and raising the 
potential for bank runs throughout that island and well beyond in similarly weak 
Eurozone economies, providing a clear example of how easy it is to push the 
entire global financial system over the edge into disaster. 
At the time of writing this final thesis, systemic risk of failure appears to have 
lessened. However, history shows that situation will not continue indefinitely. If 
another perfect storm develops in the future, will the resources, political support 
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and understanding be available to avert it? More importantly, what additional 
systemic risk mitigation is there, capable of moving operational behaviour 
completely away from the cusp of catastrophe? The proposed theory suggests that 
any lasting solution (until the next crisis) must directly address emergent 
phenomena in the system through selective interventions in the operational 
behaviour of systemically important participants (SIPs) by a central authority with 
sufficient power, expertise and funding. However, care must be taken to avoid 
unintended consequences that can increase systemic risk. 
For example, when the European Central Bank responded to the Eurozone 
crisis in December 2011 by providing “… euro 489bn in unprecedented three-
year loans to more than 500 banks across the region” (Alloway and Atkins 2011) 
without staggering repayment schedules and ensuring the proper use of those 
funds, ahead of a crucial round of government debt refinancing, it was stimulating 
a classic concentration of focus in the supply and demand of SIFS. By allowing 
banks to use this money as they wish, a new threat was created where some banks 
could ignore refinancing their existing assets in favour of buying higher yielding 
assets such as more of the sovereign debt that got them into trouble to begin with. 
If enough of the 500 banks did this, the proposed theory suggests overall 
operational effectiveness of the global financial system would have been further 
compromised, and systemic risk would have continued to increase. At the very 
least a new synchronicity effect would have been created, where many banks 
would simultaneously require re-financing at similar times in the future, with 
unknown consequences. 
7.2 Implications for Systemic Risk Mitigation 
New opportunities for a contribution to practice in systemic risk mitigation arise 
from this theory by using the correlation between focus and satisfaction from 
hypothesis 1 to improve and maintain stability in the global financial system. 
While continuing with the existing practice of introducing new regulations that 
address perceived causes of the latest crisis to reduce the risk of their recurrence, 
it would be possible for regulators to manage emergent operational behaviour by 
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dispersing focus (see conjecture 7) and improving overall operational 
effectiveness to ensure that distress is unable to propagate. Macroprudential 
initiatives aimed at directing operational behaviour, along with the introduction of 
suitable regulatory compliance obligations to provide the necessary data for 
oversight, could change the current reactive stance of crisis intervention to one 
that is more proactive and pre-emptive. For example, regulatory instruments 
incorporating the principles of this theory, or derivative models, could be used in 
monitoring distress as it propagates and simulating intervention effects to identify 
appropriate actions. These might include creating disincentives for growth in 
concentrations of participation involving certain SIFS, or using funds that would 
otherwise be employed in quantitative easing in addressing gaps in demand or 
supply. Naturally, any such macroprudential initiatives must be aimed at system-
wide effects, globally. Otherwise any sub-systemic response would likely be sub-
optimal in its effects, potentially becoming a new source of systemic risk. 
7.3 Policy Guidelines 
Pre-emptive regulation is consequently argued to require improved operational 
transparency from system participants, and prompt visibility of data about their 
operational behaviour, in order to prevent positive feedback inducing a failure of 
the system to operate within required parameters. This translates into changes and 
additions to policy, which in turn call for new regulatory practices. The policy and 
practices recommendations of this thesis are: 
i. Operational performance parameters should be identified, communicated, 
and required to be maintained by systemically important participants; and 
performance confirmation data should be provided by them; to enable 
constant prudential monitoring of the system’s operational behaviour; and 
continual updating and publication of operational behaviour assessments of 
the global financial system and all regional and national financial sub-
systems; for all system participants. 
ii. Then a policy of pre-emptive operational intervention must be assigned 
ownership among senior regulators, for ensuring positive feedback from 
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emergent operational behaviour is prevented from inducing a failure of the 
system to operate within the parameters established in policy ‘i’. 
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8 CONCLUSIONS 
8.1 Plausibility Assessment 
The outcome of theory development is presented, from research into a gap in 
knowledge about how systemic risk arises and materializes in the global financial 
system. It takes a systems-theoretic approach (Dubin, 1978), incorporating a 
simulation-constructivist orientation towards the meaning of theory and theory 
development (Davis, Eisenhardt and Bingham, 2007), within a realist 
constructivism epistemology for knowledge generation about complex social 
phenomena (Crnkovic, 2010). 
An assessment of the proposed theory’s plausibility refers back to the 
following: 
Research Question “How does instability of the global financial system 
become operationally catastrophic, and how could 
that outcome generally be avoided?” 
Goal Assertion   “To describe how instability of the global financial 
system becomes operationally catastrophic, and explain 
that operational behaviour, in order to diagnose when it 
approaches a state of operational crisis and understand 
how that outcome could generally be avoided”. 
Null-Hypothesis  “A plausible (verified and empirically validated) 
simulation of a real financial system collapse, 
corroborated by theoretical triangulation with 
catastrophe theory, will not confirm the predictions of 
hypotheses 1, 2 and 5.” 
An original research question gave rise to a narrower-scoped goal assertion, 
adapted from suggestions in multiparadigm perspectives on theory building for 
organizational studies (Gioia and Pitre, 1990), ‘to describe and explain in order to 
diagnose and understand.’ That places this mixed-methods research on the 
relevance side of the rigour/relevance debate (see ‘evaluating mixed methods’, 
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Creswell and Plano Clark, 2007: page 162). Nonetheless, it also responds to the 
call for more rigour in agent-based simulation as an experimental method 
(Bankes, 2002). 
In this context, research results show there is a non-empty class of 
computational representations, verified with the proposed theory (see sub-section 
5.5); that confirms the predictions of hypotheses 1, 2 and 5 by simulation 
experiment results (see sub-section 5.6.3); which are empirically validated by data 
from Iceland’s financial system failure (see sub-sections 5.7.2 and 5.7.3); and 
further corroborated by theoretical triangulation with catastrophe theory (see sub-
section 0); to demonstrate a ‘granular’ form of pragmatic validity (Worren, Moore 
and Elliott, 2002; Davis, Eisenhardt and Bingham, 2007). Therefore, the null-
hypothesis is refuted by demonstrating the proposed theory is a plausible 
description and explanation for how systemic failure may have been 
operationalised in the specific real world case of Iceland.  
General applicability of this theory would require further demonstration of its 
plausibility for other cases of systemic failure, including failure of the entire 
global financial system. However, thankfully, there are no other cases in recent 
history that can be taken as reasonable examples of modern operational practices 
in the financial services industry. 
Nonetheless, useful propositions are offered in this thesis for policy guidance 
in diagnosing when the global financial system is approaching a state of 
operational crisis, and understanding how that outcome could generally be 
avoided.  
8.2 Limitations 
8.2.1 Use of Catastrophe Theory 
Although much progress has recently been made by the field of mathematical 
topology in exploring how shapes can be used to visualize how an entire multi-
dimensional dynamical system behaves as a single entity, this thesis has chosen to 
apply the ‘Big tent’ notion of complexity (Rosser Jr, 2009; Rosser Jr, 2000) 
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encompassing a dynamic definition based on non-axiomatic foundations. This is 
argued in bifurcation theory to be the most promising approach to addressing 
structurally stable, generic singularities of dynamical systems (Rosser Jr, 2000). 
Within that notion, catastrophe theory is considered by this thesis to offer the best 
fit with its constructivist interpretation of the operational behaviour paradigm for 
systemic risk of failure. However, a lack of axiomatic foundations may limit the 
potential for developing mathematical predictions. 
8.2.2 Findings emphasis on final simulation 
Empirical validation of the theory is based solely on the data generated by the 
final simulation of a series of 862 simulation experiments conducted for 
calibration and testing. This is considered justifiable because the size and 
medium-scale of simulation complexity attempted by this thesis is argued in the 
literature to require a departure from the normal standards of small-scale 
simulations (Post and Votta, 2005), in which results were previously validated by 
many simulation runs using different initial conditions and run parameters. 
8.2.3 Simulated time steps 
An important consequence of the single-run validation mentioned in the previous 
sub-section is that findings are based on only one number of ticks used to interpret 
the time-steps of a simulation (i.e. 57 ticks equate to a simulated elapsed time of 
one year). Although the tick equivalence selected for validation was determined 
by the 862 calibration and testing experiments of this thesis as being optimal, as 
confirmed by corrolation statistics, further research would benefit from exploring 
the effects of using other values to see how the validation results may vary.  
In general, when simulating economic systems in this way, the choice of time 
steps and tick equivalence is driven by the granularity of the phenomenon being 
observed. For example, if a systemic failure can occur within one or two days then 
the number of ticks simulated per time step should be sufficiently large for the 
failure to be observed over that time. In the case of 57 ticks per simulated year, 
any phenomenon that takes less than one week would not be observable. 
However, calibration and testing experiments demonstrated the phenomenon of 
interest to this thesis did indeed appear within the selected timeframe. 
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8.2.4 Price Theory relevance 
The operational behaviour paradigm of systemic risk of failure explains how 
shifts in focus between the supply and demand of financial services influence the 
operational effectiveness of the global financial system. Participation is modelled 
as bids and offers on a ‘global exchange’, where trading occurs in aggregate 
values and aggregate profits or losses are simulated by random allocation rules. 
This makes pricing theory irrelevant, and the simulation of pricing activity 
becomes unnecessary.  
8.3 Contributions 
8.3.1 Overall Impact 
The claimed multi-disciplinary contribution of theory adds to economic thinking 
evolving out of a combination of neoclassical and other less orthodox work, 
described by Holt, Rosser and Colander (2011) as comprising a shift to “the 
complexity era in economics”. The theory applies philosophical insights from risk 
literature, notions of uncertainty from information science and physics, a 
perspective on change from evolutionary economics, insights about dynamical 
systems and catastrophes from complexity science, and combines them with a 
new operational behaviour paradigm, to open new conversations in the literatures 
of risk and behavioural economics. 
In particular, it explains how systemic failure arises in the operations of the 
global financial system, which is used as the basis for an improved definition of 
systemic risk of failure incorporating an interpretation of entropy as risk 
uncertainty. However, it does not specify how that risk may be calculated, or how 
systemic failure may be predicted. Nonetheless, it discusses opportunities for 
future research to do so by building on these foundations. 
8.3.2 Contribution to Theory 
8.3.2.1 A new paradigm 
An operational behaviour paradigm of systemic failure is introduced for the global 
financial system, extending current theory about systemic risk of failure to explain 
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how instability becomes operationally catastrophic, and how that outcome could 
be avoided (see Figure 1). It uses the notion of operational distress from 
proposition 12 to explain how execution-level supply and demand activities of 
collective participation behaviour emerge as operational behaviour at system 
level, potentially leading to systemic failure, encapsulated in the transformation: 
Distress:	Conditions 	↦ Current, , , ,                (26) 
(see full explanation in sub-section 4.9.5). 
8.3.2.2 A definition of systemic failure 
Explanation of that paradigm begins with a series of propositions leading to a 
definition of systemic failure in proposition 9, outlined as: 
Ⅎ ≔	 , ,… ,  "#	$	%	∈	Ⅎ ,		' ∈ (,		) > 1,		, = ' + ) − 10,				19 
(see full explanation in sub-section 4.9.2). 
8.3.2.3 A formal definition of entropy in systemic risk 
Then applying the concept of entropy to the uncertainty implicit in any 
determination of the probability of systemic failure over some useful future time- 
span, produces the new interpretation: 
Entropy5:6 	= 	− 7 58 log 58
6
8;
.																																			22 
(see full explanation in sub-section 4.9.4). 
8.3.2.4 A formal definition of systemic risk of failure 
Ultimately, this leads to the proposal of a probability metric for systemic risk of 
failure incorporating entropy as a measure of uncertainty, expressed as: 
RiskℲ6, , ∶=	A	56,	Entropy5:6B,																																	23 
(see full explanation in sub-section 4.9.4).  
Although this definition satisfies the thesis goal assertion of describing and 
explaining systemic risk of failure, calculating a precise probability with its 
uncertainty qualifier is still be beyond the reach of nonlinear mathematical 
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analysis. However this thesis suggests that a combined directional and velocity 
indicator of that risk may be feasible if it is based on simulated predictions. 
8.3.2.5 Relevance to the programme research problem 
The main contributions to theory summarised in the preceding sub-sections are 
operationalised in a way that can be traced back to the programme research 
problem by refuting a null hypothesis, and linking hypothesised predictions to a 
goal assertion derived from that problem (see sub-section 8.1).  
8.3.3 Contribution to Practice 
8.3.3.1 A practical definition of systemic risk of failure 
For practical purposes, the formal definition in expression 23 can be restated in 
less formal terminology as: “a measure of the overall probability at a current 
time of the system entering an operational state of systemic failure by a specified 
time in the future; qualified by a measure of uncertainty determined by the 
system’s entropy for a series of probabilities about a succession of future 
operational states considered to be (e.g. by simulation) capable of that outcome 
by the specified time; in the absence of new mitigation efforts”. 
8.3.3.2 Recommended changes to practices 
Macroprudential tools incorporating the principles of this theory, or derivative 
models, could be used in monitoring distress as it propagates and simulating 
intervention effects to identify appropriate actions. These might include creating 
disincentives for growth in concentrations of participation involving certain SIFS; 
or using funds that would otherwise be employed in quantitative easing in 
addressing gaps in demand or supply; or influencing the interplay between 
diversity and exposure. Naturally, any such macroprudential initiatives must be 
aimed at system-wide effects globally, otherwise any sub-systemic response 
would likely be sub-optimal in its effects, potentially becoming a new source of 
systemic risk. 
8.3.4 Contribution to Policy 
Macroprudential oversight is therefore argued to require improved operational 
transparency from system participants, and prompt visibility of data about their 
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operational behaviour, in order to prevent positive feedback inducing a failure of 
the system to operate within required parameters. This translates into changes and 
additions to policy, which in turn call for new regulatory practices. The policy and 
practice recommendations of this thesis are: 
i. Operational performance parameters should be identified, communicated, 
and required to be maintained by systemically important participants; and 
performance confirmation data should be provided by them; to enable 
constant prudential monitoring of the system’s operational behaviour; for 
continual updating and publication of operational behaviour assessments of 
the global financial system, and regional or national financial sub-systems; 
for the benefit of all system participants. 
ii. Then a policy of pre-emptive operational intervention should be assigned 
ownership among senior regulators, for ensuring positive feedback from 
emergent operational behaviour is prevented from inducing a failure of the 
system to operate within the parameters established in policy ‘i’. 
8.4 Research Implications 
8.4.1 Economic theory 
An evolutionary economics theory of the type outlined in this thesis takes a 
constructivist approach to modelling the global financial system as a behavioural 
topology for an operational behaviour paradigm, derived from the participation 
actions of a simple set of agents, with operating parameters and rules. While it 
does not intended to explain the full richness of that system’s nature, the theory 
does aim to throw some light on how systemic failure materializes out of systemic 
risk in the way the system operates. 
The implications of this foundational research are nonetheless broad in scope, 
offering the potential for advances in understanding how the global financial 
system operates as a dynamical complex system by stimulating improvements in 
related areas of research such as the realism of simulations, and helping to focus 
developments in nonlinear mathematical analysis on new properties of emergent 
phenomena observed during experimentation. 
PhD - Cranfield University, January 2014. T.ILIN 
 
290 
8.4.2 Wider Applicability 
However, the theory may also have applicability to a wider class of systems in 
economics and other disciplines for which catastrophe theory is similarly relevant, 
such as the operational behaviour of medical aid distribution systems during an 
epidemic, the practicalities of services provision in social systems under distress, 
the behavioural effects of world population demographics on economic systems, 
or the potential effects of incursions in large-scale military command and support 
infrastructures. The strengths of the proposed new theory are in its concise 
treatment of the complexities of systemic risk, its use of an operational paradigm 
of supply and demand, its focus on isolating and outlining the mechanism of 
distress propagation instead of attributing causality, and its end objective of 
identifying new opportunities for systemic risk mitigation. Furthermore, it is not 
limited to the causes and effects of specific events from the past, and the theory’s 
suitability for computational methods of research is useful for aligning with new 
ways of addressing this intractable problems. With insights from multiple 
academic disciplines embedded in the theory’s model, there can furthermore be a 
reasonable expectation for generalizations to be discovered that are applicable to 
cross-disciplinary fields such as critical phenomena and behavioural science. 
8.5 Further Research Opportunities 
When looking back to the stated purpose of this research in sub-section 1.2, this 
thesis feels able to conclude that significant success has been achieved. A better 
explanation of systemic risk of failure is contributed to current understanding, 
along with more clarity in response thinking. 
Although, given the normal slow rate of adoption of new thinking in the global 
financial services industry amongst regulatory authorities and those they regulate, 
it seems unlikely that the benefits of this research will be realized quickly. It will 
take a concerted and organized promotion of the concepts presented here, 
translated into a form that is acceptable to practitioners, before any benefits they 
offer for improved global financial stability can be realized over the medium-to-
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long term. Even so, further academic research would enhance those prospects 
tremendously, until the next crisis inevitably focuses practitioner attention. 
Larger and more realistic simulations probably offer the greatest potential for 
improvements in systemic failure predictions, much as they have already 
improved weather forecasting. In this ‘complexity era’ of economics, they can 
address the need to explain how various types of unexpected behaviour emerge in 
economic systems and the consequences of ill-considered responses, and generate 
exciting new opportunities for research. Ironically, perhaps the most likely short-
term benefactors of this research would be other industries. For example, the 
defence industry has an urgent need to understand the potential systemic impacts 
of cyber attacks on vulnerable organizations and infrastructures during bouts of 
cyberwarfare (Osawa, 2013). The direction of future research based on this thesis 
would answer many of those questions. 
8.6 Summary 
In response to the research problem of project 1, this thesis describes how a gap in 
theory identified in project 2 was addressed in projects 3 and 4 by showing how 
an operational behaviour perspective on complexity theory and evolutionary 
economics can provide useful insights for outlining a new general theory of 
systemic risk of failure and its mitigation for the global financial system, capable 
of unifying and clarifying existing concepts of that risk.  
Explanations based on the findings of simulation experiments are offered for 
how it may be possible to recognize, avoid and respond to potential failures of this 
system wherever they may emerge in the future. Although further research is 
recommended for remaining questions about predictability, the fecundity and 
generalizability of the theoretical model presented is argued to be evident in the 
results obtained so far. 
It is therefore the overall conclusion of this thesis that the theory presented 
offers a credible contribution to current understanding, by advancing theory in this 
field of knowledge, and supplementing existing policy guidance for systemic risk 
mitigation. 
PhD - Cranfield University, January 2014. T.ILIN 
 
292 
 
  
PhD - Cranfield University, January 2014. T.ILIN 
 
293 
REFERENCES  
(core contributions are in bold, and exploratory contributions are underlined). 
Abend, G. (2008) 'The Meaning of 'Theory'', Sociological Theory, vol. 26, no. 2, 
pp. 173-199. 
Acharya, V.V. (2009) 'A theory of systemic risk and design of prudential bank 
regulation', J.Financ.Stab., vol. 5, no. 3, pp. 224-255, Available: ISSN: 
15723089. 
Acharya, V.V., Cooley, T., Richardson, M. and Walter, I. (2009) Manufacturing 
Tail Risk: A Perspective on the Financial Crisis of 2007-2009, Now 
Publishers. 
Acharya, V.V., Pedersen, L.H., Philippon, T. and Richardson, M. (2010) 
'Measuring Systemic Risk', FRB of Cleveland Working Paper No. 10-02. 
Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1595075. 
Acharya, V.V. and Richardson, M. (2009) 'Causes of the financial crisis', 
Crit.Rev., vol. 21, no. 2-3, pp. 195-210, Available: ISSN: 08913811. 
Acharya, V.V., Shin, H.S. and Yorulmazer, T. (2011) 'Crisis resolution and bank 
liquidity', Rev.Financ.Stud., vol. 24, no. 6, pp. 2166-2205, Available: ISSN: 
08939454. 
Acharya, V.V. and Yorulmazer, T. (2008) 'Information contagion and bank 
herding', J.Money Credit Bank., vol. 40, no. 1, pp. 215-231, Available: ISSN: 
00222879. 
Aghion, P., Bolton, P. and Dewatripont, M. (2000) 'Contagious bank failures in a 
free banking system', Eur.Econ.Rev., vol. 44, no. 4-6, pp. 713-718, Available: 
ISSN: 00142921. 
Aglietta, M. (2001) 'Financial Market Failures and Systemic Risk', Working 
Paper, vol. SERP No.96. 
Akerlof, G.A. and Dickens, W.T. (1982) 'The Economic Consequences of 
Cognitive Dissonance', The American Economic Review, vol. 72, no. 3, pp. 
307-319. 
PhD - Cranfield University, January 2014. T.ILIN 
 
294 
Akhigbe, A. and Madura, J. (2001) 'Why do contagion effects vary among bank 
failures?', J.Bank.Financ., vol. 25, no. 4, pp. 657-680, Available: ISSN: 
03784266. 
Al-Hashel, E.F. (2010) PhD Thesis: A Novel Development Methodology for 
Cooperative, Distributed Multi-Agent Systems, University of Canberra, 
Australia. 
Allen, F. (2005) 'Modelling Financial Instability', National Institute Economic 
Review, no. 192, pp. 57-67, Available: ISSN: 00279501. 
Allen, F. and Gale, D. (2001) 'Financial Contagion', Journal of Political Economy, 
vol. 108, no. 1, pp. 1-33. 
Allen, F. and Gale, D. (2007) Understanding financial crises - Clarendon 
Lectures in Finance, Paperback edition, Oxford University Press, USA. 
Allen, R.E. and Snyder, D. (2009) 'New thinking on the financial crisis', critical 
perspectives on international business, vol. 5, no. 1/2, pp. 36-55. 
Arnold, B., Borio, C., Ellis, L. and Moshirian, F. (2012) 'Systemic Risk, 
Macroprudential Policy Frameworks, Monitoring Financial Systems and the 
Evolution of Capital Adequacy', Journal of Banking \& Finance, vol. 36, pp. 
3125-3132. 
Arthur, W.B. (2006) 'Out-of-equilibrium economics and agent-based modeling', 
Handbook of computational economics, vol. 2, pp. 1551-1564. 
Asensio, A. and Lang, D. (2010) 'The Financial Crisis, Its Economic 
Consequences, and How to Get Out of It', Int.J.Polit.Econ., vol. 39, no. 2, pp. 
58-69, Available: ISSN: 08911916. 
Augier, M. (2004) 'March'ing towards "a behavioral theory of the firm"', 
Management Decision, vol. 42, no. 10, pp. 1257-1268, Available: ISSN: 
00251747. 
Axelrod, R. (2007) 'Simulation in the social sciences.', in Handbook of research 
on nature inspired computing for economy and management, pp. 90-100. 
PhD - Cranfield University, January 2014. T.ILIN 
 
295 
Axelrod, R. and Hamilton, W.D. (1981) 'The evolution of cooperation', Science, 
vol. 211, no. 4489, pp. 1390-1396. 
Bacharach, S.B. (1989) 'Organizational Theories: Some criteria for evaluation', 
Academy of Management Review, vol. 14, no. 4, pp. 496-515. 
Bak, P. and Sneppen, K. (1993) 'Punctuated Equilibrium and Criticality in a 
Simple Model of Evolution', Physical Review Letters, vol. 71, no. 24, pp. 4083-
4086. 
Bak, P., Tang, C. and Wiesenfeld, K. (1987) 'Self-organized criticality: An 
explanation of the 1/f noise', Phys.Rev.Lett., vol. 59, no. 4, pp. 381-384. 
Ball, R. (2009) 'The Global Financial Crisis and the Efficient Market Hypothesis: 
What Have We Learned?', J.Appl.Corp.Finance, vol. 21, no. 4, pp. 8-16, 
Available: ISSN: 10781196. 
Bandt, O. and Hartmann, P. (2000) 'Systemic risk: A survey', CEPR Discussion 
Papers No 2634. 
Bankes, S.C. (2002) 'Agent-based modeling: A revolution?', 
Proc.Natl.Acad.Sci.U.S.A., vol. 99, no. Suppl 3, pp. 7199-7200. 
Baranger, M. (2000) 'Chaos, Complexity, and Entropy', New England Complex 
Systems Institute, Cambridge, MA. 
Bartram, S.M., Brown, G.W. and Hund, J.E. (2007) 'Estimating systemic risk in 
the international financial system', J.Financ.Econ., vol. 86, no. 3, pp. 835-869, 
Available: ISSN: 0304405X. 
Battiston, S., Gatti, D.D., Galleti, M., Greenwald, B. and Stiglitz, J.E. (2012) 
'Liaisons Dangereuses: Increasing conectivity, risk sharing and systemic risk', 
Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control, vol. 36, pp. 1121-1141. 
Beal, N., Rand, D.G., Battey, H., Croxson, K., May, R.M. and Nowak, M.A. 
(2011) 'Individual versus systemic risk and the regulator's dilemma', PNAS, 
vol. 108, no. 31, pp. 12647-12652. 
PhD - Cranfield University, January 2014. T.ILIN 
 
296 
Beinhocker, E.D. (2011) 'Evolution as Computation: implications for economic 
theory and ontology', accepted by Journal of Institutional Economics, vol. 7, 
no. Special Issue 3, pp. 393-423. 
Benediktsdottir, S., Danielsson, J. and Zoega, G. (2011) 'Lessons from a collapse 
of a financial system', Econ.Policy, vol. 26, no. 66, pp. 183-235, Available: 
ISSN: 02664658. 
Bengtsson, E. (2013) 'Shadow Banking and Financial Stability: European money 
market funds in the global financial crisis', Journal of International Money and 
Finance, vol. 32, pp. 579-594. 
Ben-Naim, A. (2008) Entropy Demistified, Extended eBook edition, World 
Scientific. 
Berger, A.N., Klapper, L.F. and Turk-Ariss, R. (2009) 'Bank competition and 
financial stability', J.Financ.Serv.Res., vol. 35, no. 2, pp. 99-118, Available: 
ISSN: 09208550. 
Berry, M. (1977) 'Catastrophe Theory: A New Mathematical Tool for Scientists', 
Journal of Scientific \& Industrial Research, vol. 36, no. 3, pp. 103-105. 
Bertalanffy, L.v. (1950) 'An Outline of General System Theory', The British 
Journal for the Philosophy of Science, vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 134-165. 
Bexley, J.B., James, J.F. and Haberman, J. (2010) 'The financial crisis and its 
issues', Research in Business \& Economics Journal, vol. 3, pp. 1-7, Available: 
ISSN: 19413424. 
Bezemer, D.J. (2009) 'No One Saw This Coming: Understanding financial crisis 
through accounting models', MPRA Paper, no. 15892, June. 
Bezemer, D.J. (2011) 'Causes of Financial Instability', Working Paper, no. 665. 
Bhattacharyay, B.N. (2003) Towards a macro-prudential leading indicators 
framework for monitoring financial vulnerability, CESifo. 
Bikker, J.A. and Metzemakers, P.A.J. (2005) 'Bank provisioning behaviour and 
procyclicality', J.Int.Financ.Mark.Inst.Money, vol. 15, no. 2, pp. 141-157, 
Available: ISSN: 10424431. 
PhD - Cranfield University, January 2014. T.ILIN 
 
297 
Billio, M., Getmansky, M., Lo, A.W. and Pelizzon, L. (2010) 'Econometric 
Measures of Systemic Risk in the Finance and Insurance Sectors', NBER 
Working Paper Series, Working Paper 16223. 
Bisias, D., Flood, M., Lo, A.W. and Valavanis, S. (2012) 'A Survey of Systemic 
Risk Analytics', Office of Financial Research Working Paper, no. 0001. 
Blankart, C.B. and Fasten, E.R. (2009) 'Financial crisis resolution - The state as 
a lender of last resort?', Econ.Aff., vol. 29, no. 3, pp. 47-52, Available: ISSN: 
02650665. 
Bloom, R. (2011) 'The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report', The CPA Journal, vol. 81, 
no. 5, Available: ISSN: 07328435. 
Booth, L. (2009) 'The Secret of Canadian Banking: Common Sense?', World 
Economics, vol. 10, no. 3, pp. 1-18, Available: ISSN: 14681838. 
Bordo, M., Eichengreen, B., Klingebiel, D. and Martinez-Peria, M.S. (2001) 'Is 
the Crisis Problen Growing More Severe?', Economic Policy, April, pp. 53-82. 
Borio, C.E.V. and Drehmann, M. (2009) Towards an operational framework for 
financial stability:" fuzzy" measurement and its consequences, BIS Monetary 
and Economic Dept. 
Boulding, K.E. (1991) 'What is Evolutionary Economics?', Journal of 
Evolutionary Economics, vol. 1, pp. 9-17. 
Boyacioglu, M.A., Kara, Y. and Baykan, O.K. (2009) 'Predicting bank financial 
failures using neural networks, support vector machines and multivariate 
statistical methods: A comparative analysis in the sample of savings deposit 
insurance fund (SDIF) transferred banks in Turkey', Expert Sys Appl, vol. 36, 
no. 2 PART 2, pp. 3355-3366, Available: ISSN: 09574174. 
Boyd, R.N. (1983) 'On the Current Status of the Issue of Scientific Realism', 
Erkenntnis, vol. 19, pp. 45-90. 
Boyd, J.H., De Nicola, G. and Smith, B.D. (2004) 'Crises in competitive versus 
monopolistic banking systems', J.Money Credit Bank., vol. 36, no. 3 II, pp. 
487--, Available: ISSN: 00222879. 
PhD - Cranfield University, January 2014. T.ILIN 
 
298 
Bridgman, P. (1927) The Logic of Modern Physics, New York: Macmillan. 
Brockmeijer, J., Sheehy, R., Dattels, P., Kodres, L. and Jones, M. (2012) Global 
Financial Stability Report - Restoring confidence and progressing on reforms, 
International Monetary Fund Publications. 
Brownlees, C.T. and Engle, R. (2012) 'Volatility, Correlation and Tails for 
Systemic Risk Measurement', Working Paper, Available: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1611229. 
Brunetti, C., Di Filippo, M. and Harris, J.H. (2011) 'Effects of central bank 
intervention on the interbank market during the subprime crisis', 
Rev.Financ.Stud., vol. 24, no. 6, pp. 2053-2083, Available: ISSN: 08939454. 
Buchanan, M. (2009) 'Economics: meltdown modelling', Nature, vol. 460, no. 
7256, pp. 680-682. 
Buiter, W.H. (2009) 'The Unfortunate Uselessness of Most 'State of the Art' 
Academic Monetary Economics', Financial Times, 6 March. 
Bullard, J., Neely, C.J. and Wheelock, D.C. (2009) 'Systemic Risk and the 
Financial Crisis: a primer', Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review - part 1, 
September, pp. 403-418. 
Calomiris, C.W. (2010) 'Financial innovation, regulation, and reform' World Bank 
Publications. 
Canedo, J.M.D. and Jaramillo, S.M. (2009) 'A network model of systemic risk: 
stress testing the banking system', Intelligent Systems in Accounting, Finance 
\& Management, vol. 16, no. 1, pp. 87-95, Available: ISSN: 15501949. 
Carley, K.M. (2001) 'Handbook of Sociological Theory' New York: Kluwer 
Academic/Plenum. 
Caruana, J. (2010) 'Grappling with systemic risk', JASSA, vol.2, no. 6. 
Chakravorti, S. (2000) 'Analysis of systemic risk in multilateral net settlement 
systems', J.Int.Financ.Mark.Inst.Money, vol. 10, no. 1, pp. 9--, Available: 
ISSN: 10424431. 
PhD - Cranfield University, January 2014. T.ILIN 
 
299 
Chan Man Fong, C.F. and De Kee, D. (1999) Peturbation Methods, Instability, 
Catastrophe and Chaos, World Scientific. 
Chan-Lau, J.A. (2010) 'Regulatory capital charges for too-connected-to-fail 
institutions: A practical proposal', Financ.Mark.Inst.Instrum., vol. 19, no. 5, 
pp. 355-379, Available: ISSN: 09638008. 
Chiarella, C. and Di Guilmi, C. (2011) 'The Financial Instability Hypothesis: A 
stochastic microfoundation framework', Journal of Economic Dynamics and 
Control, vol. 35, pp. 1151-1171. 
Cincotti, S., Raberto, M. and Teglio, A. (2010) 'Credit Money and 
Macroeconomic Instability in the Agent-based Model and Simulator Eurace', 
Economics e-Journal, vol. 3, no. 26, September. 
Colander, D., Goldberg, M., Haas, A., Juselius, K., Kirman, A., Lux, T. and Sloth, 
B. (2009) 'The financial crisis and the systemic failure of the economics 
profession', Crit.Rev., vol. 21, no. 2-3, pp. 249-267, Available: ISSN: 
08913811. 
Commission, T.F.C.I. (2011) The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report, US 
Government Printing Office. 
Cornelissen, J.P. (2006) 'Making Sense of Theory Construction: Metaphor and 
disciplined imagination', Organization Studies, vol. 27, no. 11, pp. 1579-1597. 
Creswell, J.W. and Plano Clark, V.L. (2007) Designing and Conducting Mixed 
Methods Research, 2nd edition, Sage Publications. 
Cristelli, M., Pietronero, L. and Zaccaria, A. (2011) 'Critical Overview of Agent-
Based Models for Economics', arXiv:1101.1847. 
Crnkovic, G.D. (2010) 'Constructive research and info-computational knowledge 
generation.', Model-Based Reasoning in Science and Technology, pp. 359-380. 
Cyert, R.M. and March, J.G. (1992) A Behavioral Theory of the Firm, 2nd edition, 
Wiley-Blackwell. 
PhD - Cranfield University, January 2014. T.ILIN 
 
300 
Damaceanu, R.C. (2011) 'An Agent-Based Computational Study of Wealth 
Distribution in Function of Technological Progress Using Netlogo', American 
Journal of Economics, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 15-20. 
Danielsson, J. (2002) 'The emperor has no clothes: Limits to risk modelling', 
J.Bank.Financ., vol. 26, no. 7, pp. 1273-1296, Available: ISSN: 03784266. 
Davis, E.P. (2005) 'Challenges Posed by Ageing to Financial and Monetary 
Stability', Geneva Papers on Risk \& Insurance - Issues \& Practice, vol. 30, 
no. 4, pp. 542-564, Available: ISSN: 10185895. 
Davis, J.P., Eisenhardt, K.M. and Bingham, C.B. (2007) 'Developing Theory 
through Simulation Methods', Academy of Management Review, vol. 32, no. 2, 
pp. 480-499. 
Davis, E.P. and Karim, D. (2008) 'Comparing early warning systems for banking 
crises', J.Financ.Stab., vol. 4, no. 2, pp. 89-120, Available: ISSN: 15723089. 
de Finetti, B. (1974) Theory of Probability, John Wiley \& Sons. 
De Haan, L. and Zhou, C. (2011) 'Extreme residual dependence for random 
vectors and processes', Adv Appl Probab, vol. 43, no. 1, pp. 217-242, 
Available: ISSN: 00018678. 
De Nicolo, G., Bartholomew, P., Zaman, J. and Zephirin, M. (2004) 'Bank 
Consolidation, Internationalization, and Conglomeration: Trends and 
Implications for Financial Risk', Financial Markets, Institutions \& 
Instruments, vol. 13, no. 4, pp. 173-217, Available: ISSN: 09638008. 
De Nicolo, G. and Kwast, M.L. (2002) 'Systemic risk and financial consolidation: 
Are they related?', J.Bank.Financ., vol. 26, no. 5, pp. 861-880, Available: 
ISSN: 03784266. 
De Vries, C.G. (2005) 'The simple economics of bank fragility', J.Bank.Financ., 
vol. 29, no. 4, pp. 803-825, Available: ISSN: 03784266. 
Denzin, N.K. (1970) The Research Act in Sociology, Chicago: Aldine. 
DiMaggio, P.J. (1995) 'Comments on" What theory is not"', Adm.Sci.Q., vol. 40, 
no. 3, pp. 391-397. 
PhD - Cranfield University, January 2014. T.ILIN 
 
301 
Dimsdale, N.H. (2009) 'The financial crisis of 2007-9 and the British experience', 
Oxonomics, vol. 4, no. 1, pp. 1-9, Available: ISSN: 17525195. 
Dinther, C. (2008) 'Handbook on Information Technology in Finance'. 
Dooley, K. (2002) 'Simulation research methods', in Baum, J. (ed.) Companion to 
Organizations, London: Blackwell. 
Dore, M.H.I. and Rosser Jr, J.B. (2007) 'Do Nonlinear Dynamics in Economics 
Amount to a Kuhnian Paradigm Shift?', Nonlinear Dynamics, Psychology, and 
Life Science, vol. 11, no. 1, pp. 119-147. 
Dosi, G., Marengo, L., Bassanini, A. and Valente, M. (1999) 'Norms as Emergent 
Properties of Adaptive Learning: The case for economic routines', Journal of 
Evolutionary Economics, vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 5-26. 
Dosi, G. and Nelson, R.R. (1994) 'An Introduction to Evolutionary Theories in 
Economics', Journal of Evolutionary Economics, vol. 4, pp. 153-172. 
Dow, J. (2000) 'What is Systemic Risk - Moral Hazard, Initial Shocks and 
Propagation', Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies. 
Dowd, K. (2009) 'Moral Hazard and the Financial Crisis', Cato Journal, vol. 29, 
no. 1, pp. 141, Available: ISSN: 02733072. 
Dubin, R. (1978) Theory building, New York: Free Press. 
Duffie, D. (2010) 'The Failure Mechanics of Dealer Banks', Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, vol. 24, no. 1, pp. 51-72, Available: ISSN: 08953309. 
Dupuy, P. (2009) 'Pure indicator of risk appetite', Aust.Econ.Pap., vol. 48, no. 1, 
pp. 18-33, Available: ISSN: 0004900X. 
Easterby-Smith, M., Thorpe, R. and Jackson, P. (2012) Management Research 
(4th edition), Sage. 
Edey, M. (2009) 'The Global Financial Crisis and Its Effects', Economic Papers, 
vol. 28, no. 3, pp. 186-195, Available: ISSN: 08120439. 
Eichberger, J. and Summer, M. (2005) 'Bank capital, liquidity, and systemic risk', 
J.Eur.Econ.Assoc., vol. 3, no. 2-3, pp. 547-555, Available: ISSN: 15424766. 
PhD - Cranfield University, January 2014. T.ILIN 
 
302 
Einstein, A. (1905) 'On the Electrodynamics of Moving Bodies', Annals of 
Physics, vol. 17, no. 891, pp. 1-26. 
Eisenbeis, R.A., Frame, W.S. and Wall, L.D. (2007) 'An analysis of the 
systemic risks posed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and an evaluation of the 
policy options for reducing those risks', J.Financ.Serv.Res., vol. 31, no. 2-3, 
pp. 75-99, Available: ISSN: 09208550. 
Eisenberg, L. and Noe, T.H. (2001) 'Systemic risk in financial systems', Manage 
Sci, vol. 47, no. 2, pp. 236-249, Available: ISSN: 00251909. 
Elsinger, H., Lehar, A. and Summer, M. (2006) 'Risk assessment for banking 
systems', Manage Sci, vol. 52, no. 9, pp. 1301-1314, Available: ISSN: 
00251909. 
Epstein, R. (1984) 'Simulation research in the analysis of behavior', Behaviorism, 
vol. 12, no. 2, pp. 41-155. 
Epstein, J.M. (1999) 'Agent-Based Computational Models and Generative Social 
Science', Complexity, vol. 4, no. 5, pp. 41-60. 
Espenilla Jr., N.A. (2009) 'Regulatory factors that contributed to the global 
financial crisis', Asia-Pacific Soc.Sci.Rev, vol. 9, no. 1, Available: ISSN: 
01198386. 
Fagiolo, G., Windrum, P. and Moneta, A. (2007) 'Empirical Validation of Agent-
Based Models: Alternatives and Prospects', Journal of Artificial Societies and 
Social Simulation, vol. 10, no. 2. 
Farmer, J.D. and Foley, D. (2009) 'The Economy Needs Agent-based Modelling', 
Nature, vol. 460, August, pp. 685-686. 
Farmer, J.D. and Geanakoplos, J. (2009) 'The virtues and vices of equilibrium and 
the future of financial economics', Complexity, vol. 14, no. 3, pp. 11-38. 
Fisher, I. (1933) 'The debt-deflation theory of great depressions', Econometrica: 
Journal of the Econometric Society, vol. 1, no. 4, pp. 337-357. 
Fisk, D. (2011) 'The 2008 financial collapse: Lessons for engineering failure', 
Eng.Fail.Anal., vol. 18, no. 2, pp. 550-556, Available: ISSN: 13506307. 
PhD - Cranfield University, January 2014. T.ILIN 
 
303 
Fornasari, F. (2009) 'Six months into the US financial crisis: Key numbers and 
lessons', Rev.Econ.Cond.Italy, no. 1, pp. 49, Available: ISSN: 00346799. 
Foster, J. (2011) 'Evolutionary Macroeconomics: A research agenda', Journal of 
Evolutionary Economics, vol. 21, pp. 5-28. 
Foster, J.B. and Magdoff, F. (2009) The great financial crisis, New York: 
Monthly Review Press. 
Franklin, A. and Gale, D. (2007) Understanding Financial Crises - Clarendon 
Lectures in Finance, New York: Oxford University Press. 
Freedman, C., Kumhof, M., Laxton, D. and Muirb, D. (2010) 'Policies to 
rebalance the global economy after the financial crisis', Int.J.Cent.Bank., vol. 6, 
no. 1, pp. 215-252, Available: ISSN: 18154654. 
Friedman, B.M. and Froewiss, K.C. (1977) 'Bank Behavior in the Brunner-
Meltzer Model', J.Monetary Econ., vol. 3, no. 2, pp. 163-178, Available: ISSN: 
03043932. 
FSB (2012) Global Shadow Banking Monitoring Report, Financial Stability 
Board. 
Gai, P., Jenkinson, N. and Kapadia, S. (2007) 'Systemic risk in modern financial 
systems: analytics and policy design', Journal of Risk Finance (Emerald Group 
Publishing Limited), vol. 8, no. 2, pp. 156-165, Available: ISSN: 15265943. 
Gai, P. and Kapadia, S. (2010) 'Contagion in financial networks', Proc.R.Soc.A 
Math.Phys.Eng.Sci., vol. 466, no. 2120, pp. 2401-2423, Available: ISSN: 
13645021. 
Garicano, L. and Lastra, R.M. (2010) 'Towards a new architecture for financial 
stability: Seven principles', J.Int.Econ.Law., vol. 13, no. 3, pp. 597-621, 
Available: ISSN: 13693034. 
Gatti, D.D., Gaffeo, E. and Gallegati, M. (2010) 'Complex Agent-Based 
Macroeconomics: A manifesto for a new paradigm', J Econ Interact Coord, 
vol. 5, pp. 111-135. 
PhD - Cranfield University, January 2014. T.ILIN 
 
304 
Gennaioli, N., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R.W. (2011) 'A Model of Shadow 
Banking', NBER Working Paper Series. 
Gilbert, N. and Terna, P. (2000) 'How to Build and Use Agent-Based Models in 
Social Science', Mind \& Society, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 57-72. 
Gioia, D.A. and Pitre, E. (1990) 'Multiparadigm perspectives on theory building', 
Academy of management review, vol. 15, no. 4, pp. 584-602. 
Gleick, J. (1998) Chaos - The Science of the Unpredictable, Vintage Books. 
Goldstone, R.L. and Janssen, M.A. (2005) 'Computational models of collective 
behavior', Trends Cogn.Sci.(Regul.Ed.), vol. 9, no. 9, pp. 424-430. 
Golubitsky, M. (1978) 'An Introduction to Catastrophe Theory and its 
Applications', Siam Review, vol. 20, no. 2, pp. 352-387. 
Goodhart, C.A.E. (2005) 'What can academics contribute to the study of financial 
stability?', Econ.Soc.Rev., vol. 36, no. 3, pp. 189, Available: ISSN: 00129984. 
Goodhart, C.A.E. (2007) 'The background to the 2007 financial crisis', 
International Economics \& Economic Policy, vol. 4, no. 4, pp. 331-346, 
Available: ISSN: 16124804. 
Goodhart, C. (2010) 'Is a less pro-cyclical financial system an achievable goal?', 
Natl.Inst.Econ.Rev., vol. 211, no. 1, pp. 81-90, Available: ISSN: 00279501. 
Goodhart, C.A.E., Sunirand, P. and Tsomocos, D.P. (2005) 'A risk assessment 
model for banks', Ann.Financ., vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 197-224, Available: ISSN: 
16142446. 
Gorton, G. and Metrick, A. (2010) 'Regulating the shadow banking system', 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, vol. 2010, no. 2, pp. 261-297. 
Gould, S.J. (1982) 'Darwinism and the Expansion of Evolutionary Theory', 
Science, vol. 216, no. 4544, pp. 380-387. 
Govtvan, O. and Mansurov, A. (2011) 'Systemic risk in the financial sphere: 
Theoretical study and approaches to its estimation', Studies on Russian 
Economic Development, vol. 22, no. 2, pp. 122-129, Available: ISSN: 
10757007. 
PhD - Cranfield University, January 2014. T.ILIN 
 
305 
Gramlich, D. and Oet, M.V. (2011) 'The structural fragility of financial systems', 
The Journal of Risk Finance, vol. 12, no. 4, pp. 270-290, Available: ISSN: 
15265943. 
Granovetter, M. (1978) 'Threshold models of collective behavior', American 
journal of sociology, vol. 83, no. 6, pp. 1420-1443. 
Grasman, R.P.P.P., van der Maas, H.L.J. and Wagenmakers, E.-J. (2009) 'Fitting 
the Cusp Catastrophe in R: A cusp-package primer', Journal of Statistical 
Software, vol. 32, no. 8, pp. 1-27. 
Guba, E.G. and Lincoln, Y.S. (2005) Paradigmatic Controversies, Contradictions 
and Emerging Confluence, 3rd edition, Sage. 
Gunnarsson, E.G. (2011) 'The Icelandic Regulatory Responses to the Financial 
Crisis', European Business Organization Law Review, vol. 12, no. 1, pp. 1, 
Available: ISSN: 15667529. 
Haimes, Y.Y. (2009) 'On the Complex Definition of Risk: A systems-based 
approach', Risk Analysis, vol. 29, no. 12, pp. 1647-1654. 
Haldane, A., Hall, S. and Pezzini, S. (2007) A new approach to assessing risks to 
financial stability, Bank of England. 
Haldane, A.G. and May, R.M. (2011) 'Systemic Risk in Banking Ecosystems', 
Nature, vol. 469, pp. 351-355. 
Hart, S. (2009) 'The corporate treasurer - Playing the leading role', Journal of 
Corporate Treasury Management, vol. 2, no. 3, pp. 219-222, Available: ISSN: 
17532574. 
Hashmall, A.M. (2010) 'After the fall: A new framework to regulate "too big to 
fail" nonbank financial institutions', New York Univ.Law Rev., vol. 85, no. 3, 
pp. 829, Available: ISSN: 00287881. 
Heath, B., Hill, R. and Ciarallo, F. (2009) 'A survey of agent-based modelling 
practices (January 1998 to July 2008)', Journal of Artificial Societies and 
Social Simulation, vol. 12, no. 4, pp. 1-50. 
PhD - Cranfield University, January 2014. T.ILIN 
 
306 
Heckbert, S. (2009) 'Experimental economics and agent-based models', In 
Proceedings: MODSIM. 
Helbing, D. (2010) 'Systemic risks in society and economics', Emerging Risks, 1-
25. 
Helbing, D. (2012) 'Social Self-Organization: Agent-based simulations and 
experiments to study emergent social behavior' Springer. 
Helbing, D., Yu, W. and Rauhut, H. (2011) 'Self-Organization and Emergence in 
Social Systems: Modeling the Coevolution of Social Environments and 
Cooperative Behavior', The Journal of Mathematical Sociology, vol. 35, no. 1-
3, pp. 177-208. 
Hellwig, M.F. (2009) 'Systemic risk in the financial sector: An analysis of the 
subprime-mortgage financial crisis', Economist (NLD), vol. 157, no. 2, pp. 129-
207, Available: ISSN: 0013063X. 
Hempel, C.G. (1965) 'A Logical Appraisal of Operationalism', in Aspects of 
Scientific Explanation and Other Essays, New York: Free Press. 
Hodgson, G.M. (1998) 'On the Evolution of Thorstein Veblen's Evolutionary 
Economics', Cambridge Journal of Economics, vol. 22, pp. 415-431. 
Hodgson, G.M. (2002) 'Darwinism in economics: from analogy to ontology', 
Journal of Evolutionary Economics, vol. 12, pp. 259-281. 
Hodgson, G.M. (2007) 'Evolutionary and Institutional Economics as the New 
Mainstream?', Evolutionary and Institutional Economic Review, vol. 4, no. 1, 
pp. 7-25 
Holland, J. (2010) 'Banks, knowledge and crisis: a case of knowledge and learning 
failure', Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance, vol. 18, no. 2, pp. 
87-105, Available: ISSN: 13581988. 
Holton, G.A. (2004) 'Defining Risk', Financial Analysts Journal, vol. 60, no. 6, 
pp. 19-25. 
Holt, R.P.F., Rosser Jr, J.B. and Colander, D. (2011) 'The Complexity Era in 
Economics', Review of Political Economy, vol. 23, no. 3, pp. 357-369. 
PhD - Cranfield University, January 2014. T.ILIN 
 
307 
Honohan, P. (2008) 'Containment and Resolution in the Financial Crisis: Too 
Little, Too Late', CESifo Forum, vol. 9, no. 4, pp. 22-27, Available: ISSN: 
1615245X. 
Hoogduin, L. (2010) 'Macroprudential instruments and frameworks: a stocktaking 
of issues and experiences', in Paper No 38, CGFS, BIS. 
Horgan, J. (1995) 'From Complexity to Perplexity', Scientific American, vol. 272, 
no. 6, pp. 104-109. 
Ho, T. and Saunders, A. (1980) 'A Catastrophe Model of Bank Failure', The 
Journal of Finance, vol. XXXV, no. 5, pp. 1189-1207. 
Huang, X., Zhou, H. and Zhu, H. (2009) 'A framework for assessing the 
systemic risk of major financial institutions', J.Bank.Financ., vol. 33, no. 11, 
pp. 2036-2049, Available: ISSN: 03784266. 
Hume, D. (1974) Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, 31975th edition, 
Clarendon Press. 
Iori, G. and Jafarey, S. (2001) 'Criticality in a Model of Banking Crises', Physica 
A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, vol. 299, no. 1, pp. 205-212. 
Iori, G., Jafarey, S. and Padilla, F.G. (2006) 'Systemic risk on the interbank 
market', J.Econ.Behav.Organ., vol. 61, no. 4, pp. 525-542, Available: ISSN: 
01672681. 
Jackson, J.K. (2010) Iceland's Financial Crisis, US Congress. 
Jain, A.K. and Gupta, S. (1987) 'Some Evidence on "Herding" Behavior of U.S. 
Banks', Journal of Money, Credit \& Banking (Ohio State University Press), 
vol. 19, no. 1, pp. 78-89, Available: ISSN: 00222879. 
Janssen, M.A. (2005) 'Agent-Based Modelling', Modelling in Ecological 
Economics, pp. 155-172. 
Janssen, M.A. and Ostrom, E. (2006) 'Empirically Based, Agent-Based Models', 
Ecology and Society, vol. 11, no. 2, pp. 37-49. 
Jensen, M.C. and Meckling, W.H. (1994) 'The Nature of Man', Journal of Applied 
Corporate Finance, vol. 7, no. 2, pp. 4-19. 
PhD - Cranfield University, January 2014. T.ILIN 
 
308 
Johnson, R.B., Onwuegbuzie, A.J. and Turner, L.A. (2007) 'Towards a definition 
of mixed methodology research', Journal of Mixed Methods Research, vol. 1, 
no. 2, pp. 112-133. 
Jorda , O., Schularick, M. and Taylor, A.M. (2011) 'Financial crises, credit 
booms, and external imbalances: 140 years of lessons', IMF Economic Review, 
vol. 59, no. 2, pp. 349-378. 
Kambhu, J., Weidman, S. and Neel, K. (2007) New Directions for Understanding 
Systemic Risk, The National Academies Press. 
Kane, E.J. (2007) 'The Etiology of Financial Instability: Then and Now', 
Economic Review - Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, vol. 92, no. 1/2, pp. 132, 
Available: ISSN: 07321813. 
Kane, E.J. (2010) 'Redefining and containing systemic risk', Atl.Econ.J., vol. 38, 
no. 3, pp. 251, Available: ISSN: 01974254. 
Kaplan, S. and Garrick, B.J. (1981) 'On the Quantitative Definition of Risk', Risk 
Analysis, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 11-27. 
Karras, K.N. (2009) 'Credit derivatives: Banks' behaviour, financial stability and 
banking regulation', Journal of Risk Management in Financial Institutions, vol. 
2, no. 2, pp. 193-213, Available: ISSN: 17528887. 
Kaufman, G.G. and Scott, K.E. (2003) 'What is systemic risk, and do bank 
regulators retard or contribute to it?', Indep.Rev., vol. 7, no. 3, pp. 371-391, 
Available: ISSN: 10861653. 
Keynes, J.M. (1921) A Treatise on Probability, Macmillan. 
Kindleberger, C.P. and Aliber, R.Z. (2005) Manias, panics, and crashes - A 
History of Financial Crises, New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Kindleberger, C.P. and Aliber, R.Z. (2011) Manias, panics, and crashes - A 
History of Financial Crises, 6th edition, New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Kirman, A.P. (1992) 'Whom or What Does the Representative Individual 
Represent?', The Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 117-136. 
PhD - Cranfield University, January 2014. T.ILIN 
 
309 
Kleijnen, J.P.C. (1995) 'Verification and Validation of simulation models', 
European Journal of Operational Research, vol. 82, pp. 145-162. 
Kliger, D. and Tsur, I. (2011) 'Prospect Theory and Risk-Seeking Behavior by 
Troubled Firms', Journal of Behavioral Finance, vol. 12, no. 1, pp. 29-40, 
Available: ISSN: 15427560. 
Knight, F.H. (1921) Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit, Hart, Schaffner & Marx. 
Kolmogorov, A.N. (1933) Grundbegriffe der Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung, 
Berlin: Springer-Verlag. Translated (1960) as Foundations of the Theory of 
Probability. 2nd English ed. New York: Chelsea Publishing. 
Kong, F. and Wang, W. (2009) 'The early warning of financial crisis in China: 
Based on the model of artificial neural network', In Information Engineering 
and Computer Science, 2009. ICIECS 2009. International Conference, pp. 1-4. 
Kroszner, R.S. (2000) 'Lessons from Financial Crises: The Role of 
Clearinghouses', J.Financ.Serv.Res., vol. 18, no. 2-3, pp. 157-171, Available: 
ISSN: 09208550. 
Krugman, P. (2009) 'How Did Economists Get It So Wrong?', New York Times, 
September 6th. 
Kuhn, T.S. (1962) The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, University of Chicago 
Press. 
Kwan, S. and Eisenbeis, R.A. (1997) 'Bank Risk, Capitalization, and Operating 
Efficiency', J.Financ.Serv.Res., vol. 12, no. 2-3, pp. 117-131, Available: ISSN: 
09208550. 
Lave, C. and March (1975) An Introduction to Models in the Social Sciences, New 
York: Harper \& Row. 
Law, A.M. and Kelton, D.W. (1991) Simulation Modeling and Analysis, 2nd 
edition, New York: McGraw-Hill. 
LeBaron, B. (2002) 'Building the Santa Fe artificial stock market', Physica A. 
Lehar, A. (2005) 'Measuring systemic risk: A risk management approach', 
J.Bank.Financ., vol. 29, no. 10, pp. 2577-2603, Available: ISSN: 03784266. 
PhD - Cranfield University, January 2014. T.ILIN 
 
310 
Leijonhufvud, A. (2006) 'Agent-Based Macro' Handbook of computational 
economics, vol. 2, pp. 1625-1637. 
Levine, R. (2000) 'Bank-based or market-based financial systems: Which is 
better?', Journal of Financial Intermediation, vol. 11, no. 4, pp. 398-428. 
Loretan, M. (1996) 'Economic models of systemic risk in financial systems', 
North Am.J.Econ.Financ., vol. 7, no. 2, pp. 147-152, Available: ISSN: 
10629408. 
Love, D. (2010) 'Central Counterparties', JASSA, no. 3, pp. 46, Available: ISSN: 
03135934. 
Lustick, I.S. (2000) 'Agent-Based Modelling of Collective Identity: Testing 
constructivist theory', Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 
3, no. 1, pp. 1-27. 
Lux, T. (1995) 'Herd Behavior, Bubbles and Crashes', The Economic Journal, vol. 
105, pp. 881-896. 
Macal, C.M. and North, M.J. (2010) 'Tutorial on Agent-Based Modelling and 
Simulation', Journal of Simulation, vol. 4, pp. 151-162. 
Mackay, C. (2004) Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds, 
Barnes \& Noble, first published in 1841. 
Mackenzie, N. and Knipe, S. (2006) 'Research dilemmas: Paradigms, methods and 
methodology', Issues in Educational Research, vol. 16, no. 2, pp. 193-205. 
Magnan, M.L. (2009) 'Fair value accounting and the financial crisis: Messenger 
or contributor?', Account.Persp., vol. 8, no. 3, pp. 189-213, Available: ISSN: 
1911382X. 
Markowitz, H.M. (1952) 'Portfolio Selection', Journal of Finance, vol. 7, no. 1, 
pp. 77-91. 
Martinez-Jaramillo, S., Perez, O.P., Embriz, F.A. and Dey, F.L.G. (2010) 
'Systemic risk, financial contagion and financial fragility', J.Econ.Dyn.Control, 
vol. 34, no. 11, pp. 2358-2374, Available: ISSN: 01651889. 
PhD - Cranfield University, January 2014. T.ILIN 
 
311 
Martinez-Miera, D. and Repullo, R. (2010) 'Does competition reduce the risk of 
bank failure?', Rev.Financ.Stud., vol. 23, no. 10, pp. 3638-3664, Available: 
ISSN: 08939454. 
May, R.M. and Arinaminpathy, N. (2010) 'Systemic risk: The dynamics of model 
banking systems', J.R.Soc.Interface, vol. 7, no. 46, pp. 823-838, Available: 
ISSN: 17425689. 
May, R.M., Levin, S.A. and Sugihara, G. (2008) 'Complex systems: ecology for 
bankers', Nature, vol. 451, no. 7181, pp. 893-895. 
McGavin, K. (2010) 'Short Selling in a Financial Crisis: The Regulation of Short 
Sales in the United Kingdom and the United States', Northwestern Journal of 
International Law \& Business, vol. 30, no. 1, pp. 201, Available: ISSN: 
01963228. 
McKibbin, W.J. and Stoeckel, A. (2009) 'Modelling the global financial crisis', 
Oxf.Rev.Econ.Policy, vol. 25, no. 4, pp. 581-607, Available: ISSN: 0266903X. 
Merton, R.C. and Bodie, Z. (1995) 'A Conceptual Framework for Analyzing the 
Financial Environment' Harvard Business School Press. 
Miller, G.P. and Rosenfeld, G. (2010) 'Intellectual Hazard: how Conceptual 
Biases in Complex Organizations Contributed to the Crisis of 2008', Harvard 
Journal of Law \& Public Policy, vol. 33, no. 2, pp. 807, Available: ISSN: 
01934872. 
Minford, P. (2010) 'The banking crisis as dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrium', CESifo Econ.Stud., vol. 56, no. 4, pp. 554-574, Available: ISSN: 
1610241X. 
Minsky, H.P. (1977) 'A Theory of Systemic Fragility', in Altman, E.I. and 
Sametz, A.W. (ed.) Financial Crises: Institutions and Markets in a Fragile 
Environment, New York: John Wiley \& Sons. 
Minsky, H.P. (1993) 'The Financial Instability Hypothesis', in Arestis, P. and 
Sawyer, M. (ed.) Handbook of Radical Political Economy, Aldershot: Edward 
Elgar. 
PhD - Cranfield University, January 2014. T.ILIN 
 
312 
Mishkin, F.S. (1992) 'Anatomy of a Financial Crisis', Journal of Evolutionary 
Economics, vol. 2, pp. 115-130. 
Mishkin, F.S. (1999) 'Global financial instability: Framework, events, issues', 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 13, no. 4, pp. 3-20, Available: ISSN: 
08953309. 
Morgan, D.L. (2007) 'Paradigms Lost and Pragmatism Regained', Journal of 
Mixed Methods Research, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 48-76. 
Mrotzek, M. and Ossimitz, G. (2008) 'Catastrophe Archetypes - Using system 
dynamics to build an integrated systemic theory of catastrophes', The 2008 
Conference of the System Dynamics Society. 
Mundy, C. (2004) 'The nature of risk: The nature of systemic risk - trying to 
achieve a definition', Balance Sheet, vol. 12, no. 5, pp. 29-31, Available: ISSN: 
09657967. 
Myerson, R.B. (1999) 'Nash equilibrium and the history of economic theory', 
Journal of Economic Literature, vol. 37, no. 3, pp. 1067-1082. 
Nelson, R.R. (2012) 'Demand, Supply, and Their Interaction on Markets, As Seen 
From the Perspective of Evolutionary Economic Theory', Journal of 
Evolutionary Economics, vol. Published online: 23rd June 2012. 
Nelson, R.R. and Winter, S.G. (1982) An Evolutionary Theory of Economic 
Change, Belknap Press. 
Nelson, R.R. and Winter, S.G. (2002) 'Evolutionary Theorising in Economics', 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 16, pp. 23-46. 
Nicolo, G.D., Bartholomew, P., Jahanara, Z. and Zephirin, M. (2004) 'Bank 
consolidation, internationalization, and conglomeration: trends and 
implications for financial risk', Financial Markets, Institutions & Instruments, 
vol. 13, no. 4, November, pp. 173-217. 
Nicolo, G.D. and Kwast, M.L. (2002) 'Systemic risk and financial consolidation: 
Are they related?', Journal of Banking & Finance, no. 26, pp. 861-880. 
PhD - Cranfield University, January 2014. T.ILIN 
 
313 
Nielsson, U. and Torfason, B.K. (2012) 'Iceland's Economic Eruption and 
Meltdown', Scandinavian Economic History Review, vol. 60, no. 1, pp. 3-30. 
Nier, E.W. (2011) 'Macroprudential policy - taxonomy and challenges', 
Natl.Inst.Econ.Rev., vol. 216, no. 1, pp. 1-15, Available: ISSN: 00279501. 
Nier, E., Yang, J., Yorulmazer, T. and Alentorn, A. (2007) 'Network models and 
financial stability', J.Econ.Dyn.Control, vol. 31, no. 6, pp. 2033-2060, 
Available: ISSN: 01651889. 
O'brien, C. (2010) 'Insurance Regulation and the Global Financial Crisis: A 
Problem of Low Probability Events', Geneva Papers on Risk \& Insurance, vol. 
35, no. 1, pp. 35, Available: ISSN: 10185895. 
Oeffner, M. (2008) Doctoral Thesis. Agent-Based Keynesian Macroeconomics: 
An evolutionary model embedded in an agent-based computer simulation, 
University of Wurzburg. 
Oren, T.I. and Zeigler, P.B. (2012) 'System theoretic foundations of modeling and 
simulation: a historic perspective and the legacy of A. Wayne Wymore.', 
Simulation, September, pp. 1033-1046. 
Osawa, J. (2013) 'Is Cyber War Around the Corner? Collective Cyber Defense in 
the Near Future', Brookings East Asia Commentary, November. 
Panageas, S. (2010) 'Bailouts, the incentive to manage risk, and financial crises', 
J.Financ.Econ., vol. 95, no. 3, pp. 296-311, Available: ISSN: 0304405X. 
Patro, D.K., Qi, M. and Sun, X. (2012) 'A Simple Indicator of Systemic Risk', 
Journal of Financial Stability, vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 105-116. 
Pattanaik, S. (2008) 'Gaping Fault Lines in the Global Financial Stability 
Architecture: Lessons from the US Sub-Prime Crisis', Journal of International 
and Area Studies, vol. 15, no. 2, pp. 87--, Available: ISSN: 12268550. 
Pawar, B. (2009) Theory Building for Hypothesis Specification in Organizational 
Studies, London: Response Books, Sage. 
Petersen, M.A., Senosi, M.C., Mukuddem-Petersen, J., Mulaudzi, M.P. and 
Schoeman, I.M. (2009) 'Did bank capital regulation exacerbate the subprime 
PhD - Cranfield University, January 2014. T.ILIN 
 
314 
mortgage crisis?', Discrete Dyn.Nat.Soc., vol. 2009, Available: ISSN: 
10260226. 
Pfeffer, J. (1982) Organizations and Organization Theory, Boston: Pitman. 
Poirot, C.S..J. (2001) 'Financial integration under conditions of chaotic hysteresis: 
The Russian financial crisis of 1998', Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, 
vol. 23, no. 3, pp. 485-507, Available: ISSN: 01603477. 
Popper, K.R. (1959) The logic of scientific discovery, London: Hutchinson. 
Popper, K.R. (1963) Conjectures and Refutations: The growth of scientific 
knowledge, Harper Torchbooks. 
Popper, K. (1979) Objective Knowledge: An evolutionary approach, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford. 
Post, D.E. and Votta, L.G. (2005) 'Computational science demands a new 
paradigm', Physics Today, January, pp. 35-41. 
Potts, J. (2000) The New Evolutionary Microeconomics: Complexity, Competence 
an Adaptive Behaviour, E. Elgar Publishers. 
Prigogine, I. (1997) 'Non-Linear Science and the Laws of Nature', Journal of The 
Franklin Institute, vol. 334B, no. 5/6, pp. 745-759. 
Pruden, H.O., Paranque, B. and Baets, W. (2004) 'Interpreting Data from an 
Experiment on Irrational Exuberance: applying a cusp catastrophe model and 
technical analysis rules', Journal of Technical Analysis, vol. Winter-Spring, pp. 
1-7. 
Quiggin, J. (2010) Zombie Economics: How Dead Ideas Still Walk Among Us, 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Raberto, M., Cincotti, S., Focardi, S.M. and Marchesi, M. (2001) 'Agent-based 
simulation of a financial market', Physica A: Statistical mechanics and its 
applications, vol. 299, no. 1, pp. 319-327. 
Rao, T.V.S.R. (2010) 'Financial crisis, efficient bailouts, and regulatory policy', 
Macroeconomics and Finance in Emerging Market Economies, vol. 3, no. 2, 
September, pp. 167-188. 
PhD - Cranfield University, January 2014. T.ILIN 
 
315 
Read, C. (1838) Logic, deductive and inductive, Grant Richards. 
Reinhart, C.M. and Rogoff, K.S. (2009) This time is different: Eight centuries of 
financial folly, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 
Renn, O. and Klinke, A. (2004) 'Systemic risks: a new challenge for risk 
management.', EMBO Rep., vol. 5 Spec No, pp. 41-46, Available: ISSN: 
1469221X. 
Renyi, A. (1961) 'On Measures of Entropy and Information', Fourth Berkeley 
Symposium on Mathematical Statistics and Probability, 547-561. 
Rizzi, J.V. (2008) 'Behavioral Basis of the Financial Crisis', Journal of Applied 
Finance, vol. 18, no. 2, pp. 84-96, Available: ISSN: 15346668. 
Robinson, D.W. (2008) 'Entropy and Uncertainty', Entropy, vol. 10, pp. 493-506. 
Rochet, J.-C. (2003) 'Why are there so many banking crises?', Economic Studies, 
vol. 49, no. 2, pp. 141-155. 
Rochet, J.-C. (2009) 'Regulating Systemic Institutions', Finnish Economic 
Papers, vol. 22, no. 2, pp. 35-46, Available: ISSN: 07845197. 
Rochet, J.-C. (2010) 'Systemic risk: Changing the regulatory perspective', 
Int.J.Cent.Bank., vol. 6, no. 4, pp. 259-276, Available: ISSN: 18154654. 
Rochet, J.-C. and Tirole, J. (1996) 'Interbank lending and systemic risk', 
J.Money Credit Bank., vol. 28, no. 4, pp. 733-762, Available: ISSN: 00222879. 
Rosser Jr, J.B. (2000) From Catastrophe to Chaos: A general theory of economic 
discontinuities (second edition), Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
Rosser Jr, J.B. (2007) 'The Rise and Fall of Catastrophe Theory Applications in 
Economics: Was the baby thrown out with the bathwater?', Journal of 
Economic Dynamics \& Control, vol. 31, pp. 3255-3280. 
Rosser Jr, J.B. (2008) 'Constructivist Logic and Emergent Evolution in 
Economics', Presentation to K. Vela Velupillai. 
Rosser Jr, J.B. (2009) 'Computational and Dynamic Complexity in Economics', in 
Handbook of Complexity Research, Edward Elgar. 
PhD - Cranfield University, January 2014. T.ILIN 
 
316 
Rosser Jr, J.B. (2010) 'Is a Transdisciplinary Perspective on Economic 
Complexity Possible', Journal of Economic Behavior \& Organization, vol. 75, 
no. 1, pp. 3-11. 
Rosser Jr, J.B. (2010) 'Post Keynesian Perspectives and Complex Ecologic-
Economic Dynamics', Metroeconomica, vol. 62, no. 1, pp. 96-121. 
Rotheli, T.F. (2010) 'Causes of the financial crisis: Risk misperception, policy 
mistakes, and banks' bounded rationality', J.Socio-econ., vol. 39, no. 2, pp. 
119-126, Available: ISSN: 10535357. 
Safarzynska, K., Frenken, K. and van den Bergh, J.C.J.M. (2012) 'Evolutionary 
Theorising and Modeling of Sustainability Transitions', Research Policy, vol. 
41, pp. 1011-1024. 
Safarzynska, K. and van den Bergh, J.C.J.M. (2010a) 'Evolutionary models in 
economics: a survey of methods and building blocks', Journal of Evolutionary 
Economics, vol. 20, pp. 329-373. 
Safarzynska, K. and van den Bergh, J.C.J.M. (2010b) 'Demand-Supply 
Coevolution with Multiple Increasing Returns: Policy analysis for unlocking 
and system transitions', Technological Forecasting and Social Change, vol. 77, 
no. 2, pp. 297-317. 
Sargent, R.G. (1996) 'Verifying and Validating Simulation Models', Winter 
Simulation Conference, 55-64. 
Scardovi, C., Gatti, S. and Ventola, D. (2010) 'Market crises, the financial system 
and the real economy: Analysis and implications for the global financial 
services industry', Journal of Risk Management in Financial Institutions, vol. 
3, no. 3, pp. 211-230, Available: ISSN: 17528887. 
Scheffer, M., Bascompte, J., Brock, W.A., Brovkin, V., Carpenter, S.R., Dakos, 
V., Held, H., van Nes, E.H., Rietkerk, M. and Sugihara, G. (2009) 'Early-
Warning Signals for Critical Transitions', Nature, vol. 461, no. 3, pp. 53-59. 
Scheffer, M., Carpenter, S.R., Lenton, T.M., Bascompte, J., Brock, W., Dakos, V., 
van de Koppel, J., van de Leemput, I.A., Levin, S.A., van Nes, E.H., Pascual, 
PhD - Cranfield University, January 2014. T.ILIN 
 
317 
M. and Vandermeer, J. (2012) 'Anticipating Critical Transitions', Science, vol. 
338, pp. 344-348. 
Schich, S. (2010) 'Insurance Companies and the Financial Crisis', OECD Journal: 
Financial Market Trends, vol. 2009, no. 2, pp. 123, Available: ISSN: 
19952864. 
Schwarcz, S.L. (2008) 'Systemic risk', --. 
Schwarcz, S.L. (2011) 'Identifying and Managing Systemic Risk: An assessment 
of our progress', Harvard Business Law Review Online, vol. 1, pp. 94-104. 
Scott, R.C. and Sattler, E.L. (1983) 'Catastrophe Theory in Economics', Journal of 
Economic Education, vol. 14, no. 3, pp. 48-59. 
Shaffer, S. (2007) 'Aggregate concentration and the cost of systemic risk', 
Appl.Econ.Lett., vol. 14, no. 6, pp. 425-428, Available: ISSN: 13504851. 
Shannon, C.E. (1948) 'A Mathematical Theory of Communication', The Bell 
System Technical Journal, vol. 27, July, October, pp. 379-423, 623-656. 
Sheldon, G. and Maurer, M. (1998) 'Interbank Lending and Systemic Risk: An 
empirical analysis for Switzerland', Reveu Swisse d Economie Politique et de 
Statistique, vol. 134, pp. 685-704. 
Shiller, R.J. (2000) Irrational Exuberance, John Wiley \& Sons. 
Shiller, R.J. (2003) 'From Efficient Markets Theory to Behavioral Finance', 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 17, no. 1, pp. 83-104. 
Shin, H.S. (2009)a 'Reflections on Northern Rock: The Bank Run that Heralded 
the Global Financial Crisis', Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 23, no. 1, 
pp. 101-120, Available: ISSN: 08953309. 
Shin, H.S. (2009)b 'Securitisation and financial stability', Econ.J., vol. 119, no. 
536, pp. 309-332, Available: ISSN: 00130133. 
Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R.W. (2010) 'Unstable banking', J.Financ.Econ., vol. 97, 
no. 3, pp. 306-318, Available: ISSN: 0304405X. 
PhD - Cranfield University, January 2014. T.ILIN 
 
318 
Sigurjonsson, T.O. (2010) 'The Icelandic Bank collapse: Challenges to 
governance and risk management', Corp.Gov., vol. 10, no. 1, pp. 33-45, 
Available: ISSN: 14720701. 
Simpson, J.L. (2010) 'Were there warning signals from banking sectors for the 
2008/2009 global financial crisis?', Appl.Financ.Econ., vol. 20, no. 1-2, pp. 45-
61, Available: ISSN: 09603107. 
Skaggs, N.T. (2003) 'H. D. Macleod and the Origins of The Theory of Finance in 
Economic Develeopment', History of Political Economy, vol. 35, no. 3, pp. 
361-384. 
Slattery, D. and Nellis, J.G. (2011) 'Rethinking the role of regulation in the 
aftermath of the global financial crisis - the case for the UK', Panoeconomicus, 
vol. 58, no. 3, pp. 407-423. 
Smelser, N.J. (1962) Theory of Collective Behavior, The Free Press, New York, 
Macmillan. 
Smith, E.R. and Conrey, F.R. (2007) 'Agent-Based Modeling: A new approach for 
theory building in social psychology', Personality and Social Psychology 
Review, vol. 11, no. 1, pp. 87-104. 
Somit, A. and Peterson, S.A. (1992) The Dynamics of Evolution: The punctuated 
equilibrium debate in the natural and social sciences, Cornell University Press. 
Stiglitz, J.E. (1999) 'Reforming the global economic architecture: Lessons from 
recent crises', The Journal of Finance, vol. 54, no. 4, pp. 1508-1522, Available: 
ISSN: 00221082. 
Stiglitz, J. (2010) 'Lessons from the Global Financial Crisis of 2008', Seoul 
Journal of Economics, vol. 23, no. 3, pp. 321-339, Available: ISSN: 12250279. 
Strogatz, S.H. (1994) Nonlinear Dynamics and Chaos, Westview Press. 
Sussmann, H.J. and Zahler, R.S. (1978) 'Catastrophe Theory As Applied to the 
Social and Biological Sciences', Synthese, vol. 37, no. 2, pp. 117-216. 
Sutton, R.I. and Staw, B.M. (1995) 'What theory is not', Adm.Sci.Q., vol. 40, no. 
3, pp. 371-384. 
PhD - Cranfield University, January 2014. T.ILIN 
 
319 
Sy, A.N.R. (2009) 'The Systemic Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies and Rated 
Markets', World Economics, vol. 10, no. 4, pp. 69-108, Available: ISSN: 
14681838. 
Tannenbaum, C.R. (2007) 'The incredible shrinking banking industry', Bus.Econ., 
vol. 42, no. 4, pp. 16-21, Available: ISSN: 0007666X. 
Tesfatsion, L. (2006) 'Agent-based computational economics: A constructive 
approach to economic theory', in Handbook of computational economics, 
Elsevier. 
Thom, R. (1975)b 'Catastrophe Theory: its present state and future perspectives', 
in Manning, A. (ed.) Dynamical Systems - Warwick 1974. Lecture Notes in 
Mathematics, Springer, Berlin. 
Thom, R. (1975)a Structural Stability and Morphogenesis: an outline of a theory 
of models, Reading: Benjamin. 
Thom, R. (1977) 'Structural Stability, Catastrophe Theory, and Applied 
Mathematics: The John von Neumann Lecture, 1976', SIAM Review, vol. 19, 
no. 2, pp. 189-201. 
Thom, R. (1983) Mathematical Models of Morphogenesis, Ellis Harwood, 
Chichester. 
Trichet, J.C. (2010) 'Macroprudential Regulation As An Approach To Contain 
Systemic Risk: Economic foundations, diagnostic tools and policy 
instruments', Speech at 13th Conference of teh ECB-CFS Research Network, 
European Central Bank. 
Tsomocos, D.P. (2003) 'Equilibrium analysis, banking and financial instability', 
J.Math.Econ., vol. 39, no. 5-6, pp. 619-655, Available: ISSN: 03044068. 
Tularam, G.A. and Subramanian, B. (2013) 'Modeling of Financial Crises: A 
critical analysis of models leading to the global financial crisis', Global Journal 
of Business Research, vol. 7, no. 3, pp. 101-124. 
Tumer, K. and Agogino, A. (2007) 'Distributed agent-based air traffic flow 
management', AAMAS'07, Honolulu, Hawai'i, USA, 330-337. 
PhD - Cranfield University, January 2014. T.ILIN 
 
320 
Turner, R.H. and Killian, L.M. (1987) Collective Behavior, 3rd edition, 
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. 
Uhlig, H. (2010) 'A model of a systemic bank run', J.Monet.Econ., vol. 57, no. 1, 
pp. 78-96, Available: ISSN: 03043932. 
Upper, C. (2011) 'Simulation methods to assess the danger of contagion in 
interbank markets', J.Financ.Stab., vol. 7, no. 3, pp. 111-125, Available: ISSN: 
15723089. 
van den Bergh, J.C.J.M. and Gowdy, J.M. (2000) 'Evolutionary Theories in 
Environmental and Resource Economics: Approaches and Applications', 
Environmental and Resource Economics, vol. 17, pp. 37-57. 
Van Doren, P. (2011) 'Collapse of Shadow Banking', Regulation, vol. 34, no. 2, 
pp. 53, Available: ISSN: 01470590. 
Vedder, R. (2009) 'The Evolving Global Financial System', Journal USA, vol. 14, 
no. 5, pp. 27-30. 
Vedral, V. (2011) 'Living in a Quantum World', Scientific American, vol. 304, no. 
6, pp. 38-43. 
Velupillai, K.V. (2005) 'The Unreasonable Ineffectiveness of Mathematics in 
Economics', Cambridge Journal of Economics, vol. 29, no. 6, pp. 849-872. 
Venkatasubramanian, V. (2011) 'Systemic failures: Challenges and opportunities 
in risk management in complex systems', AIChE J., vol. 57, no. 1, pp. 2-9, 
Available: ISSN: 00011541. 
Wacker, J.G. (1998) 'A definition of theory: research guidelines for different 
theory-building research methods in operations management', J.Oper.Manage., 
vol. 16, no. 4, pp. 361-385. 
Wagner, W. (2006) 'Diversification at financial institutions and systemic crises', 
Journal of Financial Intermediation, vol. 19, no. 3, pp. 373-386, Available: 
ISSN: 10429573. 
PhD - Cranfield University, January 2014. T.ILIN 
 
321 
Wagner, W. (2008) 'The homogenization of the financial system and financial 
crises', J.Financ.Intermediation, vol. 17, no. 3, pp. 330-356, Available: ISSN: 
10429573. 
Walby, S. (2010) 'A social science research agenda on the financial crisis', 
Twenty-First Century Soc., vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 19-31, Available: ISSN: 
17450144. 
Wallison, P.J. (2008) 'Everything You Wanted to Know about Credit Default 
Swaps: But Were Never Told', Journal of Structured Finance, vol. 15, no. 2, 
pp. 20-30, Available: ISSN: 15519783. 
Weick, K.E. (1989) 'Theory Construction as Disciplined Imagination', Academy of 
Management Review, vol. 14, no. 4, pp. 516-531. 
Weick, K.E. (1995) 'What Theory Is Not, Theorising Is', Administrative Science 
Quarterly, vol. 40, pp. 385-390. 
Weiner, E.J. (2010) The Shadow Market, Oneworld. 
Weitzner, D. and Darroch, J. (2009) 'Why moral failures precede financial crises', 
Crit.Perspect.Int.Bus., vol. 5, no. 1-2, pp. 6-13, Available: ISSN: 17422043. 
Whetten, D.A. (1989) 'What constitutes a theoretical contribution?', The Academy 
of Management Review, vol. 14, no. 4, pp. 490-495. 
Williamson, S.D. (2011) 'A Defense of Contemporary Economics: John Quiggin's 
Zombie Economics in Review', Washington University in St Louis, mimeo, pp. 
1-27. 
Wilson, J.O.S., Casu, B., Girardone, C. and Molyneux, P. (2010) 'Emerging 
themes in banking: Recent literature and directions for future research', 
Br.Account.Rev., vol. 42, no. 3, pp. 153-169, Available: ISSN: 08908389. 
Windrum, P., Fagiolo, G. and Moneta, A. (2007) 'Empirical validation of agent-
based models: Alternatives and prospects', Journal of Artificial Societies and 
Social Simulation, vol. 10, no. 2, pp. 8. 
Wolf, C.J. (1999) 'Financial crises and the challenge of "moral hazard"', Society, 
vol. 36, no. 5, pp. 60-62, Available: ISSN: 01472011. 
PhD - Cranfield University, January 2014. T.ILIN 
 
322 
Wolfson, M.H. (2002) 'Minsky's Theory of Financial Crises in a Global Context', 
Journal of Economic Issues (Association for Evolutionary Economics), vol. 36, 
no. 2, pp. 393-400, Available: ISSN: 00213624. 
Woodcock, A. and Davis, M. (1978) A Revolutionary Way of Understanding How 
Things Change - Catastrophe Theory, Penguin. 
Worren, N.A., Moore, K. and Elliott, R. (2002) 'When theories become tools: 
Toward a framework for pragmatic validity', Human Relations, vol. 55, no. 10, 
pp. 1227-1250. 
Xafa, M. (2010) 'Role of the Imf in the Global Financial Crisis', Cato Journal, 
vol. 30, no. 3, pp. 475, Available: ISSN: 02733072. 
Xu, Y. and Liu, D. (2010) 'Empirical study on the contagion effect of financial 
crisis', In Computer Application and System Modeling (ICCASM), 2010 
International Conference on, vol. 5, pp. V5-560.  
Yang, D., Mu, D. and Yao, M. (2009) 'Analysis of Financial Crisis: A 
perspective based on catastrope theory', Management and Service Science 
2009, MASS'09., 1-4. 
Ye, K., Wang, S., Wang, H. and Miao, B. (2009) 'Ontology based multi-agent 
system for financial systemic risk management', Education Technology and 
Training, 2008. and 2008 International Workshop on Geoscience and Remote 
Sensing. ETT and GRS 2008. vol. 2, pp. 609-612. 
Zeeman, E.C. (1976) 'Catastrophe Theory', Scientific American Magazine, April, 
pp. 65-70, 75-83. 
Zeidan, R. and Richardson, K. (2010) 'Complexity Theory and the Financial 
Crisis: a Critical Review', Corporate Finance Review, vol. 14, no. 6, pp. 10--, 
Available: ISSN: 1089327X. 
Zhou, C. (2010) 'Are banks too big to fail? Measuring systemic importance of 
financial institutions', Int.J.Cent.Bank., vol. 6, no. 4, pp. 205-250, Available: 
ISSN: 18154654. 
 
PhD - Cranfield University, January 2014. T.ILIN 
 
323 
APPENDICES 
 
  
PhD - Cranfield University, January 2014. T.ILIN 
 
324 
  
PhD - Cranfield University, January 2014. T.ILIN 
 
325 
Appendix A.  AWARD 
 
 
 
 
  
PhD - Cranfield University, January 2014. T.ILIN 
 
326 
  
PhD - Cranfield University, January 2014. T.ILIN 
 
327 
Appendix B.  LITERATURE REVIEW METHODOLOGY 
B.1 Process 
Project 1 of this programme of research implemented the first three stages and 
seven steps of the prescribed Cranfield University process for a systematic review 
of literature (see Figure 34 below), within a customized review methodology (see 
Figure 6). The following sub-sections outline each step, and the review protocol 
of Appendix C provides further detail. 
  
 
Figure 34: The Cranfield Systematic Review of Literature Process 
B.2 Artefacts 
A review methodology is a set of methods, techniques and tools selected for 
implementing a review process. It describes the way they can generally be used 
together in producing planned outcomes. Whereas, a protocol pre-determines the 
details of how a particular review will be conducted using that process and 
methodology, and specifies the type and nature of planned outcomes. This 
appendix provides a generic overview of the process followed. Then the protocol 
Stage 1: Planning the Review
Step 1 – Forming a review panel
Step 2 – Mapping your field of study
Step 3 – Producing a review protocol
Stage 2: Identifying and evaluating studies
Step 4 – Conducting a systematic search
Step 5 – Evaluating studies
Stage 3: Extracting and synthesizing data
Step 6 – Conducting data extraction
Step 7 – Conducting data synthesis
Stage 4: Reporting
Step 8 – Reporting the findings
Stage 5: Utilising the findings
Step 9 – Informing research
Step 10 – Informing practice
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is outlined in Appendix C, and Appendix D describes how the systematic review 
was actually conducted. 
B.3 Implementation 
Output from the scoping study formed the primary input to the methodology, for 
use in review process steps such as: mapping the field of study and producing a 
review protocol. The top swim-lane of Figure 6 shows that input feeding into the 
protocol at flowpoint 1. In a similar way, each step of the systematic review 
process has equivalent features in the methodology. The next two swim-lanes 
show how literature is searched, collected, organized and screened to produce a 
set of approved contributions. A complete audit trail is maintained, with summary 
statistics (see Table 2) organized by retention criteria, for tasks T2 to T4 in the 
methodology. Then approved contributions are evaluated against quality criteria 
in task T4, and excluded or graded; and subsequently selected for data extraction 
and synthesis in tasks T5 and T6, also with a complete audit trail. Finally, in task 
T7 analysis is performed on the data extracted, and synthesis results are 
assimilated for subsequent interpretation. 
The methodology diagram in Figure 6 also shows the technology environment 
used to implement this review, along with actual results statistics. It was the first 
design artefact produced by the project, and provides an overview of the process 
to be followed, methods to be applied, and tools to be used in sufficient detail that, 
when combined with further explanations in the following sections, also shows 
how to replicate, verify and independently assess the plausibility of literature 
findings presented in this thesis. Apart from general functionality available on a 
personal computer running Microsoft Office applications under the Windows 
operating system, with an internet browser and broadband internet access, the 
implementation also used: RefWorks 2.0 for bibliography collection and 
management; NVivo9 to organize, analyse and visualize the literature; and JabRef 
for reference formatting. The university library’s Shibboleth on-line literature 
search facility provided access to academic databases, and occasional use of 
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GOOGLE Scholar enabled ad-hoc searches for supplementary material such as 
missing full-text versions of papers and grey literature. 
A full set of reference data about articles gathered has been retained, and is 
available as soft-copy in the formats of the tools used (provided on a companion 
zip-file submitted with this thesis). This can be used for literature results 
verification if required. In addition, complete reference lists for all core and 
selected literature contributions reviewed are given in the reference section of this 
document. The following sub-sections describe steps 1 to 7. 
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B.4 Steps 
B.4.1 Step 1: Forming the Review Panel 
The first step in the Cranfield Systematic Review Methodology requires that an 
academic review panel is established for the review process. This panel provides 
the necessary oversight and guidance to ensure the quality of research produced, 
and its relevance.  
 
 
Person 
Title / 
Organisation Involvement 
Prof. Joe Nellis 
• Director of 
School of 
Management 
• Director of 
Policy, Strategy 
& Performance 
Community 
• Professor of 
International 
Management 
Economics 
• Co-Supervisor 
• Sense check on output at each stage 
• Economics Literature 
• General guidance 
 
Dr. Liz Varga 
 
• Director, 
Complex 
Systems 
Research Centre 
• Senior Research 
Officer 
• Co-Supervisor 
• Sense check on output at each stage 
• Complex Systems Literature 
• Computational Modelling Practicality 
• General guidance 
Dr. Colin Pilbeam 
• Senior Research 
Fellow, 
Management 
Research 
• Panel Chairman 
• Research Evaluation 
• Systematic Review methodology 
Heather Woodfield 
• Kings Norton 
Library 
• Cranfield 
• Library support 
Table 11: The Review Panel 
After the scoping study, the proposal for this systematic review of literature 
was discussed by Cranfield University faculty members of the School of 
Management. Initially, Prof. Alan Harrison assumed the Lead Supervisor role, 
with Dr. Colin Pilbeam taking the Panel Chair, and Dr. Liz Varga taking the 
additional Panel Member role. Prof. Joe Nellis later kindly agreed to take on a 
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subject matter advisory role. Then, after the retirement of Prof. Harrison, Prof. 
Nellis and Dr. Varga agreed to jointly assume the supervisory role as Co-
Supervisors. Heather Woodfield also agreed to provide library support. 
The Review Panel so formed advised on all matters of review procedure, 
conducted panel meetings to examine progress, and generally supervised the 
direction of this research. In regards to matters such as Protocol development, 
they were also actively involved in challenging and guiding the nature of its 
contents, and fulfilling the role of research observers to ensure the claims made by 
this systematic review of literature were consistent with Cranfield University’s 
Systematic Review Process and standards. While performing their assumed 
duties, they nevertheless showed every personal kindness and consideration for 
the conflicting academic and professional demands on this researcher’s time. 
B.4.2 Step 2: Mapping the Field of Study 
The boundaries, findings, conclusions and proposals of the scoping study paper 
preceding this review are assessed in this step.  
In that study, a general business issue is used to: scope, search and collect a 
literature sample; identify the central and peripheral contributions to addressing 
that issue; draw a venn diagram of the in-scope domains and themes of literature 
(see see Figure 8); select the most important contribution of literature for each 
overlapping area in that diagram (see Table 12); analyse the research approaches 
and philosophies in this sample (see Table 13 and Table 14); identify and appraise 
the topics of research conversation found, and develop assertions about a gap in 
knowledge related to the business issue (see Figure 35); conceptualise that gap 
(see Table 15); and build a categorisation of the significant conversations at the 
boundaries of knowledge about that gap (see Table 16). Finally, out of this set of 
artefacts a literature hypothesis, research focus, and research problem are 
developed. 
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Domains 
{Themes} 
Literature number / reference 
1+       4 
{(a∩b)\c} 
1. Acharya, Viral V. (2009) “A Theory of Systemic Risk and Design of 
Prudential Bank Regulation”, Journal of Financial Stability, 5, pp 224-255 
1+3 
{(a∩b)\c} 
2. Arthur, W. Brian (2006) “Out-of-Equilibrium Economics and Agent-Based 
Modelling”, In Handbook of Computational Economics, Vol. 2: Agent-Based 
Computational Economics, K. Judd and L. Tesfatsion, eds, Chapter 32, pp 
1551-1564 
3+1 
{(a∩b)\c} 
3. Beinhocker, Eric D. (2010) “Evolution as Computation: Implications for 
Economic Theory and Ontology”, Journal of Institutional Economics, Accepted 
for the special issue on evolution and institutions, Cambridge Science Journals. 
3+1 
{(a∩b)∩c} 
4. Buchanan, Mark (2009) “Meltdown Modelling – could agent-based 
computer models prevent another financial crisis?”, Nature, 460, pp 680-682. 
1+4 
{(a∩b)\c} 
5. Colander, David; Föllmer, Hans; Haas, Armin; Goldberg, Michael; Juselius, 
Katrina; Kirman, Alan; Lux, Thomas and Sloth, Brigitte (2008) “The Financial 
Crisis and the Systemic Failure of Academic Economics”, Kiel Working Papers 
No 1489, Kiel Institute for the World Economy. 
1+3 
{(a∩b)\c} 
6. Farmer, J. Doyne and Geanakoplos, John (2008) “The virtues and vices of 
equilibrium and the future of financial economics”, Complexity, Special Issue: 
Econophysics, 14(3), pp 11-38. 
1+4 
{(a∩b)\c} 
7. Helbing, Dirk (2010) “Systemic Risks in Society and Economics”, Part of 
IRGC report on The Emergence of Risks: Contributing Factors, International 
Risk Governance Council.  
4+1 
{(a∩b)∩c} 
8. Hoogduin, Lex (2010) “Macroprudential instruments and frameworks: a 
stocktaking of issues and experiences”, CGFS Papers No 38, BIS. 
1* 
9. Hodgson, Geoffrey M. (2007) “Evolutionary and Institutional Economics as 
the New Mainstream?”, Evolutionary and Institutional Economic Review, 4(1), 
pp 7-25. 
2+3+5 
{(b∩c)\a} 
10. Lustick, Ian S. (2000) “Agent-Based Modelling of Collective Identity: 
Testing Constructivist Theory”, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social 
Simulation, 3(1). 
2* 11. Schmenner, Roger W. and Swink, Morgan L. (1998) “On theory in 
operations management”, Journal of Operations Management, 17, pp 97-113. 
2* 
12. Wacker, John G. (1998) “A definition of theory: research guidelines for 
different theory building research methods in operations management”, Journal 
of Operations Management, 16(4), pp 361-385. 
* Peripheral contributions without thematic allocations. 
Table 12: 12 contribution examples from the scoping study literature sample 
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Table 13: Scoping Study - Discipline Contribution by Decade 
 
 
 
Table 14: Scoping Study - Research Approach by Literature Domain Theme 
 
 
 Year 
Discipline Ea
rli
er
19
00
 -1
90
9
19
10
-1
91
9
19
20
-1
92
9
19
30
-1
93
9
19
40
-1
94
9
19
50
19
59
19
60
-1
96
9
19
70
-1
97
9
19
80
-1
98
9
19
90
-1
99
9
20
00
-2
00
9
20
10
-2
01
9
G
ra
nd
 T
ot
al
Economics 5 1   3  2 1 3 5 8 27 4 59
Operations Management       1 1  3 2  7
Complex Systems 1      2  2 1 3 6 1 16
Risk Management            6  6
 
Grand Total              88
Scoping
study -
sample
academic
literature
Theme
Research Approach of 
Contribution Sy
st
em
ic
 R
is
k
O
pe
ra
tio
na
l B
eh
av
io
ur
Sy
st
em
s 
(G
lo
ba
l F
in
an
ci
al
)
G
ra
nd
 T
ot
al
Ontology
 Realism 30 24 24 78
 Interpretivism 2 3 5 10
 Pragmatism     
 Constructivist 2 3 5 10
 Participatory   
 Positivist 30 24 24 78
 Action    
 Archival    
 Case 1  1
 Experimental Design   
 Theory Building 14 19 12 45
 Narrative   
 Participant Observation   
 Review 17 7 17 41
 Survey 1  1
 Discovery
 Exposure 18 8 17 43
 Invention 14 19 12 45
 Content Analysis
 Event Analysis
 Focus Groups
 Interviews
 Modelling 14 18 12 44
 Observations 18 8 17 43
 Questionnaires
 Simulation 1 1
 New Data
 New Methods
 New Perspective 18 8 18 44
 New Theory 14 19 11 44
Method
Epistemology
Methodology
Technique
Contribution Niche Scoping 
study -
sample
academic
literature
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Figure 35: Scoping study Gap Assertions 
 
 
 
 
Table 15: Conceptual gap in the literature 
 
 
Topic Systemic Risk Operational Behaviour Systems (Global Financial) 
Financial 
Crisis
● General equilibrium theory
● Theory of systemic fragility
● Financial stability hypothesis
● Anatomy of Financial crises 
● Systemic risk measurement
● Leading indicators for 
   prediction
● General theory of 
   employment, interest and 
   money
● Behavioural Finance
● Operational agility
● Business Cycles
Complexity
● Non-cooperative game theory ● Non-equilibrium and complex  
   behaviour
● Financial globalization
● Operations management
   systems
● Agent-based computational 
   economics
Collective 
Behaviour
● Vested interests in euphoria
● Crises following innovations
● Speculative bubbles
● Irrational exhuberance
● Contagion theory
● Theory of collective behaviour
● Emergent norm theory
● Threshold models of behaviour
● Cognitive dissonance
● Herd behaviour
● Behaviour of complex 
   phenomena
● Kinship Theory
● Reciprocation Theory
● Sociology + new systems
   theory
● Agent-based models
Evolution
● Evolutionary epistemology
● Evolutionary economics
● Macroeconomic resilience
?
● Evolutionary theory of 
   economic change
● Epistemics of operational risk
● Innovation and regulatoty 
   constraints
Theory
● Theory of systemic risk -  
   based on equilibrium 
   economics, risk shifting
   phenomena and correlations
   on returns on assets. ?
● Operational framework for 
   financial stability
Theme / Key Relevant Concepts
scoping
study -
sample
academic
articles
v
w
x
y
z
A comprehensive explanation is yet to be provided for: 
i. the fundamental nature of systemic risk in the Global Financial System; 
ii. ‘How’ systemic risk evolves in that system; 
iii. ‘How’ it operationally materializes as systemic failure; 
iv. ‘How’ that materialization could be prevented. 
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Significant Conversations: Re-stating the Conceptual Gap 
Participation in each conversation is illustrated by references to one or more of the 12 example 
contributions identified in the Example Contributions column, together with an indication of their 
originating topic or boundary. 
Num Conversation 
Example 
Contributions 
(Literature 
numbers  
from Table 12) 
Topic or  
Gap-
Boundary 
(from Table 15) 
S01 Discussions: about theory development 3, 11, 12 Theory 
S02 Assessments: of a potential gap in theory 
informing the research problem 
3, 4, 5, 7 v, w, y 
S03 Theories: about systemic risk 1, 2, 8, 10 v, z 
S04 Perspectives: on the system 6, 7, 9 w, y 
S05 Definitions: of systemic risk 1, 7, 8 v, y, z 
S06 Forms: of distress in the system 7, 9 w, y 
S07 Mechanisms: of systemic failure 2, 7, 10 w, x, y 
S08 Recognition: of the potential for systemic failure 2, 4, 8 y, z 
S09 Responses: to the potential for systemic failure 8 y 
S10 Effects: of systemic failure 7 w, x 
S11 Recovery: from systemic failure 7 w, y 
S12 Involvement: in the system 4, 10 x, y 
S13 Operations: of the system 9 w, y 
S14 Reviews: of systemic crises and failures 4 x, y 
Table 16: Significant Conversations 
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B.4.3 Step 3: Producing the Review Protocol 
Then a protocol is developed and documented for subsequent reference (see 
Appendix C).  
B.4.4 Step 4: Conducting the Systematic Search 
After preliminary work in developing the protocol and its artefacts is completed, 
the search begins (see Figure 6). 
B.4.5 Step 5: Evaluating Studies 
Titles and abstracts of search results from the previous step are then negatively 
screened against relevance discard criteria (i.e. relevant contributions are 
retained), and then full texts of relevant contributions are positively screened 
against significance criteria (i.e. approved contributions are retained). Finally, 
approved contributions are evaluated and graded according to quality criteria.  
B.4.6 Step 6: Conducting Data Extraction 
Contributions evaluated as being of acceptable quality are then analysed for 
synthesis data. The type of data required depends entirely on the type of synthesis 
proposed (see Appendix C.8). 
B.4.7 Step 7: Conducting Data Synthesis 
The final step of the prescriptive stages of this methodology then synthesizes 
findings from selected literature (see example in Figure 36 and Appendix C.9). 
The review conducted for this programme of research involved thematic synthesis 
of conjectures for theory development. 
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Appendix C.  LITERATURE REVIEW PROTOCOL 
C.1 Title: 
Exploring a potential gap in theory about catastrophic instability of the global 
financial system, and mitigation of its systemic risk of failure. 
C.2 Literature Review Questions: 
 
 
C.3 Search Strings: 
 
Table 17: Derivation of search strings from review questions 
 
 
Systematic Review Questions
(with reference to the global financial 
system)
Literature Domain Themes
a
Systemic Risk
b\a
Systems (Global Financial)
c\a
Operational Behaviour
Base string for each theme TITLE (systemic 
risk)
TITLE (bank OR banks OR 
banking OR financial)  
TITLE (operat* OR behav*) AND TITLE 
(bank OR banks OR banking OR regulat* 
OR firm*) 
AND AND
Q1 Nature:What is the nature of 
catastrophic instability or total 
collapse of this system? 
TITLE (cris* OR fail* OR 
crash* OR collaps* OR 
vulnerab* OR instability OR 
stability)
(breakdown OR mania* OR panic*) 
Q2 Meaning: What is meant by the 
risk of such an occurrence? 
AND (risk*) (OR threat* OR expos*) 
Q3 Materialization: How does that 
risk materialize?
(OR exuberan* OR greed* OR appetite* 
OR fear* OR hazard* OR collect* OR 
evol* OR bubble OR subprime OR sub-
prime OR suppl* OR demand*)
Q4 Mitigation: What can be done to 
mitigate that risk?
(OR mitiga* OR risk*) 
AND NOT (systemic risk) AND NOT (systemic risk)
Complete string for each theme TITLE (systemic 
risk) 
TITLE (bank OR banks OR 
banking OR financial) AND 
TITLE (cris* OR fail* OR 
crash* OR collaps* OR 
vulnerab* OR instability OR 
stability) AND (risk*) AND 
NOT (systemic risk)  
TITLE (operat* OR behav*) AND TITLE 
(bank OR banks OR banking OR regulat* 
OR firm*) AND (breakdown OR mania* 
OR panic* OR threat* OR expos* OR 
exuberan* OR greed* OR appetite* OR 
fear* OR hazard* OR collect* OR evol* 
OR bubble OR subprime OR sub-prime 
OR suppl* OR demand* OR mitiga* OR 
risk*) AND NOT (systemic risk) 
With reference to the Global Financial System . 
Q1. What is the nature of catastrophic instability or total collapse of this system ? 
Q2. What is meant by the risk of such an occurrence ? 
Q3. How does that risk materialize ? 
Q4. What can be done to mitigate that risk ? 
Figure 37: Systematic Review literature questions 
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C.4 Quality Appraisal: 
 
T4: Quality Score Definitions 
Criterion 0 - Unacceptable 1 - Acceptable 2 – Applicable (to 
review) 
Thinking Contributions in 
which claims are 
unclear or not 
grounded in the 
literature. 
Contributions in which 
claims and their 
relationship to the 
literature can be 
determined, but some 
concepts remain 
vague. 
Contributions in which 
claims are clear and 
well grounded in the 
literature, with 
applicable concepts 
declared and 
explained where 
necessary. 
Certainty and 
legitimacy 
Contributions in 
which plausibility or 
proof for arguments 
is not established. 
Contributions in which 
plausibility or proof for 
arguments is weak, or 
without relevant 
empirical evidence. 
Contributions in which 
plausibility or proof for 
applicable arguments 
is convincing, with 
empirical evidence 
where relevant. 
Kinds of 
knowledge 
Contributions that 
make assertions 
based on 
unjustified 
assumptions. 
Contributions that 
present tentative 
findings or concepts 
based on incomplete 
research, flawed 
analysis, or simply 
offer reasoned 
conjectures. 
Contributions that 
present fully developed 
findings or concepts 
based on good 
research practices, 
and/or analysis that 
provides applicable 
insights. 
Type of 
literature 
Contributions from 
literature sources 
that have 
undetermined or 
low academic 
credibility.  
Contributions from 
credible sources of 
literature that provide 
practice or policy 
perspectives (e.g. from 
government agencies, 
professional journals). 
Contributions from 
approved academic 
sources that provide 
peer-reviewed 
research content with 
clear aims and well 
reasoned applicable 
conclusions. 
Suitability for 
purpose 
Contributions in 
which implications 
or claims cannot be 
determined or 
applied. 
Contributions in which 
claims have limited or 
peripheral bearing on 
the review purpose. 
Contributions which 
claims to inform theory 
or introduce applicable 
knowledge-for-action 
and instrumentalism. 
Table 18: Quality Score Definitions 
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T4: Quality Criteria 
Criterion/ 
Grade Rationale 
G01 Good quality exemplar having a direct bearing on the research focus 
(at least three score two, including for the Suitability criterion). 
G02 Good or adequate quality exemplar for a distinct line of thinking (but 
not G01, due to only having an adequate quality or an indirect bearing on 
the research focus). 
G03 Supporting contribution (at least two score 2, with special relevance). 
G04 Unacceptable (score 0 for any criterion). 
G05 Low quality (less than two score 2). 
G06 At least adequate quality (two or more score 2) but not exemplar or 
support for a distinct strand of thinking. 
Table 19: Quality Criteria 
 
Evaluation Scores Summary for Approved Contributions 
 Exclusions Graded Selections 
G06 G05 G04 G03 G02 G01 
Contributions Discard 
Use in Descriptive Analysis 
 
Use in Interpretive 
Analysis and Thematic 
Synthesis 
 Table 20: Approval Evaluation Results 
 
C.5 Search Engines to be used: 
• ABI/ProQuest 
• EBSCO 
• SCOPUS 
• Google Scholar (for grey literature, theses, etc) 
• SSRN 
• Regulatory authorities (Bank of England, BIS, IMF, etc) 
• Professional Literature and Web-sites 
• Personal Reading Materials 
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C.6 Primary Research Formats: 
 
Format Prescribed Use 
Journal articles Peer-reviewed articles from quality journals are the primary source of 
information about relevant primary research. 
Conference 
Papers 
Conference presentations inform this review about relevant key conversations 
of interest to research communities, and possible future directions. 
Books Recent major contributions from respected academics serve as useful 
summaries of relevant current thinking, either for the work of those authors or 
about a scoped-in field of knowledge. 
Doctoral 
theses 
Provide another source of peer-reviewed contributions, if they are relevant but 
not summarised elsewhere in journal articles, conference papers or books. 
Working 
papers 
Provide a perspective on latest thinking in relevant research, and emerging 
conversations. However, selection should be limited to papers claiming 
publication acceptance which have not yet appeared in other formats. 
Literature 
reviews 
Book reviews are not included, but journal articles contributing reviews of 
relevant research literature should be collected in that format (see ‘Journal 
articles’ above). Books of interest were reviewed directly (see ‘Books’ above). 
Institutional 
Reports 
Publications from such sources as the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) 
on relevant topics should provide practitioner and regulatory perspectives. 
Professional 
papers 
Academic quality contributions from such sources as consultancy practices 
should be used to collect evidence of relevant industry trends. 
Documents on 
the internet 
Should be collected for background information, such as MS Powerpoint 
presentations from company websites. 
Reference/ 
Bibliography 
lists 
Citation lists from the above formats should be used to cross-check for any 
contributions otherwise missed. 
Table 21: Primary research formats 
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C.7 Selection Criteria Guidelines: 
 
T1: INCLUSION CRITERIA (ALL) 
A contribution must be included if it satisfies all criteria. 
Criterion Definition / Rational 
I01 A primary contribution published in the formats given in Table 21. 
See rational in 3.6.5(a). 
I02 Published in the English language. As this language is the standard for 
international communications in the global financial system, and the 
preliminary sample from the scoping study confirms that researchers in 
this field dispersed globally among academic institutions also appear to 
follow this standard when publishing their findings, literature in other 
languages has not been searched. 
I03 Published on any date before collection. Although the age of a 
contribution may diminish its relevance in later filtering. Sources vary in 
their earliest publications retained for each academic field. Historical 
reviews provide a cross-check on completeness when long timelines of 
research are necessary. 
I04 Belonging to any academic or professional discipline represented in 
the data sources. This is to ensure a multi-disciplinary research 
approach is taken. Irrelevant inclusions will be discarded during title and 
abstract screening after a deliberate assessment of potential opportunities 
for using existing insights from other disciplines in this field of study.  
I05 Collected on the dates of 16
th
 and 17
th
 August 2011. This is to ensure 
that accurate verification of the evidence presented is possible than could 
otherwise be the case if searches were conducted over an extended 
period of time. Includes three papers written by this author that have a 
combined total of more than 450 downloads logged against them on 
SSRN at the time of search, which may indicate that some awareness of 
the contributions already made by this programme of research may 
influence current academic thinking by the time the final thesis is 
submitted. 
Table 22: Inclusion Criteria 
T2: RELEVANCE DISCARD CRITERIA (assign to first applicable) 
A contribution must be discarded if any of the below criteria applies to it. The first 
applicable criterion must be allocated to it in the ascending hierarchy: D01 to Dupl. 
See sub-section 6.1.2 for a discussion of contribution examples filtered by each 
criterion. 
Criterion Rationale 
D01 From out-of-scope literature domains: that is, other than Economics, 
Operations Management, Complex Systems, or Risk Management, and 
offering no compensating insight that is applicable to the research 
problem. 
D02 Unrelated to any of the three themes: that is, other than Systemic Risk, 
Systems (Global Financial), or Operations Management, and offering no 
compensating insight that is applicable to the research problem. 
D03 Not pertinent to the research problem: as in using some key words but 
not addressing the systematic review questions, such as providing 
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Table 23: Relevance Discard Criteria 
 
T3: SIGNIFICANCE APPROVAL CRITERIA (assign to all applicable) 
A contribution is approved for significance if it belongs to at least one of the 
conversations (S01 to S14) in this literature, converted from Table 16 into the below 
rationale for significance approval. 
Criterion Rationale (significance is approved if a contribution is made to .) 
S01 Discussions about suitable theory development and testing 
approaches. 
S02 Assessments of the state of systemic risk theory. 
S03 Theories, models, frameworks and simulations about systemic risk. 
S04 Different perspectives on the system. 
S05 Definitions for systemic risk of failure, or similar terms. 
S06 Observed forms of distress in the system. 
S07 Explanations of how systemic failure arises out of distress in the 
system. 
S08 Explanations of how to recognize the potential for systemic failure. 
investment advice during crises, or analysing returns on risk-taking under 
turbulent conditions. 
D04 Unlikely to inform the systematic review questions: as in addressing 
some of the systematic review questions, but offering irrelevant insights 
such as for pricing improvements. 
D05 Inconclusive: as in simple commentary, unsupported opinions or book 
reviews. 
D06 Relevant insights expressed better in other contributions: as in 
confirmations or re-statements of general insights presented in other 
papers. 
D07 Superseded, disproven or outdated notions:  as in contexts where 
regulations, conditions or definitions have evolved, or new facts have 
emerged. 
D08 Missing data: for example, author, year, publication name etc. 
Dupl Duplicate: Not found previously by auto de-duplication in RefWorks. 
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  S09 Explanations of how to respond to the potential for systemic failure. 
S10 Descriptions of the effects of systemic failure. 
S11 Explanations of how to recover from systemic failure. 
S12 Examples of involvement in the system. 
S13 Explanations of the system’s operations. 
S14 Reviews of systemic crises and failures. 
Table 24: Significance Approval Criteria 
 
C.8 Data Extraction Method: 
 
Reference Type; Author; Year; Title; Secondary Author; Secondary Title; 
Place Published; Publisher; Volume; Number of Volumes; Number; Pages; 
Section; Tertiary Author; Tertiary Title; Edition; Date; Type of Work; Subsidiary 
Author; Short Title; Alternate Title; ISBN/ISSN; DOI; Original Publication; Reprint 
Edition; Reviewed Item; Custom 1 - Discipline; Custom 2 - Ontology; Custom 3 - 
Epistemology; Custom 4 - Method; Custom 5 - Methodology; Custom 6 - 
Technique; Custom 7 - Contribution Niche; Keywords; URL; Author Address; 
Name of Database; Database Provider; Added to Library; Last Updated. 
Table 25: Data Extraction Base Specification 
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C.9 Thematic Synthesis Method: 
 
Figure 38: Thematic Synthesis Method 
C.9.1 Aims 
Selection of an appropriate synthesis method is vitally important, but all such 
methods are known to have major weaknesses when they are applied to an 
evidence-base requiring consideration of such matters as diversity in research 
traditions, a wide spectrum and controversial mixtures of applied methods, 
differences in accepted formalisms and levels of empirical support, paradigm 
incompatibilities, and so on. When attempting to establish evidence for a gap in 
theory, to offer new insights about what is missing, such problems are 
compounded by conventional methods of theory-driven synthesis that aim to ‘go 
beyond’ existing primary research by introducing a ‘higher order’ theoretical 
structure equivalent to ‘third order interpretations’ from meta-ethnography 
(Britten et al, 2002; Campbell et al, 2003). This aim works well if new theory is 
likely to be synthesised out of existing primary studies, as in realist synthesis 
(Dixon-Woods et al, 2005), and when synthesising from an evidence-base in a 
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state of general accord with a dominant theoretical paradigm. However, it fails to 
be productive when a shift to a new paradigm may be required, and where the 
review strategy calls for a large scope of fertile but disparate evidence-base, 
possibly including unconventional combinations of academic disciplines, to solve 
a previously intractable problem.  
C.9.2 Terms 
Key terms used to explain this synthesis are defined as follows: 
Conversations 
Descriptive themes in the literature, identified as discussion topics of common 
interest relevant to some aspect of the literature hypothesis. 
Lines of Thinking 
Thematic ideas or opinions debated within conversations around which a 
consensus is formed in the literature. 
Exemplars 
A grade G01 quality contribution to the literature considered to represent a 
distinct expression or strand of a line of thinking. 
Answer Theme 
A consensus formed between exemplars, expressed as an interpretive theme, for 
responding to a literature search questions, derived from shared claims and 
commonly declared keywords. 
C.9.3 Method 
The qualitative method selected by this review combines both descriptive and 
interpretive thematic synthesis (Thomas and Harden, 2007; Barnett-Page and 
Thomas, 2009) to produce a weighted scoring of the explanatory value of current 
primary research for a pre-defined set of literature questions, using a descriptive 
scheme, declared interpretations, and a weighted scoring method. 
After identification, collection, screening and evaluation of the initial literature, 
to establish an evidence-base of selected contributions as prescribed earlier in this 
protocol for subsequent descriptive analysis, a core subset of exemplar literature 
would then be extracted from top-quality (G01) selected contributions for 
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synthesis in Task T5. The purpose of descriptive analysis would be to identify 
lines of thinking in the selected literature from research conversations revealed by 
the scoping study. Then each contribution would be assigned to one or more line 
of thinking, and mapped to the literature questions for which it provides insights. 
At a collective level, common insights of the contributions mapped to each 
question would then be interpreted as themes, in the form of answers inferred 
from that literature using keywords and explicit claims from abstracts. Then each 
contribution would be assigned to one or more of these answer themes, according 
to the insights they offer the literature questions, from the perspective of each line 
of thinking to which they contribute, and they would be scored for explanatory 
value as described in the next sub-section, to produce a detailed thematic analysis 
(see Appendix D.5). The lines of thinking with low explanatory score values (3 or 
less) would then be determined to offer the greatest potential for significant new 
contributions to knowledge and practice; a key assumption being that sufficient 
opportunity can be found for new contributions to existing lines of thinking 
without the need for creating another.  
Then a summary matrix of explanatory value would be constructed from that 
detailed thematic analysis, showing the sub-set of lines of thinking having scores 
of mostly 3 or below for contributions to the answers of a literature question (see 
Table 3). Gap assertions would then be derived from keywords in the text of 
associated questions, answers and lines of thinking, for use in the thematic 
synthesis of conjectures for theory development. 
C.9.4 Scoring 
Weighted scoring was determined to be calculated from core contributions by the 
following process: 
i. In Appendix D.5, core contributions are assigned to answer themes 
within literature questions within conversations or lines of thinking, 
according to their insight contributions. Then a score is selected for each 
contribution to this context, indicating that it either 1=implies, 
2=supports or 3=introduces insights. 
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ii. Next, these scores are weighted for coverage at answer theme levels for 
each context. A judgement is made regarding whether there are 
sufficient numbers and depth of contributions to the answer theme, 
providing a 1=partial or 2=broad coverage for this context. A coverage 
weighting is attributed to each answer theme, and each theme’s 
weighted score is the product of its coverage weighting and the highest 
contribution score among the contributions associated with that answer. 
iii. Finally, the weighted score calculated for each answer theme in this way 
can be transferred to its context placement in Table 3, if the line of 
thinking it relates to is shown in that matrix. 
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Appendix D.  SYSTEMATIC REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
D.1 Purpose of Review 
The purpose of this review was to examine four assertions about a gap in theory 
identified in a preliminary appraisal of relevant literature from a research scoping 
study, and inform recommendations for a potential programme of theory 
development research. Consequently, the review protocol aimed to explore a 
large, multi-disciplinary evidence-base of literature to ensure the gap assertions 
were valid, to avoid re-discovering existing knowledge, and to collect applicable 
insights from diverse sources. This was collected over a two-day period (on the 
16th and 17th of August, 2011), using database search strings constructed from 
keywords and phrases found among significant conversations at the boundaries of 
the gap appraisal in the scoping study literature. The core literature filtered from 
this initial collection of 4076 contributions proved useful for synthesizing 8 
conjectures about the asserted gap in theory, to inform subsequent theory 
development.  
D.2 Evidence base 
A summary of the data statistics from tasks T1 to T4 of the methodology is 
presented in Table 2, and explained in the following sub-sections. The database 
files from which these statistics have been derived were submitted with this thesis, 
and copies can be requested from Cranfield University School of Management. 
D.2.1 Search Results Data 
D.2.1.1 Task T1 – Search 
In task T1, the three key databases queried were ABI/INFORM, EBSCO, and 
SCOPUS, with GOOGLE being used as an additional source for grey literature, 
etc. Table 2 shows that the most productive among them was SCOPUS, 
particularly when dropped duplications were taken into account (see the first 
column under ‘Discarded as not relevant’). All of these literature sources had an 
‘export to RefWorks’ feature, enabling 4069 references to be automatically 
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imported into that tool, and organized in folders by theme subsets from scoping 
study literature domains. 
After using the de-duplication feature within RefWorks, 2761 references were 
retained for export to an ‘.xml’ file. During subsequent import into NVivo9, 47 
records were found to be corrupted. These records are accounted for in the ‘Drop’ 
column under ‘Task Literature’ against ‘Corrupted records’. They represent a 
1.2% level of data corruption, which was considered acceptable. Then 7 other 
contributions were manually entered into NVivo9, resulting in a total of 2721 
unique references loaded into that tool, representing 67% of the 4069 references 
originally collected. 
D.2.2 Screening Data 
D.2.2.1 Task T2 – Screen Titles and Abstracts 
During title and abstracts screening, 1048 references were retained as relevant 
while 1673 were discarded. A breakdown of the number of references discarded 
by reason for discard is given in columns ‘Dupl to D08’ (see Table 23 for an 
explanation of each discard criterion) under ‘Discarded as not relevant’ in Table 
2, and a full list of these references can be found in the supplementary document 
titled ‘References Not Retained’, under Titles and Abstracts - Discarded 
(organized by discard code). The relevant literature count represents 26% of the 
4069 references originally collected. 
D.2.2.2 Task T3 – Screen Full Texts 
During full texts screening, 313 references were retained as approved while 735 
were rejected. A breakdown of the number of references approved by reason for 
significance is given in columns S01 to S14 (see Table 24 for an explanation of 
each significance criterion) under ‘Approval by Significance’ in Table 2.  
It should be noted that a single contribution to literature can be mapped to 
multiple reasons for significance. A full list of rejected references can be found in 
the supplementary document titled ‘References Not Retained’, under Full Text - 
Rejected. The approved literature count represents 8% of the 4069 references 
originally collected. 
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D.2.3 Evaluation Data 
D.2.3.1 Task T4 – Evaluate Contributions 
Evaluation occurred in two parses. First, each approved contribution was scored 
according to the definitions of five criteria and three score levels given in Table 
18. Then, depending on the scores allocated, each contribution was either dropped 
as excluded, or selected and given a grade, according to rationales of Table 19. A 
summary of the scores allocated to all approved contributions is given in Table 26 
below. The breakdown of exclusions and graded selection is given in Table 27. 
 
Quality Scores Summary for 313 Approved Contributions 
Criterion 0 - Unacceptable 1 - Acceptable 2 – Applicable (to 
review) 
Thinking 8 
 
35 
 
270 
 
Certainty and 
legitimacy 
1 
 
131 
 
181 
 
Kinds of 
knowledge 
3 144 166 
Type of 
literature 
6 72 235 
Suitability for 
purpose 
19 15 279 
Table 26: Quality Scores Summary for 313 Approved Contributions 
 
Out of 313 approved contributions, 119 were excluded for being below 
protocol quality criteria, and 194 were selected for grading according to protocol 
grading criteria. The selected count represents 5% of the 4069 references 
originally collected. 
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Evaluation Scores Summary for 313 Approved Contributions 
 Exclusions Graded Selections 
 G06 G05 G04 G03 G02 G01 
Contributions 26 8 85 23 5 166 
Table 27: Evaluation Scores Summary for 313 Approved Contributions 
 
D.2.4 Extraction Data 
D.2.4.1 Task T5 – Extract Data 
From the 194 selected references, a core subset of 62 references were identified as 
‘exemplars’ of the insights from distinct lines of thinking in this literature, drawn 
exclusively from top grade (G01) contributions. The notion of using both 
literature sets was prescribed in the protocol, and intended as a means of 
reviewing a wider evidence-base of selected contributions while at the same time 
synthesizing a more manageable evidence-base of core contributions. Therefore, 
all synthesis, assimilation and interpretation beyond the first step of descriptive 
analysis used this core evidence-base as a high-quality representation of the 
literature under review. Appendix D.8 analyses the metadata extracted from that 
core literature by coding the abstracts, keywords and phrases from the full-texts of 
each contribution. However, some metadata attributes were difficult to classify in 
many contributions because they generally failed to declare their research 
philosophy and approach. This often had to be construed from the material, and 
therefore may increase the subjective nature of some extracted data. 
D.2.4.2 Task T5 – Data Analysis 
A longitudinal analysis is given in Table 28, showing contributions from this core 
literature by discipline over time. When compared with a similar analysis from the 
scoping study (see Table 13), two key differences can be seen. The complex 
systems discipline is not as well established within the scope of selected domain 
themes as it appeared to be in the sample literature, but the risk management 
discipline has suddenly begun to join research conversation of interest. This 
interest from risk management is probably due to the ‘great recession’ currently 
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being experienced in most regions of the world, arising from the sub-prime credit 
crisis and subsequent sovereign debt problems. 
 
 
Table 28: Review – Discipline Contribution by Decade 
 
Table 29: Review - Research Approach by Literature Domain Theme 
 Year 
Discipline Ea
rl
ie
r
19
00
 -1
90
9
19
10
-1
91
9
19
20
-1
92
9
19
30
-1
93
9
19
40
-1
94
9
19
50
19
59
19
60
-1
96
9
19
70
-1
97
9
19
80
-1
98
9
19
90
-1
99
9
20
00
-2
00
9
20
10
-2
01
1
G
ra
nd
 T
ot
al
Economics    1 6 17 3 27
Operations Management         0
Complex Systems       1 3 2 6
Risk Management           1 14 14 29
 
Grand Total              62
Systematic
Review -
academic
literature
Theme
Research Approach of 
Contribution Sy
st
em
ic
 R
is
k
O
pe
ra
tio
na
l B
eh
av
io
ur
Sy
st
em
s 
(G
lo
ba
l F
in
an
ci
al
)
G
ra
nd
 T
ot
al
Ontology
 Realism 29 27 2 58
 Interpretivism 2 1 1 4
 Pragmatism     
 Constructivist 2 1 1 4
 Participatory 2   2
 Positivist 27 27 2 56
 Action    
 Archival    
 Case  
 Experimental Design 4 1  5
 Theory Building 10 12 22
 Narrative   
 Participant Observation   
 Review 16 14 3 33
 Survey 1 1 2
 Discovery
 Exposure 17 15 3 35
 Invention 14 13 27
 Content Analysis
 Event Analysis 1 1
 Focus Groups
 Interviews
 Modelling 13 16 29
 Observations 18 11 3 32
 Questionnaires
 Simulation
 New Data 1 1
 New Methods 3 1 4
 New Perspective 18 14 3 35
 New Theory 10 12 22
Method
Epistemology
Methodology
Technique
Contribution Niche
Systematic 
Review -
academic
literature
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When the research philosophies and approaches of the 62 exemplar 
contributions are analysed, as shown in Table 29, more implications emerge for 
this review. Although, as explained in the previous sub-section, this analysis may 
be too subjective, the strong presence of realism identified in the scoping study 
sample is confirmed in this core literature. As before, it seems to be linked to a 
constructivist epistemology that is employed in circumstances where: data is 
missing; the mathematics of a problem is non-linear and complex; or where erratic 
behaviour requires the use of simulation techniques. However, in this literature, 
simulation techniques are still at the stage of being recommended, with few signs 
of actual non-trivial use. 
The contribution niches of ‘new perspective’ and ‘new theory’ are also clearly 
present, as before (see Table 29). Indicating that theorising and theory 
development is prevalent in this multi-disciplinary academic field, reinforcing the 
scoping study conclusion that this literature represents a nascent field of research 
in which there may still be gaps in theory. 
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D.3 Description of the Literature Not Selected 
The literature not selected for review is briefly described here. A full account of it 
is given in a supplement to this document, sub-titled: ‘References Not Retained’, 
in a compilation of bibliographical reference lists for the 1673 discarded 
contributions from task T2 (see Figure 39), the 735 rejected contributions from 
task T3, and the 119 excluded contributions from task T4 (see Figure 40). In that 
supplement, discards are grouped by criteria for discard, and exclusions are 
grouped by quality exclusion criteria, reflecting their reasons for non-retention 
determined by negative screening; whereas, rejections are not grouped because 
they are the non-retentions of positive screening which uses alternative criteria for 
retention (see screening explanations in the protocol).  
 
Figure 39: Discards Analysis 
 
 
Figure 40: Exclusions Analysis (by number of contributions) 
20
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D.4 Thematic Synthesis 
D.4.1 Inputs 
Four fundamental analysis artefacts were derived out of the data extracted from 
this literature, and used to develop a categorisation of the evidence-base: two 
descriptive theme-types (conversations, and lines of thinking), one contribution 
property (exemplar) and one interpretive theme-type (answers). They were used to 
identify core contributions from multiple scoped-in academic disciplines, which 
were assimilated into a generalized, descriptive/interpretive model of the ability of 
existing theories to answer the literature review questions derived from the 
research problem. This model formed the basis for outlining a new theory 
development opportunity through thematic gap analysis, leading to synthesis of 
unexplored conjectures in that literature. ‘Going beyond’ the content of current 
literature in this way is considered a defining characteristic of synthesis (Britten et 
al, 2002). The rationale for selecting a qualitative approach to synthesis for this 
systematic review was explained in Appendix C.9.  
However, the interpretive nature of qualitative synthesis, with its dependence 
on the judgements and insights of a reviewer, is widely perceived as a weakness 
in rigour. For that reason, this review includes a complete audit trail of reasoning 
and choices made at every step of the systematic review methodology in the form 
of: 
iii. summary statistics, provided in Table 2; 
iv. complete reference lists in a supplement to this document, titled 
‘References Not Retained’, of contributions from the search results that 
were not retained in this synthesis, categorised by their reason for non-
retention in the systematic review methodology; and, 
v. further details of thematic coding and analysis in the NVivo 9 database 
used throughout this review, available in soft-copy on CD, together with all 
supporting import and export files from various software tools. 
This audit trail removes uncertainty about the subjective nature of conclusions 
reached by ensuring complete transparency throughout the systematic review 
process, particularly with regard to the synthesis outcome. It furthermore reduces 
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the scope for challenges down to differences in literature assessment. Given the 
multi-disciplinary nature of that literature, and the focus of this review on the 
potential existence of a gap in theory, it is argued here that a more quantitative 
approach to synthesis would be even more exposed to challenges of a lack of 
applicability to notions that cannot be adequately quantified.  
Therefore, the objective of this section is to present a thematic rationale for the 
qualitative sythesis of an opportunity to address a gap in theory about systemic 
risk of failure and its mitigation for the global financial system. 
D.4.2 Analysis 
This sub-section should be read in conjunction with Appendix C.9, which outlines 
the aims and method of thematic synthesis, and how it was conducted in this 
review. Here, the findings of synthesis are explained and discussed. 
D.4.2.1 Descriptive Analysis 
The results of descriptive analysis are presented in Table 30. It shows the 14 
conversations identified by the scoping study, extended by 59 lines of thinking 
(LoT), with contribution counts, and is represented by the two left-most columns 
of that table. The other columns are added when insight mapping is completed and 
merged with this analysis, to provide the insight numbers shown here. However, 
in this sub-section, Table 30 will be considered in its entirety as ‘finished’ 
descriptive analysis, and discussed as it is. 
The table shows how conversations from ‘approved’, ‘selected’ and ‘core’ 
literature-sets map to relevant insights. However, 3 conversations are marked as 
‘na’, designating ‘not appropriate’, for insight mapping. In the case of the S01 this 
is because it relates to literature that is about the process of developing insights 
only relevant to critical analysis later in this review. Similarly, S02 discusses a 
potential gap in theory for critical analysis, but offers no new insights. However, 
S10 is also considered ‘not appropriate’ because it is a conversation in the broader 
literature about the effects of systemic failure, which is not relevant to any of the 
literature questions and therefore not represented in the core set (i.e. its 
contributions were not retained during screening). Two LoTs also have ‘not 
appropriate’ designation in the S03 conversation about systemic risk theories, 
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because they represent contributions that are peripheral  to this conversation, but 
frequently referenced within it, or their insights have been superceded in some 
way (and therefore not retained during screening). 
Where insight mapping gaps appear in question columns, against some 
conversations and LoT such as the gap under Q2 for S06 (forms of distress), this 
is generally an indication that the associated literature does not consider those 
questions. However, it would not have been correct to also designate mapping in 
these gaps as ‘not appropriate’ because they may be an indication of missed 
research opportunities that are collectively being overlooked for some reason. 
Interestingly, the conversations attracting least insight contributions in this 
literature are about definitions for systemic risk (S05) and recovery from systemic 
failure (S11). Among the rest, if ‘reviews’ (S14) are not counted, recognition of 
the potential for systemic failure (S08) is also fairly low.  
The following sub-sections take these high-level observations about this 
literature and begin to infer new knowledge, assertions and conjectures. 
 
Contributions to (any) Research Conversations of the Approved, Selected and Core Literature 
Descriptive Analysis: 
Conversation (from Table 16)  
   Line of Thinking (LoT) 
Approved, 
Selected, 
Core 
Contrib-
utions 
Insight Mapping to Literature 
Questions 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Total 
S01 Discussions: about theory development.  
S01.1 - The nature of theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
S01.2 - Theory development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
S01.3 - Theory testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
S01.4 - Theory in Economics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
23, 23, na 
7 
7 
3 
6 
na na na na na 
S02 Assessments: of a potential gap in theory 
informing the research problem. 
17, 16, na  na na na na na 
S03 Theories: about systemic risk. 
S03.1 - Candidate theories of systemic risk . . . . . . . .  
S03.2 - Other insights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
S03.21 - Catastrophe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   
S03.22 - Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
117, 85, 49 
8 
48 
3 
19 
 
8 
 
3 
 
 
4 
 
 
 
 
14 
 
 
14 
 
9 
 
 
17 
 
35 
 
3 
31 
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S03.23 - Propagation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
S03.24 - Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   
S03.25 - Criticality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
S03.26 - Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
S03.27 - Behaviour . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
S03.3 - Related concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
S03.4 - Foundational contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
9 
1 
5 
8 
38 
na 
na 
10 
1 
5 
3 
9 
 
 
 
 
 
9 
2 
2 
8 
49 
 
 
 
1 
22 
19 
3 
7 
12 
80 
S04 Perspectives: on the system. 
S04.1 - Banking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
S04.2 - Complex . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
S04.3 - Economic  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
S04.4 - Financial . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
S04.5 - Insurance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
S04.6 - Market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
S04.7 - Operational . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
S04.8 - Regulatory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
84, 73, 53 
18 
7 
29 
49 
3 
13 
27 
15 
 
9 
6 
11 
24 
 
4 
4 
2 
 
 
 
24 
3 
29 
48 
2 
8 
12 
12 
 
13 
1 
18 
28 
1 
7 
25 
14 
 
46 
10 
58 
100 
3 
19 
41 
28 
S05 Definitions: for systemic risk. 
S05.1 - Causal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
S05.2 - Consequential . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
S05.3 - Combined . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
S05.4 - Similar terms and meanings . . . . . . . . . .  
18, 17, 16 
6 
1 
5 
5 
 
 
 
6 
1 
5 
5 
   
6 
1 
5 
5 
S06 Forms: of distress in the system. 
S06.1 - Banking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
S06.2 - Economic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
S06.3 - Financial . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
S06.4 - Market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
S06.5 - Monetary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
S06.6 - Operational . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
S06.7 - Regulatory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
S06.8 - Sudden shock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
118, 82, 59 
27 
23 
50 
38 
23 
8 
28 
6 
 
12 
8 
22 
24 
6 
4 
4 
3 
  
35 
27 
66 
25 
17 
5 
14 
7 
 
13 
14 
19 
7 
11 
 
15 
5 
 
60 
49 
107 
56 
34 
9 
33 
15 
S07 Mechanisms: of systemic failure. 
S07.1 - Contagion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
S07.2 - Emergence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
S07.3 - Collapse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
63, 50, 32 
3 
9 
26 
 
3 
6 
10 
  
1 
12 
15 
 
 
7 
11 
 
4 
25 
36 
S08 Recognition: of the potential for systemic failure. 
S08.1 - Early warning systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
S08.2 - Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
S08.3 - Stress testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
S08.4 - Measuring Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
S08.5 - Concentrations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
56, 34, 19 
5 
7 
2 
1 
10 
   
5 
7 
2 
1 
10 
  
5 
7 
2 
1 
10 
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S09 Responses: to the potential for systemic failure. 
S09.1 - Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
S09.2 - Intervention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
S09.3 - Regulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
S09.4 - Risk Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
85, 52, 22 
0 
12 
11 
4 
    
 
12 
11 
4 
 
 
12 
11 
4 
S10 Effects: of systemic failure. 13, 5, na na na na na na 
S11 Recovery: from systemic failure. 8, 4, 2    2 2 
S12 Involvement: in the system. 
S12.1 - Collective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
S12.2 - Deliberate (Strategic or Tactical) . . . . . . .  
S12.3 - Dysfunctional . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
S12.4 - Ignorant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
S12.5 - Procedural . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
76, 54, 28 
4 
9 
12 
2 
8 
   
4 
9 
12 
2 
8 
  
4 
9 
12 
2 
8 
S13 Operations: of the system. 
S13.1 - Cycles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
S13.2 - Innovation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
S13.3 - Interconnectedness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
S13.4 - Fragility or Resilience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
S13.5 - Visibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
42, 31, 20 
6 
3 
7 
7 
6 
   
6 
3 
7 
7 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
6 
3 
7 
7 
6 
S14 Reviews: of systemic crises and failures. 
S14.1 - Current crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
S14.2 - Other specific crises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
S14.3 - General crises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
22, 20, 6 
3 
0 
3 
 
3 
 
3 
  
 
  
3 
 
3 
Insight Totals  207 21 544 291 1063 
Table 30: Descriptive Analysis of Insight Contributions 
 
D.4.2.2 Lines of Thinking Appraisal 
The ‘selected’ literature count of 16 from column 2 of Table 30 for the S02 
conversation confirms there is interest in a potential gap in theory relevant to this 
review. However, only 8 candidate theories were found in the S03.1 LoT. On 
closer examination, most of these could barely be described as fully developed 
theories, although other contributions (in S03.2) offer a wide spectrum of less 
formal theorising to fill part of that void. Nevertheless, a lack of coherence among 
this literature could be argued, due to many conflicting LoTs about the nature of 
the global financial system (S04.1 to 8), and its instability (S06.1 to 8).  
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Diversity is not so evident among attempts to define systemic risk (S051 to 4), 
but that should not be assumed to indicate that a consensus exists (see discussion 
in 6.3.2). There appears to be a preference in this literature for offering fragments 
of explanations about how systemic risk arises, propagates and becomes 
identifiable (S05.1 to 4, S07.1 to 3, and S08.1 to 5), without much evidence of 
thinking about foundational concepts or unifying theories. Systemic risk 
mitigation also receives a lot of attention, regarding what is mitigated (S04.1 to 8, 
and S06.1 to 8) and how to respond (S09.1 to 4). However, with regards to the 
research problem of interest, operational ideas are less well represented (S13.1 to 
5), both explicitly and implicitly among the LoTs found, as are behavioural ideas 
(S12.1 to 5). Therefore, when considered as a whole, this literature seems fairly 
similar to the sample collected during the scoping study, and has the same 
conceptual gaps.  
D.4.2.3 Insight Mapping 
A more detailed picture emerged after insights were inferred from keywords and 
shared claims found during the full text screening of core contributions, enabling 
each contribution to be associated with one or more of the literature questions by 
the relevance of its insights. The 2 left-most columns of Table 31 show the output 
of that association. Then, by merging this result with the descriptive analysis in 
Table 30, an insight mapping to the literature questions could be determined for 
each LoT, represented by the numbers in the 5 right-most columns in that table. 
From the perspective of literature questions, the insight totals at the bottom of 
Table 30 suggest that research attention in this literature is focused on how 
systemic risk materializes (Q3), not on the fundamental nature of catastrophic 
instability (Q1), or how the risk of systemic failure could be mitigated (Q4).  
The low insights total for Q2 can partially be explained as the result of a 
specific correspondence between that question and the S05 conversation. All other 
questions correspond to multiple conversations. That difference in proportion to 
average insights by question is a natural effect of independently chosen 
descriptive analysis categories (derived from conversations observed in a 
preliminary sample of this literature) and literature questions (derived from a 
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research problem). Sometimes equivalent notions are independently derived from 
different sources. However, the low count for insights could also be argued as 
confirming a lack of attention to foundational concepts in this literature. 
D.4.2.4 Interpretive Analysis 
To establish the explanatory values of LoTs, as mapped to literature questions in 
Table 30, it was first necessary to organize individual contribution insights for 
each question by assigning them to insight themes. The third column from the left 
in Table 31 describes how insight themes were interpreted by clustering insights 
according to particular insight affinities found among the contributions relevant to 
each question. Then the insight clusters for each question were labelled in the 
style of answer statements, as shown in the right-most column of that table.  
The choice between potential insight affinities for clustering was based on their 
suitability for interpreting answer themes that could be assigned credible 
explanatory values for a question. The key objective was to establish a set of 
interpreted answer themes for each question that could be used to analyse gaps in 
the explanatory values of contribution insights, mapped to those questions from 
LoTs as answers at a manageable level of granularity for thematic analysis and 
synthesis (see Table 31).  
If gaps in explanatory value exist, it is argued they would be apparent no 
matter which insight affinities were selected. However, using ‘credibility in 
assigning explanatory value’ as the basis for selection helped to focus the search 
for candidate affinities.  
 
Question 
Counts for 
Core 
Contributions, 
Insights 
Interpretation of Common 
themes for Insights 
(inferred from keywords and 
shared claims in the full-texts 
of contributions) Interpreted Answer Themes 
Q1. 
Nature? 
35, 207 Insights for this question in 
the core literature can be 
clustered by their affinity to 
one or more of five adjective-
keywords: systemic, critical, 
global, financial or structural. 
A1 - Its nature is systemic 
A2 - Its nature is critical 
A3 - Its nature is global 
A4 - Its nature is financial 
A5 - Its nature is structural 
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Q2. 
Meaning? 
16, 21 Insights for this question in 
the core literature can be 
clustered by their affinity to 
one or more of three noun-
keyword combinations: 
causes, consequences, 
causes and consequences; or 
similar terms. 
A1 - It is defined by its causes 
A2 - It is defined by its 
consequences 
A3 - It is defined by its causes 
and consequences 
A4 - Similar terms and 
meanings 
Q3. 
Materialization? 
50, 544 Insights for this question in 
the core literature can be 
clustered by their affinity to 
one or more of four attributive 
verb-phrases addressing: 
participants, financial 
services, the system’s 
infrastructure and the 
system’s economic 
environment. 
A1 - Through the behaviour of 
systemically important 
participants 
A2 - Through participation in 
systemically important 
financial services 
A3 - Through interactions with 
the system’s infrastructure 
A4 - Through interactions with 
the system’s economic 
environment 
Q4. 
Mitigation? 
43, 291 Insights for this question in 
the core literature can be 
clustered by their affinity to 
one or more of four advisory 
verb-phrases addressing: 
participation, financial 
services, the system’s 
infrastructure and the 
system’s economic 
environment. 
A1 - Modify the behaviour of 
systemically important 
participants 
A2 - Modify participation in 
systemically important 
financial services 
A3 - Modify interactions with 
the system’s infrastructure 
A4 - Modify interactions with 
the system’s economic 
environment 
Table 31: Interpretive Analysis of Answer Themes 
 
D.4.2.5 Detailed Thematic Analysis 
Once answer themes were interpreted for each question from contribution insights 
it became possible to expand the combined descriptive analysis and insight 
mapping of Table 30 into a detailed thematic analysis of contribution insights with 
weighted scores for explanatory values, as presented in Appendix D.5. 
This shows how all 62 contributions to the core literature have been mapped to 
relevant answer themes, within literature questions, within LoTs, within 
conversations, together with their insight relevance and scores for each mapping. 
D.4.2.6 Explanatory Gap 
Table 3 presents a summary analysis of an extract from Appendix D.5 of LoT, 
where gaps are expected to be most evident. 
The key features of this analysis are: 
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i. Rows containing a subset of LoTs with low weighted explanatory scores of 
≤ 3 for answers to one or more literature questions (extracted from 
Appendix D.5). Keywords in the titles of these LoT are highlighted in bold 
for reference by gap assertions. 
ii. Columns containing literature questions and answer themes representing 
answers interpreted from relevant literature as suitable for assigning 
explanatory value of contribution insights from LoT (see Table 31). 
Keywords in the titles of these literature questions and answers are 
highlighted in bold for reference by gap assertions. 
iii. Weighted explanatory scores for LoT answers, presented as cell entries in 
this table, associating LoTs with literature questions through their answer 
themes.  
iv. Outlined groupings of cells representing explanatory gaps, identified by 
roman numerals I to X that are referenced by explanatory gap assertions, 
v. Explanatory gap assertions, labelled (a) to (j), summarizing inadequacies 
of the literature from the detail thematic analysis of Appendix D.5, for 
nominated explanatory gaps. The text for these gap assertions is derived 
from highlighted keywords in the titles of questions, answers and LoT 
associated with those cells. The assertions are derived from either row or 
column perspectives on cell groupings. 
It summarizes 1062 insights from 62 core contributions of literature, generated 
by 59 lines of thinking (LoT) within 14 research conversations, in providing 
explanations mapped to 17 answers associated with 4 literature questions.  
Finally, it combines a qualitative analysis of explanatory gaps in this core 
literature; with a set of gap assertions derived from keywords, phrases and claims 
found in this literature at various stages in the thematic synthesis process (see 
Figure 36); to express the weaknesses and omissions among contribution insights; 
from the perspective of literature questions derived from the research problem of 
this review. 
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D.4.3 Synthesis 
D.4.3.1 Conjecture Synthesis 
The thematic analysis of explanatory gaps in this core literature from Appendix 
D.5 and Table 3 suggested new conjectures, as shown in Table 4 which exposed a 
gap in theory for addressing the research problem of interest. Before explaining 
how those conjectures were derived, it may be useful to summarize the reasoning 
that brought the synthesis to this point.  
From the preliminary outline of a gap in knowledge and theory exposed by the 
scoping study, fourteen conversations in the literature were revealed as requiring 
more contributions (see Table 16). In this systematic review, those conversations 
were first used as significance approval criteria (with abbreviated text in Table 24) 
for filtering contributions from a much larger multi-disciplinary evidence-base of 
literature. After subsequent evaluation of that evidence-base, they also formed the 
basis for a descriptive analysis of selected contributions (see Table 30), and 
distinct lines of thinking were added around which a consensus was found to have 
formed in the literature within each conversation. Then ‘exemplar’ contributions 
from those lines of thinking, that offer potential insights for answering the 
literature search questions, were mapped to the literature search questions (see 
Table 30). 
By referring to that literature’s metadata (see Appendix D.6), it became 
possible to assign this core subset of mapped exemplar contributions, through 
analysis of their shared claims and keywords, to interpretive themes representing 
answers to the literature questions (see Table 31). After scoring, it then became 
possible to create a model of gaps in the explanatory value of this core literature 
(see Table 3). In that model, each cell represents the highest weighted score of 
exemplar contribution insights from lines of thinking (LoT) providing answers for 
those literature questions. Bordered regions of cells in the model show where 
there is weak or missing explanatory value, exposing a gap in this evidence-base 
for answering the literature questions when addressing the research problem of 
interest. 
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Table 4 then synthesises conjectures out of this explanatory model, by re-
stating the gap assertions from Table 3 as conjectures derived from the 
implications and terminology of those assertions. Therefore, if the gaps identified 
in this core literature of exemplars are representative of the entire evidence-base, 
then the conjectures must be new, and their potential for new theory development 
is highly plausible. 
D.4.3.2 Addressing the Explanatory Gap 
Table 5 rearranges the new conjectures synthesised in Table 4, to form a logical 
progression of reasoning, with references to the assertions they combine and re-
state. Then each conjecture is presented alongside a mapping to the explanatory 
gap references and literature questions it addresses. 
This table shows there are explanatory gaps associated with all 4 literature 
questions, and confirms that an opportunity exists for new theory development 
that is outlined by these 8 conjectures. The scope of these conjectures suggests 
this opportunity may either be another contribution to the fragmented theorising 
currently prevalent in this literature, based on a few of these conjectures, or a 
high-level unifying theory based on them all. 
 
Conjectures (from Table 25) Gap Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
C1.  If the essential nature of the GFS is represented as a complex 
system by a model describing the dynamics of all discrete 
potential operational states the GFS is able to assume, and that 
model is based on an operational behaviour paradigm, then it 
could be used for research into an operational perspective on 
the GFS and its systemic risk of failure. From assertions a, f and g. 
I 
and 
VII
I 
    
C2.  In that model, systemic failure of the GFS could be understood 
to materialize as: an operational state that defines the system-
wide consequence of aggregate distress among system 
operations exceeding distress tolerance and resilience criteria; 
producing a sustained inability of the entire system to operate 
as required. From assertions c and d 
III 
and 
VI 
    
C3.  From which, distress in the GFS could be interpreted by the 
model as: an operational process whereby undesirable effects 
for system participants arise from participation behaviour in a 
part of the system; that become unsupportive of overall system 
operations; generating perceived disincentives or actual barriers 
to supportive participation in other parts of the system, or 
perceived incentives for unsupportive participation.  
 From assertion i 
VII
I  
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C4. This operational interpretation implies that distress propagates 
from where it arises to other parts of the GFS by: some 
collective behaviour transmission mechanism that spreads 
concentrations in unsupportive participation behaviour; 
increasing the intensity of collective focus on that behaviour; 
and generating further distress in more parts; to potentially 
emerge as a shift in the system’s actual operational state.    
From assertion i 
IV     
C5.  A succession of such shifts in actual operational states over a 
period of elapsed time could therefore be used in a theory to 
represent GFS operational behaviour, such as: catastrophic 
instability, or total collapse, when those shifts end in an actual 
operational state of systemic failure. From assertions a, f and g. 
I 
and 
VII
I 
    
C6.  Which suggests that systemic risk of failure could be defined for 
the GFS as: the probability at a current time that a series of 
potential operational states of the GFS will manifest an 
operational behaviour capable of leading to the materialization 
of that risk as an actual operational state of systemic failure; by 
a specified time in the future; in the absence of new efforts to 
mitigate that risk; through some process of distress generation 
and propagation; to emerge in the economic environment as a 
financial crisis. From assertion h. 
IX     
C7.  A model based on this definition could be used to select 
appropriate techniques for the assessment and mitigation of the 
effects of collective operational distress, in a pre-emptive or 
reactive response that diverts catastrophic operational 
behaviour before an actual operational state of systemic failure 
becomes unavoidable. From assertions b, d and e. 
II 
V 
and 
VII 
    
C8. The GFS could therefore be shown to interact with its economic 
environment by a two-way process of transformation between its 
endogenous operational behaviour and exogenous macro-
economic circumstances. From assertion j. 
X     
Table 32: Addressing Gaps in Explanatory Value 
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D.5 Thematic Analysis (explanatory gap details) – Scored 
 
Table 33: Thematic Analysis 
Thematic Analysis of Core Literature (with Explanatory Value Scores by Context) 
CONTEXT 
Conversations or Lines of Thinking (LoT) /  
       Questions /  
           Answer (Themes) /  
               Core Contributions 
(only categories with data are shown) 
 
 
EXPLANATORY VALUE 
 
a. Coverage Weighting (1=partial, 2=broad) 
 b. Score  
      (1=implies, 2=supports, 3=introduces) 
 Weighted Score a x (highest b) 
 Distinct Insights Count 
 Insight Relevance to 
Thematic Analysis Context 
(from title or claim/s of 
contribution, Appendix G) 
S01 Discussions: about theory development  
Not mapped to questions (contributions cited in section 6 of this systematic review) 
S02 Assessments: of a potential gap in theory informing the research problem 
Not mapped to questions (contributions cited in section 6 of this systematic review) 
     
S03 Theories: about systemic risk    49  
S03.1 – Candidate theories of systemic risk    8  
Q1 -  What is the nature of catastrophic instability or total collapse of this system?      
A1 - Its nature is Systemic 1  3 4  
A Theory of Systemic Fragility (Minsky, 1977)  1   Theory, systemic fragility  
Economic models of systemic risk in financial systems (Loretan, 1996) 
 2   
Model, systemic events and 
risk 
Interbank lending and systemic risk (Rochet and Tirole, 1996)  3   Conceptual framework, 
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systemic risk of linkages  
A theory of systemic risk and design of prudential bank regulation (Acharya, 2009)  3   Theory, systemic risk  
A2 - Its nature is Critical 1  3 1  
A framework for assessing the systemic risk of major financial institutions (Huang, Zhou and 
Zhu, 2009) 
 3   
Framework, critical losses 
and systemic risk  
A3 - Its nature is Global 1  2 1  
Reforming the global economic architecture~ Lessons from recent crises (Stiglitz, 1999) 
 2   
Government measures, 
systemic risk 
A4 - Its nature is Financial 1  3 1  
Understanding financial crises - Clarendon Lectures (Allen and Gale, 2007) 
 3   
Theory, risks of financial 
intermediation  
A5 - Its nature is Structural 1  2 1  
The structural fragility of financial systems (Gramlich and Oet, 2011) 
 2   
Theory, structural fragility 
and systemic risk 
Q2 - What is meant by the risk of such an occurrence?      
A1 - It is defined by its Causes 1  3 2  
Interbank lending and systemic risk (Rochet and Tirole, 1996) 
 3   
Propagation of economic 
distress  
A theory of systemic risk and design of prudential bank regulation (Acharya, 2009) 
 3   
Endogenously chosen 
correlation of returns on 
assets held by banks  
A3 - It is defined by its Causes and Consequences 1  2 2  
Economic models of systemic risk in financial systems (Loretan, 1996) 
 2   
Various shocks severely 
disrupting financial markets 
The structural fragility of financial systems (Gramlich and Oet, 2011) 
 2   
Structural weaknesses that 
create vulnerabilities in 
financial markets 
Q3 - How does that risk materialize?       
A1 - Through the behaviour of systemically important participants 2  6 4  
Economic models of systemic risk in financial systems (Loretan, 1996)  2   Non-rational responses 
Interbank lending and systemic risk (Rochet and Tirole, 1996)  3   Constructive ambiguity 
Reforming the global economic architecture~ Lessons from recent crises (Stiglitz, 1999)  2   Market behaviour 
A theory of systemic risk and design of prudential bank regulation (Acharya, 2009)  3   Risk correlation 
A2 - Through participation in systemically important financial services 1  3 1  
Interbank lending and systemic risk (Rochet and Tirole, 1996)  3   Interbank lending stress 
A3 - Through interactions with the system’s infrastructure 2  6 6  
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Economic models of systemic risk in financial systems (Loretan, 1996)  2   Financial markets 
Interbank lending and systemic risk (Rochet and Tirole, 1996)  3   Interbank linkages 
Reforming the global economic architecture~ Lessons from recent crises (Stiglitz, 1999) 
 2   
Global economic 
architecture 
A theory of systemic risk and design of prudential bank regulation (Acharya, 2009)  3   Regulatory mechanisms 
A framework for assessing the systemic risk of major financial institutions (Huang, Zhou and 
Zhu, 2009) 
 2   Major financial institutions 
The structural fragility of financial systems (Gramlich and Oet, 2011)  3   Financial system structure 
A4 - Through interactions with the system’s economic environment 1  3 3  
A Theory of Systemic Fragility (Minsky, 1977)  2   Depression 
Reforming the global economic architecture~ Lessons from recent crises (Stiglitz, 1999)  2   Economic architecture 
A framework for assessing the systemic risk of major financial institutions (Huang, Zhou and 
Zhu, 2009) 
 3   Macro-financial conditions 
Q4 - What could be done to mitigate that risk?      
A2 - Modify participation in systemically important financial services 1  3 1  
Interbank lending and systemic risk (Rochet and Tirole, 1996)  3   Introduce discounted lending 
A3 - Modify interactions with the system’s infrastructure 2  6 6  
Economic models of systemic risk in financial systems (Loretan, 1996) 
 2   
Introduce shock prevention 
and response policies 
Interbank lending and systemic risk (Rochet and Tirole, 1996) 
 3   
Enable ‘autarky’ in bank 
monitoring 
Reforming the global economic architecture~ Lessons from recent crises (Stiglitz, 1999) 
 2   
Modify bankruptcy 
procedures in a crisis 
A theory of systemic risk and design of prudential bank regulation (Acharya, 2009) 
 3   
Mitigate aggregate risk-
shifting incentives 
A framework for assessing the systemic risk of major financial institutions (Huang, Zhou and 
Zhu, 2009) 
 3   
Charge an insurance 
premium 
The structural fragility of financial systems (Gramlich and Oet, 2011) 
 3   
Quantify structural issues in 
early warning systems 
A4 – Modify interactions with the system’s economic environment 1  2 2  
A Theory of Systemic Fragility (Minsky, 1977)  1   Increase deficit 
Reforming the global economic architecture~ Lessons from recent crises (Stiglitz, 1999) 
 2   
Introduce new governmental 
measures 
S03.2 - Other insights    48  
S03.21 - Catastrophe    3  
Q1 -  What is the nature of catastrophic instability or total collapse of this system?      
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A1 - Its nature is Systemic 2  4 1  
Systemic risks in society and economics (Helbing, 2009)  2   Large scale, complex 
A2 – Its nature is Critical 2  6 2  
A catastrophe model of bank failure (Ho and Saunders, 1980)   3   Cusp model 
Analysis of Financial Crisis~ A Perspective Based on Catastrophe Theory (Yang, Mu and Yao, 
2009) 
 2   Cusp model 
Q2 - What is meant by the risk of such an occurrence?      
Q3 - How does that risk materialize?       
Q4 - What could be done to mitigate that risk?      
S03.22 - Evaluation    19  
Q1 - What is the nature of catastrophic instability or total collapse of this system?      
Q2 - What is meant by the risk of such an occurrence?      
Q3 - How does that risk materialize?       
A1 - Through the behaviour of systemically important participants 2  6 5  
Interbank lending and systemic risk (Rochet and Tirole, 1996)  3   Benchmarking peers 
Behavioral Basis of the Financial Crisis (Rizzi, 2008)  3   Behavioural risk framework 
The Systemic Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies and Rated Markets (Sy, 2009)  3   Ratings maps 
Redefining and containing systemic risk (Kane, 2010) 
 3   
Measuring regulatory safety-
net exposures 
Effects of central bank intervention on the interbank market during the subprime crisis (Brunetti, 
Di Filippo and Harris, 2011) 
 2   Stress tests 
A2 - Through participation in systemically important financial services 1  3 5  
Interbank lending and systemic risk (Rochet and Tirole, 1996)  3   Benchmarking lending 
Bank provisioning behaviour and procyclicality (Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005)  2   Provisioning 
An analysis of the systemic risks posed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and an evaluation of 
the policy options for reducing those risks (Eisenbeis et al, 2007) 
 2   
Large investment portfolio 
exposures 
The background to the 2007 financial crisis (Goodhart, 2007)  1   Under-pricing of risk 
A theory of systemic risk and design of prudential bank regulation (Acharya, 2009) 
 3   
Correlation of returns on 
assets 
Financial crises, credit booms, and external imbalances: 140 years of lessons (Jorda, 
Schularick and Taylor, 2011) 
 1   Credit growth 
A3 - Through interactions with the system’s infrastructure 1  3 3  
A catastrophe model of bank failure (Ho and Saunders, 1980)  3   Bank failure 
Regulating Systemic Institutions (Rochet, 2009) 
 3   
Measures of systemic risk 
exposures 
The structural fragility of financial systems (Gramlich and Oet, 2011)  2   Too big / connected to fail 
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A4 - Through interactions with the system’s economic environment 1  3 1  
Modelling the global financial crisis (McKibbin and Stoeckel, 2009) 
 3   
Risk premia of economic 
shocks 
Q4 - What could be done to mitigate that risk?      
A1 - Modify the behaviour of systemically important participants 1  3 2  
Behavioral Basis of the Financial Crisis (Rizzi, 2008) 
 3   
compensation framework for 
re-alignment 
The Systemic Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies and Rated Markets (Sy, 2009)  2   Effects of downgrading risks 
A2 - Modify participation in systemically important financial services 1  2 6  
Bank provisioning behaviour and procyclicality (Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005)  2   Credit portfolio changes 
An analysis of the systemic risks posed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and an evaluation of 
the policy options for reducing those risks (Eisenbeis et al, 2007) 
 2   Portfolio sizes 
The background to the 2007 financial crisis (Goodhart, 2007)  2   Product-level leverage 
Credit derivatives: Banks' behaviour, financial stability and banking regulation (Karras, 2009)  2   Capital reserves analysis 
The Systemic Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies and Rated Markets (Sy, 2009)  1   Stress- testing results 
Effects of central bank intervention on the interbank market during the subprime crisis (Brunetti, 
Di Filippo and Harris, 2011) 
 1   Interbank lending activity 
A3 - Modify interactions with the system’s infrastructure 1  2 6  
Reforming the global economic architecture~ Lessons from recent crises (Stiglitz, 1999)  2   Track bankruptcies 
A theory of systemic risk and design of prudential bank regulation (Acharya, 2009) 
 2   
Track correlation of returns 
on assets  
A framework for assessing the systemic risk of major financial institutions (Huang, Zhou and 
Zhu, 2009) 
 1   Track insurance premium 
Redefining and containing systemic risk (Kane, 2010)  1   Monitor incentives 
Effects of central bank intervention on the interbank market during the subprime crisis (Brunetti, 
Di Filippo and Harris, 2011) 
 2   
Analyse stress-tests and 
loan guarantees 
The structural fragility of financial systems (Gramlich and Oet, 2011) 
 2   
Monitor early warning 
systems 
A4 – Modify interactions with the system’s economic environment 1  1 3  
A Theory of Systemic Fragility (Minsky, 1977)  1   Monitor deficit 
Crises in competitive versus monopolistic banking systems (Boyd, De Nicola and Smith, 2004)  1   Measure rate of inflation 
Financial crises, credit booms, and external imbalances: 140 years of lessons (Jorda, 
Schularick and Taylor, 2011) 
 1   Measure credit growth 
      
S03.23 - Propagation    9  
Q1 -  What is the nature of catastrophic instability or total collapse of this system?      
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A1 - Its nature is Systemic 1  3 6  
Interbank lending and systemic risk (Rochet and Tirole, 1996) 
 3   
Economic distress 
propagation system-wide 
through financial 
transactions 
Systemic risk - A survey (Bandt and Hartmann, 2000)  1   Contagion paradigm missing 
What is Systemic Risk - Moral Hazard, Initial Shocks and Propagation (Dow, 2000)  2   Propagation of shocks 
A theory of systemic risk and design of prudential bank regulation (Acharya, 2009) 
 3   
Spreading of bank failures 
throughout the banking 
system 
Systemic risks in society and economics (Helbing, 2009)  2   Cascading effects 
A model of a systemic bank run (Uhlig, 2010) 
 2   
Occurrence of systemic 
bank runs 
A4 – Its nature is Financial 1  3 1  
A theory of systemic risk and design of prudential bank regulation (Acharya, 2009)  3   Aggregate risk shifting 
A5 – Its nature is Structural 1  2 3  
The Failure Mechanics of Dealer Banks (Duffie, 2010) 
 2   
Occurrence of individual 
bank runs 
Systemic risk, financial contagion and financial fragility (Martinez-Jaramillo et al, 2010) 
 2   
Propagation of negative 
effects 
Systemic risk in the financial sphere – Theoretical study and approaches to its estimation 
(Govtvan and Mansurov, 2011) 
 2   
Accumulation of risk 
potential 
Q2 - What is meant by the risk of such an occurrence?    3  
Q3 - How does that risk materialize?       
A1 - Through the behaviour of systemically important participants 2  6 3  
Interbank lending and systemic risk (Rochet and Tirole, 1996)  3   Interbank lending 
What is Systemic Risk - Moral Hazard, Initial Shocks and Propagation (Dow, 2000)  2   Propagation of shocks 
A theory of systemic risk and design of prudential bank regulation (Acharya, 2009) 
 3   
Spreading of bank failures 
throughout the banking 
system 
A2 - Through participation in systemically important financial services 2  6 2  
A theory of systemic risk and design of prudential bank regulation (Acharya, 2009)  3   Aggregate risk shifting 
Systemic risk in the financial sphere – Theoretical study and approaches to its estimation 
(Govtvan and Mansurov, 2011) 
 3   
Accumulation of risk 
potential 
A3 - Through interactions with the system’s infrastructure 2  4 3  
The Failure Mechanics of Dealer Banks (Duffie, 2010) 
 2   
Occurrence of individual 
bank runs 
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Systemic risk, financial contagion and financial fragility (Martinez-Jaramillo et al, 2010) 
 2   
Propagation of negative 
effects 
A model of a systemic bank run (Uhlig, 2010) 
 2   
Occurrence of systemic 
bank runs 
A4 - Through interactions with the system’s economic environment 2  4 1  
Systemic risks in society and economics (Helbing, 2009)  2   Cascading effects 
Q4 - What could be done to mitigate that risk?      
S03.24 - Network    1  
Q1 -  What is the nature of catastrophic instability or total collapse of this system?      
A4 - Its nature is Financial 2  4 1  
Interbank lending and systemic risk (Rochet and Tirole, 1996)  2   Interbank monitoring 
Q2 - What is meant by the risk of such an occurrence?      
Q3 - How does that risk materialize?       
A2 - Through participation in systemically important financial services 1  4 1  
Interbank lending and systemic risk (Rochet and Tirole, 1996)  2   Interbank lending stress 
A3 - Through interactions with the system’s infrastructure 1  4 1  
Interbank lending and systemic risk (Rochet and Tirole, 1996)  2   Interbank linkages 
Q4 - What could be done to mitigate that risk?      
S03.25 - Criticality    5  
Q1 -  What is the nature of catastrophic instability or total collapse of this system?      
A1 - Its nature is Systemic 1  1 1  
Systemic risks in society and economics (Helbing, 2009)  
 1   
Tipping points and 
peturbations 
A2 - Its nature is Critical 1  2 4  
A catastrophe model of bank failure (Ho and Saunders, 1980)  2   Sudden crashes 
A framework for assessing the systemic risk of major financial institutions (Huang, Zhou and 
Zhu, 2009) 
 2   Critical point 
Analysis of Financial Crisis: A Perspective Based on Catastrophe Theory (Yang, Mu and Yao, 
2009) 
 2   Critical points 
Complexity Theory and the Financial Crisis: a Critical Review (Zeidan and Richardson, 2010)  1   Complexity and crises 
Q2 - What is meant by the risk of such an occurrence?      
Q3 - How does that risk materialize?       
A3 - Through interactions with the system’s infrastructure 1  2 2  
A catastrophe model of bank failure (Ho and Saunders, 1980)  2   Money markets 
A framework for assessing the systemic risk of major financial institutions (Huang, Zhou and 
Zhu, 2009) 
 2   Dynamic linkages 
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Q4 - What could be done to mitigate that risk?      
S03.26 - Operations    8  
Q1 -  What is the nature of catastrophic instability or total collapse of this system?      
A4 - Its nature is Financial 1  2 2  
Credit derivatives: Banks' behaviour, financial stability and banking regulation (Karras, 2009)  2   Derivative operations 
Bailouts, the incentive to manage risk, and financial crises (Panageas, 2010)  2   Bailout operations 
A5 - Its nature is Structural 1  3 1  
The structural fragility of financial systems (Gramlich and Oet, 2011)  3   Concentrations in operations 
Q2 - What is meant by the risk of such an occurrence?      
Q3 - How does that risk materialize?       
A1 - Through the behaviour of systemically important participants 1  3 2  
The Failure Mechanics of Dealer Banks (Duffie, 2010)  3   Dealer bank operations 
Short Selling in a Financial Crisis: The Regulation of Short Sales in the United Kingdom and the 
United States (McGavin, 2010) 
 3   Short selling operations 
A2 - Through participation in systemically important financial services 1  2 4  
Credit derivatives: Banks' behaviour, financial stability and banking regulation (Karras, 2009)  2   Trading derivatives 
The Failure Mechanics of Dealer Banks (Duffie, 2010) 
 2   
Intermediation in securities 
and derivatives 
Short Selling in a Financial Crisis: The Regulation of Short Sales in the United Kingdom and the 
United States (McGavin, 2010) 
 1   Securities operations 
Effects of central bank intervention on the interbank market during the subprime crisis (Brunetti, 
Di Filippo and Harris, 2011) 
 1   Interbank operations 
A3 - Through interactions with the system’s infrastructure 1  2 2  
A catastrophe model of bank failure (Ho and Saunders, 1980)  2   Money market operations 
Economic models of systemic risk in financial systems (Loretan, 1996)  1   Financial market operations 
Q4 - What could be done to mitigate that risk?      
A3 - Modify interactions with the system’s infrastructure 1  2 1  
Economic models of systemic risk in financial systems (Loretan, 1996) 
 2   
Shock prevention and 
response 
S03.27 - Behaviour    38  
Q1 -  What is the nature of catastrophic instability or total collapse of this system?      
A1 - Its nature is Systemic 2  6 6  
A Theory of Systemic Fragility (Minsky, 1977) 
 2   
Money market reversals,  
systemic fragility, depression 
/ inflation 
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Economic models of systemic risk in financial systems (Loretan, 1996) 
 2   
Various shocks severely 
disrupt financial systems 
Interbank lending and systemic risk (Rochet and Tirole, 1996) 
 3   
Economic distress 
propagated system-wide 
through financial 
transactions 
A theory of systemic risk and design of prudential bank regulation (Acharya, 2009) 
 3   
When many banks fail 
together throughout the 
banking system 
Systemic risks in society and economics (Helbing, 2009)   2   Theories, systemic risk 
A model of a systemic bank run (Uhlig, 2010)  2   Model, systemic bank run 
A4 - Its nature is Financial 1  3 3  
Behavioral Basis of the Financial Crisis (Rizzi, 2008)  3   Framework, financial 
Credit derivatives: Banks' behaviour, financial stability and banking regulation (Karras, 2009)  2   Framework, financial 
Bailouts, the incentive to manage risk, and financial crises (Panageas, 2010) 
 2   
Systemic collapse of 
financial institutions’ net 
worth, beyond the protection 
of bailouts 
Q2 - What is meant by the risk of such an occurrence?     n/a 
Q3 - How does that risk materialize?       
A1 - Through the behaviour of systemically important participants 2  6 28  
Anatomy of a Financial Crisis (Mishkin, 1992) 
 3   
Adverse selection, moral 
hazard 
The Financial Instability Hypothesis (Minsky, 1993)  3   Government intervention 
Economic models of systemic risk in financial systems (Loretan, 1996)  3   Non-rational responses 
Interbank lending and systemic risk (Rochet and Tirole, 1996)  3   Constructive ambiguity 
Reforming the global economic architecture~ Lessons from recent crises (Stiglitz, 1999)  3   Market behaviour 
Financial crises and the challenge of moral hazard (Wolf, 1999)  2   Moral hazard 
What is Systemic Risk - Moral Hazard, Initial Shocks and Propagation (Dow, 2000)  2   Moral hazard, leverage 
Bank provisioning behaviour and procyclicality (Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005)  3   Bank provisioning 
Manias, panics, and crashes - A History of Financial Crises (Kindleberger and Aliber, 2005)  3   Manias, panics, bubbles 
The background to the 2007 financial crisis (Goodhart, 2007)  2   Under-pricing of risk 
Containment and Resolution in the Financial Crisis: Too Little, Too Late (Honohan, 2008)  2   Weak capitalization 
Behavioral Basis of the Financial Crisis (Rizzi, 2008)  3   Behavioural biases  
A theory of systemic risk and design of prudential bank regulation (Acharya, 2009)  3   Risk correlation 
Bank competition and financial stability (Berger, Klapper and Turk-Ariss, 2009) 
 2   
Adverse selection, moral 
hazard 
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Regulatory factors that contributed to the global financial crisis (Espenilla, 2009)  2   Procyclical policies 
Credit derivatives: Banks' behaviour, financial stability and banking regulation (Karras, 2009)  3   Capital buffer reduction 
Modelling the global financial crisis (McKibbin and Stoeckel, 2009)  2   ‘Switching’ expectations 
The Systemic Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies and Rated Markets (Sy, 2009)  2   Ratings downgrading 
The Failure Mechanics of Dealer Banks (Duffie, 2010)  3   Bank runs 
Redefining and containing systemic risk (Kane, 2010)  2   Misaligned incentives 
Short Selling in a Financial Crisis: The Regulation of Short Sales in the United Kingdom and the 
United States (McGavin, 2010) 
 3   Short selling 
Intellectual Hazard: how Conceptual Biases in Complex Organizations Contributed to the Crisis 
of 2008 (Miller and Rosenfield, 2010) 
 3   Conceptual bias 
The banking crisis as dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (Minford, 2010)  2   Euphorias 
Bailouts, the incentive to manage risk, and financial crises (Panageas, 2010)  2   Exploiting protection 
Causes of the financial crisis: Risk misperception, policy mistakes, and banks' bounded 
rationality (Rotheli, 2010) 
 2   Bounded rationality 
A model of a systemic bank run (Uhlig, 2010)  2   Bank run 
Diversification at financial institutions and systemic crises (Wagner, 2010)  1   Diversification 
Effects of central bank intervention on the interbank market during the subprime crisis (Brunetti, 
Di Filippo and Harris, 2011) 
 2   Intervention 
A2 - Through participation in systemically important financial services 2  6 13  
Bank provisioning behaviour and procyclicality (Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005)  2   Credit effects on GDP 
An analysis of the systemic risks posed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and an evaluation of 
the policy options for reducing those risks (Eisenbeis et al, 2007) 
 3   Portfolio sizes 
Behavioral Basis of the Financial Crisis (Rizzi, 2008) 
 3   
Misaligned compensation on 
structured finance 
Bank competition and financial stability (Berger, Klapper and Turk-Ariss, 2009)  3   Risky loan portfolios 
The great financial crisis (Foster and Magdoff, 2009) 
 3   
Investment in failing hedge 
funds 
The corporate treasurer - Playing the leading role (Hart, 2009) 
 2   
Trading complex financial 
instruments 
Credit derivatives: Banks' behaviour, financial stability and banking regulation (Karras, 2009) 
 2   
Behavioural effects of credit 
derivatives 
Did bank capital regulation exacerbate the subprime mortgage crisis? (Petersen et al, 2009) 
 2   
Regulation laxity in sub-
prime mortgages 
The Systemic Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies and Rated Markets (Sy, 2009)  1   Ratings downgrades 
The financial crisis and its issues (Bexley et al, 2010)  2   Holding toxic assets 
The Failure Mechanics of Dealer Banks (Duffie, 2010) 
 3   
Failed intermediation in 
securities and derivatives 
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Short Selling in a Financial Crisis: The Regulation of Short Sales in the United Kingdom and the 
United States (McGavin, 2010) 
 3   
Holding securities that are 
being sold short 
Effects of central bank intervention on the interbank market during the subprime crisis (Brunetti, 
Di Filippo and Harris, 2011) 
 2   
Providing capital for 
counterparty risk cover 
A4 - Through interactions with the system’s economic environment 2  6 8  
A Theory of Systemic Fragility (Minsky, 1977)  3   Depression 
The Financial Instability Hypothesis (Minsky, 1993)  3   Impact of debt 
Minsky's Theory of Financial Crises in a Global Context (Wolfson, 2002)  2   Global debt-deflation 
Crises in competitive versus monopolistic banking systems (Boyd, De Nicola and Smith, 2004)  3   Monetary policy 
Bank provisioning behaviour and procyclicality (Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005)  2   GDP cycles 
Manias, panics, and crashes - A History of Financial Crises (Kindleberger and Aliber, 2005)  3   Cross-border money flows 
The corporate treasurer - Playing the leading role (Hart, 2009)  1   Expanding economy 
Causes of the financial crisis: Risk misperception, policy mistakes, and banks' bounded 
rationality (Rotheli, 2010) 
 2   Credit cycles 
Q4 - What could be done to mitigate that risk?      
A1 - Modify the behaviour of systemically important participants 2  6 9  
Anatomy of a Financial Crisis (Mishkin, 1992) 
 3   
Expand the lender of last 
resort role 
Financial crises and the challenge of moral hazard (Wolf, 1999)  2   Reduce ‘Riskier’ behaviour 
What is Systemic Risk - Moral Hazard, Initial Shocks and Propagation (Dow, 2000)  3   Limit firm-level leverage 
Bank provisioning behaviour and procyclicality (Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005)  3   Allow for cyclicality 
Containment and Resolution in the Financial Crisis: Too Little, Too Late (Honohan, 2008)  2   Increase intervention 
Behavioral Basis of the Financial Crisis (Rizzi, 2008) 
 3   
Align compensation with 
intended behaviour 
Regulatory factors that contributed to the global financial crisis (Espenilla, 2009)  1   Resist over-regulation 
The Systemic Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies and Rated Markets (Sy, 2009) 
 2   
Include downgrade risks in 
stress testing 
Causes of the financial crisis: Risk misperception, policy mistakes, and banks' bounded 
rationality (Rotheli, 2010) 
 3   Improve risk management 
A2 - Modify participation in systemically important financial services 2  6 13  
Interbank lending and systemic risk (Rochet and Tirole, 1996)  3   Introduce discounted lending 
Global financial instability: Framework, events, issues (Mishkin, 1999) 
 2   
Address asymmetric 
information 
Bank provisioning behaviour and procyclicality (Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005)  2   Review credit portfolio 
An analysis of the systemic risks posed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and an evaluation of 
the policy options for reducing those risks (Eisenbeis et al, 2007) 
 2   Limit Portfolio sizes 
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The background to the 2007 financial crisis (Goodhart, 2007)  2   Limit product-level leverage 
The corporate treasurer - Playing the leading role (Hart, 2009)  1   Increase transparency 
Credit derivatives: Banks' behaviour, financial stability and banking regulation (Karras, 2009)  2   Optimize capital reserves 
The Systemic Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies and Rated Markets (Sy, 2009) 
 2   
More frequent stress- testing 
and mitigation 
Short Selling in a Financial Crisis: The Regulation of Short Sales in the United Kingdom and the 
United States (McGavin, 2010) 
 3   
Improve enforcement of 
existing rules 
Intellectual Hazard: how Conceptual Biases in Complex Organizations Contributed to the Crisis 
of 2008 (Miller and Rosenfield, 2010) 
 2   
Reform and simplify 
complexities 
A model of a systemic bank run (Uhlig, 2010)  1   Purchase troubled assets 
Effects of central bank intervention on the interbank market during the subprime crisis (Brunetti, 
Di Filippo and Harris, 2011) 
 2   
Provide stress-test info and 
loan guarantees 
S03.3 - Related concepts 
Not mapped to questions (contributions cited in overall recommendations) 
     
S03.4 - Foundational contributions 
Not mapped to questions (contributions cited in overall recommendations) 
     
S04 Perspectives: on the system    53  
S04.1 - Banking    18  
Q1 -  What is the nature of catastrophic instability or total collapse of this system?      
A1 - Its nature is Systemic 2  6 4  
Interbank lending and systemic risk (Rochet and Tirole, 1996)  3   Interbank system 
A theory of systemic risk and design of prudential bank regulation (Acharya, 2009)  3   Banking system 
Financial crisis resolution - The state as a lender of last resort? (Blankart and Fasten, 2009) 
 2   
Central bank and banking 
system 
A model of a systemic bank run (Uhlig, 2010)  2   Model, banking system 
A2 - Its nature is Critical 1  3 1  
A catastrophe model of bank failure (Ho and Saunders, 1980)  3   Model, banking system 
A4 - Its nature is Financial 2  6 4  
Credit derivatives: Banks' behaviour, financial stability and banking regulation (Karras, 2009)  3   Banking system 
Did bank capital regulation exacerbate the subprime mortgage crisis? (Petersen et al, 2009)  2   Model, banking system 
The banking crisis as dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (Minford, 2010)  2   Model, banking 
Bailouts, the incentive to manage risk, and financial crises (Panageas, 2010)  2   Banking system bailouts 
Q2 - What is meant by the risk of such an occurrence?   n/a   
Q3 - How does that risk materialize?       
A1 - Through the behaviour of systemically important participants 2  6 9  
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Interbank lending and systemic risk (Rochet and Tirole, 1996)  3   Banking behaviour 
Bank provisioning behaviour and procyclicality (Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005)  3   Bank provisioning 
A theory of systemic risk and design of prudential bank regulation (Acharya, 2009)  2   Banking behaviour 
Bank competition and financial stability (Berger, Klapper and Turk-Ariss, 2009)  2   Banking competition 
Credit derivatives: Banks' behaviour, financial stability and banking regulation (Karras, 2009)  1   Banking behaviour 
The Failure Mechanics of Dealer Banks (Duffie, 2010)  3   Banking sub-system 
The banking crisis as dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (Minford, 2010)  2   Banking behaviour 
Causes of the financial crisis: Risk misperception, policy mistakes, and banks' bounded 
rationality (Rotheli, 2010) 
 3   Banking rationality 
A model of a systemic bank run (Uhlig, 2010)  3   Banking panics 
A2 - Through participation in systemically important financial services 2  6 6  
Interbank lending and systemic risk (Rochet and Tirole, 1996)  3   Interbank services 
Bank competition and financial stability (Berger, Klapper and Turk-Ariss, 2009)  2   Banking portfolios 
The corporate treasurer - Playing the leading role (Hart, 2009)  3   Banking proprietary trading 
Credit derivatives: Banks' behaviour, financial stability and banking regulation (Karras, 2009)  2   Banking derivatives trading 
Did bank capital regulation exacerbate the subprime mortgage crisis? (Petersen et al, 2009)  2   Banking capital adequacy 
The Failure Mechanics of Dealer Banks (Duffie, 2010) 
 2   
Banking intermediation in 
securities and derivatives 
A3 - Through interactions with the system’s infrastructure 2  6 6  
A catastrophe model of bank failure (Ho and Saunders, 1980)  2   Banking collapse 
Interbank lending and systemic risk (Rochet and Tirole, 1996)  3   Interbank  
A theory of systemic risk and design of prudential bank regulation (Acharya, 2009)  2   Banking regulations 
Financial crisis resolution - The state as a lender of last resort? (Blankart and Fasten, 2009) 
 2   
Banking, state support 
framework 
A framework for assessing the systemic risk of major financial institutions (Huang, Zhou and 
Zhu, 2009) 
 3   Banking, plus 
Regulating Systemic Institutions (Rochet, 2009)  3   Banking supervision 
A4 - Through interactions with the system’s economic environment 1  3 3  
Crises in competitive versus monopolistic banking systems (Boyd, De Nicola and Smith, 2004)  2   Banking system types 
Bank provisioning behaviour and procyclicality (Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005)  3   Banking induced cycles 
The banking crisis as dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (Minford, 2010)  2   Banking shocks 
Q4 - What could be done to mitigate that risk?      
A1 - Modify the behaviour of systemically important participants 1  2 2  
Bank provisioning behaviour and procyclicality (Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005)  2   Change banking cyclicality 
Causes of the financial crisis: Risk misperception, policy mistakes, and banks' bounded 
rationality (Rotheli, 2010) 
 2   
Improve banking risk 
management 
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A2 - Modify participation in systemically important financial services 1  3 3  
Interbank lending and systemic risk (Rochet and Tirole, 1996)  3   Interbank discounted lending 
Credit derivatives: Banks' behaviour, financial stability and banking regulation (Karras, 2009) 
 3   
Improve banking capital 
reserves 
Effects of central bank intervention on the interbank market during the subprime crisis (Brunetti, 
Di Filippo and Harris, 2011) 
 3   Interbank loan guarantees 
A3 - Modify interactions with the system’s infrastructure 2  6 6  
Interbank lending and systemic risk (Rochet and Tirole, 1996)  2   Banks’ mutual monitoring 
A theory of systemic risk and design of prudential bank regulation (Acharya, 2009)  3   Improve banking regulation 
Regulating Systemic Institutions (Rochet, 2009)  2   Reform interbank markets 
The Failure Mechanics of Dealer Banks (Duffie, 2010) 
 3   
Introduce ‘too big to fail’ 
policies 
A model of a systemic bank run (Uhlig, 2010)  2   Purchase banking assets 
Effects of central bank intervention on the interbank market during the subprime crisis (Brunetti, 
Di Filippo and Harris, 2011) 
 3   
Provide stress-test info and 
loan guarantees 
A4 – Modify interactions with the system’s economic environment 1  2 2  
The banking crisis as dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (Minford, 2010) 
 2   
Calibrate better policy 
responses 
Causes of the financial crisis: Risk misperception, policy mistakes, and banks' bounded 
rationality (Rotheli, 2010) 
2    Improve monetary policy 
S04.2 - Complex    7  
Q1 -  What is the nature of catastrophic instability or total collapse of this system?      
A1 - Its nature is Systemic 1  2 2  
Economic models of systemic risk in financial systems (Loretan, 1996)     Complex dynamics 
Systemic risks in society and economics (Helbing, 2009)   2   Dynamic complexity 
Systemic risk in the financial sphere: Theoretical study and approaches to its estimation 
(Govtvan and Mansurov, 2011) 
 2   Complexity, systemic risk 
A2 - Its nature is Critical 1  3 4  
A catastrophe model of bank failure (Ho and Saunders, 1980)  3   Model, catastrophe 
A framework for assessing the systemic risk of major financial institutions (Huang, Zhou and 
Zhu, 2009)  3   
Losses of major financial 
institutions reach a critical 
point, and they fail 
Analysis of Financial Crisis: A Perspective Based on Catastrophe Theory (Yang, Mu and Yao, 
2009) 
 2   Theory, catastrophe 
Complexity Theory and the Financial Crisis: a Critical Review (Zeidan and Richardson, 2010)  1   Theory, critical states 
Q2 - What is meant by the risk of such an occurrence?     n/a 
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Q3 - How does that risk materialize?       
A1 - Through the behaviour of systemically important participants 1  1 1  
Economic models of systemic risk in financial systems (Loretan, 1996)  1   Complex dynamics 
A3 - Through interactions with the system’s infrastructure 1  2 2  
A catastrophe model of bank failure (Ho and Saunders, 1980)  2   Complex system 
Economic models of systemic risk in financial systems (Loretan, 1996) 
 1   
Complexity of financial 
markets 
Q4 - What could be done to mitigate that risk?      
A3 - Modify interactions with the system’s infrastructure 1  1 1  
Economic models of systemic risk in financial systems (Loretan, 1996) 
 1   
Introduce shock prevention 
and response policies 
S04.3 - Economic    29  
Q1 -  What is the nature of catastrophic instability or total collapse of this system?      
A1 - Its nature is Systemic 1  2 3  
A Theory of Systemic Fragility (Minsky, 1977) 
 2   
Money market reversals,  
systemic fragility, depression 
/ inflation 
Economic models of systemic risk in financial systems (Loretan, 1996) 
 2   
Various shocks severely 
disrupt financial systems 
Systemic risks in society and economics (Helbing, 2009)   2   Theories, systemic risk 
A3 - Its nature is Global 1  3 1  
Reforming the global economic architecture~ Lessons from recent crises (Stiglitz, 1999) 
 3   
Disasterous short-term 
capital flows across the 
GFS, and high levels of 
bankruptcy 
A4 - Its nature is Financial 1  2 7  
Anatomy of a Financial Crisis (Mishkin, 1992)  2   Perspective, financial 
The Financial Instability Hypothesis (Minsky, 1993)  2   Hypothesis, financial 
Towards a macro-prudential leading indicators framework for monitoring financial vulnerability 
(Bhattacharyay, 2003) 
 1   Framework, financial 
Equilibrium analysis, banking and financial instability (Tsomocos, 2003)  2   Model, financial 
Understanding financial crises - Clarendon Lectures (Allen and Gale, 2007) 
 2   
Emergence of various 
financial crisis scenarios 
Did bank capital regulation exacerbate the subprime mortgage crisis? (Petersen et al, 2009)  1   Model, bank capital 
The banking crisis as dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (Minford, 2010)  1   Model, banking 
Q2 - What is meant by the risk of such an occurrence?     n/a 
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Q3 - How does that risk materialize?       
A1 - Through the behaviour of systemically important participants 1  2 5  
The Financial Instability Hypothesis (Minsky, 1993)  2   Government intervention 
Economic models of systemic risk in financial systems (Loretan, 1996)  2   Non-rational responses 
Reforming the global economic architecture~ Lessons from recent crises (Stiglitz, 1999)  1   Market behaviour 
The banking crisis as dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (Minford, 2010)  2   Euphorias 
Effects of central bank intervention on the interbank market during the subprime crisis (Brunetti, 
Di Filippo and Harris, 2011) 
 2   Intervention 
A2 - Through participation in systemically important financial services 1  2 6  
Anatomy of a Financial Crisis (Mishkin, 1992)  2   Inefficient financial markets 
Global financial instability: Framework, events, issues (Mishkin, 1999)  1   Bad credit risks 
Bank provisioning behaviour and procyclicality (Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005)  2   Credit effects on GDP 
The great financial crisis (Foster and Magdoff, 2009) 
 1   
Investment in failing hedge 
funds 
The financial crisis and its issues (Bexley et al, 2010)  1   Holding toxic assets 
Financial crises, credit booms, and external imbalances: 140 years of lessons (Jorda, 
Schularick and Taylor, 2011) 
 2   Credit growth 
A3 - Through interactions with the system’s infrastructure 1  2 1  
Reforming the global economic architecture~ Lessons from recent crises (Stiglitz, 1999) 
 2   
Global economic 
architecture 
A4 - Through interactions with the system’s economic environment 2  6 17  
A Theory of Systemic Fragility (Minsky, 1977)  3   Depression 
The Financial Instability Hypothesis (Minsky, 1993)  3   Impact of debt 
Reforming the global economic architecture~ Lessons from recent crises (Stiglitz, 1999)  3   Economic architecture 
Minsky's Theory of Financial Crises in a Global Context (Wolfson, 2002)  3   Global debt-deflation 
Crises in competitive versus monopolistic banking systems (Boyd, De Nicola and Smith, 2004)  2   Monetary policy 
Bank provisioning behaviour and procyclicality (Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005)  2   GDP cycles 
Manias, panics, and crashes - A History of Financial Crises (Kindleberger and Aliber, 2005)  3   Cross-border money flows 
New thinking on the financial crisis (Allen and Snyder, 2009)  3   Boom and bust phases 
Regulatory factors that contributed to the global financial crisis (Espenilla, 2009)  2   Monetary policies 
The great financial crisis (Foster and Magdoff, 2009)  3   Growth and stagnation 
The corporate treasurer - Playing the leading role (Hart, 2009)  1   Expanding economy 
A framework for assessing the systemic risk of major financial institutions (Huang, Zhou and 
Zhu, 2009) 
 2   Macro-financial conditions 
Modelling the global financial crisis (McKibbin and Stoeckel, 2009)  2   Global trade contraction 
Policies to rebalance the global economy after the financial crisis (Freedman et al, 2010)  2   Policy mistakes 
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The banking crisis as dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (Minford, 2010)  2   Business cycles / shocks 
Causes of the financial crisis: Risk misperception, policy mistakes, and banks' bounded 
rationality (Rotheli, 2010) 
 1   Credit cycles 
Financial crises, credit booms, and external imbalances: 140 years of lessons (Jorda, 
Schularick and Taylor, 2011) 
 2   
Recessions, slumps and 
turnarounds 
Q4 - What could be done to mitigate that risk?      
A1 - Modify the behaviour of systemically important participants 1  2 1  
Bank provisioning behaviour and procyclicality (Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005)  2   Allow for cyclicality 
A2 - Modify participation in systemically important financial services 1  2 1  
Effects of central bank intervention on the interbank market during the subprime crisis (Brunetti, 
Di Filippo and Harris, 2011) 
 2   
Provide interbank loan 
guarantees 
A3 - Modify interactions with the system’s infrastructure 1  3 3  
Economic models of systemic risk in financial systems (Loretan, 1996) 
 3   
Introduce shock prevention 
and response policies 
Effects of central bank intervention on the interbank market during the subprime crisis (Brunetti, 
Di Filippo and Harris, 2011) 
 2   
Provide stress-test info and 
loan guarantees 
The structural fragility of financial systems (Gramlich and Oet, 2011) 
 2   
Quantify structural issues in 
early warning systems 
A4 – Modify interactions with the system’s economic environment 2  6 13  
A Theory of Systemic Fragility (Minsky, 1977)  3   Increase deficit 
The Financial Instability Hypothesis (Minsky, 1993)  3   Stabilize financing regime 
Reforming the global economic architecture~ Lessons from recent crises (Stiglitz, 1999) 
 2   
Introduce new governmental 
measures 
Minsky's Theory of Financial Crises in a Global Context (Wolfson, 2002)  3   Revise expectations 
Crises in competitive versus monopolistic banking systems (Boyd, De Nicola and Smith, 2004)  2   Limit rate of inflation 
Manias, panics, and crashes - A History of Financial Crises (Kindleberger and Aliber, 2005) 
 3   
Manage scope and direction 
of money flows 
New thinking on the financial crisis (Allen and Snyder, 2009) 
 2   
Restructure for boom and 
bust phases 
The corporate treasurer - Playing the leading role (Hart, 2009) 
 1   
Acquire real-time investment 
information 
Modelling the global financial crisis (McKibbin and Stoeckel, 2009) 
 2   
Manage shocks and risk 
premia expectations 
Policies to rebalance the global economy after the financial crisis (Freedman et al, 2010) 
 2   
Balance stimulus versus 
consolidation trade-off 
The banking crisis as dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (Minford, 2010) 
 1   
Calibrate better policy 
responses 
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Causes of the financial crisis: Risk misperception, policy mistakes, and banks' bounded 
rationality (Rotheli, 2010) 
 2   Improve monetary policy 
Financial crises, credit booms, and external imbalances: 140 years of lessons (Jorda, 
Schularick and Taylor, 2011) 
 3   Manage credit growth 
S04.4 - Financial    49  
Q1 -  What is the nature of catastrophic instability or total collapse of this system?      
A1 - Its nature is Systemic 1  2 5  
A Theory of Systemic Fragility (Minsky, 1977) 
 2   
Money market reversals,  
systemic fragility, depression 
/ inflation 
Economic models of systemic risk in financial systems (Loretan, 1996) 
 2   
Various shocks severely 
disrupt financial systems 
Financial crisis resolution - The state as a lender of last resort? (Blankart and Fasten, 2009)  2   Model, systematic effects 
Systemic risks in society and economics (Helbing, 2009)   1   Theories, systemic risk 
Systemic risk in the financial sphere: Theoretical study and approaches to its estimation 
(Govtvan and Mansurov, 2011) 
 2   Theoretical, systemic risk 
A2 - Its nature is Critical 1  3 3  
A framework for assessing the systemic risk of major financial institutions (Huang, Zhou and 
Zhu, 2009)  2   
Losses of major financial 
institutions reach a critical 
point, and they fail 
Analysis of Financial Crisis: A Perspective Based on Catastrophe Theory (Yang, Mu and Yao, 
2009) 
 3   Theory, catastrophe 
Complexity Theory and the Financial Crisis: a Critical Review (Zeidan and Richardson, 2010)  1   Theory, critical states 
A3 - Its nature is Global 1  2 4  
Global financial instability: Framework, events, issues (Mishkin, 1999)  2   Financial framework 
Reforming the global economic architecture~ Lessons from recent crises (Stiglitz, 1999) 
 1   
Disasterous short-term 
capital flows across the 
GFS, and high levels of 
bankruptcy 
Minsky's Theory of Financial Crises in a Global Context (Wolfson, 2002)  2   Theory review, global 
Modelling the global financial crisis (McKibbin and Stoeckel, 2009)  2   Theory, global 
A4 - Its nature is Financial 2  6 10  
Anatomy of a Financial Crisis (Mishkin, 1992)  3   Perspective, financial 
The Financial Instability Hypothesis (Minsky, 1993)  3   Hypothesis, financial 
Towards a macro-prudential leading indicators framework for monitoring financial vulnerability 
(Bhattacharyay, 2003) 
 3   Framework, financial 
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Equilibrium analysis, banking and financial instability (Tsomocos, 2003)  2   Model, financial 
Understanding financial crises - Clarendon Lectures (Allen and Gale, 2007) 
 3   
Emergence of various 
financial crisis scenarios 
Behavioral Basis of the Financial Crisis (Rizzi, 2008)  2   Framework, financial 
Credit derivatives: Banks' behaviour, financial stability and banking regulation (Karras, 2009)  3   Framework, financial 
Did bank capital regulation exacerbate the subprime mortgage crisis? (Petersen et al, 2009)  2   Model, bank capital 
The banking crisis as dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (Minford, 2010)  2   Model, banking 
Bailouts, the incentive to manage risk, and financial crises (Panageas, 2010) 
 2   
Systemic collapse of 
financial institutions’ net 
worth, beyond the protection 
of bailouts 
A5 - Its nature is Structural 1  2 2  
New thinking on the financial crisis (Allen and Snyder, 2009)  1   Constructs, meso-structures 
The structural fragility of financial systems (Gramlich and Oet, 2011) 
 2   
When levels of 
concentration and inter-
dependency become 
untenable for the structures 
of financial systems  
Q2 - What is meant by the risk of such an occurrence?     n/a 
Q3 - How does that risk materialize?       
A1 - Through the behaviour of systemically important participants 2  6 16  
The Financial Instability Hypothesis (Minsky, 1993)  3   Government intervention 
Economic models of systemic risk in financial systems (Loretan, 1996)  2   Non-rational responses 
Interbank lending and systemic risk (Rochet and Tirole, 1996)  2   Constructive ambiguity 
Reforming the global economic architecture~ Lessons from recent crises (Stiglitz, 1999)  3   Market behaviour 
What is Systemic Risk - Moral Hazard, Initial Shocks and Propagation (Dow, 2000)  2   Moral hazard, leverage 
Manias, panics, and crashes - A History of Financial Crises (Kindleberger and Aliber, 2005)  3   Manias, panics, bubbles 
The background to the 2007 financial crisis (Goodhart, 2007)  2   Under-pricing of risk 
Containment and Resolution in the Financial Crisis: Too Little, Too Late (Honohan, 2008)  2   Weak capitalization 
A theory of systemic risk and design of prudential bank regulation (Acharya, 2009)  3   Risk correlation 
Regulatory factors that contributed to the global financial crisis (Espenilla, 2009)  2   Procyclical policies 
Credit derivatives: Banks' behaviour, financial stability and banking regulation (Karras, 2009)  2   Capital buffer reduction 
Modelling the global financial crisis (McKibbin and Stoeckel, 2009)  1   ‘Switching’ expectations 
The Systemic Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies and Rated Markets (Sy, 2009)  1   Ratings downgrading 
Short Selling in a Financial Crisis: The Regulation of Short Sales in the United Kingdom and the 
United States (McGavin, 2010) 
 2   Short selling 
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A model of a systemic bank run (Uhlig, 2010)  1   Bank run 
Effects of central bank intervention on the interbank market during the subprime crisis (Brunetti, 
Di Filippo and Harris, 2011) 
 3   Intervention 
A2 - Through participation in systemically important financial services 2  6 20  
Anatomy of a Financial Crisis (Mishkin, 1992)  2   Inefficient financial markets 
Interbank lending and systemic risk (Rochet and Tirole, 1996)  3   Interbank lending stress 
Global financial instability: Framework, events, issues (Mishkin, 1999)  3   Bad credit risks 
The nature of systemic risk - trying to achieve a definition (Mundy, 2004)  1   Uninsurable risks 
Bank provisioning behaviour and procyclicality (Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005)  2   Credit effects on GDP 
An analysis of the systemic risks posed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and an evaluation of 
the policy options for reducing those risks (Eisenbeis et al, 2007) 
 2   Portfolio sizes 
The background to the 2007 financial crisis (Goodhart, 2007)  1   Risky assets 
Behavioral Basis of the Financial Crisis (Rizzi, 2008) 
 1   
Misaligned compensation on 
structured finance 
Bank competition and financial stability (Berger, Klapper and Turk-Ariss, 2009)  2   Risky loan portfolios 
The great financial crisis (Foster and Magdoff, 2009) 
 2   
Investment in failing hedge 
funds 
The corporate treasurer - Playing the leading role (Hart, 2009) 
 1   
Trading complex financial 
instruments 
Credit derivatives: Banks' behaviour, financial stability and banking regulation (Karras, 2009) 
 3   
Behavioural effects of credit 
derivatives 
Did bank capital regulation exacerbate the subprime mortgage crisis? (Petersen et al, 2009) 
 1   
Regulation laxity in sub-
prime mortgages 
The Systemic Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies and Rated Markets (Sy, 2009)  2   Ratings downgrades 
The financial crisis and its issues (Bexley et al, 2010)  1   Holding toxic assets 
The Failure Mechanics of Dealer Banks (Duffie, 2010) 
 3   
Failed intermediation in 
securities and derivatives 
Short Selling in a Financial Crisis: The Regulation of Short Sales in the United Kingdom and the 
United States (McGavin, 2010) 
 3   
Holding securities that are 
being sold short 
Insurance Companies and the Financial Crisis (Schich, 2010) 
 2   
Insurance of mortgage- 
backed securities 
Effects of central bank intervention on the interbank market during the subprime crisis (Brunetti, 
Di Filippo and Harris, 2011) 
 2   
Providing capital for 
counterparty risk cover 
Financial crises, credit booms, and external imbalances: 140 years of lessons (Jorda, 
Schularick and Taylor, 2011) 
 3   Credit growth 
A3 - Through interactions with the system’s infrastructure 1  3 5  
A catastrophe model of bank failure (Ho and Saunders, 1980)  2   Money market 
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Economic models of systemic risk in financial systems (Loretan, 1996)  3   Financial markets 
Interbank lending and systemic risk (Rochet and Tirole, 1996)  1   Interbank linkages 
A framework for assessing the systemic risk of major financial institutions (Huang, Zhou and 
Zhu, 2009) 
 2   Major financial institutions 
The structural fragility of financial systems (Gramlich and Oet, 2011)  3   Financial system structure 
A4 - Through interactions with the system’s economic environment 2  6 7  
A Theory of Systemic Fragility (Minsky, 1977)  3   Depression 
The Financial Instability Hypothesis (Minsky, 1993)  3   Impact of debt 
Minsky's Theory of Financial Crises in a Global Context (Wolfson, 2002)  2   Global debt-deflation 
Bank provisioning behaviour and procyclicality (Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005)  2   GDP cycles 
Manias, panics, and crashes - A History of Financial Crises (Kindleberger and Aliber, 2005)  3   Cross-border money flows 
A framework for assessing the systemic risk of major financial institutions (Huang, Zhou and 
Zhu, 2009) 
 2   Macro-financial conditions 
Financial crises, credit booms, and external imbalances: 140 years of lessons (Jorda, 
Schularick and Taylor, 2011) 
 3   
Recessions, slumps and 
turnarounds 
Q4 - What could be done to mitigate that risk?      
A1 - Modify the behaviour of systemically important participants 2  4 8  
Anatomy of a Financial Crisis (Mishkin, 1992) 
 2   
Expand the lender of last 
resort role 
Financial crises and the challenge of moral hazard (Wolf, 1999)  2   Reduce ‘Riskier’ behaviour 
What is Systemic Risk - Moral Hazard, Initial Shocks and Propagation (Dow, 2000)  1   Limit firm-level leverage 
Bank provisioning behaviour and procyclicality (Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005)  2   Allow for cyclicality 
Containment and Resolution in the Financial Crisis: Too Little, Too Late (Honohan, 2008)  2   Increase intervention 
Regulatory factors that contributed to the global financial crisis (Espenilla, 2009)  1   Resist over-regulation 
The Systemic Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies and Rated Markets (Sy, 2009) 
 2   
Include downgrade risks in 
stress testing 
Causes of the financial crisis: Risk misperception, policy mistakes, and banks' bounded 
rationality (Rotheli, 2010) 
 2   Improve risk management 
A2 - Modify participation in systemically important financial services 1  3 6  
Interbank lending and systemic risk (Rochet and Tirole, 1996)  2   Introduce discounted lending 
Bank provisioning behaviour and procyclicality (Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005)  2   Review credit portfolio 
An analysis of the systemic risks posed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and an evaluation of 
the policy options for reducing those risks (Eisenbeis et al, 2007) 
 2   Limit Portfolio sizes 
The background to the 2007 financial crisis (Goodhart, 2007)  2   Limit product-level leverage 
Credit derivatives: Banks' behaviour, financial stability and banking regulation (Karras, 2009)  2   Optimize capital reserves 
Effects of central bank intervention on the interbank market during the subprime crisis (Brunetti,  3   Provide interbank loan 
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Di Filippo and Harris, 2011) guarantees 
A3 - Modify interactions with the system’s infrastructure 1  3 9  
Economic models of systemic risk in financial systems (Loretan, 1996) 
 2   
Introduce shock prevention 
and response policies 
A theory of systemic risk and design of prudential bank regulation (Acharya, 2009) 
 3   
Mitigate aggregate risk-
shifting incentives 
New thinking on the financial crisis (Allen and Snyder, 2009) 
 1   
Use infrastructure simulation 
for predictions 
Financial crisis resolution - The state as a lender of last resort? (Blankart and Fasten, 2009) 
 2   
Enforce regulations 
internationally 
The financial crisis and its issues (Bexley et al, 2010) 
 3   
Re-introduce something like 
Glass-Steagall Act 
Short Selling in a Financial Crisis: The Regulation of Short Sales in the United Kingdom and the 
United States (McGavin, 2010) 
 3   
Improve enforcement of 
existing rules 
Effects of central bank intervention on the interbank market during the subprime crisis (Brunetti, 
Di Filippo and Harris, 2011) 
 2   
Provide stress-test info and 
loan guarantees 
The 2008 financial collapse: Lessons for engineering failure (Fisk, 2011) 
 1   
Strengthen the meta-
regulation framework 
The structural fragility of financial systems (Gramlich and Oet, 2011) 
 1   
Quantify structural issues in 
early warning systems 
A4 – Modify interactions with the system’s economic environment 1  3 5  
A Theory of Systemic Fragility (Minsky, 1977)  3   Increase deficit 
The Financial Instability Hypothesis (Minsky, 1993)  3   Stabilize financing regime 
Manias, panics, and crashes - A History of Financial Crises (Kindleberger and Aliber, 2005) 
 2   
Manage scope and direction 
of money flows 
New thinking on the financial crisis (Allen and Snyder, 2009) 
 2   
Restructure for boom and 
bust phases 
Modelling the global financial crisis (McKibbin and Stoeckel, 2009) 
 2   
Manage shocks and risk 
premia expectations 
S04.5 - Insurance      
Q1 -  What is the nature of catastrophic instability or total collapse of this system?      
Q2 - What is meant by the risk of such an occurrence?     n/a 
Q3 - How does that risk materialize?       
A2 - Through participation in systemically important financial services 1  2 2  
The nature of systemic risk - trying to achieve a definition (Mundy, 2004)  1   Uninsurable risks 
Insurance Companies and the Financial Crisis (Schich, 2010)  2   Insurance of mortgage- 
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backed securities 
Q4 - What could be done to mitigate that risk?      
A3 - Modify interactions with the system’s infrastructure 1  1 1  
A framework for assessing the systemic risk of major financial institutions (Huang, Zhou and 
Zhu, 2009) 
  1  
Charge an insurance 
premium 
S04.6 - Market      
Q1 -  What is the nature of catastrophic instability or total collapse of this system?      
A1 - Its nature is Systemic 1  2 1  
A Theory of Systemic Fragility (Minsky, 1977) 
 2   
Money market reversals,  
systemic fragility, depression 
/ inflation 
A5 - Its nature is Structural 1  4 3  
New thinking on the financial crisis (Allen and Snyder, 2009)  1   Constructs, meso-structures 
Regulating Systemic Institutions (Rochet, 2009) 
 2   
Extreme stress in interbank 
and money markets  
The structural fragility of financial systems (Gramlich and Oet, 2011) 
 2   
When levels of 
concentration and inter-
dependency become 
untenable for the structures 
of financial systems  
Q2 - What is meant by the risk of such an occurrence?     n/a 
Q3 - How does that risk materialize?       
A1 - Through the behaviour of systemically important participants 1  2 3  
Reforming the global economic architecture~ Lessons from recent crises (Stiglitz, 1999)  1   Market behaviour 
Short Selling in a Financial Crisis: The Regulation of Short Sales in the United Kingdom and the 
United States (McGavin, 2010) 
 2   Short selling 
Effects of central bank intervention on the interbank market during the subprime crisis (Brunetti, 
Di Filippo and Harris, 2011) 
 2   Intervention 
A2 - Through participation in systemically important financial services 1  3 2  
Anatomy of a Financial Crisis (Mishkin, 1992)  3   Inefficient financial markets 
Short Selling in a Financial Crisis: The Regulation of Short Sales in the United Kingdom and the 
United States (McGavin, 2010) 
 2   
Holding securities that are 
being sold short 
A3 - Through interactions with the system’s infrastructure 1  2 3  
A catastrophe model of bank failure (Ho and Saunders, 1980)  1   Money market 
Economic models of systemic risk in financial systems (Loretan, 1996)  2   Financial markets 
The structural fragility of financial systems (Gramlich and Oet, 2011)  2   Financial system structure 
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Q4 - What could be done to mitigate that risk?      
A1 - Modify the behaviour of systemically important participants 1  2 1  
The Systemic Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies and Rated Markets (Sy, 2009) 
 2   
Include downgrade risks in 
stress testing 
A2 - Modify participation in systemically important financial services 1  3 3  
Credit derivatives: Banks' behaviour, financial stability and banking regulation (Karras, 2009)  2   Optimize capital reserves 
The Systemic Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies and Rated Markets (Sy, 2009) 
 3   
More frequent stress- testing 
and mitigation 
Effects of central bank intervention on the interbank market during the subprime crisis (Brunetti, 
Di Filippo and Harris, 2011) 
 3   
Provide interbank loan 
guarantees 
A3 - Modify interactions with the system’s infrastructure 1  3 3  
Interbank lending and systemic risk (Rochet and Tirole, 1996) 
 2   
Enable ‘autarky’ in bank 
monitoring 
Regulating Systemic Institutions (Rochet, 2009)  3   Reform interbank markets 
Effects of central bank intervention on the interbank market during the subprime crisis (Brunetti, 
Di Filippo and Harris, 2011) 
 3   
Provide stress-test info and 
loan guarantees 
S04.7 - Operational      
Q1 -  What is the nature of catastrophic instability or total collapse of this system?      
A2 - Its nature is Critical 1  2 2  
A catastrophe model of bank failure (Ho and Saunders, 1980) 
 2   
Interaction between 
regulators and depositors 
Complexity Theory and the Financial Crisis: a Critical Review (Zeidan and Richardson, 2010) 
 1   
Econophysics and volatility 
clustering in banking 
systems 
A3 - Its nature is Global 1  2 2  
Global financial instability: Framework, events, issues (Mishkin, 1999) 
 2   
Adverse selection and 
‘lemons problem’ 
Reforming the global economic architecture~ Lessons from recent crises (Stiglitz, 1999) 
 2   
Disasterous short-term 
capital flows across the 
GFS, and high levels of 
bankruptcy 
Q2 - What is meant by the risk of such an occurrence?   n/a   
Q3 - How does that risk materialize?       
A1 - Through the behaviour of systemically important participants 1  2 4  
The Failure Mechanics of Dealer Banks (Duffie, 2010)  2   Bank runs 
A model of a systemic bank run (Uhlig, 2010)  2   Bank run 
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Diversification at financial institutions and systemic crises (Wagner, 2010)  1   Diversification 
Effects of central bank intervention on the interbank market during the subprime crisis (Brunetti, 
Di Filippo and Harris, 2011) 
 1   Intervention 
A2 - Through participation in systemically important financial services 1  2 7  
An analysis of the systemic risks posed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and an evaluation of 
the policy options for reducing those risks (Eisenbeis et al, 2007) 
 2   Portfolio sizes 
The background to the 2007 financial crisis (Goodhart, 2007)  2   Risky assets 
Behavioral Basis of the Financial Crisis (Rizzi, 2008) 
 2   
Misaligned compensation on 
structured finance 
The corporate treasurer - Playing the leading role (Hart, 2009) 
 2   
Trading complex financial 
instruments 
The financial crisis and its issues (Bexley et al, 2010)  2   Holding toxic assets 
The Failure Mechanics of Dealer Banks (Duffie, 2010) 
 1   
Failed intermediation in 
securities and derivatives 
Short Selling in a Financial Crisis: The Regulation of Short Sales in the United Kingdom and the 
United States (McGavin, 2010) 
 2   
Holding securities that are 
being sold short 
A4 - Through interactions with the system’s economic environment 1  1 1  
Manias, panics, and crashes - A History of Financial Crises (Kindleberger and Aliber, 2005)  1   Cross-border money flows 
Q4 - What could be done to mitigate that risk?      
A1 - Modify the behaviour of systemically important participants 2  6 7  
Anatomy of a Financial Crisis (Mishkin, 1992) 
 1   
Expand the lender of last 
resort role 
What is Systemic Risk - Moral Hazard, Initial Shocks and Propagation (Dow, 2000)  2   Limit firm-level leverage 
Bank provisioning behaviour and procyclicality (Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005)  1   Allow for cyclicality 
Containment and Resolution in the Financial Crisis: Too Little, Too Late (Honohan, 2008)  2   Increase intervention 
Behavioral Basis of the Financial Crisis (Rizzi, 2008) 
 3   
Align compensation with 
intended behaviour 
The Systemic Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies and Rated Markets (Sy, 2009) 
 2   
Include downgrade risks in 
stress testing 
Causes of the financial crisis: Risk misperception, policy mistakes, and banks' bounded 
rationality (Rotheli, 2010) 
 3   Improve risk management 
A2 - Modify participation in systemically important financial services 2  6 8  
Interbank lending and systemic risk (Rochet and Tirole, 1996)  2   Introduce discounted lending 
Global financial instability: Framework, events, issues (Mishkin, 1999) 
 1   
Address asymmetric 
information 
An analysis of the systemic risks posed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and an evaluation of 
the policy options for reducing those risks (Eisenbeis et al, 2007) 
 2   Limit Portfolio sizes 
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The background to the 2007 financial crisis (Goodhart, 2007)  3   Limit product-level leverage 
The corporate treasurer - Playing the leading role (Hart, 2009)  1   Increase transparency 
Credit derivatives: Banks' behaviour, financial stability and banking regulation (Karras, 2009)  2   Optimize capital reserves 
The Systemic Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies and Rated Markets (Sy, 2009) 
 2   
More frequent stress- testing 
and mitigation 
Effects of central bank intervention on the interbank market during the subprime crisis (Brunetti, 
Di Filippo and Harris, 2011) 
 3   
Provide interbank loan 
guarantees 
A3 - Modify interactions with the system’s infrastructure 2  6 10  
Economic models of systemic risk in financial systems (Loretan, 1996) 
 1   
Introduce shock prevention 
and response policies 
Interbank lending and systemic risk (Rochet and Tirole, 1996) 
 1   
Enable ‘autarky’ in bank 
monitoring 
Reforming the global economic architecture~ Lessons from recent crises (Stiglitz, 1999) 
 3   
Modify bankruptcy 
procedures in a crisis 
Financial crisis resolution - The state as a lender of last resort? (Blankart and Fasten, 2009) 
 3   
Enforce regulations 
internationally 
A framework for assessing the systemic risk of major financial institutions (Huang, Zhou and 
Zhu, 2009) 
 2   
Charge an insurance 
premium 
The financial crisis and its issues (Bexley et al, 2010) 
 3   
Re-introduce something like 
Glass-Steagall Act 
The Failure Mechanics of Dealer Banks (Duffie, 2010) 
 3   
Introduce ‘too big to fail’ 
policies 
Short Selling in a Financial Crisis: The Regulation of Short Sales in the United Kingdom and the 
United States (McGavin, 2010) 
 2   
Improve enforcement of 
existing rules 
A model of a systemic bank run (Uhlig, 2010)  3   Purchase troubled assets 
The 2008 financial collapse: Lessons for engineering failure (Fisk, 2011) 
 1   
Strengthen the meta-
regulation framework 
S04.8 - Regulatory    15  
Q1 -  What is the nature of catastrophic instability or total collapse of this system?      
A4 - Its nature is Financial 1  3 2  
Towards a macro-prudential leading indicators framework for monitoring financial vulnerability 
(Bhattacharyay, 2003) 
 3   Framework, financial 
Did bank capital regulation exacerbate the subprime mortgage crisis? (Petersen et al, 2009)  2   Model, bank capital 
Q2 - What is meant by the risk of such an occurrence?     n/a 
Q3 - How does that risk materialize?       
A1 - Through the behaviour of systemically important participants 1  3 4  
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A theory of systemic risk and design of prudential bank regulation (Acharya, 2009)  3   Risk correlation 
Regulatory factors that contributed to the global financial crisis (Espenilla, 2009)  2   Procyclical regulations 
Credit derivatives: Banks' behaviour, financial stability and banking regulation (Karras, 2009)  2   Capital buffer reduction 
The Systemic Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies and Rated Markets (Sy, 2009)  2   Ratings downgrading 
A2 - Through participation in systemically important financial services 1  2 4  
Credit derivatives: Banks' behaviour, financial stability and banking regulation (Karras, 2009) 
 2   
Weak credit derivatives 
regulation 
Did bank capital regulation exacerbate the subprime mortgage crisis? (Petersen et al, 2009) 
 2   
Sub-prime mortgages 
regulation 
The Systemic Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies and Rated Markets (Sy, 2009)  2   Unregulated agencies 
Short Selling in a Financial Crisis: The Regulation of Short Sales in the United Kingdom and the 
United States (McGavin, 2010) 
 2   Securities short-selling 
A3 - Through interactions with the system’s infrastructure 1  2 2  
A theory of systemic risk and design of prudential bank regulation (Acharya, 2009)  2   Endogenous factors 
Regulating Systemic Institutions (Rochet, 2009)  2   Supervisory frameworks 
A4 - Through interactions with the system’s economic environment 1  3 2  
Regulatory factors that contributed to the global financial crisis (Espenilla, 2009)  3   Monetary policies 
Policies to rebalance the global economy after the financial crisis (Freedman et al, 2010)  1   Policy mistakes 
Q4 - What could be done to mitigate that risk?      
A1 - Modify the behaviour of systemically important participants 2  2 3  
Containment and Resolution in the Financial Crisis: Too Little, Too Late (Honohan, 2008)  2   Increase intervention 
Regulatory factors that contributed to the global financial crisis (Espenilla, 2009)  1   Resist over-regulation 
The Systemic Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies and Rated Markets (Sy, 2009) 
 2   
Include downgrade risks in 
stress testing 
A2 - Modify participation in systemically important financial services 1  3 3  
Credit derivatives: Banks' behaviour, financial stability and banking regulation (Karras, 2009)  2   Optimize capital reserves 
The Systemic Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies and Rated Markets (Sy, 2009) 
 2   
More frequent stress- testing 
and mitigation 
Effects of central bank intervention on the interbank market during the subprime crisis (Brunetti, 
Di Filippo and Harris, 2011) 
 3   
Provide interbank loan 
guarantees 
A3 - Modify interactions with the system’s infrastructure 2  3 8  
A theory of systemic risk and design of prudential bank regulation (Acharya, 2009) 
 2   
Mitigate aggregate risk-
shifting incentives 
Financial crisis resolution - The state as a lender of last resort? (Blankart and Fasten, 2009) 
 3   
Enforce regulations 
internationally 
Regulating Systemic Institutions (Rochet, 2009)  3   Reform interbank markets 
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The financial crisis and its issues (Bexley et al, 2010) 
 3   
Re-introduce something like 
Glass-Steagall Act 
The Failure Mechanics of Dealer Banks (Duffie, 2010) 
 3   
Introduce ‘too big to fail’ 
policies 
Short Selling in a Financial Crisis: The Regulation of Short Sales in the United Kingdom and the 
United States (McGavin, 2010) 
 2   
Improve enforcement of 
existing rules 
Effects of central bank intervention on the interbank market during the subprime crisis (Brunetti, 
Di Filippo and Harris, 2011) 
 2   
Provide stress-test info and 
loan guarantees 
The 2008 financial collapse: Lessons for engineering failure (Fisk, 2011) 
 2   
Strengthen the meta-
regulation framework 
S05 Definitions: for systemic risk    16  
Q1 -  What is the nature of catastrophic instability or total collapse of this system?      
Q2 -  What is meant by the risk of such an occurrence?      
A1 – It is defined by its Causes 2  4 6  
Interbank lending and systemic risk (Rochet and Tirole, 1996) 
 3   
Propagation of economic 
distress  
What is Systemic Risk - Moral Hazard, Initial Shocks and Propagation (Dow, 2000)  2    
Equilibrium analysis, banking and financial instability (Tsomocos, 2003)  2    
The nature of systemic risk - trying to achieve a definition (Mundy, 2004)  1    
A theory of systemic risk and design of prudential bank regulation (Acharya, 2009) 
 3   
Endogenously chosen 
correlation of returns on 
assets held by banks  
Redefining and containing systemic risk (Kane, 2010)  2    
A2 – It is defined by its Consequences 1  2 1  
A framework for assessing the systemic risk of major financial institutions (Huang, Zhou and 
Zhu, 2009) 
 2    
A3 – It is defined by its Causes and Consequences 1  2 5  
Anatomy of a Financial Crisis (Mishkin, 1992)  2    
Economic models of systemic risk in financial systems (Loretan, 1996) 
 2   
Various shocks severely 
disrupting financial markets 
Systemic risk (Schwarcz, 2008)  2    
Systemic risk, financial contagion and financial fragility (Martinez-Jaramillo et al, 2010)  2    
The structural fragility of financial systems (Gramlich and Oet, 2011) 
 2   
Structural weaknesses that 
create vulnerabilities in 
financial markets 
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A4 – Similar terms and meanings 2  4 5  
Global financial instability - Framework, events, issues (Mishkin, 1999)  2    
Systemic risk in the financial sphere - Theoretical study and approaches to its estimation 
(Govtvan and Mansurov, 2011) 
 2    
Systemic risk - A survey (Bandt and Hartmann, 2000)  2    
Systemic risks in society and economics (Helbing, 2009)  2    
What is systemic risk, and do bank regulators retard or contribute to it (Kaufman and Scott, 
2003) 
 2    
Q3 - How does that risk materialize?       
Q4 - What could be done to mitigate that risk?      
S06 Forms: of distress in the system      
S06.1 – Banking      
Q1 -  What is the nature of catastrophic instability or total collapse of this system?      
A1 - Its nature is Systemic 2  6 4  
Interbank lending and systemic risk (Rochet and Tirole, 1996) 
 3   
Economic distress 
propagated system-wide 
through financial 
transactions 
A theory of systemic risk and design of prudential bank regulation (Acharya, 2009) 
 3   
When many banks fail 
together throughout the 
banking system 
Financial crisis resolution - The state as a lender of last resort? (Blankart and Fasten, 2009)  2   Model, systematic effects 
A model of a systemic bank run (Uhlig, 2010)  2   Model, systemic bank run 
A2 - Its nature is Critical 1  3 2  
A catastrophe model of bank failure (Ho and Saunders, 1980)  3   Catastrophic bank failures 
A framework for assessing the systemic risk of major financial institutions (Huang, Zhou and 
Zhu, 2009)  3   
Losses of major financial 
institutions reach a critical 
point, and they fail 
A4 - Its nature is Financial 2  4 5  
Behavioral Basis of the Financial Crisis (Rizzi, 2008)  2   Framework, financial 
Credit derivatives: Banks' behaviour, financial stability and banking regulation (Karras, 2009)  2   Framework, financial 
Did bank capital regulation exacerbate the subprime mortgage crisis? (Petersen et al, 2009)  2   Model, bank capital 
The banking crisis as dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (Minford, 2010)  2   Model, banking 
Bailouts, the incentive to manage risk, and financial crises (Panageas, 2010) 
 2   
Systemic collapse of 
financial institutions’ net 
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worth, beyond the protection 
of bailouts 
A5 - Its nature is Structural 1  3 1  
Regulating Systemic Institutions (Rochet, 2009) 
 3   
Extreme stress in interbank 
and money markets  
Q2 - What is meant by the risk of such an occurrence?     n/a 
Q3 - How does that risk materialize?       
A1 - Through the behaviour of systemically important participants 2  6 14  
Interbank lending and systemic risk (Rochet and Tirole, 1996)  3   Constructive ambiguity 
What is Systemic Risk - Moral Hazard, Initial Shocks and Propagation (Dow, 2000)  2   Moral hazard, leverage 
Bank provisioning behaviour and procyclicality (Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005)  3   Bank provisioning 
A theory of systemic risk and design of prudential bank regulation (Acharya, 2009)  3   Risk correlation 
Bank competition and financial stability (Berger, Klapper and Turk-Ariss, 2009) 
 2   
Adverse selection, moral 
hazard 
Credit derivatives: Banks' behaviour, financial stability and banking regulation (Karras, 2009)  3   Capital buffer reduction 
The Failure Mechanics of Dealer Banks (Duffie, 2010)  2   Bank runs 
Short Selling in a Financial Crisis: The Regulation of Short Sales in the United Kingdom and the 
United States (McGavin, 2010) 
 2   Short selling 
Intellectual Hazard: how Conceptual Biases in Complex Organizations Contributed to the Crisis 
of 2008 (Miller and Rosenfield, 2010) 
 2   Conceptual bias 
The banking crisis as dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (Minford, 2010)  2   Euphorias 
Bailouts, the incentive to manage risk, and financial crises (Panageas, 2010)  2   Exploiting protection 
Causes of the financial crisis: Risk misperception, policy mistakes, and banks' bounded 
rationality (Rotheli, 2010) 
 3   Bounded rationality 
A model of a systemic bank run (Uhlig, 2010)  3   Bank run 
Diversification at financial institutions and systemic crises (Wagner, 2010)  2   Diversification 
A2 - Through participation in systemically important financial services 2  6 11  
Interbank lending and systemic risk (Rochet and Tirole, 1996)  3   Interbank lending stress 
Bank provisioning behaviour and procyclicality (Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005)  3   Credit effects on GDP 
Behavioral Basis of the Financial Crisis (Rizzi, 2008) 
 2   
Misaligned compensation on 
structured finance 
Bank competition and financial stability (Berger, Klapper and Turk-Ariss, 2009)  3   Risky loan portfolios 
The great financial crisis (Foster and Magdoff, 2009) 
 3   
Investment in failing hedge 
funds 
The corporate treasurer - Playing the leading role (Hart, 2009) 
 3   
Trading complex financial 
instruments 
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Credit derivatives: Banks' behaviour, financial stability and banking regulation (Karras, 2009) 
 3   
Behavioural effects of credit 
derivatives 
The financial crisis and its issues (Bexley et al, 2010)  2   Holding toxic assets 
The Failure Mechanics of Dealer Banks (Duffie, 2010) 
 2   
Failed intermediation in 
securities and derivatives 
Short Selling in a Financial Crisis: The Regulation of Short Sales in the United Kingdom and the 
United States (McGavin, 2010) 
 3   
Holding securities that are 
being sold short 
Insurance Companies and the Financial Crisis (Schich, 2010) 
 2   
Insurance of mortgage- 
backed securities 
A3 - Through interactions with the system’s infrastructure 1  3 5  
A catastrophe model of bank failure (Ho and Saunders, 1980)  2   Money market 
Interbank lending and systemic risk (Rochet and Tirole, 1996)  3   Interbank linkages 
Financial crisis resolution - The state as a lender of last resort? (Blankart and Fasten, 2009) 
 2   
Common response 
framework 
A framework for assessing the systemic risk of major financial institutions (Huang, Zhou and 
Zhu, 2009) 
 1   Major financial institutions 
The financial crisis and its issues (Bexley et al, 2010)  2   Legal frameworks 
A4 - Through interactions with the system’s economic environment 2  4 5  
Bank provisioning behaviour and procyclicality (Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005)  2   GDP cycles 
The corporate treasurer - Playing the leading role (Hart, 2009)  1   Expanding economy 
A framework for assessing the systemic risk of major financial institutions (Huang, Zhou and 
Zhu, 2009) 
 2   Macro-financial conditions 
The banking crisis as dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (Minford, 2010)  2   Business cycles / shocks 
Causes of the financial crisis: Risk misperception, policy mistakes, and banks' bounded 
rationality (Rotheli, 2010) 
 3   Credit cycles 
Q4 - What could be done to mitigate that risk?      
A1 - Modify the behaviour of systemically important participants 1  3 2  
Bank provisioning behaviour and procyclicality (Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005)  3   Allow for cyclicality 
Causes of the financial crisis: Risk misperception, policy mistakes, and banks' bounded 
rationality (Rotheli, 2010) 
 3   Improve risk management 
A2 - Modify participation in systemically important financial services 1  3 4  
Interbank lending and systemic risk (Rochet and Tirole, 1996)  3   Introduce discounted lending 
Bank provisioning behaviour and procyclicality (Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005)  2   Review credit portfolio 
The corporate treasurer - Playing the leading role (Hart, 2009)  1   Increase transparency 
Effects of central bank intervention on the interbank market during the subprime crisis (Brunetti, 
Di Filippo and Harris, 2011) 
 3   
Provide interbank loan 
guarantees 
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A3 - Modify interactions with the system’s infrastructure 1  3 4  
Interbank lending and systemic risk (Rochet and Tirole, 1996) 
 2   
Enable ‘autarky’ in bank 
monitoring 
The Failure Mechanics of Dealer Banks (Duffie, 2010) 
 3   
Introduce ‘too big to fail’ 
policies 
A model of a systemic bank run (Uhlig, 2010)  3   Purchase troubled assets 
Effects of central bank intervention on the interbank market during the subprime crisis (Brunetti, 
Di Filippo and Harris, 2011) 
 3   
Provide stress-test info and 
loan guarantees 
A4 – Modify interactions with the system’s economic environment 1  2 3  
Crises in competitive versus monopolistic banking systems (Boyd, De Nicola and Smith, 2004)  2   Limit rate of inflation 
The banking crisis as dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (Minford, 2010) 
 2   
Calibrate better policy 
responses 
Causes of the financial crisis: Risk misperception, policy mistakes, and banks' bounded 
rationality (Rotheli, 2010) 
 2   Improve monetary policy 
S06.2 - Economic      
Q1 -  What is the nature of catastrophic instability or total collapse of this system?      
A1 - Its nature is Systemic 1  3 4  
A Theory of Systemic Fragility (Minsky, 1977) 
 2   
Systemic fragility and 
economic depression / 
inflation 
Economic models of systemic risk in financial systems (Loretan, 1996)  2   Non-rational responses 
Interbank lending and systemic risk (Rochet and Tirole, 1996) 
 3   
Economic distress 
propagated system-wide 
through financial 
transactions 
Systemic risks in society and economics (Helbing, 2009)   3   Theories, systemic risk 
A3 - Its nature is Global 1  2 1  
Reforming the global economic architecture~ Lessons from recent crises (Stiglitz, 1999) 
 2   
Disasterous short-term 
capital flows across the 
GFS, and high levels of 
bankruptcy 
A4 - Its nature is Financial 1  3 3  
The Financial Instability Hypothesis (Minsky, 1993)  3   Government intervention 
Financial crises, credit booms, and external imbalances: 140 years of lessons (Jorda, 
Schularick and Taylor, 2011) 
 2   Credit growth 
Understanding financial crises - Clarendon Lectures (Allen and Gale, 2007)  3   Emergence of various 
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financial crisis scenarios 
Q2 - What is meant by the risk of such an occurrence?   n/a   
Q3 - How does that risk materialize?       
A1 - Through the behaviour of systemically important participants 2  6 5  
Anatomy of a Financial Crisis (Mishkin, 1992) 
 3   
Adverse selection, moral 
hazard 
The Financial Instability Hypothesis (Minsky, 1993)  3   Government intervention 
Economic models of systemic risk in financial systems (Loretan, 1996)  2   Non-rational responses 
Reforming the global economic architecture~ Lessons from recent crises (Stiglitz, 1999)  2   Market behaviour 
The banking crisis as dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (Minford, 2010)  1   Euphorias 
A2 - Through participation in systemically important financial services 2  6 3  
Anatomy of a Financial Crisis (Mishkin, 1992)  2   Inefficient financial markets 
The background to the 2007 financial crisis (Goodhart, 2007)  1   Risky assets 
Financial crises, credit booms, and external imbalances: 140 years of lessons (Jorda, 
Schularick and Taylor, 2011) 
 3   Credit growth 
A3 - Through interactions with the system’s infrastructure 1  3 2  
Economic models of systemic risk in financial systems (Loretan, 1996)  1   Financial markets 
Reforming the global economic architecture~ Lessons from recent crises (Stiglitz, 1999) 
 3   
Global economic 
architecture 
A4 - Through interactions with the system’s economic environment 2  6 17  
A Theory of Systemic Fragility (Minsky, 1977)  3   Depression 
The Financial Instability Hypothesis (Minsky, 1993)  3   Impact of debt 
Reforming the global economic architecture~ Lessons from recent crises (Stiglitz, 1999)  3   Economic architecture 
Minsky's Theory of Financial Crises in a Global Context (Wolfson, 2002)  3   Global debt-deflation 
Crises in competitive versus monopolistic banking systems (Boyd, De Nicola and Smith, 2004)  2   Monetary policy 
Bank provisioning behaviour and procyclicality (Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005)  2   GDP cycles 
Manias, panics, and crashes - A History of Financial Crises (Kindleberger and Aliber, 2005)  3   Cross-border money flows 
New thinking on the financial crisis (Allen and Snyder, 2009)  3   Boom and bust phases 
Regulatory factors that contributed to the global financial crisis (Espenilla, 2009)  2   Monetary policies 
The great financial crisis (Foster and Magdoff, 2009)  2   Growth and stagnation 
The corporate treasurer - Playing the leading role (Hart, 2009)  1   Expanding economy 
A framework for assessing the systemic risk of major financial institutions (Huang, Zhou and 
Zhu, 2009) 
 2   Macro-financial conditions 
Modelling the global financial crisis (McKibbin and Stoeckel, 2009)  2   Global trade contraction 
Policies to rebalance the global economy after the financial crisis (Freedman et al, 2010)  2   Policy mistakes 
The banking crisis as dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (Minford, 2010)  2   Business cycles / shocks 
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Causes of the financial crisis: Risk misperception, policy mistakes, and banks' bounded 
rationality (Rotheli, 2010) 
 3   Credit cycles 
Financial crises, credit booms, and external imbalances: 140 years of lessons (Jorda, 
Schularick and Taylor, 2011) 
 3   
Recessions, slumps and 
turnarounds 
Q4 - What could be done to mitigate that risk?      
A1 - Modify the behaviour of systemically important participants 1  2 1  
Bank provisioning behaviour and procyclicality (Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005)  2   Allow for cyclicality 
      
A3 - Modify interactions with the system’s infrastructure 1  3 1  
Economic models of systemic risk in financial systems (Loretan, 1996) 
 3   
Introduce shock prevention 
and response policies 
A4 – Modify interactions with the system’s economic environment 2  6 12  
A Theory of Systemic Fragility (Minsky, 1977)  3   Increase deficit 
The Financial Instability Hypothesis (Minsky, 1993)  3   Stabilize financing regime 
Reforming the global economic architecture~ Lessons from recent crises (Stiglitz, 1999) 
 2   
Introduce new governmental 
measures 
Minsky's Theory of Financial Crises in a Global Context (Wolfson, 2002)  2   Revise expectations 
Crises in competitive versus monopolistic banking systems (Boyd, De Nicola and Smith, 2004)  2   Limit rate of inflation 
Manias, panics, and crashes - A History of Financial Crises (Kindleberger and Aliber, 2005) 
 3   
Manage scope and direction 
of money flows 
New thinking on the financial crisis (Allen and Snyder, 2009) 
 2   
Restructure for boom and 
bust phases 
Modelling the global financial crisis (McKibbin and Stoeckel, 2009) 
 3   
Manage shocks and risk 
premia expectations 
Policies to rebalance the global economy after the financial crisis (Freedman et al, 2010) 
 2   
Balance stimulus versus 
consolidation trade-off 
The banking crisis as dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (Minford, 2010) 
 1   
Calibrate better policy 
responses 
Causes of the financial crisis: Risk misperception, policy mistakes, and banks' bounded 
rationality (Rotheli, 2010) 
 1   Improve monetary policy 
Financial crises, credit booms, and external imbalances: 140 years of lessons (Jorda, 
Schularick and Taylor, 2011) 
 3   Manage credit growth 
S06.3 - Financial      
Q1 -  What is the nature of catastrophic instability or total collapse of this system?      
A1 - Its nature is Systemic 2  6 3  
Economic models of systemic risk in financial systems (Loretan, 1996)  2   Various shocks severely 
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disrupt financial systems 
Financial crisis resolution - The state as a lender of last resort? (Blankart and Fasten, 2009)  3   Model, systematic effects 
Systemic risk in the financial sphere: Theoretical study and approaches to its estimation 
(Govtvan and Mansurov, 2011) 
 1   Theoretical, systemic risk 
A2 - Its nature is Critical 1  3 3  
A framework for assessing the systemic risk of major financial institutions (Huang, Zhou and 
Zhu, 2009)  3   
Losses of major financial 
institutions reach a critical 
point, and they fail 
Analysis of Financial Crisis: A Perspective Based on Catastrophe Theory (Yang, Mu and Yao, 
2009) 
 2   Theory, catastrophe 
Complexity Theory and the Financial Crisis: a Critical Review (Zeidan and Richardson, 2010)  1   Theory, critical states 
A3 - Its nature is Global 2  4 4  
Global financial instability: Framework, events, issues (Mishkin, 1999)  2   Framework, global 
Reforming the global economic architecture~ Lessons from recent crises (Stiglitz, 1999) 
 1   
Disasterous short-term 
capital flows across the 
GFS, and high levels of 
bankruptcy 
Minsky's Theory of Financial Crises in a Global Context (Wolfson, 2002)  2   Theory review, global 
Modelling the global financial crisis (McKibbin and Stoeckel, 2009)  2   Theory, global 
A4 - Its nature is Financial 2  6 10  
Anatomy of a Financial Crisis (Mishkin, 1992)  3   Perspective, financial 
The Financial Instability Hypothesis (Minsky, 1993)  3   Hypothesis, financial 
Towards a macro-prudential leading indicators framework for monitoring financial vulnerability 
(Bhattacharyay, 2003) 
 3   Framework, financial 
Equilibrium analysis, banking and financial instability (Tsomocos, 2003)  2   Model, financial 
Understanding financial crises - Clarendon Lectures (Allen and Gale, 2007) 
 3   
Emergence of various 
financial crisis scenarios 
Behavioral Basis of the Financial Crisis (Rizzi, 2008)  2   Framework, financial 
Credit derivatives: Banks' behaviour, financial stability and banking regulation (Karras, 2009)  3   Framework, financial 
Did bank capital regulation exacerbate the subprime mortgage crisis? (Petersen et al, 2009)  2   Model, bank capital 
The banking crisis as dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (Minford, 2010)  2   Model, banking 
Bailouts, the incentive to manage risk, and financial crises (Panageas, 2010) 
 2   
Systemic collapse of 
financial institutions’ net 
worth, beyond the protection 
of bailouts 
A5 - Its nature is Structural 2  4 2  
Regulating Systemic Institutions (Rochet, 2009)  2   Extreme stress in interbank 
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and money markets  
The structural fragility of financial systems (Gramlich and Oet, 2011) 
 2   
When levels of financial 
concentrations and inter-
dependencies become 
untenable for the structures 
of financial systems  
Q2 - What is meant by the risk of such an occurrence?     n/a 
Q3 - How does that risk materialize?       
A1 - Through the behaviour of systemically important participants 2   21  
Anatomy of a Financial Crisis (Mishkin, 1992) 
 3   
Adverse selection, moral 
hazard 
The Financial Instability Hypothesis (Minsky, 1993)  3   Government intervention 
Economic models of systemic risk in financial systems (Loretan, 1996)  3   Non-rational responses 
Interbank lending and systemic risk (Rochet and Tirole, 1996)  3   Constructive ambiguity 
Bank provisioning behaviour and procyclicality (Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005)  3   Bank provisioning 
Manias, panics, and crashes - A History of Financial Crises (Kindleberger and Aliber, 2005)  2   Manias, panics, bubbles 
The background to the 2007 financial crisis (Goodhart, 2007)  2   Under-pricing of risk 
Containment and Resolution in the Financial Crisis: Too Little, Too Late (Honohan, 2008)  2   Weak capitalization 
A theory of systemic risk and design of prudential bank regulation (Acharya, 2009)  3   Risk correlation 
Credit derivatives: Banks' behaviour, financial stability and banking regulation (Karras, 2009)  3   Capital buffer reduction 
The Systemic Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies and Rated Markets (Sy, 2009)  2   Ratings downgrading 
The Failure Mechanics of Dealer Banks (Duffie, 2010)  1   Bank runs 
Short Selling in a Financial Crisis: The Regulation of Short Sales in the United Kingdom and the 
United States (McGavin, 2010) 
 3   Short selling 
The banking crisis as dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (Minford, 2010)     Euphorias 
Bailouts, the incentive to manage risk, and financial crises (Panageas, 2010)     Exploiting protection 
A model of a systemic bank run (Uhlig, 2010)     Bank run 
Diversification at financial institutions and systemic crises (Wagner, 2010)     Diversification 
Effects of central bank intervention on the interbank market during the subprime crisis (Brunetti, 
Di Filippo and Harris, 2011) 
    Intervention 
A2 - Through participation in systemically important financial services 2  6 20  
Anatomy of a Financial Crisis (Mishkin, 1992)  3   Inefficient financial markets 
Interbank lending and systemic risk (Rochet and Tirole, 1996)  3   Interbank lending stress 
Global financial instability: Framework, events, issues (Mishkin, 1999)  3   Bad credit risks 
The nature of systemic risk - trying to achieve a definition (Mundy, 2004)  1   Uninsurable risks 
Bank provisioning behaviour and procyclicality (Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005)  2   Credit effects on GDP 
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An analysis of the systemic risks posed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and an evaluation of 
the policy options for reducing those risks (Eisenbeis et al, 2007) 
 3   Portfolio sizes 
The background to the 2007 financial crisis (Goodhart, 2007)  2   Risky assets 
Behavioral Basis of the Financial Crisis (Rizzi, 2008) 
 1   
Misaligned compensation on 
structured finance 
Bank competition and financial stability (Berger, Klapper and Turk-Ariss, 2009)  3   Risky loan portfolios 
The great financial crisis (Foster and Magdoff, 2009) 
 3   
Investment in failing hedge 
funds 
The corporate treasurer - Playing the leading role (Hart, 2009) 
 2   
Trading complex financial 
instruments 
Credit derivatives: Banks' behaviour, financial stability and banking regulation (Karras, 2009) 
 3   
Behavioural effects of credit 
derivatives 
Did bank capital regulation exacerbate the subprime mortgage crisis? (Petersen et al, 2009) 
 2   
Regulation laxity in sub-
prime mortgages 
The Systemic Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies and Rated Markets (Sy, 2009)  2   Ratings downgrades 
The financial crisis and its issues (Bexley et al, 2010)  3   Holding toxic assets 
The Failure Mechanics of Dealer Banks (Duffie, 2010) 
 2   
Failed intermediation in 
securities and derivatives 
Short Selling in a Financial Crisis: The Regulation of Short Sales in the United Kingdom and the 
United States (McGavin, 2010) 
 3   
Holding securities that are 
being sold short 
Insurance Companies and the Financial Crisis (Schich, 2010) 
 1   
Insurance of mortgage- 
backed securities 
Effects of central bank intervention on the interbank market during the subprime crisis (Brunetti, 
Di Filippo and Harris, 2011) 
 3   
Providing capital for 
counterparty risk cover 
Financial crises, credit booms, and external imbalances: 140 years of lessons (Jorda, 
Schularick and Taylor, 2011) 
 3   Credit growth 
A3 - Through interactions with the system’s infrastructure 2  4 12  
A catastrophe model of bank failure (Ho and Saunders, 1980)  2   Money market 
Economic models of systemic risk in financial systems (Loretan, 1996)  2   Financial markets 
Interbank lending and systemic risk (Rochet and Tirole, 1996)  2   Interbank linkages 
Reforming the global economic architecture~ Lessons from recent crises (Stiglitz, 1999) 
 1   
Global economic 
architecture 
A theory of systemic risk and design of prudential bank regulation (Acharya, 2009)  2   Regulatory mechanisms 
New thinking on the financial crisis (Allen and Snyder, 2009)  2   Meso structures 
Financial crisis resolution - The state as a lender of last resort? (Blankart and Fasten, 2009) 
 2   
Common response 
framework 
A framework for assessing the systemic risk of major financial institutions (Huang, Zhou and  1   Major financial institutions 
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Zhu, 2009) 
Regulating Systemic Institutions (Rochet, 2009)  1   Supervisory frameworks 
The financial crisis and its issues (Bexley et al, 2010)  2   Legal frameworks 
The 2008 financial collapse: Lessons for engineering failure (Fisk, 2011)  2   Oversight system 
The structural fragility of financial systems (Gramlich and Oet, 2011)  2   Financial system structure 
A4 - Through interactions with the system’s economic environment 2  6 13  
A Theory of Systemic Fragility (Minsky, 1977)  3   Depression 
The Financial Instability Hypothesis (Minsky, 1993)  3   Impact of debt 
Minsky's Theory of Financial Crises in a Global Context (Wolfson, 2002)  2   Global debt-deflation 
Crises in competitive versus monopolistic banking systems (Boyd, De Nicola and Smith, 2004)  2   Monetary policy 
Bank provisioning behaviour and procyclicality (Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005)  3   GDP cycles 
Manias, panics, and crashes - A History of Financial Crises (Kindleberger and Aliber, 2005)  3   Cross-border money flows 
Regulatory factors that contributed to the global financial crisis (Espenilla, 2009)  3   Monetary policies 
The great financial crisis (Foster and Magdoff, 2009)  3   Growth and stagnation 
The corporate treasurer - Playing the leading role (Hart, 2009)  2   Expanding economy 
A framework for assessing the systemic risk of major financial institutions (Huang, Zhou and 
Zhu, 2009) 
 2   Macro-financial conditions 
Modelling the global financial crisis (McKibbin and Stoeckel, 2009)  2   Global trade contraction 
Causes of the financial crisis: Risk misperception, policy mistakes, and banks' bounded 
rationality (Rotheli, 2010) 
 3   Credit cycles 
Financial crises, credit booms, and external imbalances: 140 years of lessons (Jorda, 
Schularick and Taylor, 2011) 
 3   
Recessions, slumps and 
turnarounds 
Q4 - What could be done to mitigate that risk?      
A1 - Modify the behaviour of systemically important participants 1  3 3  
Anatomy of a Financial Crisis (Mishkin, 1992) 
 3   
Expand the lender of last 
resort role 
What is Systemic Risk - Moral Hazard, Initial Shocks and Propagation (Dow, 2000)  3   Limit firm-level leverage 
Behavioral Basis of the Financial Crisis (Rizzi, 2008) 
 3   
Align compensation with 
intended behaviour 
A2 - Modify participation in systemically important financial services 2  6 6  
Interbank lending and systemic risk (Rochet and Tirole, 1996)  3   Introduce discounted lending 
Bank provisioning behaviour and procyclicality (Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005)  3   Review credit portfolio 
An analysis of the systemic risks posed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and an evaluation of 
the policy options for reducing those risks (Eisenbeis et al, 2007) 
 2   Limit Portfolio sizes 
The background to the 2007 financial crisis (Goodhart, 2007)  2   Limit product-level leverage 
Credit derivatives: Banks' behaviour, financial stability and banking regulation (Karras, 2009)  3   Optimize capital reserves 
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Effects of central bank intervention on the interbank market during the subprime crisis (Brunetti, 
Di Filippo and Harris, 2011) 
 3   
Provide interbank loan 
guarantees 
A3 - Modify interactions with the system’s infrastructure 1  3 3  
A framework for assessing the systemic risk of major financial institutions (Huang, Zhou and 
Zhu, 2009) 
 2   
Charge an insurance 
premium 
Redefining and containing systemic risk (Kane, 2010)  3   Re-align incentives 
A model of a systemic bank run (Uhlig, 2010)  3   Purchase troubled assets 
A4 – Modify interactions with the system’s economic environment 2  6 7  
A Theory of Systemic Fragility (Minsky, 1977)  3   Increase deficit 
The Financial Instability Hypothesis (Minsky, 1993)  3   Stabilize financing regime 
Minsky's Theory of Financial Crises in a Global Context (Wolfson, 2002)  2   Revise expectations 
Crises in competitive versus monopolistic banking systems (Boyd, De Nicola and Smith, 2004)  2   Limit rate of inflation 
Manias, panics, and crashes - A History of Financial Crises (Kindleberger and Aliber, 2005) 
 3   
Manage scope and direction 
of money flows 
Causes of the financial crisis: Risk misperception, policy mistakes, and banks' bounded 
rationality (Rotheli, 2010) 
 3   Improve monetary policy 
Financial crises, credit booms, and external imbalances: 140 years of lessons (Jorda, 
Schularick and Taylor, 2011) 
 3   Manage credit growth 
S06.4 - Market    38  
Q1 -  What is the nature of catastrophic instability or total collapse of this system?      
A1 - Its nature is Systemic 1  2 2  
A Theory of Systemic Fragility (Minsky, 1977) 
 2   
Money market reversals,  
systemic fragility, depression 
/ inflation 
Financial crisis resolution - The state as a lender of last resort? (Blankart and Fasten, 2009) 
 2   
When funding markets dry 
up 
A2 - Its nature is Critical 2  6 4  
A catastrophe model of bank failure (Ho and Saunders, 1980)  3   Model, catastrophe 
A framework for assessing the systemic risk of major financial institutions (Huang, Zhou and 
Zhu, 2009)  3   
Losses of major financial 
institutions reach a critical 
point, and they fail 
Analysis of Financial Crisis: A Perspective Based on Catastrophe Theory (Yang, Mu and Yao, 
2009) 
 2   Theory, catastrophe 
Complexity Theory and the Financial Crisis: a Critical Review (Zeidan and Richardson, 2010)  1   Theory, critical states 
A3 - Its nature is Global 2  4 5  
Global financial instability: Framework, events, issues (Mishkin, 1999)  2   Framework, global 
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Reforming the global economic architecture~ Lessons from recent crises (Stiglitz, 1999) 
 1   
Disasterous short-term 
capital flows across the 
GFS, and high levels of 
bankruptcy 
Minsky's Theory of Financial Crises in a Global Context (Wolfson, 2002)  2   Theory review, global 
Modelling the global financial crisis (McKibbin and Stoeckel, 2009)  2   Theory, global 
The Global Financial Crisis and the Efficient Market Hypothesis~ What Have We Learned (Ball, 
2009)  2   
Global financial markets are 
efficient under certain 
conditions 
A4 - Its nature is Financial 2  6 10  
Anatomy of a Financial Crisis (Mishkin, 1992)  3   In financial markets 
The Financial Instability Hypothesis (Minsky, 1993)  3   Of financial markets 
Towards a macro-prudential leading indicators framework for monitoring financial vulnerability 
(Bhattacharyay, 2003) 
 3   Monitoring financial markets 
Equilibrium analysis, banking and financial instability (Tsomocos, 2003) 
 2   
Financial markets 
equilibrium 
Understanding financial crises - Clarendon Lectures (Allen and Gale, 2007) 
 3   
Emergence of financial crisis 
scenarios in markets 
Behavioral Basis of the Financial Crisis (Rizzi, 2008)  2   Financial markets behaviour 
Credit derivatives: Banks' behaviour, financial stability and banking regulation (Karras, 2009)  3   Derivatives markets 
Did bank capital regulation exacerbate the subprime mortgage crisis? (Petersen et al, 2009)  2   Mortgage markets 
The banking crisis as dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (Minford, 2010)  2   Market equilibrium 
Bailouts, the incentive to manage risk, and financial crises (Panageas, 2010) 
 2   
Market collapse of financial 
institutions’ net worth, 
beyond the protection of 
bailouts 
A5 - Its nature is Structural 2  4 3  
New thinking on the financial crisis (Allen and Snyder, 2009)  1   Constructs, meso-structures 
Regulating Systemic Institutions (Rochet, 2009) 
 2   
Extreme stress in interbank 
and money markets  
The structural fragility of financial systems (Gramlich and Oet, 2011) 
 2   
When levels of 
concentration and inter-
dependency become 
untenable for the structures 
of financial systems  
Q2 - What is meant by the risk of such an occurrence?   n/a   
Q3 - How does that risk materialize?       
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A1 - Through the behaviour of systemically important participants 2  6 10  
Reforming the global economic architecture~ Lessons from recent crises (Stiglitz, 1999)  3   Market behaviour 
Bank provisioning behaviour and procyclicality (Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005)  3   Market cycles 
Manias, panics, and crashes - A History of Financial Crises (Kindleberger and Aliber, 2005)  3   Market bubbles 
The background to the 2007 financial crisis (Goodhart, 2007)  3   Risk pricing by markets 
Containment and Resolution in the Financial Crisis: Too Little, Too Late (Honohan, 2008)  2   Capital markets 
Modelling the global financial crisis (McKibbin and Stoeckel, 2009)  2   Market expectations 
The Systemic Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies and Rated Markets (Sy, 2009)  3   Rated markets 
Short Selling in a Financial Crisis: The Regulation of Short Sales in the United Kingdom and the 
United States (McGavin, 2010) 
 3   Shorting markets 
The banking crisis as dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (Minford, 2010)  1   Market euphorias 
Effects of central bank intervention on the interbank market during the subprime crisis (Brunetti, 
Di Filippo and Harris, 2011) 
 2   Interbank market collapse 
A2 - Through participation in systemically important financial services 2  6 11  
Anatomy of a Financial Crisis (Mishkin, 1992) 
 2   
Using inefficient financial 
markets 
Bank provisioning behaviour and procyclicality (Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005) 
 3   
Offering credit in cyclical 
markets 
The great financial crisis (Foster and Magdoff, 2009) 
 2   
Hedging in investment 
markets 
The corporate treasurer - Playing the leading role (Hart, 2009) 
 2   
Trading in markets for 
complex financial 
instruments 
Credit derivatives: Banks' behaviour, financial stability and banking regulation (Karras, 2009) 
 3   
Managing risk through credit 
derivatives markets 
Did bank capital regulation exacerbate the subprime mortgage crisis? (Petersen et al, 2009) 
 2   
Regulation sub-prime 
mortgage markets 
The Systemic Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies and Rated Markets (Sy, 2009)  3   In rated markets 
Short Selling in a Financial Crisis: The Regulation of Short Sales in the United Kingdom and the 
United States (McGavin, 2010) 
 3   
Holding securities that are 
being sold short 
Insurance Companies and the Financial Crisis (Schich, 2010) 
 2   
Insurance of mortgage- 
backed securities markets 
Effects of central bank intervention on the interbank market during the subprime crisis (Brunetti, 
Di Filippo and Harris, 2011) 
 2   
Providing capital for 
counterparty risk cover 
Financial crises, credit booms, and external imbalances: 140 years of lessons (Jorda, 
Schularick and Taylor, 2011) 
 2   Credit market excess 
A3 - Through interactions with the system’s infrastructure 2  4 4  
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A catastrophe model of bank failure (Ho and Saunders, 1980)  2   Money market 
Economic models of systemic risk in financial systems (Loretan, 1996)  2   Financial markets 
Interbank lending and systemic risk (Rochet and Tirole, 1996)  2   Interbank market 
New thinking on the financial crisis (Allen and Snyder, 2009)  2   Meso structures (markets) 
Q4 - What could be done to mitigate that risk?      
A1 - Modify the behaviour of systemically important participants 1  2 2  
Containment and Resolution in the Financial Crisis: Too Little, Too Late (Honohan, 2008) 
 2   
Increasing markets 
intervention 
Regulatory factors that contributed to the global financial crisis (Espenilla, 2009) 
 2   
Resisting over-regulating 
markets 
A2 - Modify participation in systemically important financial services 1  3 3  
Interbank lending and systemic risk (Rochet and Tirole, 1996) 
 3   
Discount lending in 
interbank market 
The corporate treasurer - Playing the leading role (Hart, 2009) 
 2   
Increase market 
transparency 
Effects of central bank intervention on the interbank market during the subprime crisis (Brunetti, 
Di Filippo and Harris, 2011) 
 3   
Provide loan guarantees for 
interbank market 
A3 - Modify interactions with the system’s infrastructure 1  2 2  
Regulating Systemic Institutions (Rochet, 2009)  2   Reform interbank markets 
Short Selling in a Financial Crisis: The Regulation of Short Sales in the United Kingdom and the 
United States (McGavin, 2010) 
 2   
Improve enforcement of 
existing rules 
S06.5 - Monetary    23  
Q1 -  What is the nature of catastrophic instability or total collapse of this system?      
A1 - Its nature is Systemic 1  2 1  
A Theory of Systemic Fragility (Minsky, 1977) 
 2   
Money market reversals,  
systemic fragility, depression 
/ inflation 
A3 - Its nature is Global 1  3 1  
Reforming the global economic architecture~ Lessons from recent crises (Stiglitz, 1999) 
 3   
Disasterous short-term 
capital flows across the 
GFS, and high levels of 
bankruptcy 
A4 - Its nature is Financial 2  6 3  
Anatomy of a Financial Crisis (Mishkin, 1992) 
 3   
Inability to channel funds to 
productive investments 
The Financial Instability Hypothesis (Minsky, 1993)  3   Impact of debt on system 
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behaviour 
Did bank capital regulation exacerbate the subprime mortgage crisis? (Petersen et al, 2009)  2   Fluctations in bank capital 
A5 - Its nature is Structural 1  2 1  
Regulating Systemic Institutions (Rochet, 2009) 
 2   
Extreme stress in interbank 
and money markets  
Q2 - What is meant by the risk of such an occurrence?   n/a   
Q3 - How does that risk materialize?       
A1 - Through the behaviour of systemically important participants 2  6 6  
Anatomy of a Financial Crisis (Mishkin, 1992)  3   Inefficient financial markets 
The Financial Instability Hypothesis (Minsky, 1993) 
 3   
Economic limitations on 
capital development 
What is Systemic Risk - Moral Hazard, Initial Shocks and Propagation (Dow, 2000)  3   Excessive financial leverage 
The background to the 2007 financial crisis (Goodhart, 2007)  2   Under-pricing of risk 
Containment and Resolution in the Financial Crisis: Too Little, Too Late (Honohan, 2008)  3   Weak capitalization 
Credit derivatives: Banks' behaviour, financial stability and banking regulation (Karras, 2009)  3   Capital buffer reduction 
A2 - Through participation in systemically important financial services 1  3 3  
Interbank lending and systemic risk (Rochet and Tirole, 1996)  3   Interbank lending stress 
Bank provisioning behaviour and procyclicality (Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005)  3   Debt effects on GDP 
Financial crises, credit booms, and external imbalances: 140 years of lessons (Jorda, 
Schularick and Taylor, 2011) 
 3   Credit growth 
A4 - Through interactions with the system’s economic environment 2  6 8  
The Financial Instability Hypothesis (Minsky, 1993)  3   Impact of debt 
Minsky's Theory of Financial Crises in a Global Context (Wolfson, 2002)  2   Global debt-deflation 
Crises in competitive versus monopolistic banking systems (Boyd, De Nicola and Smith, 2004)  1   Monetary policy 
Manias, panics, and crashes - A History of Financial Crises (Kindleberger and Aliber, 2005)  3   Cross-border money flows 
Regulatory factors that contributed to the global financial crisis (Espenilla, 2009)  3   Monetary policies 
The great financial crisis (Foster and Magdoff, 2009)  3   Growth and stagnation 
A framework for assessing the systemic risk of major financial institutions (Huang, Zhou and 
Zhu, 2009) 
 2   Macro-financial conditions 
Causes of the financial crisis: Risk misperception, policy mistakes, and banks' bounded 
rationality (Rotheli, 2010) 
 3   Credit cycles 
Q4 - What could be done to mitigate that risk?      
A4 – Modify interactions with the system’s economic environment 2  6 11  
A Theory of Systemic Fragility (Minsky, 1977)  3   Increase deficit 
The Financial Instability Hypothesis (Minsky, 1993)  3   Stabilize financing regime 
Reforming the global economic architecture~ Lessons from recent crises (Stiglitz, 1999)  3   Introduce new governmental 
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measures 
Minsky's Theory of Financial Crises in a Global Context (Wolfson, 2002)  2   Revise expectations 
Crises in competitive versus monopolistic banking systems (Boyd, De Nicola and Smith, 2004)  3   Limit rate of inflation 
Manias, panics, and crashes - A History of Financial Crises (Kindleberger and Aliber, 2005) 
 3   
Manage scope and direction 
of money flows 
New thinking on the financial crisis (Allen and Snyder, 2009) 
 2   
Restructurefor boom and 
bust phases 
Policies to rebalance the global economy after the financial crisis (Freedman et al, 2010) 
 2   
Balance stimulus versus 
consolidation trade-off 
The banking crisis as dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (Minford, 2010) 
 2   
Calibrate better (monetary) 
policy responses 
Causes of the financial crisis: Risk misperception, policy mistakes, and banks' bounded 
rationality (Rotheli, 2010) 
 3   Improve monetary policy 
Financial crises, credit booms, and external imbalances: 140 years of lessons (Jorda, 
Schularick and Taylor, 2011) 
 3   Manage credit growth 
S06.6 - Operational    8  
Q1 -  What is the nature of catastrophic instability or total collapse of this system?      
A1 - Its nature is Systemic 1  2 1  
A theory of systemic risk and design of prudential bank regulation (Acharya, 2009) 
 2   
Risk correlation operating at 
a collective level 
A2 - Its nature is Critical 1  3 2  
Systemic risk, financial contagion and financial fragility (Martinez-Jaramillo et al, 2010) 
 3   
Random shocks making its 
operation impossible 
The banking crisis as dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (Minford, 2010) 
 2   
Non-stationary productivity 
shocks 
A3 - Its nature is Global 1  2 1  
The corporate treasurer - Playing the leading role (Hart, 2009) 
 2   
Challenges of operating in 
an expanding global 
economy 
Q2 -  What is meant by the risk of such an occurrence?   n/a   
Q3 -  How does that risk materialize?       
A1 - Through the behaviour of systemically important participants 1  3 4  
Diversification at financial institutions and systemic crises (Wagner, 2010) 
 3   
Diversified operations make 
systemic crises more likely 
Financial crises and the challenge of moral hazard (Wolf, 1999) 
 2   
Disposition to engage in 
riskier (operational) 
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behaviour 
Intellectual Hazard – how Conceptual Biases in Complex Organizations Contributed to the 
Crisis of 2008 (Miller and Rosenfeld, 2010) 
 2   
Introduces a tendency to 
conceptual bias in 
organizations (that affects 
operations). 
The Failure Mechanics of Dealer Banks (Duffie, 2010) 
 2   
Loss of cash settlement 
privileges 
A2 - Through systemically important financial services 1  2 1  
The corporate treasurer - Playing the leading role (Hart, 2009) 
 2   
By using complex financial 
instruments 
S06.7 - Regulatory    28  
Q1 -  What is the nature of catastrophic instability or total collapse of this system?      
A1 - Its nature is Systemic 1  2 1  
What is systemic risk, and do bank regulators retard or contribute to it (Kaufman and Scott, 
2003) 
 2   
Reviews historical evidence 
for systemic risk in banking 
A2 - Its nature is Critical 1  3 1  
A catastrophe model of bank failure (Ho and Saunders, 1980)  
 3   
Describes the criticality of 
the relationship between 
regulatory intervention and 
depositors’ confidence 
A3 - Its nature is Global 1  2 1  
Regulatory factors that contributed to the global financial crisis (Espenilla, 2009) 
 2   
Identifies weaknesses in the 
global credit transfer market 
A4 - Its nature is Financial 1  3 1  
Causes of the financial crisis: Risk misperception, policy mistakes, and banks' bounded 
rationality (Rotheli, 2010) 
 3   
Describes regulation of 
credit cycles and its 
contribution to financial 
crises 
Q2 -  What is meant by the risk of such an occurrence?   n/a   
Q3 -  How does that risk materialize?       
A1 - Through the behaviour of systemically important participants 2  6 7  
The Financial Instability Hypothesis (Minsky, 1993) 
 3   
Government intervention is 
frequently inept 
Interbank lending and systemic risk (Rochet and Tirole, 1996) 
 3   
Government policies of 
‘constructive ambiguity’ 
What is systemic risk, and do bank regulators retard or contribute to it (Kaufman and Scott,  2   Concludes that regulators 
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2003) ‘may well have contributed 
to systemic risk’ 
Containment and Resolution in the Financial Crisis: Too Little, Too Late (Honohan, 2008) 
 2   
Finds there is a tendency for 
only ‘sporadic and case-by-
case intervention’ by 
governments. 
The corporate treasurer - Playing the leading role (Hart, 2009) 
 3   
The challenges of operating 
under acceptable levels of 
risk, and their systemic 
impact 
Causes of the financial crisis: Risk misperception, policy mistakes, and banks' bounded 
rationality (Rotheli, 2010)  2   
Describes potential 
regulations to address the 
bounded rationality of banks 
Effects of central bank intervention on the interbank market during the subprime crisis (Brunetti, 
Di Filippo and Harris, 2011) 
 3   
Argues for central bank 
intervention by releasing 
stress-test results for 
individual banks, issuing 
interbank loan guarantees, 
and direct purchase of 
troubled assets 
A2 - Through systemically important financial services 1  3 2  
Short Selling in a Financial Crisis: The Regulation of Short Sales in the United Kingdom and the 
United States (McGavin, 2010) 
 3   
Argues against the 
temporary banning of short 
selling, by showing that the 
benefits of allowing shorting 
far outweigh its potential 
harm. 
A model of a systemic bank run (Uhlig, 2010) 
 3   
Argues for the outright 
purchase of troubled assets 
by governments 
A3 - Through interactions with the system’s infrastructure 2  6 4  
The 2008 financial collapse: Lessons for engineering failure (Fisk, 2011) 
 3   
Concludes the recent crisis 
was caused by inadequacies 
of the regulatory oversight 
system – the meta-
regulation framework 
Did bank capital regulation exacerbate the subprime mortgage crisis (Petersen et al, 2009)  3   Concludes capital regulation 
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did exacerbate the crisis, 
and BASEL II should not be 
implemented until significant 
changes are considered 
A theory of systemic risk and design of prudential bank regulation (Acharya, 2009) 
 3   
Regulatory mechanisms are 
failing to mitigate against 
risk-shifting incentives 
Fair value accounting and the financial crisis- Messenger or contributor (Magnan, 2009) 
 3   
Presents evidence for 
disconnection from a firm’s 
business reality created by 
fair value accounting 
A4 - Through interactions with the system’s economic environment 1  3 1  
Regulatory factors that contributed to the global financial crisis (Espenilla, 2009) 
 3   
Describes ‘economic laxity’ 
and the procyclical nature of 
monetary policies 
Q4 - What could be done to mitigate that risk?      
A1 - Modify the behaviour of systemically important participants 2  6 5  
Economic models of systemic risk in financial systems (Loretan, 1996) 
 2   
Role of policy institutions in 
mitigation 
Reforming the global economic architecture~ Lessons from recent crises (Stiglitz, 1999) 
 3   
Government control over 
short term capital flows, and 
bankruptcy procedures in a 
crisis 
The nature of systemic risk - trying to achieve a definition (Mundy, 2004) 
 2   
Concludes that governments 
are required to insure 
against systemic risks at all 
costs 
The financial crisis and its issues (Bexley et al, 2010) 
 2   
Claims government 
intervention helped to 
mitigate the recent crisis, 
after repeal of the Glass-
Steagal Act. 
The Failure Mechanics of Dealer Banks (Duffie, 2010) 
 3   
Calls for different policies to 
address the systemic risk of 
dealer bank failures 
A2 - Modify participation in systemically important financial services 1  3 3  
Minsky's Theory of Financial Crises in a Global Context (Wolfson, 2002)  2   Calls for central bank 
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intervention as lender of last 
resort 
An analysis of the systemic risks posed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and an evaluation of 
the policy options for reducing those risks (Eisenbeis, Frame and Wall, 2007)  3   
Concludes that ‘limits on 
portfolio size .are most 
desirable approach’ 
Credit derivatives: Banks' behaviour, financial stability and banking regulation (Karras, 2009) 
 3   
Need to regulate the 
negative behavioural effects 
of credit derivatives on 
capital buffer ‘stocks’ 
A3 - Modify interactions with the system’s infrastructure 2  6 5  
Financial crisis resolution - The state as a lender of last resort? (Blankart and Fasten, 2009) 
 2   
Calls for a common 
response framework to 
enforce regulations 
internationally 
Regulating Systemic Institutions (Rochet, 2009) 
 3   
Argues the alternative to 
simply downsizing systemic 
institutions, by imposing 
stricter regulations using 
new measures of systemic 
risk exposures  
The Systemic Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies and Rated Markets (Sy, 2009) 
 3   
Suggests the use of ‘ratings 
maps’ to assess the 
systemic risk of revised 
ratings 
Redefining and containing systemic risk (Kane, 2010) 
 3   
Proposes a new method for 
measuring regulatory 
performance, by estimating 
explicit and implicit safety-
net benefits 
Systemic risk in the financial sphere: Theoretical study and approaches to its estimation 
(Govtvan and Mansurov, 2011) 
 3   
Calls for diagnosis 
techniques for market tone 
analysis, and an improved 
understanding of systemic 
risk propagation conditions 
A4 – Modify interactions with the system’s economic environment 1  3 2  
Regulatory factors that contributed to the global financial crisis (Espenilla, 2009) 
 3   
Describes ‘economic laxity’ 
and the procyclical nature of 
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monetary policies 
Causes of the financial crisis: Risk misperception, policy mistakes, and banks' bounded 
rationality (Rotheli, 2010) 
 3   
Describes monetary 
responses to credit cycles 
S06.8 - Sudden Shock    6  
Q1 -  What is the nature of catastrophic instability or total collapse of this system?      
A1 - Its nature is Systemic 1  3 1  
Systemic risks in society and economics (Helbing, 2009)  
 3   
A sudden large-scale 
disaster in the collective 
social dynamics of a socio-
economic system 
A3 - Its nature is Global 1  2 1  
Modelling the global financial crisis (McKibbin and Stoeckel, 2009) 
 2   
Describes an inter-temporal 
global model of the effects of 
‘switching’ expectations 
about risk premia 
A4 - Its nature is Financial 1  3 1  
The banking crisis as dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (Minford, 2010) 
 3   
Represented by an open 
economy real business cycle 
model, in which there are 
non-stationary productivity 
shocks 
Q2 - What is meant by the risk of such an occurrence?   n/a   
Q3 - How does that risk materialize?       
A1 - Through the behaviour of systemically important participants 2  6 4  
What is Systemic Risk - Moral Hazard, Initial Shocks and Propagation (Dow, 2000) 
 3   
Shows how moral hazard 
and leverage of individual 
firms can create small 
shocks that are amplified by 
the financial system 
Manias, panics, and crashes - A History of Financial Crises (Kindleberger and Aliber, 2005) 
 3   
Bank failures, fluctuating 
exchange rates and bubbles 
in markets are 
‘systematically’ related. 
Modelling the global financial crisis (McKibbin and Stoeckel, 2009) 
 2   
Increases in risk premia of 
firms 
The banking crisis as dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (Minford, 2010)  2   Shows how banks 
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participate in economic 
shocks and contribute to 
euphorias and crises. 
A4 - Through interactions with the system’s economic environment 1  3 3  
Manias, panics, and crashes - A History of Financial Crises (Kindleberger and Aliber, 2005)  3   Cross-border money flows 
Modelling the global financial crisis (McKibbin and Stoeckel, 2009)  3   Global trade contraction 
The banking crisis as dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (Minford, 2010)  2   Business cycles / shocks 
Q4 - What could be done to mitigate that risk?      
A1 - Modify the behaviour of systemically important participants 1  2 1  
What is Systemic Risk - Moral Hazard, Initial Shocks and Propagation (Dow, 2000)  2   Limit firm-level leverage 
A3 - Modify interactions with the system’s infrastructure 1  2 1  
The structural fragility of financial systems (Gramlich and Oet, 2011) 
 2   
Quantify structural issues in 
early warning systems 
A4 – Modify interactions with the system’s economic environment 1  3 3  
Manias, panics, and crashes - A History of Financial Crises (Kindleberger and Aliber, 2005) 
 3   
Manage scope and direction 
of money flows 
Modelling the global financial crisis (McKibbin and Stoeckel, 2009) 
 3   
Manage shocks and risk 
premia expectations 
The banking crisis as dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (Minford, 2010) 
 2   
Calibrate better policy 
responses 
S07 Failure: how distress propagates and failure materializes      
S07.1 - Contagion      
Q1 -  What is the nature of catastrophic instability or total collapse of this system?      
A1 - Its nature is Systemic 1  3 3  
Systemic risk - A survey (Bandt and Hartmann, 2000) 
 2   
Instability materializes as 
contagious effects in the 
system, together with 
various forms of external 
effects 
Systemic risk, financial contagion and financial fragility (Martinez-Jaramillo et al, 2010) 
 3   
A financial crisis is 
considered to be comprised 
of separate systemic and 
contagious elements, for 
predicting contagious 
difficulties during a time 
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period 
A model of a systemic bank run (Uhlig, 2010) 
 2   
Fear aspects of uncertainty 
aversion in bank runs 
Q2 - What is meant by the risk of such an occurrence?     n/a 
Q3 - How does that risk materialize?       
A1 - Through the behaviour of systemically important participants 1  3 1  
Systemic risk, financial contagion and financial fragility (Martinez-Jaramillo et al, 2010) 
 3   
An event that threatens 
effective operation of the 
system of interest 
Q4 - What could be done to mitigate that risk?      
S07.2 - Emergence    9  
Q1 -  What is the nature of catastrophic instability or total collapse of this system?      
A1 - Its nature is Systemic 2  4 3  
A theory of systemic risk and design of prudential bank regulation (Acharya, 2009) 
 2   
When many banks fail 
together through 
concentrations in risk 
emergent at collective levels 
of system operation 
Systemic risks in society and economics (Helbing, 2009)  
 3   
Emergence in socio-
economic systems 
Systemic risk in the financial sphere: Theoretical study and approaches to its estimation 
(Govtvan and Mansurov, 2011) 
 2   
Emergence as changes in 
‘market tone’ in the system 
A2 - Its nature is Critical 1  2 1  
Analysis of Financial Crisis: A Perspective Based on Catastrophe Theory (Yang, Mu and Yao, 
2009)  2   
Emergence as an outbreak 
of brittleness at critical 
points 
A5 - Its nature is Structural 2  4 2  
New thinking on the financial crisis (Allen and Snyder, 2009) 
 2   
Emergence as complex 
systems phenomena 
associated with structural 
changes 
The structural fragility of financial systems (Gramlich and Oet, 2011) 
 2   
Emerges as concentrations 
and inter-dependency that 
become untenable for the 
structures of financial 
systems  
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Q2 - What is meant by the risk of such an occurrence?     n/a 
Q3 - How does that risk materialize?       
A1 - Through the behaviour of systemically important participants 1  3 2  
Bank provisioning behaviour and procyclicality (Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005) 
 3   
Provisioning for emergent 
business cycles 
A theory of systemic risk and design of prudential bank regulation (Acharya, 2009)  3   Risk correlation 
A2 - Through participation in systemically important financial services 2  6 3  
Bank provisioning behaviour and procyclicality (Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005)  3   Credit effects on GDP 
The great financial crisis (Foster and Magdoff, 2009) 
 3   
Stagnation interrupted by 
periods of growth 
Financial crises, credit booms, and external imbalances: 140 years of lessons (Jorda, 
Schularick and Taylor, 2011)  3   
Credit growth is single best 
predictor of emergent 
financial instability 
A3 - Through interactions with the system’s infrastructure 1  2 3  
A theory of systemic risk and design of prudential bank regulation (Acharya, 2009)  2   Regulatory mechanisms 
New thinking on the financial crisis (Allen and Snyder, 2009)  2   Meso structures 
The structural fragility of financial systems (Gramlich and Oet, 2011) 
 2   
Structural effects of 
concentrations and 
dependencies 
A4 - Through interactions with the system’s economic environment 2  6 4  
Bank provisioning behaviour and procyclicality (Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005)  2   GDP cycles 
New thinking on the financial crisis (Allen and Snyder, 2009)  3   Boom and bust phases 
The great financial crisis (Foster and Magdoff, 2009)  3   Growth and stagnation 
Financial crises, credit booms, and external imbalances: 140 years of lessons (Jorda, 
Schularick and Taylor, 2011) 
 3   
Recessions, slumps and 
turnarounds 
Q4 - What could be done to mitigate that risk?      
A1 - Modify the behaviour of systemically important participants 1  3 1  
Bank provisioning behaviour and procyclicality (Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005) 
 3   
By counter-cyclical credit 
provisioning for emergent 
business cycles 
A2 - Modify participation in systemically important financial services 1  2 1  
Bank provisioning behaviour and procyclicality (Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005) 
 2   
React more closely to  
changes in credit portfolio 
A3 - Modify interactions with the system’s infrastructure 1  3 3  
A theory of systemic risk and design of prudential bank regulation (Acharya, 2009) 
 2   
Mitigate aggregate risk-
shifting incentives 
New thinking on the financial crisis (Allen and Snyder, 2009)  3   Use infrastructure simulation 
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for predictions 
The structural fragility of financial systems (Gramlich and Oet, 2011) 
 2   
Quantify structural issues in 
early warning systems 
A4 – Modify interactions with the system’s economic environment 1  2 2  
New thinking on the financial crisis (Allen and Snyder, 2009) 
 2   
Restructure for boom and 
bust phases 
Financial crises, credit booms, and external imbalances: 140 years of lessons (Jorda, 
Schularick and Taylor, 2011) 
 2   Manage credit growth 
S07.3 - Collapse      
Q1 -  What is the nature of catastrophic instability or total collapse of this system?      
A1 - Its nature is Systemic 1  3 2  
A Theory of Systemic Fragility (Minsky, 1977) 
 3   
Money market reversals,  
systemic fragility, depression 
/ inflation 
A theory of systemic risk and design of prudential bank regulation (Acharya, 2009) 
 3   
When many banks fail 
together throughout the 
banking system 
A2 - Its nature is Critical 1  3 4  
A catastrophe model of bank failure (Ho and Saunders, 1980)  3   Model, catastrophe 
A framework for assessing the systemic risk of major financial institutions (Huang, Zhou and 
Zhu, 2009)  3   
Losses of major financial 
institutions reach a critical 
point, and they fail 
Analysis of Financial Crisis: A Perspective Based on Catastrophe Theory (Yang, Mu and Yao, 
2009) 
 2   Theory, catastrophe 
Complexity Theory and the Financial Crisis: a Critical Review (Zeidan and Richardson, 2010)  3   Theory, critical states 
A3 - Its nature is Global 1  2 1  
Reforming the global economic architecture~ Lessons from recent crises (Stiglitz, 1999) 
 2   
Disasterous short-term 
capital flows across the 
GFS, and high levels of 
bankruptcy 
A4 - Its nature is Financial 1  3 1  
Bailouts, the incentive to manage risk, and financial crises (Panageas, 2010) 
 3   
Systemic collapse of 
financial institutions’ net 
worth, beyond the protection 
of bailouts 
A5 - Its nature is Structural 1  3 2  
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Regulating Systemic Institutions (Rochet, 2009) 
 3   
Extreme stress in interbank 
and money markets  
The structural fragility of financial systems (Gramlich and Oet, 2011) 
 3   
When levels of 
concentration and inter-
dependency become 
untenable for the structures 
of financial systems  
Q2 - What is meant by the risk of such an occurrence?     n/a 
Q3 - How does that risk materialize?       
A1 - Through the behaviour of systemically important participants 1  3 1  
Manias, panics, and crashes - A History of Financial Crises (Kindleberger and Aliber, 2005)  3   Burst bubbles 
Modelling the global financial crisis (McKibbin and Stoeckel, 2009)     ‘Switching’ expectations 
A2 - Through participation in systemically important financial services 1  3 2  
The nature of systemic risk - trying to achieve a definition (Mundy, 2004)  2   Uninsurable risks 
The Failure Mechanics of Dealer Banks (Duffie, 2010) 
 3   
Failed intermediation in 
securities and derivatives 
A3 - Through interactions with the system’s infrastructure 1  3 3  
A catastrophe model of bank failure (Ho and Saunders, 1980)  2   Money market falure 
The 2008 financial collapse: Lessons for engineering failure (Fisk, 2011)  2   Failed oversight system 
The structural fragility of financial systems (Gramlich and Oet, 2011) 
 3   
Structural failure of the 
financial system 
A4 - Through interactions with the system’s economic environment 2  6 9  
A Theory of Systemic Fragility (Minsky, 1977)  3   Sudden onset of depression 
The Financial Instability Hypothesis (Minsky, 1993)  3   Extreme impact of debt 
Minsky's Theory of Financial Crises in a Global Context (Wolfson, 2002) 
 2   
Bottom of global debt-
deflation cycle 
Manias, panics, and crashes - A History of Financial Crises (Kindleberger and Aliber, 2005) 
 3   
Extreme cross-border 
money flows 
New thinking on the financial crisis (Allen and Snyder, 2009)  3   Bust phase 
The great financial crisis (Foster and Magdoff, 2009)  3   Stagnation 
Modelling the global financial crisis (McKibbin and Stoeckel, 2009)  2   Global trade contraction 
The banking crisis as dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (Minford, 2010) 
 2   
Abrupt end of business 
cycles  
Financial crises, credit booms, and external imbalances: 140 years of lessons (Jorda, 
Schularick and Taylor, 2011) 
 3   Recessions, slumps 
Q4 - What could be done to mitigate that risk?      
A1 - Modify the behaviour of systemically important participants 1  2 1  
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Causes of the financial crisis: Risk misperception, policy mistakes, and banks' bounded 
rationality (Rotheli, 2010) 
 2   
Improve risk perception and 
management 
A2 - Modify participation in systemically important financial services 1  2 1  
The Systemic Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies and Rated Markets (Sy, 2009) 
 2   
More frequent stress- testing 
and mitigation 
A3 - Modify interactions with the system’s infrastructure 1  3 3  
The financial crisis and its issues (Bexley et al, 2010) 
 3   
Re-introduce something like 
Glass-Steagall Act 
The Failure Mechanics of Dealer Banks (Duffie, 2010) 
 3   
Introduce ‘too big to fail’ 
policies 
The structural fragility of financial systems (Gramlich and Oet, 2011) 
 3   
Quantify structural issues in 
early warning systems 
A4 – Modify interactions with the system’s economic environment 2  6 6  
Crises in competitive versus monopolistic banking systems (Boyd, De Nicola and Smith, 2004)  2   Limit rate of inflation 
Manias, panics, and crashes - A History of Financial Crises (Kindleberger and Aliber, 2005) 
 3   
Manage scope and direction 
of money flows 
New thinking on the financial crisis (Allen and Snyder, 2009) 
 3   
Restructure for boom and 
bust phases 
Policies to rebalance the global economy after the financial crisis (Freedman et al, 2010) 
 2   
Balance stimulus versus 
consolidation trade-off 
Causes of the financial crisis: Risk misperception, policy mistakes, and banks' bounded 
rationality (Rotheli, 2010) 
 3   Improve monetary policy 
Financial crises, credit booms, and external imbalances: 140 years of lessons (Jorda, 
Schularick and Taylor, 2011) 
 3   
Improve credit growth 
management 
S08 Recognition: of the potential for systemic failure      
S08.1 - Early warning systems      
Q1 -  What is the nature of catastrophic instability or total collapse of this system?      
Q2 - What is meant by the risk of such an occurrence?     n/a 
Q3 - How does that risk materialize?       
A3 - Through interactions with the system’s infrastructure 2  6 5  
Towards a macro-prudential leading indicators framework for monitoring financial vulnerability 
(Bhattacharyay, 2003) 
 3   Leading indicators 
Comparing early warning systems for banking crises (Davis and Karim, 2008)  3   Comparison of techniques 
Systemic risk, financial contagion and financial fragility (Martinez-Jaramillo et al, 2010) 
 2   
Identifying the propagation 
of negative effects 
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Systemic risk in the financial sphere: Theoretical study and approaches to its estimation 
(Govtvan and Mansurov, 2011) 
 2   
Warning of changes in 
‘market tone’ 
The structural fragility of financial systems (Gramlich and Oet, 2011)  3   Warning of structural fragility 
Q4 - What could be done to mitigate that risk?      
S08.2 - Criteria      
Q1 - What is the nature of catastrophic instability or total collapse of this system?      
Q2 - What is meant by the risk of such an occurrence?     n/a 
Q3 - How does that risk materialize?       
A3 - Through interactions with the system’s infrastructure 2  4 7  
Towards a macro-prudential leading indicators framework for monitoring financial vulnerability 
(Bhattacharyay, 2003) 
 2   
Macro-prudential 
benchmarks 
Analysis of Financial Crisis: A Perspective Based on Catastrophe Theory (Yang, Mu and Yao, 
2009) 
 1   
Critical points for the 
emergence of brittleness 
Systemic risk, financial contagion and financial fragility (Martinez-Jaramillo et al, 2010) 
 2   
Standard risk measures for 
the entire system 
Systemic risk in the financial sphere: Theoretical study and approaches to its estimation 
(Govtvan and Mansurov, 2011) 
 2   
Acceptable macro-levels of 
risk 
Interbank lending and systemic risk (Rochet and Tirole, 1996) 
 1   
Benchmarking against policy 
expectations 
A framework for assessing the systemic risk of major financial institutions (Huang, Zhou and 
Zhu, 2009) 
 2   
Theoretical insurance 
premium 
The background to the 2007 financial crisis (Goodhart, 2007) 
 2   
Acceptable levels of 
leverage 
Q4 - What could be done to mitigate that risk?      
S08.3 - Stress testing      
Q1 -  What is the nature of catastrophic instability or total collapse of this system?      
Q2 - What is meant by the risk of such an occurrence?     n/a 
Q3 - How does that risk materialize?       
A1 - Through the behaviour of systemically important participants 1  2 1  
The Systemic Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies and Rated Markets (Sy, 2009)  2   Ratings maps 
Effects of central bank intervention on the interbank market during the subprime crisis (Brunetti, 
Di Filippo and Harris, 2011)  2   
Central bank intervention 
effects identified by stress 
tests 
Q4 - What could be done to mitigate that risk?      
S08.4 - Measuring implications      
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Q1 - What is the nature of catastrophic instability or total collapse of this system?      
Q2 - What is meant by the risk of such an occurrence?     n/a 
Q3 - How does that risk materialize?       
A1 - Through the behaviour of systemically important participants 1  2 1  
Regulating Systemic Institutions (Rochet, 2009) 
 2   
Loopholes revealed in the 
supervisory / regulatory 
framework, with a proposal 
for using new measures of 
systemic risk exposure to 
address the problem 
Q4 - What could be done to mitigate that risk?      
S08.5 - Concentrations      
Q1 - What is the nature of catastrophic instability or total collapse of this system?      
Q2 - What is meant by the risk of such an occurrence?     n/a 
Q3 - How does that risk materialize?       
A1 - Through the behaviour of systemically important participants 2  6 9  
Global financial instability: Framework, events, issues (Mishkin, 1999) 
 2   
Adverse selection, and 
moral hazard 
Financial crises and the challenge of moral hazard (Wolf, 1999)  3   Moral hazard 
What is Systemic Risk - Moral Hazard, Initial Shocks and Propagation (Dow, 2000)  3   Moral hazard 
Manias, panics, and crashes - A History of Financial Crises (Kindleberger and Aliber, 2005)  3   Bubbles 
A theory of systemic risk and design of prudential bank regulation (Acharya, 2009)  3   Risk correlation 
Bank competition and financial stability (Berger, Klapper and Turk-Ariss, 2009) 
 3   
Adverse selection, and 
moral hazard 
Regulating Systemic Institutions (Rochet, 2009)  3   Too big to fail 
The Failure Mechanics of Dealer Banks (Duffie, 2010)  3   Too big to fail 
The structural fragility of financial systems (Gramlich and Oet, 2011) 
 3   
Too big to fail, too 
connected to fail 
A3 - Through interactions with the system’s infrastructure 1  2 1  
Analysis of Financial Crisis: A Perspective Based on Catastrophe Theory (Yang, Mu and Yao, 
2009) 
 2   Critical points 
Q4 - What could be done to mitigate that risk?      
S09 Responses: to the potential for systemic failure      
S09.1 - Governance    0  
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S09.2 - Intervention      
Q1 - What is the nature of catastrophic instability or total collapse of this system?      
Q2 - What is meant by the risk of such an occurrence?     n/a 
Q3 - How does that risk materialize?       
Q4 -  What could be done to mitigate that risk?       
A1 - Modify the behaviour of systemically important participants 1  2 1  
Bailouts, the incentive to manage risk, and financial crises (Panageas, 2010)  2   Bailouts 
A2 - Modify participation in systemically important financial services 1  2 1  
Regulatory factors that contributed to the global financial crisis (Espenilla, 2009)  2   Inhibit banking innovation 
A3 - Modify interactions with the system’s infrastructure 2  6 8  
Anatomy of a Financial Crisis (Mishkin, 1992) 
 3   
Lender of last resort, and 
discount window for liquidity 
Interbank lending and systemic risk (Rochet and Tirole, 1996) 
 3   
Discounted lending, and 
centralized liquidity 
management 
Minsky's Theory of Financial Crises in a Global Context (Wolfson, 2002)  2   Lender of last resort 
Financial crisis resolution - The state as a lender of last resort (Blankart and Fasten, 2009)  3   Lender of last resort 
The financial crisis and its issues (Bexley, James and Haberman, 2010) 
 3   
Provide funds to institutions 
in difficulties 
Short Selling in a Financial Crisis: The Regulation of Short Sales in the United Kingdom and the 
United States (McGavin, 2010) 
 3   
Temporarilly banning short 
positions in certain securities 
A model of a systemic bank run (Uhlig, 2010) 
 2   
Outright purchase of 
troubled assets 
Effects of central bank intervention on the interbank market during the subprime crisis (Brunetti, 
Di Filippo and Harris, 2011) 
 3   Liquidity support 
A4 – Modify interactions with the system’s economic environment 1  2 2  
Containment and Resolution in the Financial Crisis~ Too Little, Too Late (Honohan, 2008)  2   Interventions too sporadic 
Reforming the global economic architecture~ Lessons from recent crises (Stiglitz, 1999) 
 2   
Government intervention 
frequently inept 
S09.3 - Regulation      
Q1 - What is the nature of catastrophic instability or total collapse of this system?      
Q2 - What is meant by the risk of such an occurrence?     n/a 
Q3 - How does that risk materialize?       
Q4 -  What could be done to mitigate that risk?       
A1 - Modify the behaviour of systemically important participants 1  3 2  
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A theory of systemic risk and design of prudential bank regulation (Acharya, 2009) 
 3   
Regulatory incentives for 
mitigating aggregate risk-
shifting incentives 
Regulating Systemic Institutions (Rochet, 2009) 
 3   
Close loopholes for the ‘too 
big to fail’ problem 
A2 - Modify participation in systemically important financial services 1  2 3  
Credit derivatives~ Banks’ behaviour, financial stability and banking regulation (Karras, 2009) 
 2   
Do not inhibit banking 
innovation by regulation 
Did bank capital regulation exacerbate the subprime mortgage crisis (Petersen et al, 2009) 
 2   
Avoid regulatory practices 
that exacerbated the recent 
crisis 
Short Selling in a Financial Crisis: The Regulation of Short Sales in the United Kingdom and the 
United States (McGavin, 2010)  2   
Do not introduce a 
regulatory ban on short-
selling 
A3 - Modify interactions with the system’s infrastructure 2  4 6  
Financial crisis resolution - The state as a lender of last resort (Blankart and Fasten, 2009) 
 2   
Systemic risk generated by 
banking regulation 
Regulatory factors that contributed to the global financial crisis (Espenilla, 2009) 
 2   
Deal with counter-productive 
regulatory factors 
The Systemic Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies and Rated Markets (Sy, 2009)  2   Regulate rating agencies 
The financial crisis and its issues (Bexley, James and Haberman, 2010) 
 2   
Re-introduce something like 
Glass-Steagall Act 
The 2008 financial collapse: Lessons for engineering failure (Fisk, 2011) 
 1   
Strengthen the meta-
regulation framework 
Systemic risk in the financial sphere – Theoretical study and approaches to its estimation 
(Govtvan and Mansurov, 2011)  2   
Introduce systemic risk 
estimation techniques in 
regulation 
S09.4 - Risk management      
Q1 - What is the nature of catastrophic instability or total collapse of this system?      
Q2 - What is meant by the risk of such an occurrence?     n/a 
Q3 - How does that risk materialize?       
Q4 -  What could be done to mitigate that risk?       
A1 - Modify the behaviour of systemically important participants 1  2 4  
Equilibrium analysis, banking and financial instability (Tsomocos, 2003) 
 2   
Risk management 
requirements discussed 
Redefining and containing systemic risk (Kane, 2010)  2   Redefine the incentives of 
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risk managers 
Bailouts, the incentive to manage risk, and financial crises (Panageas, 2010) 
 2   
Bailout operations should 
consider the influence of 
bankruptcy cost incentives 
on the risk management 
attitude of a firm’s 
shareholders 
Causes of the financial crisis~ Risk misperception, policy mistakes, and banks' bounded 
rationality (Rotheli, 2010)  2   
Address the bounded 
rationality of risk 
management 
S10 Effects: of systemic failure    0  
S11 Recovery: from systemic failure      
Q1 - What is the nature of catastrophic instability or total collapse of this system?      
Q2 - What is meant by the risk of such an occurrence?     n/a 
Q3 - How does that risk materialize?       
Q4 -  What could be done to mitigate that risk?       
A4 – Modify interactions with the system’s economic environment 1  3 2  
Policies to rebalance the global economy after the financial crisis (Freedman et al, 2010) 
 2   
Consider the systemic risk 
trade-offs between short-run 
effects and the long-run 
effect of economic policies 
Financial crisis resolution - The state as a lender of last resort (Blankart and Fasten, 2009) 
 3   
Enforce a common 
resolution policy 
internationally 
S12 Involvement: in the system      
S12.1 - Collective      
Q1 - What is the nature of catastrophic instability or total collapse of this system?      
Q2 - What is meant by the risk of such an occurrence?     n/a 
Q3 -  How does that risk materialize?       
A1 - Through the behaviour of systemically important participants 2  6 4  
Interbank lending and systemic risk (Rochet and Tirole, 1996) 
 3   
Decentralized bank linkages 
for mutual lending. 
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A theory of systemic risk and design of prudential bank regulation (Acharya, 2009) 
 3   
Aggregate risk-shifting 
incentives at a collective 
level of operations 
Manias, panics, and crashes - A History of Financial Crises (Kindleberger and Aliber, 2005) 
 3   
The collective failures of 
banks 
Bank competition and financial stability (Berger, Klapper and Turk-Ariss, 2009) 
 3   
Tensions between 
‘competition fragility’ and 
‘competition stability’ issues 
Q4 -  What could be done to mitigate that risk?       
S12.2 - Deliberate (strategic or tactical)      
Q1 - What is the nature of catastrophic instability or total collapse of this system?      
Q2 - What is meant by the risk of such an occurrence?     n/a 
Q3 -  How does that risk materialize?       
A1 - Through the behaviour of systemically important participants 1  3 2  
Diversification at financial institutions and systemic crises (Wagner, 2010) 
 3   
Diversification makes 
systemic crises more 
desirable 
Fair value accounting and the financial crisis- Messenger or contributor (Magnan, 2009) 
 3   
A disconnection from a 
firm’s business reality is 
created by fair value 
accounting 
A2 – Through participation in systemically important financial services 1  3 3  
Credit derivatives~ Banks’ behaviour, financial stability and banking regulation (Karras, 2009) 
 3   
CDs used to reduce capital 
reserves below tenable 
levels 
Insurance Companies and the Financial Crisis (Schich, 2010) 
 2   
Insuring mortgage related 
securities 
Short Selling in a Financial Crisis: The Regulation of Short Sales in the United Kingdom and the 
United States (McGavin, 2010) 
 3   Short selling operations 
A3 - Through interactions with the system’s infrastructure 1  2 4  
Crises in competitive versus monopolistic banking systems (Boyd, De Nicola and Smith, 2004) 
 1   
Differences in banking 
systems 
An analysis of the systemic risks posed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and an evaluation of 
the policy options for reducing those risks (Eisenbeis et al, 2007) 
 2   
Reducing large investment 
portfolio exposures 
Bailouts, the incentive to manage risk, and financial crises (Panageas, 2010)  2   Providing bailout facilities 
Effects of central bank intervention on the interbank market during the subprime crisis (Brunetti,  2   To improve liquidity 
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Di Filippo and Harris, 2011) 
Q4 -  What could be done to mitigate that risk?       
S12.3 - Dysfunctional      
Q1 - What is the nature of catastrophic instability or total collapse of this system?      
Q2 - What is meant by the risk of such an occurrence?     n/a 
Q3 -  How does that risk materialize?       
A1 - Through the behaviour of systemically important participants 2  6 12  
A Theory of Systemic Fragility (Minsky, 1977)  1   ‘Ponzi’ financing of debt  
Behavioral Basis of the Financial Crisis (Rizzi, 2008)  3   Misaligned compensation 
Bank competition and financial stability (Berger, Klapper and Turk-Ariss, 2009) 
 3   
Moral hazard, adverse 
selection 
Anatomy of a Financial Crisis (Mishkin, 1992) 
 3   
Moral hazard, adverse 
selection 
What is systemic risk, and do bank regulators retard or contribute to it (Kaufman and Scott, 
2003) 
 2   
Counterproductive 
regulation 
Manias, panics, and crashes - A History of Financial Crises (Kindleberger and Aliber, 2005)  3   Manias, panics, bubbles 
Financial crises and the challenge of moral hazard (Wolf, 1999)  2   Moral hazard 
What is Systemic Risk - Moral Hazard, Initial Shocks and Propagation (Dow, 2000)  2   Moral hazard 
Global financial instability: Framework, events, issues (Mishkin, 1999)  2   Adverse selection 
Short Selling in a Financial Crisis: The Regulation of Short Sales in the United Kingdom and the 
United States (McGavin, 2010) 
 3   Short selling operations 
Bailouts, the incentive to manage risk, and financial crises (Panageas, 2010) 
 2   
Exploitation of implicit 
protection 
Redefining and containing systemic risk (Kane, 2010)  3   Misaligned incentives 
Q4 -  What could be done to mitigate that risk?       
S12.4 – Ignorant      
Q1 - What is the nature of catastrophic instability or total collapse of this system?      
Q2 - What is meant by the risk of such an occurrence?     n/a 
Q3 -  How does that risk materialize?       
A1 – Through the behaviour of systemically important participants 1  3 2  
Causes of the financial crisis~ Risk misperception, policy mistakes, and banks’ bounded 
rationality (Rotheli, 2010) 
 3   Bounded rationality 
Intellectual Hazard~ how Conceptual Biases in Complex Organizations Contributed to the Crisis 
of 2008 (Miller and Rosenfeld, 2010)  2   
Intellectual hazard (i.e. lack 
of understanding through 
inadequate education, 
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experience or insight) 
Q4 -  What could be done to mitigate that risk?       
S12.5 - Procedural      
Q1 - What is the nature of catastrophic instability or total collapse of this system?      
Q2 - What is meant by the risk of such an occurrence?     n/a 
Q3 -  How does that risk materialize?       
A1 - Through the behaviour of systemically important participants 1  2 3  
Behavioral Basis of the Financial Crisis (Rizzi, 2008)  2    
Bank competition and financial stability (Berger, Klapper and Turk-Ariss, 2009)  2   Competitive banking system 
The Failure Mechanics of Dealer Banks (Duffie, 2010)  2   Failure resolution policies 
A3 - Through interactions with the system’s infrastructure 1  3 5  
Containment and Resolution in the Financial Crisis: Too Little, Too Late (Honohan, 2008)  2   Regulation 
Did bank capital regulation exacerbate the subprime mortgage crisis? (Petersen et al, 2009)  2   Regulation 
Regulating Systemic Institutions (Rochet, 2009)  3   Regulation 
Crises in competitive versus monopolistic banking systems (Boyd, De Nicola and Smith, 2004) 
 1   
Monopoly versus 
competition policies 
Policies to rebalance the global economy after the financial crisis (Freedman et al, 2010)  2   Failure resolution policies 
Q4 -  What could be done to mitigate that risk?       
S13 Operations: of the system      
S13.1 – Cycles      
Q1 - What is the nature of catastrophic instability or total collapse of this system?      
Q2 - What is meant by the risk of such an occurrence?     n/a 
Q3 -  How does that risk materialize?       
A4 - Through interactions with the system’s economic environment 2  6 6  
A Theory of Systemic Fragility (Minsky, 1977)  3   Economic cycles 
The Financial Instability Hypothesis (Minsky, 1993)  3   Cycles of instability 
Bank provisioning behaviour and procyclicality (Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005) 
 3   
Credit provisioning pro-
cyclicality 
Regulatory factors that contributed to the global financial crisis (Espenilla, 2009) 
 2   
Procyclical monetary 
policies 
The banking crisis as dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (Minford, 2010) 
 3   
Open economy real 
business cycle model 
Financial crises, credit booms, and external imbalances: 140 years of lessons (Jorda, 
Schularick and Taylor, 2011) 
 3   Boom and bust cycles 
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Q4 -  What could be done to mitigate that risk?       
S13.2 – Innovation      
Q1 - What is the nature of catastrophic instability or total collapse of this system?      
Q2 - What is meant by the risk of such an occurrence?     n/a 
Q3 -  How does that risk materialize?       
A1 - Through the behaviour of systemically important participants 1  3 1  
The corporate treasurer - Playing the leading role (Hart, 2009) 
 3   
Innovative uses of  complex 
financial instruments 
A3 - Through interactions with the system’s infrastructure 1  3 2  
Regulatory factors that contributed to the global financial crisis (Espenilla, 2009) 
 2   
Allowing uninhibited banking 
innovation 
Fair value accounting and the financial crisis- Messenger or contributor (Magnan, 2009) 
 3   
Unintended effects of 
accounting innovations 
Q4 -  What could be done to mitigate that risk?       
S13.3 – Interconnectedness      
Q1 - What is the nature of catastrophic instability or total collapse of this system?      
Q2 - What is meant by the risk of such an occurrence?     n/a 
Q3 -  How does that risk materialize?       
A1 - Through the behaviour of systemically important participants 1  3 1  
Interbank lending and systemic risk (Rochet and Tirole, 1996) 
 3   
Decentralized bank linkages 
for mutual lending. 
A3 - Through interactions with the system’s infrastructure 2  6 6  
New thinking on the financial crisis (Allen and Snyder, 2009) 
 3   
Complex systems and 
meso-structures 
Systemic risks in society and economics (Helbing, 2009) 
 2   
Non-linear and/or network 
interactions, collective social 
dynamics 
A framework for assessing the systemic risk of major financial institutions (Huang, Zhou and 
Zhu, 2009)  3   
Dynamic linkages between 
major US banks and macro-
financial conditions  
Systemic risk, financial contagion and financial fragility (Martinez-Jaramillo et al, 2010) 
 2   
Contagion mechanism for 
propagating negative effects 
through connections in a 
financial system 
Complexity Theory and the Financial Crisis: a Critical Review (Zeidan and Richardson, 2010) 
 1   
Complex systems, network 
topologies and neural 
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networks 
Effects of central bank intervention on the interbank market during the subprime crisis (Brunetti, 
Di Filippo and Harris, 2011) 
 1   
Interbank loan guarantees 
and counterparty risk 
Q4 -  What could be done to mitigate that risk?       
S13.4 – Resilience      
Q3 -  How does that risk materialize?       
A1 - Through the behaviour of systemically important participants 1  2 2  
Bank provisioning behaviour and procyclicality (Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005) 
 2   
Aligning bank credit 
provisioning to business 
cycles for improved 
resilience 
The corporate treasurer - Playing the leading role (Hart, 2009) 
 1   
Enterprise-wide risk 
framework 
A3 - Through interactions with the system’s infrastructure 1  3 5  
A Theory of Systemic Fragility (Minsky, 1977)  3   Systemic fragility 
The structural fragility of financial systems (Gramlich and Oet, 2011) 
 2   
Financial system structure, 
vulnerabilities and 
concentrations 
Systemic risks in society and economics (Helbing, 2009) 
 3   
Self-organizing, adaptive 
nature of complex systems, 
and robustness to external 
peturbations 
Policies to rebalance the global economy after the financial crisis (Freedman et al, 2010) 
 2   
Rebalancing policies to be 
more resilient to short and 
long-run economic effects 
The banking crisis as dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (Minford, 2010) 
 2   
Calibrating policy responses 
to address non-stationary 
productivity shocks 
S13.5 – Visibility      
Q3 -  How does that risk materialize?       
A3 - Through interactions with the system’s infrastructure 1  3 2  
Fair value accounting and the financial crisis- Messenger or contributor (Magnan, 2009) 
 3   
Visibility of fair value 
accounting in financial 
institutions’ reporting can 
severely undermine their 
financial condition 
The 2008 financial collapse: Lessons for engineering failure (Fisk, 2011)  2   Systemic failure is normally 
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due to inadequacies of the 
oversight system, its meta-
regulation framework 
Q4 -  What could be done to mitigate that risk?       
A3 - Modify interactions with the system’s infrastructure 1  3 4  
Anatomy of a Financial Crisis (Mishkin, 1992) 
 3   
Address asymmetric 
information 
The Systemic Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies and Rated Markets (Sy, 2009) 
 3   
Apply ‘ratings maps’ in 
stress tests 
The corporate treasurer - Playing the leading role (Hart, 2009) 
 2   
Greater transparency from 
trading partners 
Effects of central bank intervention on the interbank market during the subprime crisis (Brunetti, 
Di Filippo and Harris, 2011) 
 2   Release stress-test results 
S14 Reviews: of systemic crises and failures      
S14.1 - Current crisis      
Q1 -  What is the nature of catastrophic instability or total collapse of this system?      
A4 - Its nature is Financial 2  6 3  
The background to the 2007 financial crisis (Goodhart, 2007)  3    
The financial crisis and its issues (Bexley, James and Haberman, 2010)  3    
The great financial crisis (Foster and Magdoff, 2009)  3    
S14.2 - Other specific crises      
S14.3 - General crises      
Q1 -  What is the nature of catastrophic instability or total collapse of this system?      
A4 - Its nature is Financial 2  6 3  
Manias, panics, and crashes - A History of Financial Crises (Kindleberger and Aliber, 2005)  3    
Financial crises, credit booms, and external imbalances~ 140 years of lessons (Jorda, 
Schularick and Taylor, 2011) 
 3    
Understanding financial crises - Clarendon Lectures (Allen and Gale, 2007)  3    
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D.6 Core Literature Metadata 
Authors Year Pub Type 
Literature 
Domain 
Theme Discipline 
Title and Claim/s  
(summarised using Keywords and phrases 
from each contribution) Keywords and Phrases 
              
Minsky 1977 Book Systemic Risk Economics A Theory of Systemic Fragility  
Argues that an incipient financial crisis will be 
triggered when money market changes lead to 
present value reversals or appreciable 
decreases in their margins of safety. Once 
'ponzi' financing of debt reaches significant 
levels, it is followed either by serious 
depression or the 'floating off' of debt made 
possible by inflation through large increases in 
government deficits.   
• Systemic fragility  
• Financial crisis 
• Money market 
• ‘Ponzi’ financing of debt 
• Depression 
• Inflation 
• Government deficits 
 
Ho and 
Saunders 
1980 Journal 
article 
Op Behaviour Complex Sys A catastrophe model of bank failure 
Offers a model showing how interaction of bank 
management, regulators and depositors can 
induce catastrophic failure. Shows the crucial 
relationship between the power of regulatory 
intervention and depositors’ confidence levels 
which are both necessary and sufficient for 
catastrophe to occur. Also argues that 
catastrophe appears to be more likely for large 
money market banks rather than small banks. 
• Catastrophe model 
• Bank failure 
• Catastrophic failure 
• Regulatory intervention 
• Large money- market 
banks 
Mishkin 1992 Journal 
article 
Systemic Risk Economics Anatomy of a Financial Crisis 
Provides an asymmetric information 
framework and a definition for explaining 
financial crises. These are used to argue that a 
financial crisis is a disruption to financial 
markets in which adverse selection and moral 
hazard problems become much worse, 
• Financial crisis definition 
• Asymmetric information 
framework 
• Financial markets 
• Adverse selection 
• Moral hazard 
• Lender-of-last-resort role 
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restricting the efficient channelling of funds to 
those who have the most productive investment 
opportunities. The framework explains effects 
beyond those generated by bank panics, and 
provides a rationale for an expanded lender-of-
last-resort role for the central bank in which it 
uses the discount window to provide liquidity 
to sectors outside of the banking system. 
• Discount window for 
liquidity 
• Banking system 
 
Minsky 1993 Book Systemic Risk Economics The Financial Instability Hypothesis  
Argues that, from time to time, capitalist 
economies exhibit inflations and debt 
deflations which seem to have the potential to 
spin out of control. In such circumstances the 
economic system's reactions to a movement of 
the economy are observed to amplify that 
movement, while government interventions 
aimed at containing deterioration in financial 
stability are frequently inept. An explanation of 
this systemic behaviour argues a view that is 
contrary to the accepted views of Smith and 
Walras, who implied that the economy can best 
be understood by assuming that it is an 
equilibrium seeking and sustaining system. By 
interpreting the substance of Keynes' "General 
Theory" as describing a particular time in history, 
and drawing on the credit view of money and 
finance by Joseph Schumpeter, an alternative 
view is proposed for the modern world which 
holds that an understanding of financial relations 
and their implications cannot be restricted to the 
liability structure of businesses and the cash 
flows they entail. This view constitutes a new 
theory of the impact of debt (instruments) on 
systemic behaviour, incorporating the way 
• Financial instability 
• Capitalist economies 
exhibit inflations and debt 
deflations 
• Economic system 
• Government intervention 
• Impact of debt 
(instruments) on systemic 
behaviour 
• Cycles of stability. 
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debt is validated. Its first hypothesis holds that 
the economy has financing regimes in which it is 
stable and those in which it is unstable. The 
second hypothesis holds that, over a prolonged 
period of prosperity, the economy transits from 
financial relations that make for a stable system 
to those that make for an unstable system 
(cycles of stability). 
Loretan 1996 Journal 
article 
Systemic Risk Economics Economic models of systemic risk in financial 
systems 
A number of definitions of systemic risk are 
examined. While various shocks are often cited 
as having the potential to severely disrupt the 
functioning of financial markets, an argument is 
developed that holds it is also necessary to 
consider the ‘nonrational’ behavioral 
responses of agents involved in these shocks, 
to fully understand the dynamics of systemic 
events. The role of policy institutions in 
preventing or mitigating such events is also 
considered. 
• Definitions of systemic 
risk 
• Shocks 
• Financial markets 
• ‘nonrational’ behavioral 
responses 
• Dynamics of systemic 
events 
• Role of policy 
institutions 
• Mitigation 
Rochet and 
Tirole 
1996 Journal 
article 
Systemic Risk Economics Interbank lending and systemic risk 
Systemic risk is defined as the ‘propagation of 
an agent's economic distress to other agents 
linked to that agent through financial 
transactions.’ This concept is examined in 
manufacturing, reinsurance and banking. Then 
‘too big to fail’ policies for protecting uninsured 
depositors of large insolvent banks are 
considered. Government authorities are 
described as sometimes applying a policy of 
'constructive ambiguity' in their willingness to 
intervene in such circumstances. The 
• Interbank lending 
• Systemic risk definition 
• Propagation  
• Economic distress 
• Insurance 
• Too big to fail 
• Authority intervention 
• ‘Constructive ambiguity’ 
• Mitigation 
• Discounted lending to 
distressed banks 
• Centralized liquidity 
PhD - Cranfield University, January 2014. T.ILIN 
 
440 
mitigation techniques considered include: 
discounted lending by governments to 
distressed banks; centralizing the liquidity 
management of banks (by a central bank 
providing guarantees, or acting as a central 
counterparty); or bank transactions on 
derivatives market having collateral 
conditions applied. However, no clear 
conceptual framework exists for applying 
these techniques, and the hybrid nature of the 
current system of interbank linkages (largely 
decentralized interbank mutual lending, with 
central government intervention) makes clarity 
difficult to achieve. A discussion of policy issues 
leads to a proposed model for benchmarking 
different forms of peer monitoring for failure 
avoidance and systemic risk mitigation, and 
comparison with 'autarky' - where banks do not 
monitor each other. 
management 
• Collateral conditions on 
derivatives transactions 
• No clear conceptual 
framework exists 
• Interbank linkages 
• Benchmarking 
•  ‘Autarky’ 
Mishkin 1999 Journal 
article 
Op Behaviour Economics Global financial instability: Framework, events, 
issues 
Defines financial instability and shows how it 
harms economic activity through asymmetric 
information and two basic problems in the 
financial system: adverse selection and 
moral hazard. Adverse selection is described 
as behaviour that occurs before the financial 
transaction takes place, when potential bad 
credit risks are the ones who most actively seek 
out a loan. Moral hazard is described as 
behaviour that occurs after the transaction takes 
place, when a borrower has insufficient 
incentives to pay back the loan because the 
lender bears most of the loss on that loan if the 
• Global 
• Financial instability 
definition 
• Asymmetric information 
• Financial system 
• Adverse selection 
• Moral hazard 
• Financial intermediaries 
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borrower defaults. The underlying rationale for 
involving financial intermediaries in such 
transactions is that they have both the ability 
and the economic incentive to address problems 
of asymmetric information. 
Stiglitz 1999 Journal 
article 
Systemic Risk Risk Reforming the global economic architecture: 
Lessons from recent crises 
Focuses on global financial crises, and 
proposes government measures to dampen 
(mitigate) financial instability and systemic 
risk, including governmental controls over 
short-term capital flows and the modifications 
of bankruptcy procedures in a crisis. Which is 
followed by a general discussion on the need to: 
(1) better integrate financial and real economics, 
(2) be wary of anthromorphizing market 
behaviour, and (3) reach beyond anecdotes to 
construct coherent theoretical models and 
undertake empirical testing. 
• Economic architecture 
• Global Financial crises 
• Government measures 
• Mitigation 
• Financial instability 
• Systemic risk 
• Short-term capital flows  
• Bankruptcy procedures 
in a crisis  
• Need for coherent 
theoretical models 
Wolf 1999 Journal 
article 
Systemic Risk Economics Financial crises and the challenge of moral 
hazard  
‘Moral hazard’ is defined as a disposition on the 
part of individuals or organizations to engage in 
riskier behavior because of a tacit assumption 
that someone else will bear all or part of the 
costs. Moral hazard decision-making is then 
considered in the context of financial crises. 
• Financial crises 
• Moral hazard 
• Riskier behavior 
Bandt and 
Hartmann 
2000 Working 
Paper 
Systemic Risk Economics Systemic risk: A survey 
Surveys the literature on the broad concept of 
systemic risk, and finds there is a consensus 
on defining it as comprised of contagion effects 
and various forms of external effects. However, 
the conclusion drawn is that a general 
• Systemic risk definition 
• Contagion and external 
effects 
• ‘Theoretical paradigm is 
still missing’ 
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theoretical paradigm is still missing.  
 
Dow 2000 Journal 
article 
Systemic Risk Risk What is Systemic Risk - Moral Hazard, Initial 
Shocks and Propagation 
Surveys the research on various topics related 
to systemic risk, and examines case studies of 
financial crises and failures. Then discusses 
the significance of references to moral hazard 
in that literature, and recommends it as a 
potentially fruitful area for future research. 
Existing research is described as emphasizing 
the powerful propagation mechanisms 
whereby a small initial shock can be amplified 
by the financial system. However, the 
combination of moral hazard and leverage at 
the level of the individual firm is argued to be 
an important cause of initial shocks to the 
financial system worthy of more research 
attention. 
• Systemic risk 
• Financial crises and 
failures 
• Moral hazard 
• Propagation 
mechanisms 
• Shocks 
• Financial system 
• Firm-level leverage 
Wolfson 2002 Journal 
article 
Op Behaviour Economics Minsky's Theory of Financial Crises in a Global 
Context 
Describes how Minsky's debt-deflation process 
has so far been averted, and how a major 
revision of the optimistic expectations of a 
boom period has not occurred since the Great 
Depression due to the intervention of the 
Federal Reserve as lender of last resort. 
• Global financial crises 
• Major revision of 
expectations  
• Great Depression 
• Intervention 
• Lender of last resort 
Bhattachary
ay 
2003 Journal 
article 
Op Behaviour Economics Towards a macro-prudential leading indicators 
framework for monitoring financial vulnerability 
Proposes a macroprudential indicators (MPI) 
framework for monitoring the vulnerability of 
financial markets. A literature survey on 
studies of leading indicators is presented. 
• Macropruden-tial leading 
indicators framework 
• Monitoring 
• Vulnerability 
• Financial markets 
• Benchmarks 
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Then an illustrative and simple framework for 
analysis and interpretation of a core set of 22 
leading indicators (that were identified from 67 
commonly agreed Asian Development Bank 
Indicators for selected AsiaPacific countries) is 
presented using annual time-series data for 
those countries, with a simple methodology for 
constructing benchmarks for early warning 
signals and for developing a set of composite 
indicators.  
• Early warning signals 
• Set of composite 
indicators 
Kaufman 
and Scott 
2003 Journal 
article 
Systemic Risk Risk What is systemic risk, and do bank regulators 
retard or contribute to it? 
Discusses the alternative definitions and 
sources of systemic risk, briefly reviews the 
historical evidence of systemic risk in banking, 
and describes how participants in financial 
markets traditionally have protected themselves 
from systemic risk. Then banking regulations 
that were adopted to reduce the probability of 
systemic risk and the damage it causes (its 
effects) are evaluated, and recommendations 
are made for mitigating that risk. 
• Systemic risk definitions 
• Bank regulators 
• Banking system 
• Banking regulations 
• Effects 
• Mitigation 
Tsomocos 2003 Journal 
article 
Systemic Risk Economics Equilibrium analysis, banking and financial 
instability 
Extends the canonical ‘General Equilibrium with 
Incomplete Markets’ (GEI) model with money 
and default to allow for competitive banking and 
financial instability. A non-trivial quantity 
theory of money is derived and the model 
provides a useful analytical device for policy 
analysis of situations in which crisis prevention 
(mitigation) and (risk) management become 
necessary to reduce the risks and costs of 
• Financial instability 
• Quantity theory of 
money 
• Model for policy analysis 
• Mitigation 
• Risk management 
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financial instability. 
Boyd, De 
Nicola and 
Smith 
2004 Journal 
article 
Op Behaviour Economics Crises in competitive versus monopolistic 
banking systems 
A banking crisis is defined as a case in which 
banks exhaust their reserve assets. Then a 
model is presented which shows, under different 
specifications, the banking industry in a country 
or region is either a single monopoly bank or a 
competitive banking industry. Relative crisis 
probabilities under the two banking systems 
are determined to be independent of the conduct 
of monetary policy (i.e. they depend on the 
rate of inflation). 
• Banking crisis definition 
• Monopoly/ competitive 
banking 
• Crisis probabilities 
• Monetary policy 
• Rate of inflation 
Mundy 2004 Journal 
article 
Systemic Risk Risk The nature of systemic risk - trying to achieve a 
definition 
Argues that systemic risk is an elusive concept, 
and the search for a ‘proper’ definition can be 
fruitless, but an understanding of its nature is 
essential. Some risks are described as 
uninsurable, which mostly fall into two 
categories: either they are inevitable or they are 
illegal. However, systemic risk is defined as a 
risk that is both so extreme and so critical in its 
impact on society that governments are 
required to insure them, even at the cost of 
their own economic principles. 
• Systemic risk definition 
• Search for ‘proper’ 
definition can be 
fruitless 
• Uninsurable risks 
• Governments are 
required to insure 
against systemic risk at 
all costs 
Bikker and 
Metzemaker
s 
2005 Journal 
article 
Op Behaviour Economics Bank provisioning behaviour and procyclicality 
Investigates how bank provisioning behaviour 
is related to business cycles. Provisioning is 
shown to be substantially higher when GDP 
growth is lower, reflecting increased riskiness of 
the credit portfolio when the business cycle 
turns downwards, which is argued to also 
• Bank provisioning 
behaviour 
• Procyclicality 
• Based on level of GDP 
growth 
• Credit risk 
• Credit portfolio 
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increase the risk of a credit crunch. 
 
• Credit crunch 
Kindleberge
r and Aliber 
2005 Book Systemic Risk Economics Manias, panics, and crashes - A History of 
Financial Crises  
Provides a history of financial crises, and 
analyses the stages of financial crises over the 
past two and a half centuries, with further 
references to a monetary history covering four 
centuries. The conclusion reached is that a 
combination of bank failures, the overshooting 
and undershooting of exchange rates around 
their long-run equilibrium values, and bubbles in 
real estate and stock markets, were 
systematically related and resulted from 
various shocks that led to large changes in the 
scope and direction of cross-border money 
flows.  
• Financial crises 
• Stages 
• Monetary history 
• Bank failures 
• Bubbles 
• Shocks 
• Bank failures, exchange 
rates and bubbles ‘are 
systematically related’ 
• Cross-border money 
flows 
Allen and 
Gale 
2007 Book Systemic Risk Economics Understanding financial crises - Clarendon 
Lectures in Finance  
Gives a brief introduction to prominent theories 
of financial crises, but confirms that theory is 
at a relatively early stage, even though there is 
a significant empirical literature on financial 
crises. Then, out of the observation that crises 
are complex phenomena in practice, an 
argument is developed for concluding 'there is 
no one theory of crises that can explain all 
aspects of the phenomena of interest.' 
• Theories of financial 
crises 
• Theory is at a relatively 
early stage 
• Crises are complex 
phenomena 
• 'There is no one theory 
of crises’ 
Eisenbeis et 
al 
2007 Journal 
article 
Systemic Risk Risk An analysis of the systemic risks posed by 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and an evaluation 
of the policy options for reducing those risks 
Describes the nature of large mortgage- and 
non-mortgage oriented investment portfolios 
• Systemic risks 
• Investment portfolios 
• Policy options 
• Limits on portfolio size 
• Mitigation 
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held by these institutions, and related systemic 
concerns. Then several policy options are 
evaluated for reducing their systemic risk 
exposure, and concludes that limits on 
portfolio size (assets or liabilities) would be the 
most desirable approach to mitigating the 
systemic risk posed by Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac. 
• Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac  
Goodhart 2007 Journal 
article 
Op Behaviour Risk The background to the 2007 financial crisis 
Discusses the background to the financial 
crisis in 2007, and asserts that many aspects 
this crisis were already predicted. Archival 
research is shown to confirm that almost all 
central banks and international financial 
institutions that published some form of 
Financial Stability Review were predicting a 
serious under-pricing of risk in that publication 
well before the middle of 2007. This risk 
manifested as quite low risk spreads between 
risky assets and safe assets, while overall 
volatility declined. At the same time leverage 
was high, as financial institutions were clearly 
prepared to move into increasingly risky 
assets in pursuit of their goals. 
• Financial crisis 
• Predicted 
• Central banks 
• International financial 
institutions 
• Financial Stability 
Review 
• Under-pricing of risk 
• Volatility 
• Leverage 
• Increasingly risky assets 
Davis and 
Karim 
2008 Journal 
article 
Systemic Risk Risk Comparing early warning systems for banking 
crises  
Assesses the logit and signal extraction early 
warning systems (EWS) for banking crises 
using a comprehensive common dataset, and 
suggests that logit is the most appropriate 
approach for global EWS and signal extraction 
for country-specific analysis. 
• Global early warning 
systems 
• Banking crises 
• Logit approach 
• Country-specific 
analysis 
Honohan 2008 Journal Op Behaviour Risk Containment and Resolution in the Financial • Containment and 
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article Crisis: Too Little, Too Late 
Finds that regulatory authorities allowed 
strained credit conditions reflecting weak 
capitalization of major banks to persist for over 
a year with only sporadic and case-by-case 
interventions. 
resolution 
• Regulatory authorities 
• Weak capitalization 
• Sporadic interventions 
Rizzi 2008 Journal 
article 
Op Behaviour Economics Behavioral Basis of the Financial Crisis 
Major risks are conjectured as being frequently 
ignored due to behavioral biases, which are 
reinforced by organizational obstacles, resulting 
in mistakes such as misaligned compensation 
systems. A supplemental behavioral risk 
framework is outlined, and applied to the 
structured finance market. 
• Financial crisis 
• Major risks 
• Behavioral biases 
• Misaligned 
compensation 
• Supplemental behavioral 
risk framework 
Schwarcz 2008 Journal 
article 
Systemic Risk Risk Systemic risk  
Provides a summary of testimony presented 
before the U.S. House of Representatives 
Committee on Financial Services on October 2, 
2007. A legal perspective on the definition of 
systemic risk was outlined, along with a 
conceptual framework for examining what risks 
are truly ‘systemic,’ what causes those risks, 
and how, if at all, those risks should be 
regulated. 
• Legal definition of 
systemic risk 
• Conceptual framework 
• Causes 
• Potential for regulation 
Acharya 2009 Journal 
article 
Systemic Risk Economics A theory of systemic risk and design of 
prudential bank regulation 
Systemic risk is modelled as the 
endogenously chosen correlation of returns on 
assets held by banks. Regulatory mechanisms 
are described as failing to mitigate aggregate 
risk-shifting incentives, thereby increasing 
systemic risk. More prudential regulation is 
shown to operate at a collective level, 
• Systemic risk model 
• Regulatory mechanisms 
• Mitigation 
• Aggregate risk-shifting 
incentives 
• Collective level of 
operation 
• Risk correlation 
• Individual risk 
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regulating each bank as a function of both its 
joint (correlated) risk with other banks as well 
as its individual (bank-specific) risk. 
Allen and 
Snyder 
2009 Journal 
article 
Systems Complex Sys New thinking on the financial crisis 
Argues that many features of financial crises 
occur naturally in evolutionary and complex 
systems. In particular, the boom phase leading 
to this current crisis (early 1980s through 2006) 
and bust phase (2007-) are described as being 
associated with structural changes in 
institutions, technologies, and monetary 
processes, i.e. changing ‘meso structures’. 
Dominant examples of such infrastructures 
within the global economy are observed to 
increasingly be purely financial constructs and 
processes. Rigorous analytical predictions of 
financial crisis variables are further argued to 
be, at present, ‘not possible using 
evolutionary and complex systems’ 
approaches; although, such systems are 
described as being potentially fruitful subjects for 
study through simulation methods and certain 
types of econometric modeling. Scholars, 
policymakers, and practitioners are thought to 
appreciate the more comprehensive 
evolutionary and complex systems framework 
and see that it suggests a new political economy 
of financial crisis. Despite a huge scholarly 
literature (organized recently as first-, second- 
and third-generation models of financial 
crises) and a flurry of topical essays in recent 
months, systemic understanding has been 
lacking. 
• Financial crisis 
• Evolutionary systems 
• Complex systems 
• Boom and bust phases 
• Structural changes 
• ‘Meso structures’ 
• Dominant financial 
infrastructures 
• Global economy 
• predictions of financial 
crisis ‘not currently 
possible using 
evolutionary and 
complex systems’ 
• ‘simulation methods and 
certain types of 
econometric modeling 
useful’ 
• First-, second- and third-
generation models of 
financial crises 
• Systemic understanding 
has been lacking 
Ball 2009 Journal Op Behaviour Risk The Global Financial Crisis and the Efficient • Efficient markets 
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article Market Hypothesis: What Have We Learned? 
Challenges the view that the efficient markets 
hypothesis, by Eugene Fama, is in some way 
responsible for the current worldwide crisis.  
hypothesis 
• Cause 
• Current worldwide crisis 
Berger, 
Klapper and 
Turk-Ariss 
2009 Journal 
article 
Op Behaviour Risk Bank competition and financial stability 
Argues how, under the ‘competition-fragility’ 
view, more bank competition erodes market 
power, decreases profit margins, and results in 
reduced franchise value that encourages bank 
risk taking. Under the alternative ‘competition-
stability’ view, more market power in the loan 
market is described as potentially resulting in 
higher bank risk as the higher interest rates 
charged to loan customers make it harder to 
repay loans, thereby exacerbating moral hazard 
and adverse selection problems. Observed 
results are described as supporting the former 
view: banks with a higher degree of market 
power also have less overall risk exposure. 
However, the "competition-stability" view does 
show that market power increases loan 
portfolio risk. 
• ‘Competition-fragility’ 
view 
• ‘Competition-stability’ 
view 
• Market power 
• Moral hazard 
• Adverse selection 
• Overall risk exposure 
• Loan portfolio risk 
Blankart 
and Fasten 
2009 Journal 
article 
Systemic Risk Economics Financial crisis resolution - The state as a lender 
of last resort? 
A model is proposed for the contractual state 
resulting from an ‘exchange of protection’ 
against the systemic risks of regulation for the 
banking sector. Governments are described as 
having neglected to install institutions to reduce 
‘systematic’ risks during the years of 
globalisation, and are An evaluation is offered 
for what can be undertaken in both the short and 
long run, and how far a common response 
• Financial crisis 
resolution 
• Lender of last resort 
• Model of a contractual 
state 
• ‘Exchange of protection’ 
• Systemic risks of 
regulation 
• Globalisation 
• ‘Systematic’ risks 
• Enforced internationally 
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framework can be enforced internationally.  
Espenilla 2009 Journal 
article 
Op Behaviour Economics Regulatory factors that contributed to the global 
financial crisis 
Exposes regulatory factors that contributed to 
the 2008 global financial crisis, during which 
weaknesses in the CRT (credit risk transfer) 
market are believed by many to have catalyzed 
the present economic slowdown. However, that 
slowdown is argued to be more attributable to 
economic laxity at the time, through the 
procyclical nature of monetary policies that 
reinforced the market downturn. Therefore 
regulators are urged to resist the temptation of 
addressing previous failures in financial stability 
management by simply inhibiting banking 
innovation. Instead, they are advised to review 
their procyclical policies. 
• Regulatory factors/ 
failure 
• Global financial crisis 
• Economic laxity 
• Procyclical nature of 
monetary policies 
• Market downturn 
• Inhibiting banking 
innovation 
Foster and 
Magdoff 
2009 Book Systemic Risk Economics The great financial crisis  
Offers a combined review of the causes and 
consequences of the 'Great Financial Crisis', 
starting in late summer 2007 with the failure of 
two Bear Stearns hedge funds. It is argued 
that, from a long-term historical perspective, this 
crisis will be seen as symptomatic of a more 
general crisis of financialization, beyond 
which lurks the specter of stagnation. Then a 
radically different economic view is proposed, 
that suggests the normal path of mature 
capitalist economies is one of stagnation 
interrupted by periods of growth until 
favourable conditions wane and stagnation 
resurfaces. 
• Review 
• 'Great Financial Crisis' 
• Hedge funds 
• Crisis of financialization 
• Radically different 
economic view 
• Stagnation interrupted 
by periods of growth 
Hart 2009 Journal Op Behaviour Risk The corporate treasurer - Playing the leading • Corporate treasurers 
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article role 
Describes how corporate treasurers are faced 
with a growing list of challenges, including a 
series of new concerns around counterparty risk, 
liquidity and systemic risk inherent in owning 
increasingly complex instrument types. 
Operating in an expanding global economy 
and innovative uses of increasingly complex 
financial instruments to finance and run daily 
operations is described as a challenge. It is 
suggested that treasurers can improve their 
capabilities significantly by demanding greater 
transparency from their trading counterparties, 
and by leveraging near real-time information on 
the financial health of the firms in which they 
invest. They could also develop clear, objective 
methods to evaluate the strength of their 
investments, as well as insist that their firms 
employ enterprise-wide risk management 
solutions to ensure they operate under 
acceptable levels of risk throughout the 
corporation. 
 
• Systemic risk 
• Operating in an 
expanding global 
economy 
• Innovative, complex 
financial instrument 
types 
• Run daily operations 
• Greater transparency 
• Enterprise-wide risk 
management 
• Ensure they operate 
under acceptable levels 
of risk 
Helbing 2009 Proceedin
gs 
Systemic Risk Complex Sys Systemic risks in society and economics  
Discusses the observation that many large-
scale disasters have a strong human 
component that cannot be solved by technical 
approaches alone, but requires an 
understanding of collective social dynamics. A 
summary is presented of how complexity 
contributes to the emergence of systemic 
risks in socio-economic systems. Then such 
disasters are described as being mostly based 
• Review of theories of 
systemic risk 
• Large-scale disasters 
• Collective social 
dynamics 
• Complexity 
• Emergence 
• Social and economic 
systems 
• Cascading effects 
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on cascading effects, which are due to non-
linear and/or network interactions. It is 
therefore argued that linear, experience-based, 
or intuitive approaches to these disasters often 
fail to provide a suitable picture of the 
functioning of such systems.  Instead, they lead 
to the illusion of control, a dangerous logic of 
failure, paradoxical system behaviours, 
unwanted side effects, and sudden regime 
shifts. Whereas, the application of complex 
systems methods is thought to enable the 
anticipation, avoidance, or mitigation of systemic 
risks and their effects. Furthermore, by using the 
self-organising, adaptive nature of complex 
systems to interpret the behaviour of socio-
economic systems, opportunities arise for 
inducing favourable system behaviours which 
are robust to external perturbations and 
adaptive to changing conditions.  
• Non-linear and/or 
network interactions 
• Illusion of control 
• Logic of failure 
• Paradoxical system 
behaviours 
• Sudden regime shifts 
• Complex systems 
methods 
• Self-organising, adaptive 
nature 
• External perturbations 
Huang, 
Zhou and 
Zhu 
2009 Journal 
article 
Systemic Risk Economics A framework for assessing the systemic risk of 
major financial institutions 
An integrated micro-macro model is 
presented, that takes into account dynamic 
linkages between the health of major US 
banks and macro-financial conditions. 
Results suggest that the theoretical insurance 
premium that would be charged to protect 
against losses (mitigation) that equal or exceed 
15% of total liabilities of 12 major US financial 
firms stood at $110 billion in March 2008 and 
had a projected upper bound of $250 billion in 
July 2008. 
 
 
• Systemic risk 
• Integrated micro-macro 
model 
• Dynamic linkages 
• Major US banks and 
macro-financial 
conditions 
• Theoretical insurance 
premium 
• Mitigation 
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Karras 2009 Journal 
article 
Op Behaviour Risk Credit derivatives: Banks' behaviour, financial 
stability and banking regulation 
In studying the behavioural effects of credit 
derivatives on banks, this theoretical analysis 
models how banks can achieve optimal capital 
reserves with credit derivatives, in the context of 
a capital inventory management framework. It 
is shown that credit derivatives can have the 
negative behavioural effect of encouraging 
banks to reduce their capital buffer stocks, if 
they are unregulated. 
• Credit derivatives 
• Behavioural effects 
• Banking regulation 
• Capital buffer stock 
reduction 
• Framework 
• Behaviour of banks 
Magnan 2009 Journal 
article 
Op Behaviour Economics Fair value accounting and the financial crisis: 
Messenger or contributor? 
An explanation is proposed for how fair value 
accounting (FVA) affects the nature of 
financial reporting, and the impacts it had on 
financial institutions during the 2007-9 
financial crisis. Evidence presented suggests 
that FVA applied by banks and their regulators 
may have severely undermined the financial 
condition of some institutions. In particular, this 
effect is shown to be amplified for institutions 
holding assets in markets that saw their liquidity 
dry up during the crisis. It is argued that, in such 
circumstances, the use of FVA in financial 
reporting may accelerate a firm’s disconnection 
from its business reality. 
• Fair value accounting 
• Financial reporting 
• Financial institutions 
• 2007-9 financial crisis 
• Disconnection from a 
firm's business reality 
McKibbin 
and 
Stoeckel 
2009 Journal 
article 
Op Behaviour Economics Modelling the global financial crisis 
The global financial crisis is represented by a 
combination of shocks to global housing 
markets, and sharp increases in the risk 
premia of firms, households, and international 
investors, in an intertemporal (dynamic 
• Global financial crisis 
• Shocks to global 
housing markets 
• Intertemporal global 
model 
• 'switching' of 
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stochastic general equilibrium or DSGE) global 
model. This shows that a 'switching' of 
expectations about risk premia in financial 
markets can easily generate a severe 
economic contraction in global trade and 
production, as is currently being experienced in 
2009. Results suggest that the future direction of 
the global economy depends critically on 
whether the effects of recent shocks are 
expected to be permanent or temporary. 
expectations about risk 
premia 
• Severe economic 
contraction in global 
trade 
• Permanent or temporary 
Petersen et 
al 
2009 Journal 
article 
Op Behaviour Economics Did bank capital regulation exacerbate the 
subprime mortgage crisis? 
A model is presented for the dependence of 
bank credit and capital on the level of 
macroeconomic activity under Basel I and 
Basel II (regulation), and their connection with 
banking behavior for the period before and 
during the subprime mortgage crisis (SMC). 
• Model 
• Bank capital regulation 
• Macro-economic activity 
• Banking behavior 
• Subprime mortgage 
crisis 
Rochet 2009 Journal 
article 
Systemic Risk Risk Regulating Systemic Institutions 
Considers loopholes revealed in the 
supervisory/regulatory framework for banks, 
particularly regarding the ‘too big to fail’ 
problem. Then a solution is proposed based on 
an industrial organization approach. As an 
alternative to simply downsizing large financial 
institutions, or imposing stricter regulations 
based on newly developed measures of 
systemic risk exposures, in-depth reform is 
proposed for the organization (structure) of 
interbank and money markets. 
• Systemic institutions 
• Supervisory/ regulatory 
framework for banks 
• Too big to fail 
• Industrial organization 
approach 
• Measures of systemic 
risk exposures 
• Structural reform of 
interbank and money 
markets 
Sy 2009 Journal 
article 
Systemic Risk Risk The Systemic Regulation of Credit Rating 
Agencies and Rated Markets 
A model is proposed for illustrating how 
• Systemic regulation 
• Credit rating agencies 
• Financial markets 
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financial markets have relied too heavily on 
ratings. It shows how downgrades have led to 
systemic market losses and deteriorating 
liquidity. The paper suggests the use of 
'ratings maps' and stress-tests to assess the 
systemic risk of ratings, and increased capital 
or liquidity buffers to manage such risk 
(mitigation). 
• Ratings downgrades 
• Systemic market losses 
• Deteriorating liquidity  
• 'Ratings maps' and 
Stress-tests 
• Systemic risk of ratings 
• Mitigation 
Yang, Mu 
and Yao 
2009 Proceedin
gs 
Systemic Risk Complex Sys Analysis of Financial Crisis: A Perspective 
Based on Catastrophe Theory  
Argues that an outbreak of brittleness is the 
root cause of financial crises. Results are 
presented from a study of the brittleness critical 
points that are conjectured to have triggered 
catastrophic instability of the financial 
system. A cusp catastrophe model is applied 
to analyze a sub-loan crisis, using the 
catastrophe progression method to evaluate 
brittleness of the financial system. 
• Financial crisis 
• Brittleness 
• Root cause of financial 
crises 
• Critical points 
• Catastrophe 
• Cusp model 
• Catastrophe progression 
method 
• Financial system 
Bexley et al 2010 Journal 
article 
Op Behaviour Risk The financial crisis and its issues 
Discusses the timeline, causes and severe 
impact on the U. S. economy of the recent 
financial crisis, when 305 of its banks failed in 
2009, compared to 1,600 banks that failed 
during the entire period spanning the 1980s and 
early 1990s. Government intervention is 
claimed to have helped mitigate the crisis by 
providing funds to a number of financial 
institutions in difficulties, after repeal of the 
Glass-Steagall Act from the US legal 
framework allowed them to develop risky 
financial products that generated extreme 
financial instability. Toxic assets, mortgages, 
• U. S. economy 
• Financial crisis 
• Banking industry 
• Government intervention 
• Mitigation 
• Glass-Steagall Act 
• Legal framework 
• Risky financial products 
• Toxic assets, mortgages, 
and subprime lending  
• Credit crunch 
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and subprime lending are argued to have been 
the main drivers of this financial crisis, 
compounded by the subsequent limited 
availability of credit  referred to as the credit 
crunch. 
Duffie 2010 Journal 
article 
Op Behaviour Risk The Failure Mechanics of Dealer Banks 
Describes how, during the recent financial 
crisis, major dealer banks (banks that 
intermediate in markets for securities and 
derivatives) suffered from new forms of bank 
runs. The failure mechanics of these banks 
are illustrated by the 2008 failures of Bear 
Stearns and Lehman Brothers, who were 
previously considered by regulatory authorities 
as "too big to fail." The mechanics by which 
dealer banks can fail, and the policies available 
to treat the systemic risk resulting from their 
failures, are shown to differ markedly from those 
of conventional commercial bank runs.  
• Financial crisis 
• Major dealer banks 
• Securities and 
derivatives 
• New forms of bank runs 
• Failure mechanics 
• Too big to fail 
• Policies 
• Systemic risk 
• Commercial bank runs 
Freedman et 
al 
2010 Journal 
article 
Op Behaviour Risk Policies to rebalance the global economy after 
the financial crisis  
Considers some of the main risks and 
opportunities currently facing the global 
economy, and discusses a number of potential 
policy mistakes that could lead to even worse 
outcomes than currently envisaged. Then the 
trade-offs between short-run and long term 
economic effects are examined. This is 
illustrated by a case study of the United States, 
that provides estimates of the long-term 
damage from protracted excessive fiscal 
deficits, and of the benefits from significant 
fiscal consolidation. 
• Main risks 
• Global economy 
• Policy mistakes 
• Worse outcomes than 
currently envisaged 
• trade-offs between short-
run effects and long-run 
crowding-out effect 
• Fiscal deficits and 
consolidation 
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Kane 2010 Journal 
article 
Systemic Risk Risk Redefining and containing systemic risk 
After redefining systemic risk, the need to 
manage it better is addressed by re-examining 
misaligned incentives in government and 
financial sectors of the economy. Then reforms 
are suggested for restoring faith in the diligence, 
competence, and integrity of officials who 
manage the financial system’s safety net. The 
incentives of private risk managers, 
accountants, credit-rating firms, and 
government supervisors are aligned with the 
interests of ordinary taxpayers, by a proposed 
new method for measuring regulatory 
performance in terms of its effect on safety-net 
risk exposures, and for estimating the explicit 
and implicit safety-net benefits individual 
institutions receive, so that performance awards 
can be attributed to appropriate officials. 
• Systemic risk definition 
• Mitigation (containment) 
• Misaligned incentives 
• Risk managers 
• Accountants 
• Credit-rating firms  
• Government supervisors  
• Measuring regulatory 
performance 
• Estimating the explicit 
and implicit safety-net 
benefits 
Martinez-
Jaramillo et 
al 
2010 Journal 
article 
Op Behaviour Risk Systemic risk, financial contagion and financial 
fragility 
Suggests systemic risk is generally 
acknowledged to be the risk of the occurrence of 
an event that threatens the well functioning of 
the system of interest (financial, payments, 
banking, etc.), sometimes to the point of making 
its operation impossible. It is modelled with 
two main components: a random shock that 
weakens one or more financial institutions, and 
a mechanism which transmits (propagates) and 
possibly exacerbates such negative effects to 
the rest of the system. This model shows how 
it is possible to estimate the distribution of 
losses for the banking system, and derive 
• Systemic risk definition 
• System of interest 
• Making its operation 
impossible 
• Random shock 
• Propagation of negative 
effects to the rest of the 
system 
• Estimate the distribution 
of losses for the banking 
system 
• Standard risk measures 
for the entire system 
• Prediction of contagious 
difficulties during a 
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standard risk measures for that entire 
system. From which the systemic and 
contagious elements can be separated to predict 
if the system is more likely to experience 
contagious difficulties during a certain 
period of time. 
certain period of time 
McGavin 2010 Journal 
article 
Op Behaviour Risk Short Selling in a Financial Crisis: The 
Regulation of Short Sales in the United Kingdom 
and the United States 
Discusses how market regulators in 2008, 
including the US Securities and Exchange 
Commission ("SEC") and the UK Financial 
Services Authority ("FSA"), attempted to restore 
investor confidence in public capital markets to 
protect financial institutions from rapid 
devaluation of their stock by temporarily 
banning short positions in certain securities. 
As an alternative to that approach, it is argued 
that in a well-regulated market with minimal risk 
of abuse, the liquidity and information efficiency 
benefits of short selling far outweigh its potential 
harm. Short sellers have exploited lax regulation 
and inattentive enforcement of anti-abuse rules 
to manipulate stock prices and earn substantial 
fees. However, these are shown to be rare 
episodes, suggesting that the world's major 
capital markets need better enforcement of 
existing rules and not new rules. 
• In 2008 
• Market regulators 
• Confidence in markets 
and financial institutions 
• Temporarily banning 
short positions in certain 
securities  
• Minimal risk of abuse 
• World's major capital 
markets need better 
enforcement of existing 
rules and not new rules 
Miller and 
Rosenfield 
2010 Journal 
article 
Systemic Risk Risk Intellectual Hazard: how Conceptual Biases in 
Complex Organizations Contributed to the Crisis 
of 2008 
Discusses intellectual hazard as an 
unrecognized systemic risk in financial 
• Intellectual hazard 
• Systemic risk 
• Financial markets 
• Crisis in 2008 
• Impairs the acquisition, 
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markets, and how it contributed to the crisis in 
2008. Then observations are offered for how 
intellectual hazard impairs the acquisition, 
analysis and communication of information 
between a complex organization and its 
external parties, creating a tendency to 
conceptual bias that interferes with accurate 
thought and analysis within such organizations. 
From which general recommendations are 
derived for organizational reforms that might 
help address intellectual hazard. 
analysis and 
communicat-ion of 
information 
• Complex organizations 
• Tendency to conceptual 
bias 
• Organizational reforms 
 
Minford 2010 Journal 
article 
Op Behaviour Risk The banking crisis as dynamic stochastic 
general equilibrium 
Argues that crises are triggered by the inherent 
uncertainty of the capitalist system. This 
uncertainty is represented in an open economy 
real business cycle model of the UK by 
including non-stationary productivity shocks. 
In this model a random sequence of good or bad 
economic shocks accumulate, producing 
euphorias and crises. Banking crises are 
then superimposed in this model, when banks 
get sucked in by the euphoria. From this new 
explanation of how crisis shocks originate, 
existing macro models can describe how the 
macro effects of a banking crisis develop, to 
calibrate the necessary policy responses. An 
Illustration of this is provided by DSGE models 
of the EU and the US. 
• Open economy real 
business cycle model 
• Non-stationary 
productivity shocks 
• Euphorias and crises 
• Banking crises 
• Macro models 
• Macro effects 
• Policy responses 
Panageas 2010 Journal 
article 
Op Behaviour Risk Bailouts, the incentive to manage risk, and 
financial crises 
Derives risk management rules about 
bancruptcy cost incentives for the outside 
• Bailouts 
• Risk management 
• Bancruptcy cost 
incentives 
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stakeholders or debtholders of a firm to bail it 
out as bankruptcy looms, optimized against 
incentives for that firm's shareholders to 
deliberately increase volatility in order to exploit 
the implicit protection of a bailout. Then a 
model is introduced based on these rules, which 
shows how acceptable risk limits (of potential 
bankruptcy) tighten abruptly when the firm's net 
worth declines below an endogenously 
determined threshold, which can account for 
phenomena such as ‘flight to quality.’ 
• Exploiting implicit 
protection 
• Endogenously 
determined threshold of 
risk limits 
• Model of risk phenomena 
such as ‘flight to quality’ 
Rotheli 2010 Journal 
article 
Op Behaviour Risk Causes of the financial crisis: Risk 
misperception, policy mistakes, and banks' 
bounded rationality  
Describes important determinants of the 
current financial crisis, and argues that the 
bounded rationality of banks  contributes to 
credit cycles. After discussing the shortcomings 
of monetary policy, risk management, rating 
agencies, and banking regulations, measures 
are proposed for strengthening their stabilizing 
effects.  
• Determinants of the 
current financial crisis 
• Bounded rationality of 
banks 
• Credit cycles 
• Monetary policy, risk 
management, rating 
agencies and banking 
regulations 
Schich 2010 Journal 
article 
Op Behaviour Risk Insurance Companies and the Financial Crisis 
Describes how for many insurers, direct 
exposure to the US mortgage market epicentre 
of the current crisis, and to related securities, 
appears to have been limited. Where it did 
occur, the insurance purposes for using 
financial instrument types at the core of 
difficulties is cited as the reason why some 
institutions from that sector were affected. 
• Insurers 
• Epicentre of financial 
crisis 
• Mortgage related 
securities 
• Insurance purposes of 
financial instrument 
types 
Uhlig 2010 Journal 
article 
Systemic Risk Economics A model of a systemic bank run 
Presents a model explaining the 2008 financial 
• Model 
• Systemic bank run 
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crisis as being reminiscent of a bank run. This 
suggests a prudent response would be the 
outright purchase of troubled assets by 
governments (mitigation), at prices above 
current market prices, that may both alleviate 
the financial crisis as well as provide tax payers 
with returns above those for safe securities 
• 2008 financial crisis 
• Outright purchase of 
troubled assets 
• Mitigation by 
governments 
Wagner 2010 Journal 
article 
Op Behaviour Economics Diversification at financial institutions and 
systemic crises 
Shows that diversification of financial 
institutions may be beneficial, but it also entails 
a cost. Even though diversification reduces each 
institution's individual probability of failure, it is 
observed to  make systemic crises more 
likely. Then, when systemic crises induce 
additional individual costs (over and above 
individual failures), full diversification 
becomes no longer desirable. As a result, it is 
argued that the optimal degree of diversification 
may be arbitrarily low. A similar rationale is also 
suggested as applicable beyond diversification, 
regarding the benefits of interbank insurance 
and financial integration. 
• Diversification of 
financial institutions 
• Makes systemic crises 
more likely 
• Full diversification 
becomes no longer 
desirable 
• Interbank insurance and 
financial integration 
Zeidan and 
Richardson 
2010 Journal 
article 
Systems Complex Sys Complexity Theory and the Financial Crisis: a 
Critical Review 
Reviews the financial crisis through the lens of 
complexity theory. Two prominent general 
approaches to complexity are identified for 
economics and finance: econophysics and 
econobiology. Both are bottom-up, 
population-based approaches, but are said to 
differ sharply in their methods of dealing with 
complexity. Regarding the former approach, it is 
• Financial crisis 
• Complexity theory 
• Econophysics 
• Econobiology 
• Bottom-up, population-
based approaches 
• ‘no single econophysics 
model of the banking 
system’ 
• Network topology 
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argued there is ‘no single econophysics 
model of the banking syste’, citing network 
topology as one of many ways to analyze 
financial markets, representing a particular type 
of model in that literature. However, the 
disadvantages of models from this literature are 
given as: ‘narrow explanations, and theoretically 
empty.’ The three main types of econobiology 
models of the banking system discussed are: 
neural networks, support vector machines 
and genetic algorithms. The disadvantages of 
models from this literature are given as: ‘lack of 
predictions, and hard to model.’ However, it is 
observed that ‘A specific line of research could 
concentrate on developing an encompassing 
theory to tie all the different approaches 
together to arrive, at some point, at a 
complexity-based standard model of finance.’ 
• Neural networks 
• Support vector machines 
• Genetic algorithms 
• Need for developing an 
encompassing theory 
Brunetti, Di 
Filippo and 
Harris 
2011 Journal 
article 
Op Behaviour Risk Effects of central bank intervention on the 
interbank market during the subprime crisis  
Explores whether central bank intervention 
improved liquidity in the inter-bank market 
during the current subprime crisis. Results 
suggest that the central bank should release 
stress tests for individual banks, issue 
interbank loan guarantees, or engage in direct 
asset purchases, rather than simply providing 
more capital when counterparty risk poses 
systemic risk to the interbank market during the 
current subprime crisis.  
• Central bank intervention 
• Inter-bank market 
• Subprime crisis 
• Release stress tests 
• Inter-bank loan 
guarantees 
• Direct asset purchases 
• Counterparty risk 
• Systemic risk 
Fisk 2011 Journal 
article 
Systems Complex Sys The 2008 financial collapse: Lessons for 
engineering failure 
Argues that the problems for systemic risk 
• Systemic risk 
• Regulation 
• Financial systems 
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regulation in financial systems are very similar 
to real world engineering. First, the evolution of 
the crisis is described, drawing on published 
contributions. Then parallels at each stage of the 
crisis to engineering systems failures are 
identified. The conclusion reached is that the 
real failure was not caused by incompetent 
regulators, but inadequacy of their oversight 
system - the meta-regulation framework.  
• Evolution of the crisis 
• Engineering systems 
failures 
• Oversight system 
• Meta-regulation 
framework 
Govtvan 
and 
Mansurov 
2011 Journal 
article 
Systemic Risk Risk Systemic risk in the financial sphere: Theoretical 
study and approaches to its estimation 
Discusses how the international financial crisis 
stimulated research interest in the problem of 
financial risks. Systemic and systematic risks 
are described as the ‘most complicated and 
poorly studied macrolevel risk effects.’ 
Approaches to their regulation and estimation 
are reviewed, and special attention is paid to 
methods for qualitative analysis of the potential 
accumulation mechanism of crisis 
development. Then definitions for systemic 
risk and its mitigation (or neutralization) are 
discussed, covering the use of market 
instruments, diagnosis of crisis potential by 
means of market tone analysis, and analysis of 
systemic risk spreading (propagation) 
conditions (in terms of the interbank credit 
market). 
• Systemic and systematic 
risk definitions 
• ‘Most complicated and 
poorly studied 
macrolevel risk effects’ 
• Regulation and 
estimation of systemic 
risks 
• Potential accumulation 
mechanism  
• Use of market 
instruments 
• Market tone analysis 
• Propagation conditions 
Gramlich 
and Oet 
2011 Journal 
article 
Systemic Risk Risk The structural fragility of financial systems 
Argues that lessons from the most recent 
financial crisis show specific vulnerabilities of 
financial markets due to weaknesses in the 
structure of the financial system (structural 
• Recent financial crisis 
• Vulnerabilities 
• Structural fragility 
• Impact of systemic risk 
• Concentration (‘too big 
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fragility). As the literature points out, the impact 
of systemic risk can be closely related to 
issues of concentration (‘too big to fail’) and 
dependency (‘too connected to fail’). 
Elements of structural fragility and their 
modelling requirements are explored in the light 
of current transformations in financial markets. 
Then an extended approach for conceptualizing 
structural fragility is suggested, that can be used 
to evaluate proposals for quantifying structural 
issues in early warning systems (EWSs) for 
systemic crises, which introduces the 
theoretical groundwork for further empirical 
studies. 
to fail’) 
• Dependency (‘too 
connected to fail’) 
• Early warning systems 
• Theoretical groundwork 
Jorda, 
Schularick 
and Taylor 
2011 Working 
Paper 
Systemic Risk Economics Financial crises, credit booms, and external 
imbalances: 140 years of lessons 
Studies the experience of 14 developed 
countries over 140 years (1870-2008), and 
applies new statistical tools to describe the 
temporal and spatial patterns of crises in five 
episodes of global financial instability over 
that time period. From the macroeconomic 
dynamics before crises, credit growth is shown 
to have a tendency to be elevated, and short-
term interest rates are depressed. Furthermore, 
recessions associated with financial crises lead 
to deeper slumps and stronger turnarounds in 
external imbalances than during normal 
recessions. This leads to asking to what extent 
external imbalances help predict financial crises. 
The overall finding is that credit growth 
emerges as the single best predictor of 
financial instability. External imbalances have 
played an additional role, but more so in the pre-
• Financial crises 
• Credit booms 
• External imbalances 
• Temporal and spatial 
patterns of crises 
• Five episodes of global 
financial instability in the 
past 140 years 
• Recessions, slumps and 
turnarounds 
• Credit growth emerges 
as the single best 
predictor of financial 
instability 
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WWII era of low financialization than today. 
              
Grand 
Total (62 
contributi
ons)             
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Appendix E.  THEORY BUILDING METHODOLOGY 
E.1 Process 
A 16-step process for implementing the four projects/phases of this methodology 
(see Figure 4) is described in the following sub-sections. The actions involved in 
each step are given, along with inputs, outputs and the implementation 
project/phase. 
E.1.1 Step 1: Review the Scoped Literature 
E.1.1.1 Inputs 
i. Business issue.  
ii. Sample evidence base of relevant multi-disciplinary literature. 
iii. Complete evidence base of relevant multi-disciplinary literature. 
E.1.1.2 Actions 
Conduct an exploratory review of the sample literature to identify gaps in 
knowledge regarding the business issue, and follow up with a formal systematic 
review of literature. 
E.1.1.3 Outputs 
i. Critical review of the literature. 
ii. Protocol for a systematic review of literature. 
iii. Evidence base of core selected literature. 
iv. Detailed thematic analysis. 
E.1.1.4 Implementation 
Project/phase 1. 
E.1.2 Step 2: Synthesize Theoretical Conjectures 
E.1.2.1 Inputs 
i. Outputs from step 1.  
E.1.2.2 Actions 
Conduct a thematic synthesis of theoretical conjectures about the gap in theory 
identified in the literature, according to the systematic review protocol. 
PhD - Cranfield University, January 2014. T.ILIN 
 
468 
E.1.2.3 Outputs 
i. Summary thematic analysis of an identified gap in theory. 
ii. Theoretical conjectures. 
E.1.2.4 Implementation 
Project/phase 1. 
E.1.3 Step 3: Determine a research problem 
E.1.3.1 Inputs 
i. Output from step 1.  
ii. Theoretical conjectures from step 2. 
E.1.3.2 Actions 
Review theoretical conjectures about the identified gap in theory, and scope out a 
research problem from that gap.. 
E.1.3.3 Outputs 
i. Scoped research problem statement (as a research question). 
E.1.3.4 Implementation 
Project/phase 1. 
E.1.4 Step 4: Assess Research Focus and Revise Conjectures 
E.1.4.1 Inputs 
i. Output from step 3. 
E.1.4.2 Actions 
Consider the focus of research to be attempted, and translate the research question 
into a tightly worded goal assertion in line with the purpose selected for theory 
development. Then revise conjectures accordingly. 
E.1.4.3 Outputs 
i. Goal assertion. 
ii. Revised conjectures. 
E.1.4.4 Implementation 
Project/phase 2. 
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E.1.5 Step 5: Search Alternative Literature for Insights 
E.1.5.1 Inputs 
i. Output from step 4.. 
E.1.5.2 Actions 
Extract keywords from the goal assertion and revised conjectures, and use them in 
search strings applied in an exploratory search of literature from alternative 
academic disciplines. 
E.1.5.3 Outputs 
i. Insights from alternative literature. 
E.1.5.4 Implementation 
Project/phase 2. 
E.1.6 Step 6: Propose Theoretical Model and Outline of Theory 
E.1.6.1 Inputs 
i. Insights from step 5. 
ii. Revised conjectures from step 4. 
E1.6.2 Actions 
Use insights and revised conjectures to deveop a theoretical model and inform the 
development of initial propositions and hypotheses that present an outline of new 
theory for further research. 
E.1.6.3 Outputs 
i. Theoretical model. 
ii. Propositions and hypotheses of an outline of theory. 
E.1.6.4 Implementation 
Project/phase 2. 
E.1.7 Step 7: Collect Empirical Data for Analysis 
E.1.7.1 Inputs 
i. Output from step 6.  
ii. Source of empirical data about real world cases for theory validation. 
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E.1.7.2 Actions 
Collect empirical data relevant to the propositions and hypotheses for financial 
analysis and theory validation. Then do financial analysis of phenomena of 
interest. 
E.1.7.3 Outputs 
i. Collected empirical data. 
ii. Financial analysis. 
E.1.7.4 Implementation 
Project/phase 3. 
E.1.8 Step 8: Specify Conceptual Model and Experiments 
E.1.8.1 Inputs 
i. Output from step 6. 
ii. Output from step 7. 
E.1.8.2 Actions 
Develop and specify a conceptual model and experimentation suitable for testing 
and validating the outline of theory using empirical data collected. 
E.1.8.3 Outputs 
i. Conceptual model. 
ii. Experiment specifications. 
iii. Simulation protocol. 
E.1.8.4 Status 
Completed in project 2. 
E.1.9 Step 9: Create/ Modify Computational Representation 
E.1.9.1 Inputs 
i. Output from step 8. 
E.1.9.2 Actions 
Create or modify a computational representation from the conceptual model that 
fits the objectives of the experiment specifications. This step may be iterated 
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multiple times due to change requirements arising from the verification and 
validation steps. 
E.1.9.3 Outputs 
i. Computational representation. 
E.1.9.4 Implementation 
Project/phase 3. 
E.1.10 Step 10: Verify Computational Representation 
E.1.10.1 Inputs 
i. Computational representation from step 9. 
E.1.10.2 Actions 
Confirm the internal validity of the computational representation for enacting 
specified theoretical logic, and check for its robustness by analysing its sensitivity 
to variations in design choices. 
E.1.10.3 Outputs 
i. Verification results. 
E.1.10.4 Implementation 
Project/phase 3. 
E.1.11 Step 11: Simulate for Calibration and Experimentation 
E.1.11.1 Inputs 
i. Output from step 9. 
E.1.11.2 Actions 
Design and run a preliminary series of simulation experiments to understand how 
phenomena related to the theoretical propositions arise. Make adjustments to the 
computational specifications, update the simulation design and re-verify as 
necessary for eliminating error effects. Then design and run the main series of 
simulation experiments, to evaluate potential changes to assumptions or logic, and 
to test theoretical propositions and hypotheses.  
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E.1.11.3 Outputs 
i. Calibration results. 
ii. Final computational representation. 
E.1.11.4 Implementation 
Project/phase 3. 
E.1.12 Step 12: Validate with Empirical Data 
E.1.12.1 Inputs 
i. Financial analysis and data from step 7. 
ii. Output from step 11. 
E.1.12.2 Actions 
Use financial analysis to compare the simulation results using the same collected 
data, for testing validating the propositions and hypotheses, to enable empirical 
confirmation of the external validity of the simulation. If confirmed, this 
strengthens the argument for the validity of the new theory. 
E.1.12.3 Outputs 
i. Quantitative analysis of simulation results validation. 
ii. Qualitative analysis of simulation results validation. 
E.1.12.4 Implementation 
Project/phase 3. 
E.1.13 Step 13: Corroborate Final Results by Theoretical Triangulation 
E.1.13.1 Inputs 
i. Output from step 11. 
ii. Propositions and hypotheses from step 6. 
E.1.13.2 Actions 
Review phenomena visible in the computational representation interface to 
confirm the null-hypothesis as an outcome of the final experiment. 
E.1.13.3 Outputs 
i. Observed phenomena. 
ii. Confirmation or refutation of the null-hypothesis. 
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E.1.13.4 Implementation 
Project/phase 3. 
E.1.14 Step 14: Summarize findings 
E.1.14.1 Inputs 
i. All outputs from all steps. 
E.1.14.2 Actions 
Gather all research findings together regarding the final version of the simulation, 
review them against the research goal assertion, and present them in an overall 
findings discussion. 
E.1.14.3 Outputs 
i. Overall research findings discussion. 
E.1.14.4 Implementation 
Project/phase 4. 
E.1.15 Step 15: Refine and Complete Theory 
E.1.15.1 Inputs 
i. Observed phenomena from step 13. 
ii. Propositions and hypotheses from step 6. 
E.1.15.2 Actions 
Return to the outline of theory and update it to reflect the refinements suggested 
by experimentation. Then examine the theory implications and its potential for 
informing regulatory practice regarding risk mitigation.  
E.1.15.3 Outputs 
i. Revised/new propositions. 
ii. Revised/new conjectures. 
iii. Discussion of theory and implications. 
iv. Contribution to practice of systemic risk mitigation policy/technique. 
E.1.15.4 Implementation 
Project/phase 4. 
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E.1.16 Step 16: Discuss Implications and Reach Conclusions 
E.1.16.1 Inputs 
i. Output from step 15. 
E.1.16.2 Actions 
Consider the implications of the theory for the programme research problem, and 
present them in an overall conclusions discussion. 
E.1.16.3 Outputs 
i. Overall research conclusions discussion, with implications. 
E.1.16.4 Implementation 
Project/phase 4. 
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Appendix F.  THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS 
This section provides reference material in support of theory discussions 
throughout this thesis. In particular, it identifies the domain and premises on 
which the proposed theory is founded that are important for its understanding 
(Pawar, 2009; Dubin, 1978), but not directly relevant to its explanation. This is 
intended to ensure that a logical progression of reasoning is maintained by 
separating foundational matters from discussions regarding new theory proposals, 
to improve clarity in the latter. 
F.3 Domain 
F.3.1 Nature of contributions 
A general theory of systemic risk is outlined for the global financial system, with 
practical implications for systemic risk mitigation, based on evolutionary 
economics viewed from an operational behaviour perspective. It introduces a 
unifying thesis in the literature, to expose fundamental principles about diverse 
crisis phenomena, by modelling the way the global financial system operates as a 
system of supply and demand in SIFS. The final model is comprised of 9 
conjectures and a theoretical topology in the form of a cusp catastrophe-type 
model for a dynamical complex system. Then 13 theoretical propositions use the 
concept of systemic failure from that model to offer new insights about the nature 
of systemic risk for recognizing, avoiding and responding to the potential of such 
failures wherever they may emerge in the future. Out of which five hypotheses are 
derived, and used for validating the final theory by computational 
experimentation. 
F.3.2 Boundaries 
The scope of this theory is limited to SIP interactions directly related to the supply 
and demand of SIFS, and only includes those types of interaction that materially 
affect the systemic risk impact of SIFS among SIPs.  
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F.3.3 Unit of theory 
An execution-level activity-type is the fundamental unit of theory, describing the 
lowest granularity of participation between SIPs over SIFS. 
F.4 Premises 
F.4.1 Accepted principles 
The following key principles established elsewhere in the literature, and supported 
in current debates by credible academic opinion, are accepted in this thesis. 
i. It is accepted as evident that macroeconomic crises in the global 
financial system’s external environment exhibit common patterns that 
interact with the internal operations of that system, and their effects can 
be represented by a two-dimension cusp catastrophe-type topology 
(Thom 1975; Zeeman 1977) for explaining its systemic risk of failure.  
ii. Then, from the properties of complex systems (Rosser Jr, 2007; Helbing, 
2012), the emergent behaviour of that system arising as complexity at 
systemic level out of changes in execution-level activity can be taken as 
reflecting those patterns of interaction in some deterministic way. 
iii. Agent-based model simulation provides a credible alternative to 
nonlinear mathematical analysis, as a method of interpreting the 
qualitative nature of that emergent behaviour for systematic analysis 
(Davis, Eisenhardt and Bingham, 2007; Helbing, 2012). 
iv. The evolutionary paradigm of economics offers the most appropriate 
basis for exploring emergent phenomena in a theory using a multi-agent 
computational model to explain how those phenomena emerge (Helbing, 
2012; Safarzynska and van den Bergh, 2010a). 
v. Insights from behavioural economics can be applied to the notion of 
changes in the state of a system from complex systems theory, to explain 
operational behaviour of the global financial system (Shiller, 2003; 
Helbing, Yu and Rauhut, 2011). 
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F.4.2 Constraints 
i. Consideration in this theory of both the intended and actual supply and 
demand for SIFS among SIPs is constrained by the lack of empirical 
evidence for its complete validation. Therefore, validation is limited to 
the observed phenomena of actual participation, while theoretical 
predictions are focused on an explanation for how underlying intentions 
are transformed by complex system characteristics to generate such 
phenomena. A computational model is developed for experimentally 
demonstrating how this occurs. 
ii. Limitations in the realism of the computational model used are 
necessary to achieve practical results within the time and budget 
constraints of a doctoral thesis. Therefore, an emphasis is placed on 
modelling the participations of stylized SIPs in the supply and demand 
of stylized SIFS within a stylized financial system. The insights gained 
are nonetheless shown to be realistic by observable and replicable 
phenomena. 
F.4.3 Assumptions 
i. Whatever causes or effects of distress may be argued, understanding the 
way it propagates operationally through the system is more crucially 
relevant for recognizing, avoiding and responding to potential systemic 
failures. 
ii. Erratic changes are assumed not to occur in the size and nature of the 
population of SIPs, and in the composition of a list of financial services 
considered to be SIFS.  
iii. It is assumed that the systemic importance of particular generic financial 
services is an intrinsic property, and not significantly dependent on 
circumstances in a way that that can change materially between the time 
periods under analysis.  
F.4.4 Practicalities 
The potential for practical applications of this theory depends on data becoming 
available for identifying ‘intended’ supply and demand activities in SIFS, 
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alongside existing ‘actual’ data. This is not as improbable as it may at first seem. 
Most financial services that would qualify as SIFS are already traded 
electronically, and therefore have published bid and offer activity levels and rates. 
Even over-the-counter trading is required to maintain this information for best-
execution pricing rules of MiFID regulations. Therefore, it will only be direct 
trading between counterparties that will need to comply in the future. 
 
  
PhD - Cranfield University, January 2014. T.ILIN 
 
479 
Appendix G.  COMPUTATIONAL REPRESENTATION 
G.1 Documentation 
This appendix contains supporting material for section 5.4 of the thesis. 
The artifacts found here are: 
i. The computational model interface, with a description of the main features 
of interest and basic run instructions. 
ii. An extract listing of the NetLogo 3D 5.0.4 simulation code, containing 
examples of extensive commentary including rule numbering for model 
verification with Table 8. 
iii. A subset of the data output from the final simulation experiment, providing 
the output at key datapoint ticks for reconciliation with the data analysis 
spreadsheets and charts. 
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version of the full interface used for exploratory testing over 862 simulation 
development runs. Among various features tested, those remaining are considered 
to be essential requirements for generating the financial effects of Iceland’s 
financial system collapse over the years between 2003 and the end of 2008. 
Any previously tested code behind this simulation dashboard that is not 
necessary for generating the financial effects of interest has been removed, to 
make verification easier. Therefore, only the parameter settings, initial conditions 
and initial values presented ‘out of the box’, or when the model-mode "Iceland - 
asset growth strategy" is selected, are assured to produce verified and validated 
results. 
Consequently, running the simulation is simply a matter of pressing the ‘setup’ 
button and waiting until the diagnostics message “Setup completed successfully” 
appears, Then the ‘go’, ‘step’ and ‘toggle topology’ buttons are enabled. 
When replicating the experiment, the ‘go’ button runs the entire simulation 
through all 285 ticks, whereas the ‘step’ button runs one tick at a time. The 
‘toggle topology’ button simply hides or shows the reference standard topology in 
the 3D-View. The other buttons enable a ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ perspective 
on that topology, or the current operational state can be placed in the centre by 
pressing ‘find’. Then visualizations of the financial effects are observed in the 
chart boxes for the micro, meso, macro and phenomenal levels, the ‘output’ text 
box, and the separate 3D-View. 
G.2.2 3D-View 
The other interface component is shown in Figure 26. It presents an interactive 3D 
rendering of the computational model’s three-surface topology, which provides a 
dynamic visual representation of changes in the operational state of the system in 
a catastrophe theory state-manifold. 
When experimental observations are being made, three self-explanatory 
buttons can be used to gain a better perspective:  ‘orbit’, ‘zoom’ and ‘move’. 
  
PhD - Cranfield University, January 2014. T.ILIN 
 
482 
 
  
PhD - Cranfield University, January 2014. T.ILIN 
 
483 
G.3 Code Extract 
The following code has been copied from the NetLogo simulation. It is also provided with this thesis in electronic form for replication 
purposes on a CD labelled ‘PhD Thesis – Thomas Ilin, 2013. Supplementary material” containing the original source code in NetLogo 3D 
5.0.4 readable format, along with installation files for that version of NetLogo. 
The code is pasted here for verification purposes. It enables references to rules and data fields in Table 8 to be verified by examining 
code labelled by comments (text prefixed by double semi-colons ‘;;’) containing corresponding rule-numbers. 
 
;; Project 3: Theory Testing and Validation, of a PhD thesis. Cranfield University School of Management. 
;; Titled:'An evolutionary theory of systemic risk and its mitigation for the global financial system'. 
;; Researcher: Thomas Ilin.   
;; Presenting: An Agent-Based Simulation Model. 
;; First Published: in March, 2013.  
;; Current Version: July, 2013. 
;; Version: 8.62 
 
extensions [ matrix ] 
 
;; -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Global variables 
globals [ 
   
  g-parses-per-tick                        ;; parameter - number of parses through participation rules taken each tick 
  g-write-all-transactions              ;; parameter - identifies output reporting as on/off. Off shows only summary totals per tick. On shows all participation. 
  g-sensitivity                                 ;; parameter - assumed system-wide sensitivity to losses shared by all participants 
  g-meso-analysis                          ;; parameter - values used in the meso analysis chart (TOTALS or AVERAGES) 
  g-turbulence                                ;; parameter - assumed system-wide turbulence experienced by all participants 
  g-run-ticks                                   ;; parameter - total duration of the simulation experiment in number of ticks  
  g-ticks-per-year                          ;; parameter - number of ticks representing one year in the simulation 
  g-sustained-failure-ticks           ;; parameter - number of consecutive ticks in which zero satisfaction must be maintained for systemic failure to be declared 
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>>> BEGINNING OF CODE LISTING EXTRACT 
 
 
  ;; Calculate % of SATISFACTION 
  let rank-count 0 
  let running-total 0 
  let product-list (list ) 
  let satisfaction-list (list ) 
  let overall-satisfaction 0 
  let top-product-satisfaction% 0 
  let second-product-satisfaction% 0 
  let third-product-satisfaction% 0 
  let fourth-product-satisfaction% 0 
  let fifth-product-satisfaction% 0 
  let sixth-product-satisfaction% 0 
  let non-top-satisfaction%-mean 0 
 
  if (g-overall-fully-filled != 0) 
    [  
      ;; Sort and list PRODUCTS into a descending order of their satisfaction%. 
      set product-list sort-on [ (- satisfaction%) ] market 
      foreach product-list 
        [ 
          ;; Sequentially process the SATISFACTION list in descending sequence, and allocate ranking. 
          ask ? 
            [  
              set rank-count (rank-count + 1) 
              if (rank-count = 1) [ set top-product-satisfaction% satisfaction% ] 
              if (rank-count = 2) [ set second-product-satisfaction% satisfaction% ] 
              if (rank-count = 3) [ set third-product-satisfaction% satisfaction% ] 
              if (rank-count = 4) [ set fourth-product-satisfaction% satisfaction% ] 
              if (rank-count = 5) [ set fifth-product-satisfaction% satisfaction% ] 
              if (rank-count = 6) [ set sixth-product-satisfaction% satisfaction% ] 
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              output-print (word "     product: " function " rank: " rank-count " offers-open-total: " offers-open-total " bids-open-total: " bids-open-total " fully-filled: " fully-filled " 
satisfaction% " satisfaction%) 
            ] 
        ] 
      ;; SATISFACTION is the satisfaction% NOT concentrated in the first PRODUCT. 
      set satisfaction-list (list second-product-satisfaction% third-product-satisfaction% fourth-product-satisfaction% fifth-product-satisfaction% sixth-product-satisfaction%) 
      set non-top-satisfaction%-mean round (mean satisfaction-list) 
      set overall-satisfaction (round ((non-top-satisfaction%-mean / top-product-satisfaction%) * 100)) 
    ] 
  ;; If g-overall-available-satisfied is 0 then default overall satisfaction is already 0. 
  set g-overall-available-satisfied overall-satisfaction 
 
  output-print (word "     non-top-satisfaction%-mean: " non-top-satisfaction%-mean " overall-satisfaction: " overall-satisfaction) 
  output-print (word "     activities-count: " activities-count )  
 
;; 12. Calculate/update the value effects of fills for SIPs. 
  if (g-write-all-transactions = true) 
    [ output-print "12. Calculate/update the value effects of fills for SIPs." ] 
 
  if (g-write-all-transactions = true) 
    [  
      output-print "     PERFORMANCE"  
    ] 
  let deal 0 
  let cash 0 
  let credit 0 
  let profit-running-total 0 
  let profit-change-total 0 
  let my-loans-to-SIPs 0 
  let my-liquid-assets 0 
  let my-borrowings-from-SIPs 0 
  let my-liabilities 0 
  let my-assets 0 
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  ask SIPs with [ ((SIP-type = "PARTICIPANT-REGULATED") or (SIP-type = "PARTICIPANT-UNREGULATED") or (SIP-type = "FOREIGN-PARTICIPANT") or (SIP-type = 
"CENTRAL-AUTHORITY")) and (live? = true) and (ticks > 1) ] 
    [  
      let SIP-who who 
      let SIP-activities (link-set activities with [ by-SIP = SIP-who ]) 
      let securities-proceeds 0 
      let debt-charges 0 
      let fees 0 
      let my-sentiment sentiment 
      If ((SIP-type = "PARTICIPANT-REGULATED") or (SIP-type = "PARTICIPANT-UNREGULATED")) 
        [ 
          ;; Rule R04 
          ask SIP-activities with [ (SIFS-code = "LL")] 
            [  
              set deal filled  
            ] 
          if (deal > 0) 
            [ 
              ;; Set non-SIPs participation factors by datapoint for lending 
              let LL-1-non-SIPs-factor 0 
              let LL-2-non-SIPs-factor 2.1 
              let LL-3-non-SIPs-factor 0.28 
              let LL-4-non-SIPs-factor 2.00 
              let LL-5-non-SIPs-factor 4.10 
              set loans-to-SIPs loans-to-SIPs + deal 
              ;; add % of SIPs lending as simulation of non-SIPs lending (not handled in participation rules). 
              let deal-from-non-SIPs 0 
              if (ticks > (g-ticks-per-year))  
                 [  
                   ifelse (ticks <= sentiment-change-on-tick) 
                     [  
                       ;; datapoint 2 ... 
                       set deal-from-non-SIPs (round (deal * LL-2-non-SIPs-factor))  
                     ] 
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                     [  
                       ifelse (ticks <= foreign-acquisitions-on-tick)  
                         [  
                           ;; datapoint 3 ... 
                           set deal-from-non-SIPs (round (deal * LL-3-non-SIPs-factor))  
                         ] 
                         [  
                           ifelse (ticks <= (g-foreign-acquisitions-on-tick + g-ticks-per-year)) 
                             [  
                               ;; datapoint 4 ... 
                               set deal-from-non-SIPs (round (deal * LL-4-non-SIPs-factor))  
                             ] 
                             [  
                               ;; datapoint 5 ... 
                               set deal-from-non-SIPs (round (deal * LL-5-non-SIPs-factor))  
                             ] 
                         ] 
                     ] 
                 ] 
              ifelse (liquid-assets < (deal + deal-from-non-SIPs)) 
                [ set liquid-assets 0 ] 
                [ set liquid-assets (liquid-assets - (deal + deal-from-non-SIPs)) ] 
              set deal 0 
            ] 
          ;; Rule R14 
          ask SIP-activities with [ (SIFS-code = "DT") ] 
            [  
              set deal filled 
            ]  
          if (deal > 0) 
            [ 
              ;; set non-SIPs participation factors by datapoint for deposit taking. 
              let DT-1-non-SIPs-factor 3.38 
              let DT-2-non-SIPs-factor 3.38 
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              let DT-3-non-SIPs-factor 11 
              let DT-4-non-SIPs-factor 2 
              let DT-5-non-SIPs-factor 3 
              ;; add % of SIPs deposits as simulation of non-SIPs deposits (not handled in participation rules). 
              let deal-from-non-SIPs 0 
              ifelse (ticks > (g-ticks-per-year))  
                 [  
                   ifelse (ticks <= sentiment-change-on-tick) 
                     [  
                       ;; datapoint 2 ... 
                       set deal-from-non-SIPs (round (deal * DT-2-non-SIPs-factor))  
                     ] 
                     [  
                       ifelse (ticks <= foreign-acquisitions-on-tick)  
                         [  
                           ;; datapoint 3 ... 
                           set deal-from-non-SIPs (round (deal * DT-3-non-SIPs-factor))  
                         ] 
                         [  
                           ifelse (ticks <= (g-foreign-acquisitions-on-tick + g-ticks-per-year)) 
                             [  
                               ;; datapoint 4 ... 
                               set deal-from-non-SIPs (round (deal * DT-4-non-SIPs-factor))  
                             ] 
                             [  
                               ;; datapoint 5 ... 
                               set deal-from-non-SIPs (0 - (round (deal * DT-5-non-SIPs-factor))) 
                               set deal (0 - deal)  
                             ] 
                         ] 
                     ] 
                 ] 
                 [  
                   ;; datapoint 1 ... 
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                   set deal-from-non-SIPs (round (deal * DT-1-non-SIPs-factor))  
                 ] 
              if ((liquid-assets + deal + deal-from-non-SIPs) >= 0) 
                [ 
                  set deposits-from-SIPs deposits-from-SIPs + deal 
                  set liquid-assets (liquid-assets + deal + deal-from-non-SIPs) 
                  set assets (assets + deal + deal-from-non-SIPs) 
                  set liabilities (liabilities + deal + deal-from-non-SIPs) 
                ] 
              set deal 0 
            ] 
          ;; Rule R17 
          ask SIP-activities with [ (SIFS-code = "DP") ] 
            [  
              set deal filled  
            ] 
          if (deal > 0) 
            [ 
              ;; net change to assets is zero 
              set deposits-with-SIPs deposits-with-SIPs + deal 
              set liquid-assets liquid-assets - deal 
              set deal 0 
            ] 
          ;; Rule R20 
          ask SIP-activities with [ (SIFS-code = "DI") ] 
            [  
              set cash filled  
            ]  
          if (cash > 0) 
            [ 
              ;; set liquidity, trading and charging tactics by datapoint for debt issuance. 
              let DI-1-liquidity-tactic 0.20 
              let DI-1-trading-tactic 0.80 
              let DI-1-charging-tactic 0.0333 
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              let DI-2-liquidity-tactic 0.05 
              let DI-2-trading-tactic 0.95 
              let DI-2-charging-tactic 0.017 
              ;; Debt issuance is simulated within a leveraged strategy applied to short-selling debt. 
              set deal (round (cash * (g-assumed-securities-leverage)))  
              ifelse (ticks > (g-ticks-per-year)) 
                [  
                  ;; datapoint 2 ... 
                  set liquid-assets (round (liquid-assets + (deal * DI-2-liquidity-tactic))) ;; put a portion of new liquidity into liquid assets. 
                  set trading (round (trading + (deal * DI-2-trading-tactic)))               ;; put the rest into the trading account. 
                  set debt-charges (round (debt-charges + (deal * DI-2-charging-tactic)))    ;; post the charges to profit calculations. 
                ] 
                [  
                  ;; datapoint 1 ... 
                  set liquid-assets (round (liquid-assets + (deal * DI-1-liquidity-tactic))) ;; put a portion of new liquidity into liquid assets. 
                  set trading (round (trading + (deal * DI-1-trading-tactic)))               ;; put the rest into the trading account. 
                  set debt-charges (round (debt-charges + (deal * DI-1-charging-tactic)))    ;; post the charges to profit calculations. 
                ] 
              set debt-issued (debt-issued + deal) 
              set liabilities (liabilities + (deal + cash)) 
              set assets (assets + deal) 
              set deal 0 
              set cash 0 
            ] 
          ;; Rule R21 
          ask SIP-activities with [ (SIFS-code = "DR") ] 
            [  
              set cash filled  
            ]  
          if (cash > 0) 
            [ 
              ;; set liquidity, trading and charging tactics by datapoint for debt retirement. 
              let DR-1-liquidity-tactic 0.082 
              let DR-1-trading-tactic 0.918 
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              let DR-1-charging-tactic 0.114 
              let DR-2-liquidity-tactic 0 
              let DR-2-trading-tactic 0 
              let DR-2-charging-tactic 0.114 
              let DR-3-liquidity-tactic 0.599 
              let DR-3-trading-tactic 0.401 
              let DR-3-charging-tactic 0.80 
              ;; Debt retirement is simulated within a leveraged strategy applied to short-selling debt. 
              set deal (round (cash * (g-assumed-securities-leverage)))  
              ifelse (ticks <= foreign-acquisitions-on-tick) 
                [  
                  ;; datapoint 1 ... 
                  ifelse (liquid-assets >= (deal * DR-1-liquidity-tactic)) 
                    [ 
                      set liquid-assets (round (liquid-assets - (deal * DR-1-liquidity-tactic))) 
                      set trading (round (trading - (deal * DR-1-trading-tactic))) 
                    ] 
                    [ 
                      set trading (trading - deal) 
                    ] 
                  set debt-charges (round (debt-charges + (deal * DR-1-charging-tactic)))    ;; for profit calculations. 
                ] 
                [  
                  ifelse (ticks > (g-foreign-acquisitions-on-tick + g-ticks-per-year)) 
                    [  
                      ;; datapoint 3 ... 
                      ifelse ((liquid-assets - deal) >= 0) 
                        [  
                          set liquid-assets (round (liquid-assets - (deal * DR-3-liquidity-tactic))) 
                          set trading (trading - (deal * DR-3-trading-tactic)) 
                        ] 
                        [ set trading (trading - deal) ] 
                      set debt-charges (round (debt-charges + (deal * DR-3-charging-tactic)))    ;; charges and penalties for retiring deal. 
                    ] 
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G.4 Data 
There are two types of data available from the ‘output’ text box control in the simulation dashboard. If the ‘write-all-transactions’ switch is 
on, then all participation transactions, sub-totals and tick summaries are written to that control. If the switch is off, then only tick 
summaries are written to that control. For the purpose of validating financial results produced by the simulation this switch can be left off. 
This allows tick summaries for specific tick numbers corresponding to the 6 validation datapoints* to be easily found, copied and pasted 
into a word document for analysis, or directly pasted into the ‘Financial Analysis’ spreadsheet for statistical comparison with actual 
financials already collected into that spreadsheet from the annual reports of Icelandic financial institutions provided by Bankscope. * see 
row 6 in the ‘Results Data’ tab of the ‘Financial analysis’ spreadsheet for the relationship between the 6 validation datapoints and 
simulation year-ends. 
The following sub-sections contain simulated financial results from datapoint tick summaries pasted in that way into this document, 
which were also used to paste individual simulation values into the financial analysis spreadsheet for statistical comparison. Together, they 
offer a full audit-trail of simulation data from collection point to results analysis. Further validation can be achieved by replicating the 
simulation, collecting this data again, and comparing it with the results pasted here.  
G.4.1  Datapoint 1 
SETUP in progress: Iceland - systemic failure from asset growth strategy. 
     g-total-income 0 g-total-profit-change 0 g-turbulence-losses 0 
     g-total-profits: 2288092 g-total-assets: 565463619 g-total-liabilities: 568777007 g-total-liquid-assets: 103384474 
     g-total-loans: 0 g-total-deposits: 5801338 g-total-debt: 437144393 g-total-securities: 17649488 
     g-average-profits: 104004 g-average-assets: 25702892 g-average-liabilities: 25853500 g-average-liquid-assets: 4699294 
     g-average-loans: 0 g-average-deposits: 263697 g-average-debt (issued): 19870200 g-average-securities: 802249 
     g-total-SIPs: 22 regulated-SIPs-count: 0 unregulated-SIPs-count: 22 g-overall-available-satisfied (+3): 3 standard-z: 0 
DIAGNOSTICS - Setup completed successfully. 
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G.4.2  Datapoint 2 
tick 57 -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
11. Match any open bids/offers and fills from the previous tick. 
     overall sentiment: 2 
     product: DEBT rank: 1 offers-open-total: 1286385 bids-open-total: 3868736 fully-filled: 1286385 satisfaction% 33 
     product: LOAN rank: 2 offers-open-total: 32232982 bids-open-total: 9729786 fully-filled: 9729786 satisfaction% 30 
     product: SECURITY rank: 3 offers-open-total: 7606785 bids-open-total: 1036449 fully-filled: 1036449 satisfaction% 14 
     product: DEPOSIT rank: 4 offers-open-total: 5790762 bids-open-total: 47880632 fully-filled: 5790762 satisfaction% 12 
     product: FUND rank: 5 offers-open-total: 0 bids-open-total: 0 fully-filled: 0 satisfaction% 0 
     product: SETTLEMENT rank: 6 offers-open-total: 0 bids-open-total: 0 fully-filled: 0 satisfaction% 0 
     non-top-satisfaction%-mean: 11 overall-satisfaction: 33 
     activities-count: 49 
     OVERALL-DEMAND-FOCUS: 56 OVERALL-SUPPLY-FOCUS: 39 OVERALL-SATISFACTION: 33 
     g-total-income 3277132 g-total-profit-change 1291773 g-turbulence-losses 1946470 
     g-total-profits: 6181635 g-total-assets: 3031255287 g-total-liabilities: 3088906629 g-total-liquid-assets: 690826769 
     g-total-loans: 245375324 g-total-deposits: 129829178 g-total-debt: 1958031151 g-total-securities: 423267494 
     g-average-profits: 294364 g-average-assets: 144345490 g-average-liabilities: 147090792 g-average-liquid-assets: 32896513 
     g-average-loans: 11684539 g-average-deposits: 6182342 g-average-debt (issued): 93239579 g-average-securities: 20155595 
     g-total-SIPs: 21 regulated-SIPs-count: 0 unregulated-SIPs-count: 21 g-overall-available-satisfied (+3): 36 standard-z: 28 
G.4.3  Datapoint 3 
tick 114 -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
11. Match any open bids/offers and fills from the previous tick. 
     overall sentiment: 1 
     product: DEBT rank: 1 offers-open-total: 18367624 bids-open-total: 14662404 fully-filled: 14662404 satisfaction% 80 
     product: DEPOSIT rank: 2 offers-open-total: 7397988 bids-open-total: 10778944 fully-filled: 7397988 satisfaction% 69 
     product: SECURITY rank: 3 offers-open-total: 55137778 bids-open-total: 16581777 fully-filled: 16581777 satisfaction% 30 
     product: LOAN rank: 4 offers-open-total: 1431023 bids-open-total: 9652627 fully-filled: 1431023 satisfaction% 15 
     product: FUND rank: 5 offers-open-total: 0 bids-open-total: 0 fully-filled: 0 satisfaction% 0 
     product: SETTLEMENT rank: 6 offers-open-total: 0 bids-open-total: 0 fully-filled: 0 satisfaction% 0 
     non-top-satisfaction%-mean: 23 overall-satisfaction: 29 
     activities-count: 50 
     OVERALL-DEMAND-FOCUS: 74 OVERALL-SUPPLY-FOCUS: 41 OVERALL-SATISFACTION: 29 
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     g-total-income 133065160 g-total-profit-change 129924371 g-turbulence-losses 32413466 
     g-total-profits: 3385689093 g-total-assets: 16436266933 g-total-liabilities: 16685274017 g-total-liquid-assets: 1446451674 
     g-total-loans: 359320471 g-total-deposits: 340840201 g-total-debt: 7315991927 g-total-securities: 12476793277 
     g-average-profits: 161223290 g-average-assets: 782679378 g-average-liabilities: 794536858 g-average-liquid-assets: 68878651 
     g-average-loans: 17110499 g-average-deposits: 16230486 g-average-debt (issued): 348380568 g-average-securities: 594133013 
     g-total-SIPs: 21 regulated-SIPs-count: 0 unregulated-SIPs-count: 21 g-overall-available-satisfied (+3): 32 standard-z: 39 
G.4.4  Datapoint 4 
tick 171 -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
11. Match any open bids/offers and fills from the previous tick. 
     overall sentiment: 0 
     product: LOAN rank: 1 offers-open-total: 23543524 bids-open-total: 21962275 fully-filled: 21962275 satisfaction% 93 
     product: SECURITY rank: 2 offers-open-total: 1835796 bids-open-total: 4286857 fully-filled: 1835796 satisfaction% 43 
     product: DEPOSIT rank: 3 offers-open-total: 3137641 bids-open-total: 11743062 fully-filled: 3137641 satisfaction% 27 
     product: SETTLEMENT rank: 4 offers-open-total: 1914479 bids-open-total: 10855255 fully-filled: 1914479 satisfaction% 18 
     product: DEBT rank: 5 offers-open-total: 0 bids-open-total: 0 fully-filled: 0 satisfaction% 0 
     product: FUND rank: 6 offers-open-total: 0 bids-open-total: 0 fully-filled: 0 satisfaction% 0 
     non-top-satisfaction%-mean: 18 overall-satisfaction: 19 
     activities-count: 64 
     OVERALL-DEMAND-FOCUS: 30 OVERALL-SUPPLY-FOCUS: 29 OVERALL-SATISFACTION: 19 
     g-total-income 4409212 g-total-profit-change -22936609 g-turbulence-losses 4812007 
     g-total-profits: 249148320 g-total-assets: 8000871811 g-total-liabilities: 8249878895 g-total-liquid-assets: 2390728361 
     g-total-loans: 878666766 g-total-deposits: 509252986 g-total-debt: 4333688799 g-total-securities: 1707138211 
     g-average-profits: 11864206 g-average-assets: 380993896 g-average-liabilities: 392851376 g-average-liquid-assets: 113844208 
     g-average-loans: 41841275 g-average-deposits: 24250142 g-average-debt (issued): 206366133 g-average-securities: 81292296 
     g-total-SIPs: 21 regulated-SIPs-count: 0 unregulated-SIPs-count: 21 g-overall-available-satisfied (+3): 22 standard-z: 4 
G.4.5  Datapoint 5 
tick 228 -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
11. Match any open bids/offers and fills from the previous tick. 
     overall sentiment: 0 
     product: LOAN rank: 1 offers-open-total: 3092091 bids-open-total: 7254903 fully-filled: 3092091 satisfaction% 43 
     product: DEPOSIT rank: 2 offers-open-total: 10347707 bids-open-total: 209809788 fully-filled: 10347707 satisfaction% 5 
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     product: SECURITY rank: 3 offers-open-total: 91036 bids-open-total: 15781669 fully-filled: 91036 satisfaction% 1 
     product: SETTLEMENT rank: 4 offers-open-total: 371965 bids-open-total: 75440144 fully-filled: 371965 satisfaction% 0 
     product: DEBT rank: 5 offers-open-total: 0 bids-open-total: 0 fully-filled: 0 satisfaction% 0 
     product: FUND rank: 6 offers-open-total: 0 bids-open-total: 0 fully-filled: 0 satisfaction% 0 
     non-top-satisfaction%-mean: 1 overall-satisfaction: 2 
     activities-count: 85 
     OVERALL-DEMAND-FOCUS: 33 OVERALL-SUPPLY-FOCUS: 33 OVERALL-SATISFACTION: 2 
     g-total-income 5355604 g-total-profit-change 613957 g-turbulence-losses 5352309 
     g-total-profits: 197303904 g-total-assets: 10300805545 g-total-liabilities: 11420319044 g-total-liquid-assets: 4979384503 
     g-total-loans: 993576401 g-total-deposits: 1075600763 g-total-debt: 4733905672 g-total-securities: 2693061723 
     g-average-profits: 9395424 g-average-assets: 490514550 g-average-liabilities: 543824716 g-average-liquid-assets: 237113548 
     g-average-loans: 47313162 g-average-deposits: 51219084 g-average-debt (issued): 225424080 g-average-securities: 128241034 
     g-total-SIPs: 21 regulated-SIPs-count: 0 unregulated-SIPs-count: 21 g-overall-available-satisfied (+3): 5 standard-z: 8 
G.4.6  Datapoint 6 
tick 285 -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
11. Match any open bids/offers and fills from the previous tick. 
     overall sentiment: 0 
     product: DEPOSIT rank: 1 offers-open-total: 7846719 bids-open-total: 6642986 fully-filled: 6642986 satisfaction% 85 
     product: SECURITY rank: 2 offers-open-total: 511422 bids-open-total: 3580866 fully-filled: 511422 satisfaction% 14 
     product: LOAN rank: 3 offers-open-total: 328615 bids-open-total: 3359838 fully-filled: 328615 satisfaction% 10 
     product: SETTLEMENT rank: 4 offers-open-total: 502461 bids-open-total: 5602166 fully-filled: 502461 satisfaction% 9 
     product: DEBT rank: 5 offers-open-total: 0 bids-open-total: 0 fully-filled: 0 satisfaction% 0 
     product: FUND rank: 6 offers-open-total: 0 bids-open-total: 0 fully-filled: 0 satisfaction% 0 
     non-top-satisfaction%-mean: 7 overall-satisfaction: 8 
     activities-count: 61 
     OVERALL-DEMAND-FOCUS: 21 OVERALL-SUPPLY-FOCUS: 19 OVERALL-SATISFACTION: 8 
     g-total-income 3121450 g-total-profit-change -16035364 g-turbulence-losses 6473982 
     g-total-profits: -2028768085 g-total-assets: 4797072845 g-total-liabilities: 5836406227 g-total-liquid-assets: 2312876789 
     g-total-loans: 348927324 g-total-deposits: 674844171 g-total-debt: 3597576985 g-total-securities: 1075837011 
     g-average-profits: -112709338 g-average-assets: 266504047 g-average-liabilities: 324244790 g-average-liquid-assets: 128493155 
     g-average-loans: 19384851 g-average-deposits: 37491343 g-average-debt (issued): 199865388 g-average-securities: 59768723 
     g-total-SIPs: 18 regulated-SIPs-count: 0 unregulated-SIPs-count: 18 g-overall-available-satisfied (+3): 11 standard-z: 4 
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DIAGNOSTICS - Run completed successfully 
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Appendix H.  SIMULATION - PROTOCOL 
This appendix is an experimental simulation protocol for project 3. As the last 
output of step 8 in the methodology process (see Figure 4), it combines the 
simulation approach, methodology and simulation environment outputs from that 
step in a predefined written list of research specifications to be adopted, followed 
and fulfilled by that project. 
This helps to ensure successful replication of the results produced by project 3, as 
far as the stochastic nature of simulation allows, and facilitates their assessment 
through peer review. 
Based on the recommendations of Helbing (2012: page 35, 2.2). 
Table 34: Project 3 Research Protocol 
Item Description Specification/ Objectives/ Outcomes 
1 Type of research. Theory development. 
2 Research approach A systems-theoretic approach, incorporating 
a simulation-interpretivist orientation 
towards the meaning of theory and theory 
building. 
3 Goal of research To describe and explain in order to diagnose 
and understand. 
4 Simulation technique Uses (multi) agent-based computational 
economics simulation as an experimental 
technique for theory illustration and 
hypothesis testing, with empirical validation. 
5 Simulation Environment NetLogo 3D 5.0.4 (see sub-section 5.6.1 for 
architecture). 
6 Phenomena to be explained Predictions of hypotheses 1, 2 and 5 (from 
sub-section 4.11). 
7 Purpose of simulation To illustrate qualitative aspects of the 
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proposed new theory, and to generate 
quantitative data by simulation for empirical 
validation with data from a real financial 
system failure at national level, used as a 
proxy for the global financial system. 
8 Methodology Agent-based theory building (see section 
3.5.2). 
9 Experimental design Multiple calibration and verification runs, 
with one final validation run. 
10 Simulation rationale Simulate the financial system collapse of 
Iceland over the years 2003 to 2008). 
11 Model outline See sub-sections 5.3 and 5.4. 
12 World The macro-level agent-space is a manifold 
within a 3-D state-space of the type 
described by catastrophe theory (see Figure 
18). Also includes an embedded micro-level 
agent-space in the 2D plane at the base of 
the 3D state-space, and an embedded 
phenomenal-level agent-space in the 2D 
plane at the top of the 3D state-space for 
tracking the movements of the current state. 
13 Agents 1. Phenomenal-level agents representing 
the operational behaviour of the system. 
2. Macro-level agents representing 
operational states of the system.  
3. Meso-level agents 
representing participation 
summaries. 
4. Micro-level agents 
representing system 
participation. 
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14 Mechanisms 1. Collective participation behaviour. 
2. Distress propagation. 
3. Operational behaviour emergence. 
4. Systemic failure. 
15 Assumptions See sub-section 5.3.6. 
16 Verification This will be achieved by a table reconciling 
artefacts between the theoretical model, 
conceptual model, and computational 
representation.  
17 Initial conditions Will be extracted from fiancial analysis of 
the icelandic collapse, and entered into the 
simulation dashboard. 
18 Boundary conditions Uses a finite 3D world with fixed 
boundaries, over which agents are not able 
to cross.  
19 Time discretization The model uses discrete, fixed time-periods 
which will be calibrated during design and 
verification. 
20 Fluctuations treatment Noise effects and issues related to such 
concerns as quasi-random number 
generation will be considered during design 
and verification. 
21 Visualization Phenomena of interest to the theory will be 
illustrated by agent behaviour in the 3D 
View. Also, time-plots and other real-time 
analyses will be incorporated in the 
simulation interface (dashboard) design. 
22 Performance and scalability The simulation will be run on a high-spec 
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computer, and the model will be calibrated 
for different performance and scalability 
demands. 
23 Reproducibility A full functional specification of the 
simulation model and the experimentation 
design will be provided in a supplementary 
document, along with all source code and 
results. 
24 Robustness checks This will be performed in the usual manner 
by changing the values of simulation 
parameters, constants and conditions to 
confirm predictions can be manifested. 
25 Statistical ensembles Statistical analysis will be applied to the 
final simulation only, due to the ‘granular’ 
version of pragmatic validation considered. 
26 Statistical Analysis Analysis will calculate the Pearson 
correlation coefficient, and Kologorov-
Smirnov test for a time-series of datapoints. 
27 Sensitivity analysis Sensitivities of simulation results to such 
influences as micro/macro parameters, 
ergodicity, across run variability, etc., will 
be checked prior to the final run.  
28 Results validation A quantitative description of the results of 
simulations will be empirically validated 
against data and academic analyses from the 
Icelandic financial system failure, with 
further qualitative validation of visual 
phenomena generated by theoretical 
triangulation. 
29 Validation data sources The Bankscope database and a review of 
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empirical academic articles about the 
Icelandic financial system collapse, and 
government reports. 
30 Known limitations See sub-section 5.4.4. 
31 Outcome appraisal See sub-section 5.8. 
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Appendix I.  SUPPORTING EVIDENCE AND MATERIALS 
A .zip file containing materials useful for replication and other assessment 
pruposes is provided with this thesis, in a zipped directory titled: 
PhD - THOMAS ILIN Thesis and Reference Materials 
• NetLogo5.0.4Installer.exe 
• PhD - THOMAS ILIN Final 2014 (data).xlsx 
• PhD - THOMAS ILIN Final 2014 (simulation) v862.nlogo3d 
• PhD - THOMAS ILIN Final 2014 (Systematic Review of Literature) 
v38.0.nvp 
• PhD - THOMAS ILIN Final 2014 (thesis).docx 
• PhD - THOMAS ILIN Final 2014 (thesis).pdf 
 
